Multi-mission
naval aviator Herb Carmen returns safely to base with yet another interesting
report. Here ‘tis.
By Cdr. Herb Carmen
Best Defense piracy
columnist
History
shows that stopping piracy almost always requires actions ashore. In
the case of piracy near Somalia, very little has yet
been done to put pressure on the shore establishment that supports the
booming business and burgeoning industry of piracy in the region. By
steering clear of the Somali coast and focusing on sea lane protection and
escort, navies may make hijacking merchant vessels more difficult for pirates
but can only address the symptoms of piracy without
confronting the source and the motivations
behind it.
With some 2 million square miles of
ocean to patrol, it requires considerable
effort to do counter-piracy well. While escort operations have been
largely successful in recent months, the annual number of pirate attacks has
increased. The rate of pirate hijackings
actually decreased by 28% in 2009, but the
number of hijackings remains almost steady
between 2008 and 2009. What the steady number of hijackings
might suggest is that pirates have a finite
capacity ashore to berth and retain seized vessels; and, within that finite
capacity, pirates have been able to sustain a certain level of success in the
region despite the success in the sea lanes.
Even as navies make it more
difficult for pirates at sea, the problem isn't going away without addressing
piracy closer to shore and denying pirates the use of port facilities. Recent hijackings have been largely against merchant vessels that have strayed from transit
corridors and ignored best practices. The most recent example of such a hijacking is the
capture of the Saudi tanker Al Nisr Al Saudi
which was hijacked
Monday and had not registered its voyage with MSCHOA. The vessel was taken to Garacad, a well-known
pirate stronghold. Garacad isn't new to the Navy, as seen in this video.
Last week brought promising news of
a first step in denying pirates the use of ports
such as Garacad, along the middle of the Somali coastline. The
ministers of the defense of the European
Union announced
an expansion of the mission of EU's Operation Atalanta to "include control
of the Somali ports where pirates are based as well as ‘neutralizing'
mother ships that allow the pirates to operate over 1,000 kilometers from the
coast." Until now, EU NAVFOR has focused its maritime
assets on protection of vessels of
the World Food Program (WFP) delivering food
aid to displaced persons in Somalia and the protection of vulnerable vessels
sailing in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast. While they've been
largely successful
in protecting WFP aid, it appears that EU NAVFOR is expressing a
willingness and commitment to confront piracy more directly. If the EU
takes this mission on wisely and with drive and energy, it could reduce Somali
piracy significantly.
Beyond the issue of piracy, what happens to WFP aid once it is delivered to Somalia
has become the challenge ashore. The
WFP partially suspended operations in Somalia in January in the face of threats
and attacks from armed groups. In a statement Sunday, Al Shabaab "banned" WFP operations in Somalia.
Just this week,
there are reports
that WFP trucks and truck drivers have been hijacked ashore. WFP has hopes to restart work in the area in March
or April and aims to provide food assistance to 3.5
million people.
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