Walking Wounded - It isn't just the oil itself, it is the free flow of that commodity. If we had been after oil, we could have very easily seized the Kuwaiti fields during the First Gulf War.

Though we import less than 20 percent of our oil from the region, that ain't the issue. Oil is a fungible commodity. In other words: it matters not where it's produced, but how much is available on the world market at literally any given hour of the day.

Think of it like this: if even a small percent of the world’s oil flow is disrupted where are the nations who rely heavily or solely on Gulf oil going to buy it? They'll buy it from the countries that produce the other 80 percent, which in turn causes all spot prices for crude to escalate, to include the production in Canada, our number one supplier.

So, no matter what your thoughts, it was never about, nor is it now about, taking over the oil fields in Iraq.

If a national oil field set is strategic heartland to our well fueled arms, it is that of Arabia or Iran, because of their (competing) radical islamist trans-national agenda, that agenda's destabilizing regional effect, and their national oil company's primary role in funding wahabi-deobandi madrassa's and revolutionary Shiite groups like Hamas.

I meant 'oil the international commodity whom all must salute or suffer consequences', not the reserves below Basra or Kirkuk. Maintaining our twin contingencies agin Iran and for(?) Arabia was mentioned during our support for Saddam's 1980's attempt at Khomeini regime change and resulting trench-war, and again in 2003. The 30 or 40 US battallions used up in diffuse de-mining ops since Baghdad fell haven't changed that strategic picture.

The good (?) news is that the Western gulf fields have peaked, so Saudi economic tipping force as the only producer with unpumped capacity will soon end. The bad news is that any oil, post-peak, is capable of generating shortage-panic and armed competitive responses, and that Iran and Iraq may eclipse Arabia, at the rate the Arabians are pumping.

Unfortunately, it would have been just as eliptic for me to ask 'is it about the pipelines...' Accepting your caveats and contextualization, it's not silly to say we're fighting for much the same reason as the Germans drove across the steps for Baku.

Zawahiri and his bearded front man have us forked on the horns of a dilemma. If we focus on Iraq, Central Asia drifts his way. If we focus on the Central Asian gas fields, pipeline routes and nukes, Persia steals a march into Arabia, bringing another economically crippling Gulf war in oil-producing lands closer. If we try to do both, we risk losing both and our own economic independence.

An outlaw Egyptian MD who gets the corrupt Christian empire stretched out and fighting the takfiri Shiites, positioning his dark-horse faction to take Egypt and Arabia, is pretty humbling. And that's all I have to say about that.

oil and steps are bad news, like wonton violens;)

Walking Wounded - When analysts discuss whether Saudi oil has peaked and is in decline, some, though not all, are alluding to the Kingdom's light oil reserves. On my last visit, ARMACO, piloted by Chevron, were using new recovery techniques in the Wafra fields located in the Partitioned Neutral Zone. I noted this also appeared in the Wall Street Journal awhile back. Anyone trying to analyze what's actually under the sand in the "Enchanted Kingdom," though if correct, would have trouble proving their analysis.

The Saudi's are clever, they manage their resources close hold and try to ensure the world stays on fossil fuels.

Again, agreed.

With half their income coming from investment, not oil, the Saudis are wise to withhold the answer to the trillion dollar question of when they will (have?) peaked in capacity. They have peaked in production, and most of the other producers are in decline, but the recession demand drop provides enough doubt to fuel denial. However, they'll never hit the kind of 150-200% numbers that were talked about, in turn of the century economic 'planning'.

It's a safe bet there won't be enough juice for all the kids still burning charcoal at the edge of growing deserts.

Matt Simmons, a top Houston investment banker, agrees with you that the Aramco sets the gold standard for using the best (US) recovery tech, shutting off excess water cut at each 'tine' of the well, and that they continue to conceal the data that would reveal the Ghawar depletion picture. Simmons also lays out why a seamless Aramco transition from primary to secondary recovery doesn't alter the peak curve, except by a flatter top and steeper decline. Simmons opines that since the peak of Ghawar (probably the last 'king' field) marks the global peak, it is too important to let the Saudis withhold info that the other economies need to plan their post-peak survival strategy.

Saudis who bankrolled OBL and other Wahabi ambitions holding the sole excess petro production capacity and key depletion info at the foundation level of the global economic picture should worry DoD, the CIA and Congress. Unless they already have the classified dope, and their best buddies are already in good position to profit.

Here are 3 slides that should get a strategic thinker to google [Mathew Simmons, +peak oil].
And remember, sheep lie;)

http://energyassociation.blogspot.com/2010/01/matthew-simmons-latest-presentation.html

Is it possible, given the American intolerance for a war that lasts longer than a full season of American Idol, that we will leave before any real reconciliation? That there is a real civil war lurking just beneath the surface? That the Shi'a government will continue to insist on our departure so good old fashioned ethnic cleansing (or is it Sunni cleansing) can begin in earnest? Seems that we have armed a lot of Sunni warlords and the Iraqi military and created just what they need for a full-blown war that rips the country (and the neo-con dream of a pro-American democracy) to shreds. For awhile I felt that the Bush con job that got us in there in the first place was one of the worst governmental actions ever, but that there might be a chance to salvage the entire mess by leaving a somewhat stable situation behind. Now I'm not very hopeful of that.

… and we promptly returned them to the nominal custody of our local gendarme, the al-Sabah family.

If our intention had been to spread democracy, we would have insisted on holding elections. Instead we restored a hereditary monarchy.

Iran's goal in Iraq are to have a Shiite led government that is friendly to Tehran. Iraq has been the historical rival to Iran for centuries. They also want to tie the two economies together, allow the free flow of religious tourists to holy Shiite shites in Iraq, and get the U.S. out. It doesn't want an Iranian type government in Baghdad, just it's friends in power, which ironically the U.S. assisted in since it backed the Supreme Council as the main Shiite party after the invasion.

...but not strongly.

They may have intermediate goals of obtaining economic resources for the Islamic Revolution that may include having peace-able (rather than peaceful) trading partners.

They may also be of two minds, internally, about what they want to do.

But, never in history, has a religious leader ultimately not wanted to "spread the faith".

It's arguable that, soon, they hope to do so, under the perceived "protection" that a threshold nuclear umbrella provides, i.e. the inability of others to "cancel" your sovereignty.

Shi'ism, as has already been said, is revolutionary. Unfortunately for the revolutionaries that idea lives on. I've seen Shi'ism compared to Catholicism, in that there's a requirement for an intercessor; a Pope. The problem for the Iranians and for the GA's in Najaf is that Popes are not so rare in this revolution.

From the top (and I'm simplifying here) we have the Grand Ayatollahs - the "Source" - in Najaf who, for the purists, should be running the whole Shi'ite show across the world. Iran, with Khomeini-ism is a breakaway from that idea (and one to which the Supreme Council has sworn allegiance) and believes that Shia Islamic jurisprudence should differ from country to country. Then we have the Sadrist trend demanding loyalty at a much lower level - even village to village - following a local Islamic scholar. That is not to say that they're followers of Moqtada; the Fadila party are Sadrists, as are the "Soldiers of Heaven" (remember those guys who, allegedly wanted to whack the GA's) who are Mahdi'ists.

In short, the Iranians are not on a home run with Iraq - as I'm sure they're fully aware - and there are endless opportunities for the whole project to turn bad on them. And that's just among the devout Shia who may, at one and the same time, be Iraqi nationalists be opposed to Iranian influence for non-religious reasons.

But Operation Iraqi Freedom gave them a good foot in the door.

BTW; the genius' named Wurmser and Feith believed they could leverage this.

As long as their are leading Shiite clerics in Najaf, Iran will not be able to "spread the faith" as you claim. None of them subscribe to the Iranian model. Even the Supreme Council which is the party closest to Iran does not advocate clerical rule.

Sistani is very old.

The Hawza is ... a fractious bunch. In a crisis, they could be 'manipulated' to assert themselves, to pacify, in the name of fitna. (They could be mobilized, first, to oppose a new, emerging 'strongman' or a 'coup', and then end up with the reins of power they didn't want in the first place, as part of their "success" in opposing others).

Iran's own destiny is not clear. How much they can tolerate a 'rival philosophy' right next door is hard to gauge. The recent events seem to have gouged even deeper a bulwark out of the Kohmenei's theory of the jurisprudent. Some of their behavior is even paranoid, a hallmark of totalitarians, i.e. regimes who end up brittle with the imperative to merely perpetuate themselves, not much more, like, retain legitimacy by implementing changes such Rafsanjani was reportedly after, a greater power-sharing.

Iraq's religious establishment just went through a 2 year+ civil war in which millions were displaced, thousands ended up dead, foreign forces occupied the country, the government was dysfunctional, Iraq was a failed state, etc. You don't think that wasn't a big crisis already? It's hard to think of a more pressing set of circumstances in which they would somehow "assert" themselves into power if they didn't do it then.

Joel, I agree with the substance of what you say here but I think the timeline is off.

Badr - in the person of Abdul Aziz al Hakim - was wheeling and dealing with ambassador Khalilzad at the pre-war London conference in December 2002.

In April of 2003 an early takeover bid of Saddam (later Sadr) city by Badr was repulsed by the nascent JAM.

By August of 2003 Badr was carrying out assassinations of nationalist professionals and intellectuals. They were targeting Sunni and Shia alike.

In February of 2004 the integration of Badr - along with the Peshmerga - into the security forces began. This followed Paul Wolfowitz's remarks that Iraqis should be in the front line against the violent resistance to the occupation.

Yes, absolutely on the interior ministry takeover. I believe I read about a Basra assassination list in 2006 in which 3,000 "Ba'athists" were killed. Again, Sunni and Shia.

The reality is that from the outset US troops were fighting - and dying - to consolidate and secure Iranian gains in Iraq that they could only have dreamed of in the 1980's.

The "Awakening" was more about pushing back Iranian encroachment than dealing with AQI (that took only a few weeks). The question there is, who was waking up?