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Syria: Is It the Sunnis' or Shiites' Fault?
Posted By Thomas E. Ricks
Tuesday, February 23, 2010 - 11:30 AM
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This blog knows all too well that no one is right all the time, and that it is important to listen to people who know their stuff and disagree with you. So when I saw Nir Rosen, a fellow at the NYU Center on Law and Security, make some comments that sharply disagreed with my pessimistic views on Iraq, I asked him to write a guest post for Best Defense explaining his take on the situation. Nir, who has been knocking around Iraq lately, graciously did so.
Nir Rosen is a writer and Fellow at the New York University Center on Law and Security. He has spent over four years in Iraq since 2003. His first book on Iraq, In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq, was published by Simon and Schuster early in 2006. His new book on Iraq and the region will be published later this year by Nation books. His work can be found on www.nirrosen.com.By Nir Rosen
Best Defense guest Iraq political commentatorIt's been frustrating to read the latest hysteria about sectarianism returning to Iraq, the threat of a new civil war looming, or even the notion that Iraq is "unraveling." I left Iraq today after an intense mission on behalf of Refugees International. My colleague Elizabeth Campbell and I traveled comfortably and easily throughout Baghdad, Salahedin, Diyala and Babil. We were out among Iraqis until well into the night every day, often in remote villages, traveling in a normal Toyota Corolla. Our main hassle was traffic and having to go through a thousand security checkpoints a day. Stay tuned for our report next month about the humanitarian crisis in Iraq (which deserves more attention than political squabbles) and the situation of Iraqis displaced since 2003. Stay tuned for my own article about what I found politically as well. And finally stay tuned later this year for my book on the Iraqi civil war, the surge, counterinsurgency and the impact of the war in Iraq on the region.
From the beginning of the occupation the US government and media focused too much on elite level politics and on events in the Green Zone, neglecting the Iraqi people, the "street," neighborhoods, villages, mosques. They were too slow to recognize the growing resistance to the occupation, too slow to recognize that there was a civil war and now perhaps for the same reason many are worried that there is a "new" sectarianism or a new threat of civil war. The US military is not on the streets and cannot accurately perceive Iraq, and journalists are busy covering the elections and the debaathification controversy, but not reporting enough from outside Baghdad, or even inside Baghdad.
Iraqis on the street are no longer scared of rival militias so much, or of being exterminated and they no longer have as much support for the religious parties. Maliki is still perceived by many to be not very sectarian and not very religious, and more of a "nationalist." Another thing people would notice if they focused on "the street" is that the militias are finished, the Awakening Groups/SOIs are finished, so violence is limited to assassinations with silencers and sticky bombs and the occasional spectacular terrorist attack -- all manageable and not strategically important, even if tragic. Politicians might be talking the sectarian talk but Iraqis have grown very cynical.
When you talk to people they tell you that the sectarian phase is over. Of course with enough fear it could come back, but Shiites do not feel threatened by any other group, and Sunnis aren't being rounded up, the security forces provide decent enough security, and they are pervasive, there is no reason for people to cling to militias in self defense and besides militiamen are still being rounded up, I just don't see enough fuel here for a conflagration -- leaving aside the Arab/Kurdish fault line, of course. (Though if Maliki went to war with the Kurds that would only further unite Sunni and Shiite Arabs.) The Iraqi Security Forces like Maliki enough, even if they prefer Alawi. The Iraqi army will not fall apart on sectarian lines, it would attack Sunni and Shiite militias, if there were any, but these militias are emasculated. They can assassinate and dispatch car bombs but they can't hold ground, they can't engage in firefights with checkpoints. The Iraqi Security Forces might arrest a lot of innocent people, but they're also rounding up "bad guys" and getting a lot of tips from civilians. The Iraqi Security Forces might be brutal, sometimes corrupt, but they no longer act as death squads, they take their role very seriously, perhaps too seriously, but these days anything is better than the recent anarchy and sectarian massacres.
Of course Maliki is in the end still a Shiite sectarian actor and has a core constituency, as Chalabi cleverly forced him to reveal, but Maliki is not pro-Iranian (though Iran is too often demonized as well as if the dichotomy is pro-American and good or pro-Iranian and bad). It's not a dichotomy of pro-Iranian or nationalist either.
It's not about whether Iraqis are sectarian or not. They are, though the vitriol and hatred have decreased. It's that they are not afraid of the other sect anymore. Fear is what led to the militias taking power and to the political and military mobilization along sectarian lines. There are attempts by some Shiite and Sunni parties to scare people again but in my conversations I feel it is failing. The fear is gone and the Iraqi Security Forces fill the security void, even if it's not pretty.
There is concern about Sunnis being disenfranchised or getting the shaft. But they have been disenfranchised since 2003. In part they disenfranchised themselves but anyway none of them expect to get unshafted. It's already done. The government is in Shiite hands and now it's a question of whether it will remain in the relatively good Shiite hands of Maliki, who provides security and doesn't bring down an iron fist on you unless you provoke him (sort of like Saddam), or the dirty corrupt and dangerous Shiite hands of Maliki's rivals -- Jaafari, Hakim, etc. I think these elections mean a lot more to Americans (as usual) and maybe to Iraqi elites than they do to Iraqis.
Besides, what can Sunnis do? Nothing, they're screwed and they have to accept it, and they have. The alternative is far worse for them. Sunnis in the region will not go to war alongside the Sunnis of Iraq. That moment came and went in 2006. Iraqi Sunnis don't even have a single leader who is charismatic and has real appeal, they're divided among themselves and these days your average Iraqi just isn't that into politics. I've heard it hundreds of times by now, they blame the religious parties, they say they got fooled and now they understand. Now that's not completely true, but the militias were able to mobilize people because of a security vacuum. These days it doesn't matter how remote and shitty the village I visit is, there are Iraqi Security Forces, and people have good things to say about them. Compared to the first three years of the occupation, Sunnis seem downright docile, maybe bitter or wistful, maybe angry, but their leadership is emasculated, in jail, abroad, just trying to survive, or just trying to make money.
Maliki will probably emerge the victor in the elections. His more sectarian and corrupt Shiite rivals are discredited and unpopular, but more importantly, he is an authoritarian ruler in the Middle East, he would have to be really incompetent if he couldn't stay in power. If Karzai could do it, then Maliki should be able to as well. Of course there is nothing uniquely Middle Eastern about this. In fact maybe looking at post-Soviet states is useful -- that is, the new ruler will not readily relinquish control, even if he has to bend the rules a bit, or operate outside the constitution. This has happened in Asia, Africa, and other places in transition. I hate to admit that I hope Maliki wins. He's the best of all the realistic alternatives. It's not like a more secular candidate is likely to win, so if it's not Maliki it will be Jaafari or Chalabi. Frankly this is a rare case where I hope Maliki violates the constitution, acts in some kind of authoritarian way to make sure he wins the elections, because the alternative is fragmentation, or a criminal, sectarian kleptocratic Shiite elite taking over, and then Iraq might unravel. For now it's still "raveling."
Excellent article. While still entertaining doubts about the ease Nir Rosen fluffs off sectarian divisiveness and the potential for renewed trouble it really covers new ground at least for me. After finishing reading I came away thinking that it all pretty much depends on the Iraqi Army holding things together and responding to legal orders. Will they continue to do this as political dynamics evolve and what if their pay is interrupted as a result of a Baghdad financial crisis? Anyway, this is Tom’s blog at its best in finding different and informed views.
I appreciate that Tom highlights those who disagree with him.
And I appreciate that I'm not the only one that thinks that screaming "Iraq is unraveling" 40+ times in 10 months doesn't make it so.
Tom,
I love your books and I love your blog. But I was starting to question whether you were too attached to your pessimistic outlook on Iraq, to be objective; whether you might be seeing everything through 'unpink' lenses (what with the unraveling series and all). I'm glad you posted this contrary view. It tells me that you're thinking hard about what's going on and what might be coming, and that you're not wedded to one point of view.
Thanks for the Books and thanks for the Blog
Reality is just more complicated than yes or no.
Behind that more positive view is, perhaps, a glimmer of value for the contributions of our honored dead.
Iraqis, as a whole, are tired of war and petty divisions, and like most of us, trying to stumble into their future. Not a big threat to either themselves or the region.
Steve
"...so if it's not Maliki it will be Jaafari or Chalabi...."
This is a flat spin...til when?
Lynch/FP has a great Odierno photo
Lynch/FP has a GREAT Odierno photo in his piece on Iraq politics and US contingency planning. It's the crucifix pose, featuring a pentagon halo. Or maybe i've just been spending too much time in the koala tree.
Re the 'inevitable unravelling' plot line, I have say that Lynch has pretty much won the point against Ricks on the Withdrawal/SOFA agreement having legitimacy, weight, and great symbolic importance to any hope or claim for future Iraqi sovereignty.
Gregory's question to Petraeus about whether Iraq is (for now) the most democratic (Arab) country in the ME was at least as interesting as P's role in the DADT debate.
Don, I think the folks in the photo above are building clove apples, which make aromatic sense in a smelly city like Baghdad.
Doubtful though I am about Nir Rosen's reliability on some subjects, I think he may be closer to being right than Tom Ricks as to Iraq's immediate future.
An exhausted population, badly attrited militia groups, and a strong army don't seem the formula for a renewal of violence on the scale Iraq saw up to 2008. Farther down the road the story might turn, but for now I don't see breakdowns in civil order that might delay the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq.
Has Ricks been too committed to the "unraveling" position he staked out in The Gamble? I think so, and the reason is probably that he, like many Americans, viewed the situation in Iraq with a strong preconception of what political "reconciliation" had to look like. Nothing close to it was visible in 2008 (or is visible now), which meant that the reduction in violence that followed the surge couldn't last -- a conclusion that does not follow, though as I suggest above what is true now may not be five years from now.
Replace "Sunni" and "Shia" with "Lutheran" and "Methodist" and understand why most Americans WILL NEVER UNDERSTAND the Muslim mind. I refer to modern Protestants, not the 18th century sorts.
We either bomb them into submission or leave. COIN ain't gonna do it.
I actually suggested to an O-6 that we surround a small village with concertina wire, drop pamphlets giving all residents 10 days to come out. We photo id and fingerprint all who come out -- put them up in tents. Then drop a neutron bomb on the village. No damage to structures, but we wipe out the bad guys hiding inside. Then send everyone home.
Response? "Can you get me the weapon from Pantex?"
Ask an American the difference...
...between a Lutheran and a Methodist, and they will likely be as clueless as about the difference between Shia and Sunni.
A neutron bomb? Really?
As with all similar simplistic tactics, it relies on the fact that the bad guys will stay in the town, rather than coming out with their uncles, brothers, and cousins -- then return to raising hell when you leave. The bad guys are not some external bacteria, invading the host. They can't be easily separated and exterminated because they are part of the population.
I have always felt the surge and COIN tactics were not the primary factors in the changes of 2007. The fact is, the civil war was fought, and lost by the Sunnis, and in 2007 they came to realize it, and understand their best hope of salvaging something was a deal -- while the Americans were still around to help broker it. COIN and the surge were just confidence building measures in that process.
You missed my point on the Neutron Bomb scenario
If the bad guys "stay in the town", they're dead...from the irradiation. If they come out with the general population, we can ID them and hold them.
Quit making this harder than it is...it's really a simple military solution. But it's a hard POLITICAL decision to make. And we have Obama the ditherer.
What has Rosen said in this post that is markedly different from anything Ricks has posted in his "unraveling series"? He writes the Sunnis are "screwed" and that they need to get used to Shiite rule. Is there room for political compromise (the point of of surge, right?): nope. In fact, we better get used to Maliki; he's the glue that'll hold everything together. Just because shit hasn't exploded again, with bodies dumped in the Tigris on a daily basis and mosques blowing up doesn't mean Iraq is not unraveling.
A couple points: Yes, Shiite militias aren't slaughtering Sunnis like they did in 2005-06 and, yes, violence is down to a lower but still "tragic" rate. The fear is gone, Rosen says. But he never really explains why this is the case.
The fact is that the '05-'06 civil war was, in effect, a sectarian cleansing centered mainly in the mixed Shiite-Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad. Shiite militias drove Sunni families out of their mixed neighborhoods and blood feuds abounded. Today, Baghdad is predominantly a Shiite city, will little tiny pockets of Sunnis scattered about. Most of the Sunnis who lived in mixed neighborhoods like Hurriya and Ghazaliya now live in the "belts of Baghdad," the rural outskirts like Taji, Sab al Boor, Nasser wa-salaam and Abu Ghraib (or, if they're lucky, Jordan and Syria).
The fear is gone today precisely because of this sectarian cleansing. Iraqis no longer live in the same neighborhood as the militia that drove them out. The ISF and all their checkpoints are basically a buffer now. When you see Imam Hussein posters on T-walls by an NP checkpoint, you know it's Shiite territory and if you're a Sunni, you probably aren't going through those checkpoints unless you have money or directly know a shurta or jundi who will let you through. Bottom line: Iraq, and especially Baghdad, has been fundamentally reorganized and there's no going back to what once was.
The issue that should deserve more attention, though, is the relationship between the dynamics brought about by the US surge and the sectarian cleansing. Did deploying US battalions and companies to JSSs and COPs throughout Baghdad have the decisive effect of ending the cycles of sectarian violence? And if so, how? Or, did the civil war play itself out, with the sectarian re-organization of Baghdad complete before the surge was at its peak, circa late summer 2007? Sorta asks the same questions LTC-retired Doug Ollivant posed in Tom's #43 Iraq-unraveling post a few days ago.
Let's not forget the new weapon of choice used against US troops during the surge--the EFP, the Iranian-originated IED. You can bet that the Shiite militias, many of whom melted into complicit Iraqi Army and National Police units, took pleasure in taking pot-shots against US patrols traversing through their neighborhoods and along their main avenues. There's a reason why ISF units never really complained about EFPs...
Lastly, here's Nir Rosen last April in The National:
http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090410/REVIEW/910535938/-1/NEWS (Seems like the Iraqi "street" told Rosen last April shit would hit the fan when US troops finally left; why is Rosen more optimistic today than he was 10 months ago?)
I'm inclined towards your analysis. It'll be interesting to see just exactly who it was that Rosen met with and interviewed. Obviously if it was Sunnis who were relatively unharmed because they resided in insignificant neighborhoods, then their views are irrelevant.
What's more concerning to me is determining what the push-back will be (if any) from Maliki and his allies within the ISF to stay out of the larger regional dynamics of Iran and the Sunni Kingdoms.
In that sense the Sunnis may have a slight opening in getting on board with a Shi'i (sectarian first) candidate, as long is there is a foundational agreement to work toghether to limit the success of Hakim and his ilk who are favored by Iran.
The devil you know, who prefers a stalemate, is better than the devil who's willing to have you shot and dumped into the Tigris the second he gets into power.
"If the bad guys "stay in the town", they're dead...from the irradiation. If they come out with the general population, we can ID them and hold them."
Bad guys don't wear neon signs that say: "I'm a bad guy".
"Quit making this harder than it is...it's really a simple military solution. But it's a hard POLITICAL decision to make."
It is a lot harder than you think, and it has nothing to do with the President.
Are you going to build a wall around Kabul or Baghdad and queue up 2-3 million to ID them? And then stop people from coming and going after you are done? Good luck with that.
Was anyone else a little bothered by Rosen's brazen hawking of his wares in the first graf? Sounds like he has something to sell, too, and you're not going to sell much if it's exactly what the other guy is selling. Frankly, a lot of this reads more like marketing spin than honest journalism. I'm not accusing Rosen of anything that naked; it's probably just coincidence. But his rose-colored view of Iraq's future sounds about as convincing now as it did in the mouths of others circa 2003. A lapse in attacks doesn't tell us much; the real test will come when the Americans have actually pulled out completely. If Iraq is truly striving for peace, is truly weary of the pointless violence, we'll see it then. I hope that's the case, but I'm not hopeful.
Have hit an all time low since the 2003 invasion. They actually dropped slightly after the U.S. withdrew from Iraq's cities in June 09. Attacks and deaths have hitten a plateua since Jan. 09. Deaths go up and down each month, same thing with mass casualty bombings. Overall attacks have stayed steady since about Nov. 09 as well. The reason for the drop is because Sunnis came out and participated in the Jan. 09 elections.
Today there are 3 main actors still carry out violence. 1) Al Qaeda. They will continue their attacks until they eventually get tired and move onto the next hot spot. That could actually happen in a couple years. 2) Baathists/nationalists insurgents they need to get integrated back into society to end their violence. They actually supported the Al Hadbaa party in Ninewa in the Jan. 09 elections and attacks have dropped there since then. Overall, as the current anti-Baathist campaign shows, there's little likelihood that they will get any kind of reconciliation so their attacks will likely continue into the short term. 3) Iranian backed Special Groups. Most of them have been scattered by the U.S. and Iraqi offensive and they only carry out a few attacks a month. Basically this violence will continue whether the U.S. is there or not and is largely, but not completely, driven by domestic issues within Iraq.
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