What direct impact did a 3-star commander in Baghdad, overseeing the entire theater, have on the daily interrogations? Did he give any guidance on how to conduct interrogations? Did he inspect or fail to inspect the detention facilities?

Or was he just the man in charge when these problems handed, and thus an easy target to point a finger?

Monty was no politician but he was the first allied commander to win a large scale land battle.

He also said wonderfully batty things like;

this sort of thing may be tolerated by the French, but we're British — thank God

about the legalisation of homosexuality (despite the fact he was probably gay).

LtGen Sanchez was the overall commander and as such, was responsible for everything his command did or failed to do - something that seems to have fallen out of vogue, specifically within the Army's senior officer ranks.

"Back in the day," Masharu Homma's defense counsel used that excuse also, though I believe MacArthur stated regardless, he should have known what was going on and bore responsibility - they hung Homma - but Mac was old fashioned that way. Me? I'm fond of keeling hauling, but that's out of vogue too.

There is no revelation here; everyone knew the top tier was condoning this behavior. But it reinforces the point about leadership, and Sanchez's commander-in-chief was exibiting very little himself now that I think of it.

As for Sanchez, 1.) he's in charge, and bears the responsibility for everything good and bad that happens under his watch, and 2.) some of these techniques he had to specifically authorize/allow.

For more about Pryer's views:
http://cryptome.org/what-cost.pdf

... not surprising at all, is it? The most obvious lessons (in so many things) are basic, fundamental, even obvious, and need to be drilled into our heads over and over again, because, being who we are, we constantly doubt them. Thanks for this, Tom.

Also, great book on WWII in case you missed it: "Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II," by Michael Bess

http://www.amazon.com/Choices-Under-Fire-Moral-Dimensions/dp/0307263657

... "obvious." Now there's a brilliant insight. I'm ready for my Pulitzer. Bring back the edit button.

The saying used to be among Soviet analysts who read propaganda that those who know do not speak and those who speak do not know. HUMINT collectors, especially good ones, are part of the most insular of insular communities. What is interesting is that there appears to be a debate among insiders about the viablity of torture and what precisely constitutes torture. I've heard both sides of this debate from inside that community. Debates like this are resolved by leaders, often at quite high levels, and sometimes those leaders make mistakes. In the end, soldiers follow orders and leadership matters.

I understand command responsibility.

But command responsibility does not entail being the "key figure" unless he actually was the key figure.

I don’t buy the idea that some detainees cannot be tried because the evidence against them is the product of torture, yet they can’t be released because they are too dangerous.

I suggest that such detainees be tried in special proceedings, perhaps conducted by a non-US tribunal), where their confessions (and the circumstances thereof) would be received in evidence and given such weight as the judge/jury decides is appropriate.

Since it is a given that statements (particularly confessions) produced by torture are notoriously unreliable, our government officials presumably have some corroborating evidence that supports their belief in the guilt of these detainees. That additional evidence can be offered as well.

Neither show trials nor indefinite detention without trial serves the interests of the USA.

This whole debate seems irrelevant to me. We still torture the people we want to by using rendition. Since nobody ever refers to this inconvenient fact, the debate becomes totally vacuous. Clearly, we shouldn't be torturing people in warzones just because they are fighting their governments (although I don't know that everyone agrees with that statement, I can assume reasonable people do). From what all of these army "experts" say, it seems that only a fascist looking in from the outside would mandate "enhanced" techniques and only an incompetent would voluntarily torture someone without considering any rules. The question is, if the army's experts are convinced that both the torture seen at places like abu ghraib and the enhanced techniques authorized for CIA use are worthless, then why isn't there a debate over rendition as well? And why do CIA agents like the one who prematurely proclaimed the success of KSM's waterboarding have such a fetish for torture? You would think their interrogators would be more "expert" than the army's; if they aren't then the agency should be disbanded. The main problem is that these debates always devolve into 24-like scenarios, with Dick Cheney spouting the Jack Bauer line. and the hypothetical threat always seems to be nuclear annihilation. it's sad that we're stupid enough to imagine the world in such a way when considering major policy choices. my favorite part, though, is that the former administration trusted all information coming to them about saddam's nuclear program without a hint of skepticism. maybe if they had waterboarded ahmed chalabi and curveball they would have seen the hitch in their scheme. Too bad they never even saw curveball, much less interrogated him. it seems that the specter of nuclear fallout in the US (even when its totally absurd and misguided) is enough for the neocons to uncritically justify the grand schemes that directly result in hundreds of thousands of ay-rab deaths. someone should ask our supposedly christian population why their lives are worth more than iraqis'.

Regarding the comments above regarding Sanchez, don't forget that Sanchez was put in charge after Franks and many of his generals decided they were done and came back to the U.S., bringing most of their headquarters elements with them. How a group of military officers decide for themselves to up and leave the war zone is beyond my ability to comprehend. Sanchez should of had control of the interrogators and detainee personnel (via his headquarters) and he deserves some of the blame, but Franks and Rumsfeld deserve more.

As I recall from reading WWII history, the Brits had great success in getting information from Nazi spies and saboteurs without resorting to torture. They also had great success in turning those agents and using them in counterintelligence operations. Reinventing the wheel isn't necessary here. Just go back and study how they did it. It's not rocket science.

Montgomery is a case study in British mass delusion. Except for El Alamein, I can't think of any battle where Montgomery demonstrated superior capability. Even El Alamein was much more about logistics than superior leadership, strategy or tactics, proving the adage that amateurs talk about tactics and experts talk about logistics. The Germans were at the end of a very long supply line, while the Brits were not. Frankly, the war would have been shorter without Montgomery, but the Brits needed a hero and he was available.

I asked the general once in WaPo online Q&A why no general officers resigned over the Abu Ghraib....he stated, I recall, that he looked forward to a commission to answer.

Jim Webb, in a time still as a private citizen, once surmised that maybe the chain of command had been corrupted and the generals felt no obligation to be accountable.

Know this implies maybe the curia knew but did nothing...we still don't have a read over the involvement and direction sources. And there doesn't appear to be the interest to find out.

Maybe none of the services placed themselves directly at risk of embarrassment - the cardinal sin.

link here http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA502354&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Academic rigor?: The first half of the paper is simply a rehash of NY Times Articles, Fiasco, CALL journals and the myriad of investigations conducted by DoD. I know these officers have to cite passages for their work, but I think i've read the first 80 pages about six times...I always worry when a narrative becomes conventional wisdom -- it causes us to not look at our assumptions and recommendations. I think the final recommendations put forth are weak and eminate from this staid thinking. Finally, Pryer has a quote from LTC Hoepner (a real good officer BTW) who he appears to have worked for in Iraq that sets up the premise of 1AD's "city on a hill metaphor" and Hoepner is listed as a faculty member grading the paper....Gee I wonder what grade this Major got?

That said the basic thrust of his argument with Sanchez and the problems caused by his leadership and strategic direction clearly impacted the nature of the insurgency (see my post above for more Sanchez failures) the first two years of the war and the problems with interrogation and detention. Cheers.

couple other points:
- He's critical of the lack of resources dedicated to review detention packets for release at CJTF-7, but has nothing to say about the huge numbers of MAMs tactical level units where sweeping from the streets with little justification -- fueling an insurgency among the populace and adding to the resource issues.

-- he totally misses the disaster that MG Miller's GITMO team had on interrogation policy and ops in OIF1 -- probably because he was at BDE/ BN level and didn't see it...truth is often a function of where you stand and Pryer's position and reverence for 1AD color the report at times.

- Policy and doctrine: Pryer does an excellent job clearly laying out the confusing array of policies , SOP issues that were at stake in OIF 1. I think he has a flaw in his thesis argument that most interrogators treated detainees humanely while at the same time noting that FM 34-52 and interrogation doctrine was ill defined and inconsistent pg 95. The FM was not inconsistent; a lack of trained personnel and an ethics-free leaderless environment will defeat what ever doctrine you write on a piece of paper. Where there was good leadership, training and oversight --- you had fewer problems. It is that simple and 100 pages shorter.

School training: pg 116 details the difference between school-trained interrogators and others who conducted questioning...This is an important point and while I find Pryer's "high ground" values self-serving, it's important to note that training and leadership work. As he points out 1AD has some excellent leaders and warrant officers. That said, he correctly notes the high number of abuse cases at point of capture at tactical levels without allowing for the possibility that if uncooperative detainees were retained longer at Division holding areas that perhaps they too would have had some of the MP/MI issues that took place at Abu G because of the lack of depth in trained personnel across our division/ BDE formations at the time.

- this is simply not true and overstatement: " At Abu Ghraib, these harsh (interrogation - added) techniques rapidly descended into sadistic, sexualized violence that
shamed a nation. " Pryer is falling into the Daily Kos routine of confusing the humiliation of prisoners by MPs with interrogations that exceeded doctrine/policy/ common decency....the Fay/Jones/ Taguba report does not say that interrogators descended into sadistic, sexualized violence. NOTABLY THIS IS ONE OF THE FEW SENTENCES WITHOUT A REF. In fact, while there was clearly collaboration between MP and MI at Theater Facilities, there is nothing to suggest the most sadistic acts - pyramids/ dog collars/ sex abuse executed by MPs were conducted at the behest of MI personnel.

Is this the new CSGS standard explanation?: "Most notably, since the U.S. military's leaders in the 1980s and 1990s had done a poor job of predicting the Clausewitzian "nature" of its next fight (hardly a singular occurrence in our nation's history), the U.S. Army was simply not built to wage large-scale counterinsurgency operations in 2003." Interesting point...I wonder if this is conventional wisdom in at CGSC these days I can envision hearing it being mentioned in small-group...in other words it was not OUR fault we were unprepared for Iraq 2003 - it was Reimer, Sullivan and all of those NTC/ Force XXI-focused boobs in the 80s and 90s who set us up.

missing, should be added: Prohibitions against non-interrogator trained personnel are now codified in doctrine, access rosters to facilities and theater policy.

Wrong conclusion: FM 2-2.23 is already an overreaction to the interrogation problems and the author's sense that we need to add more restrictions to an already clear set of dos and don'ts is classic Army leadership at its worst. Somehow if we write every don't do on a list --- nothing bad will happen...come on Doug -- come down from the hill, leave the the TOC and join the rest of us in reality. You correctly point out the value of training and ethics based leadership on these complex ops -- more lawyers and timid doctrine that reads like an ACLU document are not serious solutions they are overreactions. Too often this document falls into the trap of thinking every interrogation at Abu G, Cropper and SMUs was some trip into the Dick Cheney ghoul chamber...that is far from the case and unhelpful because it reinforces the perceived need to overcorrect our interrogation policies.

Ethics leadership is a good thought...you could have included the focus on ethics and humane treatment now being included in interrogator training.

The loss of an MI HQ is also an interesting thought and bears watching; however there haven't been MI HQs in Iraq and AFG for the last several rotations...it would be interesting to know what the impact is on ops and oversight the data is out there (outside Pryer's circle of 1AD friends)

Quick note to Tom:
take a run out to Huachuca sometime and see if you think the doctrine, training and ethics cut mustard...I'd be interested in your thoughts... I haven't been out there since 07, but I thought they were clearly on the right track.

Sean Rossi
Maj, USA

Sean,

Thanks for the constructive criticism. A few points, though:

First, the master’s thesis to which you directed folks is not the book that Tom read. Consequently, you missed many things. For the book, I added two new chapters and an autobiographical prologue (largely involving experiences I had in Iraq as an MI company commander and an MI Battalion’s assistant operations officer). I also fleshed out bits and pieces in other chapters. Most notably, COL(R) Stu Herrington wrote an extensive and truly insightful Foreword for the book. To order and respond to the actual book, you need to call the Command and General Staff College’s new University Press directly, 913-651-0624. All proceeds from the sale of the book go to the CGSC Foundation, which, among other good deeds, funds an ethics teaching position at the school.

Next, your faulting my thesis for a lack of academic rigor seems truly incredible to me. Did you read the bibliography and extensive endnotes? Yes, I relied heavily on numerous investigations and reports (many of which are DoD but some of which are not). But I also personally conducted 15 lengthy interviews as well as drew information from other interviews posted on the internet, especially the Combat Study Institute’s ever-growing Operational Leadership Experiences interview archive, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/contentdm/home.htm. Altogether, I directly drew from more than 150 primary sources as well as more than 40 secondary sources. And this truly was just the tip of the research iceberg. I can honestly say that I sifted through tens of thousands of pages of documents to get to the “golden nuggets” I actually cited in the book.

That said, you are probably making a valid point about my over-citing everything. But, I really didn’t feel I had any choice but to make extensive use of corroborating endnotes since I’m an active-duty military officer writing on an extremely sensitive topic. Plus, all those endnotes have the added benefit of aiding other researchers. In a few annotated endnotes, I even rated the value of sources.

In short, Sean, if you have written anything that was more exhaustively researched than “The Fight for the High Ground,” I applaud you. It is certainly possible (though unlikely).

Moving on. It is good to see you think as highly of LTC Hoepner as I do! But, while he was on my thesis committee and provided constructive feedback regarding this project to me at various stages, he certainly did not grade the project. Also, while I did indeed work for him for six months during OIF I, there has been absolutely no motivation for me to be ingratiating toward him in recent years, even if I were the type of man to act thus toward his leaders. I am emphatically not this type, though (although I sometimes wish I were).

I did indeed discuss the problem of tactical level units sweeping up innocent “50 meter targets” and fueling the insurgency. In the book, I discuss this problem explicitly on page 38 and then touch upon it again on page 82.
I also did in fact talk about the impact of MG Miller’s Gitmo team on interrogation policy and ops in OIF I. I discussed the impact of this team (admittedly rather obliquely) at the start of Chapter 2, which is also in the thesis. In the book, references to this visit are on pgs. 8, 15, 16, 45, 127, and 143. I probably should have written still more on this particular subject in both the thesis and book. Good eye.

How is my discussion of “high-ground values” self-serving? Personally, I feel just the opposite about the matter.

You criticize the connection I made between the Abu Ghraib crimes and interrogation operations, essentially dismissing this connection as unreferenced and poorly considered. This is untrue. Although I wish this connection had not existed, it did. Consider the following: two soldiers of the “Abu Ghraib Nine”—the soldiers charged with crimes that landed nearly all of them in prison—were interrogators not MPs." These two interrogators were convicted of forcing detainees to crawl naked on the floor while handcuffed in sexually humiliating positions, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13311-2004Sep11.html. As noted in both my thesis and book, the Fay/Jones report concluded that interrogators had encouraged guards to abuse detainees as part of their interrogation approaches. Major General Fay found 16 cases of interrogation abuse that had been committed by MPs at the behest of interrogators as well as an additional 11 cases of abuse in which interrogators had been directly involved (pg. 44 of the book). Additionally, a few interrogators routinely ordered MPs to keep detainees nude at the facility, believing that they should allow only those detainees who provided intel to wear clothing. This belief had migrated to Abu Ghraib from Gitmo, where “removal of clothing” had been an approved interrogation technique from 2 Dec 02 to 15 Jan 03.

I could go on, but let us stop and think about this for a moment. Is it possible that nude human pyramids and similar crimes would have occurred if interrogation operations had not been perpetuating a climate of abuse at Abu Ghraib and the hard site there had not been full of naked prisoners? Yes. Graner and crew were a sick bunch. But is it not also extremely unlikely that this abuse could have occurred—at least on the scale that it did occur—without the specific conditions set for this abuse by interrogators?

Far from saying that doctrine needs to be more restrictive, in the book, I address one key area in which current doctrine clearly represents an extreme over-reaction--the absurdly restrictive requirement for interrogators to obtain General Officer approval to keep detainees housed separately (a condition that is actually a necessary precondition for most successful interrogation). Most other doctrine, I argue, is right on and just needs a few minor tweaks here and there. I also fully understand the inherent limitations of doctrine (ultimately, mere words on paper). Hence my argument that our Army needs to ensure its leaders receive more robust training with regard to ethics. It is not the letter of the law that needed fixing, I argue, so much as it was the morally bankrupt spirit that sometimes undermined the rules governing U.S. interrogations.

That's enough for this entry. Feel free to look me up on AKO and drop me an email. You clearly have a decent working knowledge of the subject, and more discussion might benefit both of us.

Cheers!
Doug

Doug

I'll look forward to finding the book. Obviously, my comments are focused on the paper I read and the conclusions it reaches. If the book is more expansive in its analysis I'll take a look; that said nearly everyone with a Masters has written a 150-200pg thesis (why do you think you're unique, first values and now writing?) - my comment regarding your thesis was simply that I've read the first 80 pages about 6 times - please don't take it as some criticism of the research or quality writing; but it's more a function of caring about these issues, being familiar with the source material and my own hypercritical prickness. You've done a fine job distilling those materials down into a readable narrative.

I agree with you the doctrinal restrictions on separation defy common sense, but frankly the type of broad brush overstatements on interrogation abuses that are prevalent in your paper fueled this backlash within the Army Officer Corps. So I'm glad you're in the chorus of saying we've gone too far in some respects, but I think we have some different views on the issues and what the facts mean.

Example -- Your ref to SPC Cruz and Krol (325MI reservists) fails to mention that the detainee that they abused was not on MI hold and was already being abused by MPs when they showed up on the scene. These are important distinctions because it counters the idea that there was an interrogation purpose behind their actions -- the detainee was a rapist and the MPs wanted to punish him. This wasn't a pride and ego down gone awry this was criminal conduct. Doctrine, policy, Rumsfeld/ Cheney, ROE was not the issue here. Ethics was. Again, I think by painting interrogation ethics as flawed (minus 1AD's trained interrogators) you add to a narrative that the interrogation community's values were/ are bad and fundamentally worse than the rest of the Army/ Military. I find the IROE violations in Fay/ Jones stupid, unhelpful and unprofessional; they offend me as a trained interrogator and officer. They hurt our country; BUT we don't need to exaggerate them or add hyperbole to the narrative, because it confuses what we should do in the future. Perhaps that's why I find your city on the hill motif cheesy and self serving.

Along those lines I'd like your thoughts on something -- I've worked targeting for SMUs and interrogation; when I read things like your thesis I wonder what you think the fundamental difference is between interrogation ROE violations and Soldier ROE excesses at checkpoints, airstrikes and on targeted raids. The US Military has killed several hundred to thousands of civilians in these operations (depending on whose #s you like). Killed. We tend to only prosecute those who engaged in murder/ rape and we rarely make the names of the other Soldiers famous or blame them for why every foreign fighter came to Iraq. What's different? We fall all over ourselves trying to rectify doctrine, policy and training for yelling, loud music and SERE techniques that we've done to our own Soldiers. I think its an interesting and complex topic and your thesis is a good resource in the dialogue. We live in a country and serve in a Military that is more sometimes more at ease killing AQ members (and collateral targets otherwise known as civilians) from drones rather than sending troops to do our assassinations. I don't think its coincidence that we get squimish on the ethics of interrogation.

Best of luck on your book sales -- Glad to see my money will go to an ethics position, I think it's a great topic and cause.

Sean,

When I was in Iraq during OIF I, I was truly profoundly impressed by the ethical stands made by the HUMINT professionals I knew. Today, even though I out-ranked most of these professionals, I acknowledge that many of them were my mentors with regard to military ethics. So, like you, I was deeply troubled by the revelations regarding interrogator misconduct at Abu Ghraib.

When I started the paper that you read, I set out to do three things: one, understand what exactly went wrong where in Iraq and why; two, shine a spotlight on the model ethical behavior exhibited by most interrogators during OIF I (because you wouldn’t know that this were the case, based on the “narrative” about Abu Ghraib that you described); and three, determine whether we are on course today with regard to interrogation operations.

Thus, I fully understand and commiserate with what I believe to be your defensiveness with regard to the popular perception that U.S. interrogators during OIF I were collectively amoral. I think it is this defensiveness (after all, I did discuss Abu Ghraib and a few other dark holes) that led you to miss one of my main themes, namely, that the ethical behavior of the vast majority of interrogators during OIF I was exemplary. Although this theme is perhaps a little clearer in the book than it was in the thesis, it should have been apparent in the thesis as well. After all, I had the following conclusion in the thesis (the verbiage of which I kept for the book):

"The school-trained interrogators of TF 1AD were citizens of this higher 'city.' Furthermore, TF 1AD’s interrogators were not alone in this regard. Although the 101st Airborne Division had a facility at Camp Diamondback where SERE techniques (and worse abuse) occurred, there are no indicators that SERE techniques were used at the score or so of other holding areas operated by this division. Similar conclusions can also be drawn regarding the vast majority of detention facilities operated by CJTF-7's other major subordinate commands. What is more, even at the theater level, there are few indicators that Camp Ashraf, Camp Whitford, or Camp Bucca (which processed more total prisoners during OIF I than any other detention facility in Iraq) systemically applied SERE or other abusive interrogation techniques. Thus, the numerous investigations into interrogation operations which followed the scandal at Abu Ghraib and which concluded that the vast majority of U.S. soldiers had not abused detainees were correct."

I supported this conclusion in many ways, but primarily with one chapter of the thesis (and two chapters of the book) that were dedicated to TF 1AD and why this unit did not employ abusive interrogations. Also, when describing incidents of such abuse in other units, I was careful to ensure that the reader understood that such incidents did not occur in the other units of their parent command (with the exception of the 3d ACR, which had at least two units practice interrogation’s darker arts).

Sure, I wrote far more about TF 1AD than I did about CJTF-7’s other major subordinate commands. Frankly, I did this because I was intimately familiar with its interrogation operations and knew the people I needed to interview to flesh out finer details. But I also made sure that it was clear throughout both thesis and book that TF 1AD’s interrogators were not alone in their commitment to staying on the moral high ground.

Next, my answer should be predictable with regard to your ROE question: I of course do not consider leaders and soldiers who intentionally kill civilians to achieve a laudable goal (such as the killing of AQ terrorists) on a higher moral plane than those who accept the “ticking time bomb rationale” for abusive interrogations. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits the “infliction of violence” on “persons taking no active part in the hostilities.” Like you apparently, I not only support the Geneva Conventions, but I believe that to do anything less is to betray our nation’s best ideals. We are, after all, part originators of these conventions, most obviously via General Order 100 of our Civil War.

Although an idealist with regard to right conduct for Americans, I am not naive. I’m not so proud of my uniform and country not to realize that we have often strayed from our ideals. Indeed, I recognize that there have always existed clandestine operators in both military units and civilian agencies who have performed dirty deeds for what they believed to be good ends (as in Orwell’s quote about “rough men” being prepared to “visit violence” so that we can “sleep safe in our beds”). In this context, it is perhaps more understandable (though not more forgivable) that some of our nation’s political and military leaders recently believed that they were morally correct to betray our nation’s values and authorize “torture –light” interrogation techniques.

But perhaps the most important thing that Gitmo and Abu Ghraib should have taught us is that the world has fundamentally changed. The world today is simply far too connected for us to have a publicly visible government and military—one that adheres to our national values—and secretive circles within these institutions that betrays those values for noble ends. If we Americans are to have any credibility in this world—indeed, if we are to survive in this brave, new flat world of ours—we must strive to ensure that all, and not just most, U.S. governmental organizations adhere to our national values.

And while I recognize the much greater challenge today’s “flat world” represents, I for one welcome this change!

In general, you’ve made some great points. When you’ve been wrong, I chalk this up to your reading my thesis rather than my book or to your misunderstanding my ideas (which may be due to my own poor powers of communication). After all, my ideas aren’t new. In fact, I would say they are fairly representative of what I take to be the collective wisdom of our trade. If we were to continue our discussion, I suspect you would ultimately find that we disagree about very little at all...

Tom Ricks has given me the honor of writing a guest blog, which should show up in the next couple days. Hopefully, this piece will clarify rather than muddy the waters further. When it does appear, if you have any more questions or comments, we should continue our discussion there.

Cheers,
Doug

Daniele,

You obviously have strong feelings on this subject. Unfortunately, these feelings are often too-little tempered by knowledge. Only someone who has not served in the U.S. military during the last two decades could possibly have written your comments.

In general, I have never been more impressed by a group of my peers than I have been impressed by my fellow military servicemembers. I can make this argument as well as anyone, since being a soldier is actually my third profession. (I worked my way through school as a journalist and then taught at the university level for two years before enlisting, and later, becoming an intelligence officer.) Although there are certainly some major duds in the military, as a group, I have no doubt that military officers and enlisted personnel are truly representative of our nation’s finest. This stands to reason, since only 25% of Americans of military age even qualify for military service. The rest are predominantly disqualified because they do not have a high school diploma (or equivalent), have disqualifying criminal convictions, or are physically unqualified.

Yes, our military competes for this cream of the crop (America’s top 25%) with other better-paying professions, but as a whole, the military has done quite well in this competition. It’s no wonder that young, bright Americans are driven to join and reenlist in the military, since poll after poll taken during the last two decades has shown that the military is the most trusted institution in America, ahead even of medicine, teaching, and business. (For an example of one such poll, see http://usmilitary.about.com/od/theorderlyroom/a/06harrispoll.htm )

The respect most Americans have for our military and those who serve within it may not be the norm in the areas where you have lived, but it is certainly common across greater swathes of America. Also, did you know that, in 2009, Forbes selected West Point as the best college in America, ahead of Princeton, Harvard, and Yale? I could ramble on here, but hopefully, you are willing to consider my point and do some research of your own here. If you do this research, please make sure you consult a variety of sources from across the political spectrum.

Although I sympathize with some of your feelings, your ideas about our U.S. military today neither derive from broad personal experience nor from a literature that is thus derived. As Shakespeare would probably have said, there are more things in heaven and earth, Danielle, than are dreamt in your philosophy! So, broaden your reading base! Also, beware of using words which may sound intelligent but which come across as unintelligent when arranged in certain ways. What I mean is, be careful of concealing irrational feelings-- both from others and yourself—behind pseudo-academic jargon. Write simply, clearly, cleanly. This way, when an especially strong feeling or prejudice does arise, you can better manage it--or at the very least, present it to the world for what it is.

Best,
Doug