IS THAT YOU?

Groundpounder please find another bridge to troll under. You're posts are uniformly rude and uninformed.

Is that your best shot? Thank you for making my point! In the U.S Military anyone who doesn't drink DOD's brew of Kool-Aid and thoughtlessly tote the company line is a fill-in-the-blank. Creative approaches to problem solving are stifled at every turn by gutless, spineless brown-nosers, sycophants and lackeys, who wouldn't make a pimple on a Coast Guard Recruit's ass! Does the term "risk adverse" ring a bell with you, sport?

Something happens to an officer from the time he is an O-5 until he becomes an O-6 and up. I think the formal name for it is Ambition Induced Stupidity Syndrome. AISS is the military acronym (to pronounce correctly, the I is silent). Very few officers can overcome this syndrome but some do succeed. Petraeus did. McMaster did. Most don't though. The most prominent of those who didn't in recent history is Tommy Franks and George Casey. Until he died, David Hackworth wrote elegantly about this syndrome, but I don't recall if he called it that.

I'm no fan of the current CENTCOM CINC, but you're absolutely correct about everything else, especially Hack! Back in the early 80s, I'd swear that the Army mandated that all captains selected for promotion get a full frontal lobotomy before they were allowed to pin on their golden oak leaves!

The SV Marines did certainly have a better reputation than the SV Army but in the end they collapsed just as completely as did the ARVN when the s--t hit the proverbial fan. Up in Danag there were a lot of SV Marines that were throwing women and children out of American transport aircraft so they could flee instead. Basically, puppet troops like these were only good if constantly propped up by their American sponsors. Certainly, no match for dedicated NVA with the scent of victory in their nostrils. My purely speculative guess is that the Iraqi Army and the Afghan Army will in the long run be little different.

JPWREL - Part and parcel for the hastening of the probably eventual collapse was that the Saigon government moved the S. Vietnamse Marines down south out of I Corps, which was tantamont to what Napleon's troops would have thought, had he recalled the Old Guard back to Paris - there was panic. The 4th Bn dug-in and awaited there fait, knowing they were buying their commandant time to evacutate families and as many of his Marines as he could.

You will never see such devotion in Afghanistan - it's all tribal old chum.

Again, I will reinforce what I previously stated: until the Afghan rank and file see that their top leadership is sacrificing as they are, and are lead by leaders commissioned/appointed on merit - there will be no competent ANA. Additionally, our trainers and advisors must be be assured there assignments are career building, and they must also live, sleep, and if necessary, fight with their Afghan unit.

This is one of the possible flaws in COIN. We may not be acknowledging the enevitable eventual collapse of Afganistan when we also leave - and leave we must. But we also must at least try - history need not repeat itself.

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Revised history? As I understand it the SV Marines were moved south from Quang Tri to the Danang area where they fought the NVA around their headquarters at Bo Tu Linh. As the ARVAN disintegrated they were left on their own and part of the survivors were evacuated by ship to Saigon. Many of the remaining elements got caught up with the riot at the air base during the evacuation. If I am wrong then I always invite correction.

I got ahead of myself. The two day battle took place west of Danang, and that is in I Corps - you are correct. I was off-shore, I won't be this time, it would seem. : |

You've perhaps heard of Dien Bien Phu? Truth be known, one underlying reason for inserting French forces there was because General Navarre among many reasons, most poorly thought out, understood the valley was at least, Ho Chi Minh's primary opium growing area in which he filled his coffers to continue the revolution.

Now there is absolutely no comparison expect for fact that Marjah is also a prime hub for opium production for the Taliban. As for your statement that the majority of the population has fled? That is not yet substantiated, since there has been a concerted effort to avoid, and prevent that. Thus the far in advance warning order of the impending operation, along with advance force special operations, which haven't been widely reported on.

The crux of the problem with irregular warfare is that feeble governments either have no ability or sometimes (like Pakistan) the inclination to address the insurgent that take over a district or town; by the time it reaches the point of being problematic for them, it is beyond a police matter and calls for military action. Too often that military actions is so overwhelming that it alienates the local population - it appears we understand the latter finally.

In addition, and importantly, it is an opportunity to find out where our Afghan Army counterpart's proficiency is, and whether they are up to the task or not - something worth finding out also, since they'll be alongside our forces.

Don't be such a nay sayer until we see how this operation shakes out. If it turns out that it was based on more wishful thinking than operational intelligence shaping the maneuver - I'll perhaps join you as a nay sayer.

Remember something: counter-insurgency is hard, and it's always been hard. American's have come to believe we can find the problem; fix it; and move on. It doesn't always work that way.

TYRTAIOS, I think you have made a solid response to HairySteve20’s doubts about the effectiveness of ‘Operation Moshtarak’ now underway by British and American troops. We of course must give it the time it requires to play out. History generally teaches us that large conventional operations against insurgencies are rarely if ever decisive or even accretive to the larger mission but since all insurgencies have different characteristics and forms you are right we must wait and see.

The weak link here is not whether NATO forces can handle the job but whether the Afghan Army and police are capable of sustaining the success that the NATO troops achieve? From conversations with members our best special op’s units my impression is that for a host of reasons the Afghan Army cannot and likely never will be able to find their butts with both hands and that the Afghan Police are even more corrupt and incompetent than Iraq Police, which is saying a lot.

Which all comes down to peeling off NATO troops to permanently hand hold and prop up Afghan forces in areas theoretically secured. Personally, I just don’t see the American public (or NATO’s public for that matter) putting up with another decade more of low intensity warfare and high expense while our economy is deconstructing?

JPWREL - as to your last statement: read Bernard Finel's article titled "An Alternative to COIN" in the "Armed Forces Journal."

This operation around Marja looks to be a classic example of clear, hold, and build. Apparently there is supposed to be significant backfill of ANA, police, and infrastructure developement upon withdrawl of our conventional forces.

Let's you and I see how this evolves old man (I've never mentioned it, and won't again, my Youngblood is involved).

I'm just confused that a town that is not mentioned in the top 120 towns in Afghanistan in terms of population ( http://www.tageo.com/index-e-af-cities-AF-step-1.htm ) has suddenly acquired a population of 80,000 ( http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8514397.stm )? Have any journalists bothered checking any of the information they are being spoon fed?

I sincerely hope no one gets hurt but the whole thing smells of a giant PR exercise. Is this indicative of conflicting pressures on GHQ in Afghanistan? Are they being asked to run a counter insurgency campaign while at the same time feeling they have to show something flashy for the press.

Lots of lives were wasted in Vietnam by commanders who wanted to raise their media profile by launching assaults on targets that had no strategic significance but that would offer a chance to declare a 'victory'. Colonel Hal Moore wrote about it with some bitterness.

As i mentioned above this operation has been heavily trailed for six months, if there was a genuine desire to engage the enemy, whoever they are, a smaller, quicker operation would make sense. If the idea is to clear hold and build then a six month build up and 15,000 troops to take a one horse town means it will take about three hundred years to cover the whole of Afghanistan.

I suspect in a manner of speaking there is some PR value here. The Taliban also spread their own PR - why not us? : )

However, it is my understanding the town is the largest that the Taliban have outright controlled. In addition, as mentioned before, it is a prime source of revenue through the narco-trade for the Taliban - thus a likely place to conduct an operation of this size.

The key here is: if we get this right, it will become a model for what we can accomplish. If we don't get it right, the Afghan and aid backfill after we leave being all important, we are, as they say on the chess board, forked.

Thanks for the reference to the excellent article by Finel in the AFJ. He essentially promotes a strategy, which I have supported for years and also has been rejected by the Pentagon for just as long for their own parochial reasons. The USA has the ability to strike quickly and devastatingly from over the horizon without permanent base structures. This is a unique one of a kind capability, which we enjoy and should exploit. Finel is also right in that while insurgent forces may practice their own form of asymmetrical warfare rather than respond to their initiative we should take the initiative from them and execute our own form of asymmetrical warfare using our highly mobile strike forces and intelligence gathering capabilities.

This strategy means an intensive use of space communications and reconnaissance, carrier manned strike capability, and UAV’s for reconnaissance and strike, and offshore conventional quick reaction forces such as Marines for larger operations and Navy SEAL’s for precision on target assault. As of now SEAL’s are essentially being used as high-octane light infantry, which is a waste of their hyper expensive training and capabilities. The goal is to neutralize and destroy threat targets and get the hell out and continue to monitor the threat situation. Perhaps follow-on strike may be desired.

Bernard Finel, also demonstrates how the U.S. has failed to properly do net risk assessment relating true strategic political risk of a threat situation versus assets committed. This means as he states that if we realized the vast bulk of our war aims our commitment should be proportioned accordingly. In my view, Iraq is a situation where the vast bulk of our war aims were accomplished when we reached Bagdad. The follow-on nation building effort was unnecessary and unrelated to our national interests.

Today, rather than stationing 130,000 ISAF troops in Afghanistan we should measure the true risks to ourselves and continuously monitor and strike those targets, which pose a threat to us. Permanent garrisons and endless low intensity warfare not only overly tests the patience of the American publics political support but does not use forces efficiently and leaves us exposed in other potential theaters.

For others here is the link: http://www.afji.com/2010/02/4387134