Monday, February 8, 2010 - 1:54 PM

When David Kilcullen is at his best, he is unexcelled at discussing how to wage a counterinsurgency campaign. And I think the Australian infantry officer turned political anthropologist/COIN guru is at his best when he gathers field observations, boils them down to distilled principles, and then describes those rules in a clear, practical manner.
So I want to take some time to go through a paper he wrote recently in Afghanistan. (I didn't get it from him, by the way.) While it ostensibly is about metrics in COIN campaigning, it amounts to a thorough discussion of what works in such warfare, what doesn't, and -- especially -- how to tell the difference. It is written about the current campaign in Afghanistan, but clearly has broader applications. ...
After some initial throat-clearing (one of my rules when I was an editor was to see if I could cut the first three pages of any long article), Kilcullen's first major section is about metrics to be avoided. These are:
... awesome!
TE Lawrence never cut the rail to Medina
His strategy was to threaten and bruise it, force a counter-strategic Turk concentration, sending their troops and supply as far from the key battle as possible.
We are now in the position of the last Ottoman, bleeding for security and governance of subjected peoples of Helmand and Nuristan, at the farthest corner of our empire.
Interestingly, the key battle(s) was in Gaza which we know for other reasons now.
History’s important WW, but also acknowledge we aren't the Turks.
I would bet the theorist in Mr. Kilcullen would agree that as COIN applies to the operational side of the realm, there is no carved in stone set of techniques in an insurgency except possibly one - insurgents don't have to defeat the counter-insurgent in combat to achieve their "strategic" objectives."
The Taliban have time on their side. It will be interesting to see how much time we have on our side, because I lied: there is another rule carved in stone – counter-insurgency takes time to achieve strategic objectives.
If you really think that we are like the Ottoman Empire
Then I can see where some of ideas from previous posts came from. The people of Helmand and Nuristan are hardly our subjects but nice try. Nuristan is an area of large support for us actually and we are hardly in a life and death struggle in any areas, we are not even at close to levels of casualties of some years in Vietnam even and that is over almost 10 years of fighting for us now in two wars. You then go on to imply that we have an Empire? Umm....really? Are we taxing the countries we have bases in? We raping the natural resources of any of them? I could swear we pay them but that must be my mistake about those crazy leases we sign. Do you get your history and world view from Howard Zinn or are you just an English Lit Major with a flair for the dramatic with lines like "We are now in the position of the last Ottoman, bleeding for security and governance of subjected peoples of Helmand and Nuristan, at the farthest corner of our empire", I mean, really!?
non-turkishness acknowledged...
... aside from the appellation accorded to formerly fiery young bucks graduating toward (or beyond) Jr. field officer status. Like young turk Kilcullen- who must know that 1917 Turkish rail communication into the Hijaz was not much inferior to our supply lines in the Kush today. My statement, 'position of the last ottoman' was framed in the context of a decisive strategic distraction.
Gen. McChrystal's JSOC or ISAF forces can summarily arrest MAM's and call in lethal fires on structures and convoys, outside of an Afghan 'chain of command' that was installed and is supplied under our air umbrella. We're the big dog, one with global military bases and forces engaged in multiple wars. Opinions on what 'empire' means in this ' new american century' are like what we each sit on. You're entitled to you own, Eric III. But ad hominem attacks don't negate historical comparisons to the Turks in Arabia, or the Brits in Central Asia.
(BTW, the combat vet in my clan memorized Kipling's lines on soldiering in Afghanistan before he left school. The Greeks, Romans, Chinese and various Turkic hordes have come and gone, with little but poetry left to tell the stories of their heroes and enemies. It helps to know this kind of stuff has happened before, take useful notes on how a great power gets 'hoist on it's own petard.')
One hopes that Team Obama/CENTCOM/ISAF appreciate the limits that even the greatest nation has to work within, or else be willing to face the consequences of running experimental wars at full scale in real time. It's only a hope, because 'mah fellow 'marcans' aren't trusted with the book on how our young officers and 'strategic' ranks came to be nation builders, while dodging bullets of various international origins, shot from guns we helped import.
If voters aren't included in an informed discussion, one that goes deeper than pride in our force and flag, we're not unreasonable in defaultiing to a 'no' vote. We survived Stalin and Mao (sort of). We certainly can contain Afghanistan without mainforce occupation, if going broke is the alternative. Omar's thugs are not an existential threat outside of Afghanistan, nor should anyone believe that UBL can only be unearthed thru nation building in Kandahar.
The insurgent, when he does win, as Karzai, his Pashtun recruits and our A-teams once did, has to adapt to the more difficult role of a governing counterinsurgent. If he fails at good governance, he quits, dies, or rolls back into insurgency, a la Omar, or Saddam. In a land occupied by a Potomac army operating on foreign credit, the one-eyed insurgent may have the longer view, as Tyrtaios suggests. Kipling's strategically 'cheaper man' is alive and fighting what he regards as an infidel empire.
More than one old Afghan Amir was deposed, then allowed in the spirit of the Great Game to return from opaque subcontinent exile, to reclaim Kandahar. It's kind of a Pashtun-Durrani tradition, no?
The ghosts of young turks who once forded these same far rivers with an over-extended Macedonian emperor might take note that America has thrown an exceeding wide perimeter around Diego Garcia, but somehow missed KSM's home county. I take note that barbarous drug-lords are pressing at the gates of El Paso, Nogales, and not that far from my home near Camp Pendleton.
lol, I was right, heck, maybe even an MA in English Lit? ;)
Look, to compare the US to an Empire is a reach. Umm..did the British Empire pay to lease bases? Pay for Mineral Contracts? How about the Russians? The Mongols? The Turks? Etc..etc....you are attempting to compare History via your damatic license for over reach and what I am going to start calling your flair ;) If you opinion is that we are an Empire who has subjects, then how come we do not seem to profit much from this? Are you saying we should not have gone into Aghanistan? I could have sworn the country was used as a training base and launching pad for attacks on us and some of our Allies. So, what would you do? I am curious as to your strategy other than calling us an Empire, making implications that we are somehow making subjects of people, the weapons ("Shots fired") that are there would not have gotten there anyway without us , (they have these neat things called smugllers who have been bringing in Weapons for centuries, Asadabad is a great place to get AKs for dirt cheap) and that we are like past "empires" who have gone through Aghanistan? The insurgents do not fight us as some infidel invading there country- some fight because that is just the way they are, most fight for power others fight because we screwed up, those are the natives. There are also a nice chunk of foreign fighters who would fight us at whatever spot we are at. Your implication that they are organized into some massive movement and are in some kind of "Fifth Afghanistan Horde" and are coming over the mountains sounds just silly. Also, again, with the over reach, Macedonia? Alexanderdid fine here, nothing some fires and massive murders did not solve, but he used "ROEs" you would not have approved of.
You try to hard in your attempts to write with knowledge and while I admit you do have a bit of "flair" your constant attacks on the US and why we shouldn't be there are like reading an undergrads paper, lots of fluff not a lot of real knowledge. If you want to talk about tactics, strategy, etc..great, give some ideas on how to better do it but your ad hominem attacks on the country our so called empire and lack of actual knowledge are hardly in depth or accurate and almost always predictable.
T.E. Lawrence & David Kilcullen
When getting lost in history, and studying the likes of T.E. Lawrence, many fail to recognize the fact that Peter O'Toole - err, I mean Lawrence was himself an insurgent fighting the Ottoman Turks, as opposed to a counter-insurgent.
It might be interesting to re-read Lawrence looking at it from an insurgent's point of view.
In reading Kilcullen, he cites examples of actually sitting down and discussing the issues with the insurgent, albeit, as an observer.
Again speaking of Lawrence. The man did not have an epiphany one night and all of a sudden write his Seven Pillars of Wisdom. He arrived at his conclusions slowly over time, which he then outlined in his 27 Articles that were published in 1917.
I suspect Kilcullen also didn't arrive at his conclusions overnight either, and one might wonder if the real question isn't along the same lines that Lawrence of Arabia stated: that insurgencies should be fought only where national security it at stake, something I believe Kilcullen would agree with.
So I find your argument should be: how important is Afghanistan to our national security, as opposed to what others did historically before us in Afghanistan? : )
There's a pretty strong rumor, supported by contemporary sightings and reportage, that TE continued his work post-war as a Pashtun insurgent, West of the Indus. The story is that while he was supposedly an RAF mechanic in British India, Lawrence was posing as an Arab religious scholar, fomenting Pashtun tribal rebellion across the border against King Amanullah's modernizing efforts. It seems incredible that such a colorful reprise, one that raised press notoriety at the time, could be written out of most Lawrence bio's. But laundering history is a winners traditional privilege, and the Brits are cagey about methods they may want to use again.
Afghanistan's importance to America was once gauged by it's miraculous effect on Soviet containment, wounding the bear and toppling Gorby. Now our war policy is being multi-tasked for service in containing Iran and Pakistani nuclear proliferation, on top of the GWOT thing. Top issues affecting global oil and gas prices, to be sure. But it's hard to have an informed opinion on the current US policy imperatives, when the smoke-screen covering how and why things went so wrong for the prior 30 years is so dense.
Call me simple minded, but if US democracy is a sacred trust, targeting voters with lies on a matter of war is a primary sort of sin. The existential issue at stake is the constitutional contract, the trust between governed and government at home, before our military morale and reputation abroad is considered. Whupping insurgent Pashtuns has to take a back seat, in a war for the soul of our republic.
So, tell what lies are being told?
First, I think it would have been pretty cool if TE was doing that but if he did then trust me, we would have heard about it from the Brits, they cannot keep things like that to themselves and we would have heard a million times over how once again they are the "Man" when it comes to COIN ;)
As for your last paragraph, what lies? What is going on that the administration is telling tall tales over?
Uncovering T. E. Lawrence - Covering Kilcullen
Walking Wounded - Some men not only shape history, but are also influenced by it there selves. This would describe Kilcullen to a degree since he has had an impact on how we approach counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, through his experiences. But it describes T.E. Lawrence to a much larger degree, since his impact was much greater
Because Lawrence became almost an Arab himself, he may have exhausted himself in his pursuit of Arab independence, and contemporary writings about him state this was cause and effect for him to resign his commission, and seek anonymity in the ranks of the RAF, and later the tank corps.
However, the man was simply too famous to remain an unknown; Lowell Thomas having invented Lawrence as Lawrence of Arabia. So I doubt, and concur with ERIC, that it is highly unlikely that the British could have kept any activity of Lawrence in S. W. Asia unknown. Just as it would be difficult for Kilcullen to work any such program without becoming uncovered today.
"If the flea may assert a kindred feeling with the lion... then let me suggest how my experience (& abandonment) of work in Arabia repeats your history of a situation-with-no-honest-way-out-of-it. You on the large thinking plane, me on the cluttered plane of action... and both lost." - think about Lawrence's statement as it relates to Afghanistan. I wonder what Kilcullen thinks about?
Not to mention, the alleged epiphany he had while laying sick in the tent--chronicled in the "Evolution of a Revolt" chapter--is seen by many to be largely metaphorical. As you said, he arrived at these ideas over time. However, I think he needed to spell them out for the reader, hence, the epiphany in the tent.
As always making wild assertions and implications ;)
When did I ever say in any or my pasts posts on this topic or others that no mistakes were made? I like how you, when not coming up with wild conspiracies such as in past posts, often make wild assertions as to what people "really" mean when they post something. Heck, I go off on our Senior Officer Corps all the time but never mind that ;)
So, we should not have invaded Afghanistan? Is that your opinion? You think we should have just gone in and pushed the AQ out? To where exactly? To Pakistan so that after we left they would just come back? And your crazy assertion that the AQ was not welcome in Afghanistan or really even wanted is just silly on it's face, the TB tacitly supported the AQ. Most of your post is the usual drivel that you spout-we shouldn't be there, shouldn't still be there, everything we do is wrong, etc..etc...
Bribes? Yeah, we do it all the time, it is called AID. Killing Afghans? Oh, you mean the TB, AQ and Foreign Fighters? Umm..yup..will continue to do so as well. The tragic incidents due to CAS are mostly gone now and it is a shame we did not put more concentration on this while Iraq was going on but it is spilt milk, all you can do is learn from it and make sure it does not happen anymore. Most or your rants on this page and in other posts on the topic have usually boiled down to A.) You Hate the past administration or B.) Something nefarious is always behind anything we do (We = the US)
So, please, enlighten me to your solution that would prevent the TB from taking over again, allowing the AQ to creep back in or some other group and all the while not abandoning the Afghanis once again like we did during the Cold War so that this will not continue to be a hell hole on earth. Please, I await your great solution that does not go back into the past and talk only of mistakes and gives no solutions, that talks only of nafarious reasons of why we as a country do anything and again gives no solutions or even ideas? Look forward to is K. ;)
Where can we get the full essay by Kilcullen?
Kilcullen has been on Charlie Rose a couple of times, which is where I first heard of him. If not for him and a few others that Petraeus listened to, the leftist liberals in this country would have gotten what they most want. Another lost war.
Really? So that’s what those limp wrist liberals think! Not being a leftist liberal I don't presume to know what they wish for. But for myself a centrist and rather pragmatic and non-ideological citizen with a kid serving at the very point of the spear in Afghanistan my hope is that they shut down this senseless and bungled war as soon as possible and begin to do a little 'nation building' here at home.
Limp wrist liberals. Those are your words, not mine.
Leftist liberals almost always think of themselves as "centrist," "pragmatic," and "non-idealogical." Paul Krugman at the New York Times is an example. A leftist liberal if ever there was one.
Having served at the point of the spear myself, I really don't know what to think about you using your kids service as justification for your point of view. I'll assume it's a parents concern for their safety and not idealogical. However, a pragmatic centrist would take a good hard look at your proposed course of action and think about what the overall effects of such a course of action would be for the United States over the long term. That's where liberals usually drop the ball.
Agree the war, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, was bungled in the early stages. Senseless though? Iraq is arguable, but Afghanistan is pretty clearcut. Using that word says more about your ideology than you might think.
Naturally, none of this changes the fact that Kilcullen is a brilliant thinker and if he hadn't of had an influence on Iraq we would have pulled out of there with our tails between our legs. And that would have been a leftist liberals dream come true. Take a look at how Kilcullen was attacked in the media by liberals. That speaks volumes.
Firstly, I could say the same thing about right wing drumbeating hawks in that they assume they are the arbiters of truth and reason. As far as my boy is concerned your damn right I am concerned about his safety and all his men in his SEAL platoon. They are more than willing to go forth harms way no matter the place, no matter the danger. However, in my view if they must sacrifice let it be for a worthy cause and not merely for the imbecilic blunder of craven leaders.
Regarding the war in Iraq it was absurd policy based on a premeditated conspiracy of mendacious information. If you think the world believes we are leaving that chaotic disaster with our reputations intact then I think perhaps you have misunderstood what has happened in that country.
Attacking and destroying al Qaida was justified self-defense on our part even if it was done in an incompetent manner and we arrogantly confused a discrete operation for a successful strategy. Invading Afghanistan of all places, and perpetuating an incompetently conducted eight-year war with no tangible or measurable benefits to American national security was and remains madness.
Your brilliant thinker Kilcullen or his acolyte Petraeus can invent all sorts of original doctrine and they may sincerely believe in the efficacy of their ideas but like Vietnam it will never make up for a policy, which at its core is rotten. They are merely shifting the deck chairs around on a sinking ship in the midst of an effusion of blood for a bankrupt cause.
You are wrong on this on this JPWREL. This is hardly a sinking ship and most insurgencies lose, that has been the history of them. The only way we can lose this is if a bunch of people start the "we are tired" mantra and we pull out, it is a mantra that rings hollow by the way since it is people like your son and others on this blog who actually carry the load for this war and I have yet to meet many who say we should get out. The war will be a long one, that is for certain, it will not break us financially but if we do not stay the course it will hurt us long term in how we are percieved (weak with no staying power, something China will watch), how the people who actually fight these wars will feel about there government and country (betrayed) and lastly will allow a rebuilding of a negative force in the area that will eventually cause us and others problems not mention yet another abandonment of people who trusted us to make things better.
Firstly, American foreign policy should not be undertaken merely to entertain the military and assuage their egos and professional ambitions. If they believe in the war fine, that is their privilege, but that fact does not necessarily make it sensible policy nor serve our larger national interests. Many in the armed forces believed in the war we waged in Vietnam and that a supposedly avoidable defeat there was a betrayal of those that served. That feeling still did not make the war in that shattered land good policy. The armed forces are the servants of the nation its not the other way around. However, one could be forgiven for thinking so after observing the patronizing and pandering to the brass hats by media drunken Congressmen. Unlike old Prussia the Army is not the state.
Financially, we cannot afford it. We have a deficit of about $1.7 billon, which we borrow from our trading partners. In the meantime our economy has run off the rails and unemployment continues to mount and revenues decline. The war in Afghanistan accrues no value to us whatsoever by any measure. The Chinese whose opinion you worry about must look at us as if we are idiots squandering our national strength chasing ghosts in the valleys and mountains of Afghanistan. As far as impressing them they likely have long ago formed their own opinion of the fickle nature of the American publics moral fiber and willpower.
However, on the other hand we have an indisputable right to detect and destroy al Qaida wherever it lurks. It is perfectly a matter of national self-defense. But deploying a good portion of our conventional military to accomplish this mission is so absurd as to be ludicrous. The battle against that foe can best be waged by international cooperative intelligence gathering and assessment, continuous reconnaissance (air, electronic and ground), special operations units and law enforcement in target countries. If we locate al Qaida in Afghanistan kill them. If we find them in Yemen kill them. If we find them in Somalia kill them. We don’t need to invade and occupy these countries and take on the burden of reconstruct them. We need to reconstruct our own country.
See, I knew you was a leftist lib. Your arguments are straight from the pages of DailyKos. By the way, SEALs operate in teams, not platoons.
It is not about egos, where was that said? lol Would love to see how you got that out of my post. I said that we would feel betrayed and you said it is about our egos? Umm....right.
It is not about "impressing" China, if you cannot see what that post was in relation to them I am not sure how much I can help you. They are already flexing there muscles and will weigh us accordingly to how we react to them and watch us in the conflict. Do you not think they are our next biggest competitor in terms of power, influence and militarily? Tell me you can see that and really did not think it was about "impressing" someone.
If you think "international intelligence sharing" and police work coupled with selected killings will solve problems let me point to you that outside of the Commonwealth Countries and ourselves that intel sharing without a lot of problems is a pipe dream. Our own intel services do not share intel well. Police? Again, outside of Commonwealth Countries and maybe tge EU what makes you expect to get that kind of co-operation overseas without the same kind of handouts we are doing right now around the world and in Afghanistan?
PS-to the other poster, while I might agree with some of your posting, SEALs operate in Platoons and Troops under a Team.
You are correct. My apologies to all.
Excuse me but I don't need a lesson of how SEAL's operate. Sixteen man (13 E's including a Chief and 2 O's) Platoons and squads are the tactical element of a SEAL Team. Teams are largely administrative like like the two NSWC Groups. I welcome challenges to my point of view and disagreements over policy but not over the structure of SEAL's.
Navy SEALS are vastly overrated! Please tell us about all the successful missions this band of over-hyped squids has performed in the GWOT. And don't come back with some cockamamie story about "secret missions and black bag jobs off the books! FF.
You're a father to a SEAL, I am a father to a little girl. We all want to protect our kids. I know this is all sensitive subject to you but can I tell you something? Your son is a SEAL, I am guessing by choice...since you and Rubber Duck and all the others on this board like to rail about the non-existent draft...I can only assume that your SEAL is part of the AVF.
As I am sure you know, SEALS are cutting edge troops, the best of the best. Even as a stodgy Army officer I know that the SEALS are among the best in the U.S. force if not the best in the world. They get time and resources and training that the rest of us dream about. They do missions around the world that we wish for.
Having said that there is a line in the movie SPEED where Dennis Hoppers mad bomber says "A BOMB WANTS TO EXPLODE" otherwise it wouldn't be a BOMB. Your son is a SEAL, if he wasn't in Afghanistan or Iraq he would be somewhere else none of us know about. Guess what he would be doing? EXPLODING, SHOOTING, KILLING, BEING A SEAL. Because that's what (I assume) he wants to do. If not, then he can always leave when his enlistment is up. SEALS don't get where they are without WANTING IT really bad.
My Dad was a retired career military guy and he liked to do this kind of chatting with his old cronies about the proper political direction of our country. And he liked to write letters to Congresscritters sharing his opinion. But if I knew for a moment that he was invoking my name or the names of my siblings (who also served) over and over (like you do) I would have told him to STFU. Why?
Because like your son, I'm a BOMB too and I am meant to explode. I volunteered to do so. Because there are so many of us on this board who STILL SERVE today your constant commentary on this matter often comes across as patronizing. Let your arguments stand on the basis of the logic instead of the passion of your parenthood. Just my recommendation.
Eric, I respect your point of view since I know you are very well informed and experienced. In my view I think our disagreements over these wars arises mainly because we make judgments from a very different perspective. For instance my comment about the ego’s of the brass hats I believe is right on the mark since it has been consistently observed by many others than myself that once their reputations are on the line they have a tendency to recommend even the reinforcement of failure in order to preserve their prestige. I understand that military leaders possess the ‘can do spirit’ but it should not be pursued at the expense of good judgment and practicality merely to assuage their reputations. This was part of the story of Vietnam where a candid risk-assessment of necessary resources and strategy to accomplish the mission was never entertained for fear of the perception of defeat.
Senior military commanders more often than not are like bad stock traders in that they make an investment and when it goes bad they average down hoping for a different outcome. Eventually, when the stock inevitably blows up they lose even more of their client’s money and damage their professional reputation. A smart trader places trading controls like stop loss’s or option spreads so that he preserves his capital, which in our case is measured in blood, treasure and prestige. This paradox is a universal problem and not even primarily an American problem. The German Army of the First World War proved to be superb at ‘fighting war’ but horrible at ‘waging war’ in that at no point could they bring themselves to do an honest strategic net-assessment for fear of their reputations. Germany then reprised the same blunder on steroids twenty years later. No, we are not like Germany in that eventually common sense will prevail since we wage war in the context of democratic institutions and popular sentiment.
Eric, I would be happy to discuss the complex situation arising between China and us but not in this space since I have already wandered far off the original point that Tom as posted. At another time we can review that potentially troubling relationship.
Hunter, after reflecting on your comments I believe you have a good point. He is not an EM but an officer and loves his profession, as do his men. As a father observing with anguish repeated deployments to wars whose rational and management I have serious doubts about it stirs my emotions as I think it would anyone. But still you are essentially right that the debate should be focused on facts not sentiment.
Thanks for listening and the kind response. v/r Hunter
Like the Sniper with 100+ confirmed? The Somali Pirate Incident, The Resuce of Jessica Lynch, numerous times in OEF and OIF where they took it to the enemy, the multiple Presidential Unit Citations different teams have gotten, the 2 Medals of Honor and 3 Navy Crosses, etc..etc..? Besides that? Nothing really I guess. Obviously you have never worked with them or know much.
We do look at things from a very different perspective but my point was the it would have nothing to do with egos and the way your post in reply was written you wrote it in a way that said that is what I was talking about when nothing could be farther from the truth.
One, I think you know my opinion of senior military leadership for the most part from my posts and of course my positive interactions with Ducky all the time ;)
Second, China, it is not that complex JPWREL, they are already flexing there muscles, pushing out to areas like the Spratly Islands and rattling swords over Taiwan and attempting to push around as well. EVERYTHING we do Militarily affects EVERYTHING else in perception and policy, especially to a country like China. Do not think they are not happy to poke us in the eye in places either.
Third, perception becomes reality. If other countries begin to think we will not stick it out, are not strong they will cozy up to our enemies and not back us as much when we need them. Everything ties in everything else in Foreign policy when conflict is involved.
Really, things are not that complex, the world is and always will be about a struggle for power and security, I would prefer us to be at the apex of that for as long as we are able to be, China wants to be there, Iran wants that in the Gulf and Russia wants it in Asia and Europe as well. This conflict matters on the big picture and our success will only enhance our position. It is ours to lose and only when those who are not actually taking the weight of the conflicts start shouting the mantra of "we are tired" that we can lose it.
Well, our relations with China are complicated by the fact that they are a vitally important trading power whose importance as the marginal buyer of our debt is critical to this nations financial stability. Not every aspect of relations with other countries can be measured in the context of military capability. We in a way have become a debtor nation to China and thus a dependent. They as the creditor have in fact hampered their flexibility in dealing with us by the old adage that the largest debtor to a bank owns the bank.
As far as strategic relationship with China or India or Russia or anyone else is concerned I am a big believer in designing our military and naval forces around the capabilities of those rival nations and not speculative guesswork about their intentions. For instance, if China has developed the capability to interdict USN Strike Groups as far out as 1,000-1,500 miles from her coast then we must defeat that capability with our own. If China or Russia has the capability to interdict our space-based systems then we must be able to defeat that also.
The problem and complexity lies herein, we are fundamentally broke, and our national finances are a disaster area relying upon a potential rival for sustainment. While we squander hundreds of billons in futile and senseless wars on the Asia mainland attempting to reconstruct nations and cultures our larger strategic interests are being neglected to sustain these idiotic operations.
Al-Qaida a ridiculous entity has forced a super-power to spend trillions of dollars in trying to destroy it. In their wildest dreams they could not have visited such disruption on our nation by physical acts or terror. I say fight al Qaida with the correct tools and not allow them to retain the initiative over our national interests as they have so spectacularly done to date. I am sure you get the gist of what I am speaking about. It is complex and we have made it so by our own foolishness and amateurish bungling of our foreign policy.
I thought it was interesting that Obama made such a big deal of the body count in his SOTU:
"in the last year, hundreds of al Qaeda's fighters and affiliates, including many senior leaders, have been captured or killed -- far more than in 2008."
Also interesting that nobody really picked up on how this is inconsistent with the whole COIN approach, which I guess was the point of the Exum-Fick CNAS report on drone strikes
Obama was proving that he is tough...
...or at least as tough as GW Bush. Which is admittedly a pretty low bar.
I love how the big words fly in attempts to mystify. These do not necessarily support the writers credentials since there is a thesaurus on your computer. Nice education wish you would have put it to work. See i do not know you and you do not know me. I can predict the future the next post will have a stupid joke and a number of misspelled words or something to that effect.
I look forward to reading about what to measure. "What not to measure" is important. Usually a moral or pyrrhic victory to boost the "Teams" motivation.
Blah Blah Blah.
The important thing to take away here is HOW DO YOU MEASURE A NEGATIVE? HOW DO YOU MEASURE A LACK OF INSURGENCY(CRIME,etc)? Thats all bash away.
Identifying poor metrics is pretty well trod ground: that body counts and attack trends are inadequate metrics for measuring COIN success is a five year old conclusion. Part of their continued attraction is that they are relatively easy to count, and do transmit some measure of information on enemy behavior. Certainly moreso than the basket of other quasi-economic indicators the Army has tried. Units have been twisting themselves in knots for years trying to develop more accurate, effective metrics -- so if Kilcullen has cracked the code, we are all ears. One of the major hurdles is that the information provided by these creative metrics are generally dwarfed by the resources required to gather them.
Hallelujah!!! Finally someone else gets it!! Maybe now we can start to shrug off these resurgent McNamarists who seek to quantify everything without once stopping to consider that it is the qualitative assessments that count. Maybe, in addition to the Kilcullen papers, people need to start reading some of the other smart kids on the block like Gant's Tribal Engagement which goes some way to defining what a state of normalcy might be for Afghanistan and Wineera's Interbella which considers factors which indicate deviation from local normalcy.
Ultimately what we are trying to do in COIN and CIT/CIA is return the host nation (for want of a better term) back to a state of relative normalcy (relative to the that state and its people and environment - NOT what we might wish it were). This normalcy should be defined as part of the predeployment work-up so as to inform campaign objectives; as it should also be for the adversary forces so we can assess the success of efforts to disrupt THEIR state of normalcy. While metrics remain of some use as informing data, ultimately the assessments that count are qualitative ones.
Couldn't it be said that the problem with McNamara's quantifying wasn't the data, but what he thought the data was telling him?
"Any input metric." Megadittoes...although these are not the end all, be all, having metrics that shows what you are doing (MOPs) can assist you as to know what you need to change when the effects are not being accomplished. MOPs need to be developed (1 to assist in task development), and 2, to develop a wy to accomplsih your tasks. If one of your megadittos is a way to track what you are doing to accomplish the effect. Stop building hospitals, schools, patrols in an area if it does not have an effect.
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