COIN commander reveals: Here’s what worked for me in Ramadi

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Wednesday, February 3, 2010 - 11:51 AM Share

One of the more interesting presentations at the conference I attended recently in Tampa on the Anbar Awakening was by Brig. Gen. Sean MacFarland, who as a colonel commanded an Army brigade in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, in 2006-2007. At a time when top American commanders were telling their subordinates to disengage and pull back onto big bases, MacFarland did the opposite, working with tribes, establishing outposts, and encouraging tribal sheikhs to turn against al Qaeda. When Gen. Petraeus arrived in Iraq in February 2007, one of the first things he did was fly out to Ramadi to see what MacFarland was doing -- which turned out to be an updated version of what Petraeus's protégé H.R. McMaster had done in Tel Afar in 2005-2006.

Gen. MacFarland gave me permission to quote from the unpublished paper he presented. Here goes.

First, he argues that all counterinsurgency is local. That makes sense because it is a form of politics.
Second, the people are indeed the key to the solution. But, he adds, "It is not enough to protect the population, they must be given the means to protect themselves." (Interesting point for whoever revises the Army/Marine COIN manual to mull.) "Bottom line: We promised them the means to secure themselves in a way that did not disrupt their cultural order." That is, he explains, they didn't want police directed by Baghdad because they feared Iranian infiltration of Iraqi security forces.
Third, to engage in genuine COIN is to grab the tail of the dragon. You can't lead the local uprising, "All you can do is enable it." And you will operate not only on very incomplete knowledge, you often will know less than the other people in the room-like who and where the bad guys are.
And don't expect to rest on your laurels. One fix creates another problem. If you succeed, your problems are hardly over. "As the threat receded, old rivalries began to re-emerge."

Chris Hondros/Getty Images

EXPLORE:IRAQ, MILITARY

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GROUNDPOUNDER

5:15 PM ET

February 3, 2010

The Emperor Has No Clothes On!

Give us a break! This guy copies what USMC second lieutenants have been doing on their own since 2005, and he's considered to be a freaking tactical genius! God help the U.S Army if this is what constitutes "thinking outside the box."

TOM RICKS

6:32 PM ET

February 3, 2010

Yes and no

Certainly J.D. Alford's outfit did some of this stuff in al Qaim. But not all Marine 2nd LTs were doing good COIN. For example, Haditha . . . .
Best,
Tom

JOKER 2

12:42 AM ET

February 4, 2010

COL MacFarland

This little blurb does not do justice to COL MacFarland. I was a USMC combat advisor with 3d Bn, 1st Bde, 1st IA Div in Ramadi during the Awakening. MacFarland is one of my heroes. He completely understoon COIN and was one of the first Cmdrs to assume the risk of putting OPs throughout a city. We must have had 30 OPs inside Ramadi (and it's a pretty small city). We won over the people by our constant presence along side them, and he was the key link to Sheik Abd Sitar who brought the tribes to our side during the Awakening. Unfortunately, his successor Col Charlton 1-3 BCT received a lot of the credit, although I found him to be terrible at COIN--actually taking power/responsibility AWAY from the Iraqi Army at a time when we were trying to get out of Dodge...

2:59 AM ET

February 4, 2010

My Two Cents

Time to throttle back, Groundpounder. Your point is exaggerated and comes across as unprofessionally parochial. There is no need to disparage a good Army Colonel you probably don’t know.

Tom, I got your point, but there weren’t any 2nd Lts present during the Haditha incident.

Joker 2, you are correct, and thank you for your service. Few are aware of the incredible risks inherent to the advisor mission (e.g., going on patrol with just one or two other Americans present). Fewer know how incredibly rewarding it can be...when done right. Semper Fi, Abu Sameer.

FERAL JUNDI

5:40 PM ET

February 3, 2010

Cash?

I was kind of curious. Did he talk at all about how to buy loyalty or how much money he had to sling in order to get folks to support his operations? Because money can be an advantage as well with this stuff. Sure they might dislike Al Qaeda, but they also have families to feed and money can be a motivator to partner with the Americans as well. Especially for the single Iraqis, because those guys need a house if they plan on hooking up with the ladies. So paying more than the insurgents were paying, would be just one factor to look at for your local based COIN strategy.
Oh, and on a funny note, the captcha below had a dollar figure for me to input. lol Weird.

CMEYERGO

7:45 PM ET

February 3, 2010

You are correct

The fastest way to defeat local insurgents is to arm the local people. However, that undermines the power of the central govt. and creates bigger problems in the future. Military officers are always focused on short-term success, so they like this. They'll be back home before it blows up.

3:11 AM ET

February 4, 2010

Always?

"Military officers are always focused on short-term success, so they like this. They'll be back home before it blows up."

Tarring so many with such a broad brush is evidence of intellectual laziness. We were both Marine Officers, maybe you were "always focused on short-term success" but don't pretend to know what I or thousands of other officers were focused on.

ERIC_STRATTONIII

12:35 PM ET

February 4, 2010

IF, while I understand your point I have to agree with him when it comes to "most" officers. I have in the past and will continue to say that a lot of JOs in the Army and the Marines get it but at the higher levels I have to say the Marines have tended to "get it" while the Army is being forced to "get it". Some Army officers almost seem to be dragged kicking and screaming to "get it" with regard to COIN. Far to many of the Senior Leadership whose battle space I have worked in were very short term looking and the only political or COIN operations they seemed to care about much was how reports from FID, PRT and other Humanitarian Missions looked going up the chain and how he (The OIC) looked at meetings to his superiors. The JOs are still doing a great job in both services, but once you get to about the 05 level it really starts to taper off as far as being flexible, adapting and being open to change. The higher up you go those things fall in direct correlation to rank. There are a few exceptions, as always but on the whole our senior leadership has been lacking, especially in the Army. I can only hope that a lot of the JOs who I have seen do really well and "get it" stay in and rise up the CoC but I am not confident that will happen with so many getting out in large droves and for the reasons myself and many others have cited time and time again on this blog. Always have hope though :)

HUNTER

4:41 PM ET

February 4, 2010

I think you have something there Strat

See here we go agreeing again. I think this there may be a real correlation between officers who came up circa Desert Storm vs those who came up circa Bosnia. Mind you it wasn't a big gulf in time, but it was a real change in focus.

Desert Storm was almost purely kinetic, and quite honestly way too self-congratulatory after the fact - for not alot of real effort. Bosnia (and other Former Yugoslavia area adventures to wit Macedonia and Kosovo) caused a real re-think in what was going on. And as much as many disparaged the idea of nation building that is what we were doing there. Certainly there was alot more COIN-like emphasis and civil interaction required in the Balkans.

Add to that the RIF that followed Desert Storm and I think you have some real factors describing who was left in the force and a real line of delineation. The WWIII focus of the NTC probably didn't help (although CMTC in Germany was mixing HIC and LIC stuff back in '94 when I was a 2nd Louie there).

In the grand scheme of things though the difference between those who get it and those who don't is their willingness to have an open mind and LEARN new things, then communicate that properly through commander's intent and desired endstate. Constant study is what is required. Until it makes it into the OPORD, the commander's can say much and do otherwise.

9:17 PM ET

February 4, 2010

Eric, I agree.

I think you're pretty close to the truth.

ERIC_STRATTONIII

10:04 PM ET

February 4, 2010

Wow, two O's agree with me?

I need to re-think my premise then ;)

HUNTER

3:07 PM ET

February 5, 2010

heh

The sooner we all stop fighting one another and working on the same team the better off we will all be.

I have determined there are two or three real constants on this board - and we all recognize there are only a handful of regular posters, so we know where the fighting lines are.

1. O vs NCO/E wars
2. Interservice wars (The Army sux etc.)
3. Academy wars (Shut them down etc.)

I seem to come up on the 'wrong' side of most of these issues but I'll continue to 'educate'. But I would prefer, in the end, to go the "can't we all just get along?" route and concentrate on bigger issues.

ERIC_STRATTONIII

3:37 PM ET

February 5, 2010

Come on Hunter! lol

Lighten up man, you are one of the good ones it seems. I will admit I do come up now and then a bit biased to the NCO side ;) but that is mostly dealing with Ducky lol
I am with you on the Academy and just want the Army to be what is was, when our Airborne Corps were just as good as the Brits instead of just being infantry who jump, to a time when guys like Patton, Eisenhower and MacArthur could rise to the top and were more concerned with winning and being adaptive is all I really want. There is no reason that we cannot train our guys to be crack Light Infantry Units and go back to leadership that stayed in a location for more than 18-24 months and who were big on Commanders Intent instead of micro-management. Something has been lost.
Also, I do not like having to admit to the Brits that they have a better lead and trained Army, it is a source of National Pride darn it!!! ;)

CHARLIEFORD

5:53 AM ET

February 4, 2010

"One fix creates another problem."

I am so loving this.

I'm a historian who ot tossed into teaching a lot of courses I wasn't particularly prepared, or particularly eager, to teach. But teach them I had to.

My druthers were US intellectual, religious, and cultural history.

I had to teach politics, foreign relations, and war.

I came of age in the Nixon years. I hated all that stuff.

Learning it on the fly, I was desperate to ferret out organizing principles that would serve to make sense of all the blooming, buzzing, flux of confusion (William James, modified).

And what's quoted above is the first rule I discovered on my own as I tried to do so, in regards to foreign relations.

I guess it holds, both macro and micro.

Not the most comforting of lessons. But for those of us who prefer reality, however uncomfortable, to bed-time stories, it's a good thing to learn.

And learn early.

Before you go barging into some country thinking they'll greet you with candy and flowers, and then you'll go home to live happily ever after.

What a couple long strange wars it's been, huh?

GROUNDPOUNDER

1:04 PM ET

February 4, 2010

IF, you're full of pompous crap!

And you come across as a know-it-all wannabe who couldn't lead a fire team to the head! FF.

9:23 PM ET

February 4, 2010

Your response was too predictable.

Have a nice day, "Groundpounder."

STEVE C

9:17 PM ET

February 5, 2010

"It is not enough to protect

"It is not enough to protect the population, they must be given the means to protect themselves." (Interesting point for whoever revises the Army/Marine COIN manual to mull.) "Bottom line: We promised them the means to secure themselves in a way that did not disrupt their cultural order." That is, he explains, they didn't want police directed by Baghdad because they feared Iranian infiltration of Iraqi security forces.

That's a major departure from the Surge narrative (yes, I know you hate the word), don't you think?