Tuesday, February 2, 2010 - 12:19 PM

When I called last year for closing the undergraduate service academies and replacing them with something like the British Sandhurst model, it caused so much controversy that my related recommendation to shutter the war colleges (except maybe for the Naval War College's strategy department) went all but ignored.
So I was pleased to see retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert Scales take up the issue in the February 2010 issue of Proceedings. Scales knows what he is talking about -- he's a former commandant of the Army War College with a PhD in history. He says:
The best and brightest are avoiding the war colleges in favor of service in Iraq and Afghanistan. The average age of war college students has increased from 41 to 45, making this institution a preparation for retirement rather than a launching platform for strategic leadership.
Yow. If we're looking to trim the Pentagon budget, that sounds like a good place to start. But there's more. Scales also worries about the practice of contracting out teaching to civilians. Professional military education, or PME, he says, has become "an intellectual backwater."
The answer, he says, lies not in academic reform but in the military personnel system:
The truth is, PME reform is not a pedagogical problem. It's a personnel problem that can addressed only by changing the military's reward system to favor those with the intellectual right stuff.
Driving home the point, another article in the same issue, by Army Maj. Niel Smith, one of the lions of Ramadi, takes a pop at "a lethargic [military] education bureaucracy staffed largely by retirees and contractors."
Would guess this is probably an Army problem, mostly. Various parts of the military at various times have downgraded the value of the senior service colleges for their front-runners (nuke submariners never did send their best and probably do not do so now, e.g.). But USMC has always held the colleges high in regard (a future commandant was classmate of mine at National) and so has USAF (a future Air Force Chief of Staff was a classmate of mine at National). This blog has earlier carried suggestions that Army is downplaying PME in general and this seems part of that. But would not generalize Scales' comments to all Services without more info.
And should this not be seen as further evidence that My Favorite Army is going through a bad patch? Clueless on strategy and on procurement programs, unresponsive to the scandals at Abu Ghraib, inert on sexual harassment in deployed units, My Favorite Army seems to cry out for reform. But no one seems to hear that where it might matter. Big issue. Big worry.
And good to see Proceedings coming forward with this. Have been telling them for years to expand their ambit to all the Services and to joint issues. Best military journal around - nothing else like it. Wilkerson is winning....
Delighted to see RD give a well-earned salute to 'Proceedings', the best professional military journal of them all by a nautical mile.
I understand there may be a short piece on military blogging in the next issue...
While the Army indeed does have it's problems, one of the reasons it is so highlighted is because THEY and the USMC are doing most of the fighting. Big Navy has just as many problems, especially in it's Senior Officer Corps, it personnel and rating system, standards, etc..Only NavSof and NavAir folk are really in deep in the conflicts. Look at the recent case at the USNA and what the CNOs goals are even though we have been at war since 01' yo would not know it the Navy. The only major change the Navy has made is to adopt Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) Navy wide and that took them till 2004! Heck, standards are being dropped all over the place in the Navy now, even at BUD/S, where a push for 500 more SEALs has caused a lot of changes in the program and Big Navy has taken it and the SEAL Prep program over at Great Lakes and is running it like a day care center. So, while I am with you that the Army is in dire straits, the Navy could "change course" too.
Oh, and "Proceedings" is by far the best Military Professional Magazine out there Hunter, Army Professional Mags are mostly about self love ;)
Navy SEAL BUD’s getting easier?? Ha! In your dreams. About the only thing that has changed is that the drops for physical injuries that do not permit continuation are being given more rollbacks and time to heal. And rollback means exactly that, rollback to the beginning. My kid actually went through hell week three times as a result of first pneumonia and second a lung embolism. The Indoc pass rates are no higher now that they have ever been (20%) and then they lose more through the para, diving and ground phases and finally the SQT. Only Brit Marines and SAS can compare.
Trust me, it is easier. They are not allowed to hammer the kids anymore unless it is scheduled in and approved via the CoC. They are not running to and from chow anymore. They are not doing head carries with the boats and you are allowed to get rolled back continually. The Skipper at BUD/S was told in no certain terms to have 200+ students get through every year. They are also moving to drop it to 22 weeks vice 26 that is has always been. It may change with the next CO and it changes time to time due to one CO's philosophy but there is a huge push for 500 more team guys, Big Navy want's a return on it's investment. Ask your kid on the West Coast, trust me, it is easier.
Eric, I have a reply to your thoughts about changes in BUD's from my kid in Afghanistan. It is lengthy so send me your email address to JPWREL@gmail.com and I will send it to you. He has a good friend who was on the American Swim Team at the Beijing Olympics who just completed his SQT and he will get more updated info for you from him. BTW, I was in Coronado in October and on base using the beach in front of ST 7 and the BUD’s class was running with boats on their heads.
Just shoot it to me, I am at my handle Eric_Strattoniii@yahoo.com
The BUD/S classes just started going to no head carries, it is an expierment by the new CO, they do that stuff all the time. If you want to get a good feel for what is going on there, go to SOCNET.com Lot's of retired Frogs on it, it is also the current place of the "Wall of Shame" checks.
You two should really get a room somewhere - then you can congratulate yourselves and the Navy all day long.
Those of us that don't know what a nautical mile is don't care...; - )
Hunter, a nautical mile is a very useful system of measurement representing approximately 1 minute of arc of latitude (1.15078 land miles) thus is convenient for aviation and water navigation using Mercator projection charts. The Navy is keen on navigation and seemingly unlike the Army prefers to know where it is going. :-)
The "Best and the Brightest" are Leaving the Army in Droves!
Memo to Beltway Bobby Scales: The "Best and the Brightest" aka competent officers have been leaving the Army in droves once they realized our corrupt political and military leaders weren't really serious about WINNING the GWOT!
the issue isn't up yet, and even if it is, it's probably behind a subscriber wall. If not, could you please give us more direct links?
Thanks
anon_anon
http://www.usni.org/
The February issueI just received yesterday and contains a major section on "Military Education & Training'. My guess is that the Feb. issue will show up on the site later this month. There is also a nice section piece 'Mess Deck Intelligence' operated by our friend Rubber Ducky which I cannot locate on the internet? A little help RD?
Proceedings Feb issue (some links are members only): http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/index.asp
MilBlogging piece: http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=2202
I asked the Senior Editor (old friend) to pass the piece along to MSGT Grisham and he this: "Grisham received an electronic copy and thought "Mess Deck Intelligence" was a real blog. So I guess we pulled it off." Great fun.
Damn, sure do miss the edit function.
...Mr. Ricks, that Scales' overarching argument isn't to close the senior PME institutions, which is implied in your brief exegesis of his piece. Rather, it is to re-create them i ways more meaningful to strategic leadership. One can argue usefully about the value of service academies, to be sure, but only a charlatan - with due respect - would suggest that staff college education is dispensable. Scales, like any historically-literate observer of military affairs, would recoil from your gratuitous assertion that "[i]f we're looking to trim the Pentagon budget, that sounds like a good place to start."
Nah, I like the staff colleges. In fact, as a friend of mine at the Pentagon notes, that is really where the system works, and needs to. If I were king of PME, I'd
--put on a ban on sending officers to the war colleges as "pre-retirement" tours
--consider closing each of the war colleges altogether
--move my best teachers and most of my research money to the staff college level. This is where you can really affect the future of the officer corps
--do away with most retiree teachers, except the ones who are truly excellent teachers or researchers, and aim to get combat-experienced active-duty officers back as teachers
--and, as I said a year ago, close the service academies as undergraduate institutions and make them more like Sandhurst--that is, graduate institutions focussed on military service
Best,
Tom
Mr. Ricks. The problem is not that there is no need for the War Colleges, but rather they have not turned out the critical, strategic leaders our Nation so desperately needs. The "select for promotion people that think just like I do" has produced a generation of rsik-averse senior leaders that do not "push back" against silly ideas. The solution, congressionally-mandated, might be to sever the influence these perfumed princes have over the education process and force some sea changes at the War Colleges.
Tom-
Three comments on senior-level war colleges.
1. The National War College (full disclosure: graduate and faculty in the past) does a very good job of both forcing future leaders to think and forcing them to shift to a joint perspective. Reasonable persons can disagree, but I think an objective cost-vs-benefit review of National would say net-net it is very much worth keeping. There is no other experience like it in leading future senior leaders of the Services to see how a). the national-security apparatus functions and b). how the federal government functions. These are vital learning areas for future chiefs of service etc.
2. The CNO's Strategic Studies Group at Newport is a total success. Small size, big impact on both Navy thinking and future Navy leaders. O-6s only; nearly all are flag-bound. Naval War College itself seems to just grind out graduates, with no real influence or special learning, but SSG is top notch.
3. Leavenworth's SAMs course is in the same category as Navy's SSG, but for O-4s. It has an incredible track record. That's where My Favorite Army should be going for clear-headed analysis and insight, uncluttered by career lusts and the stifling of thought by flags.
if everything's a priority - nothing is
i won't apologize for the cliche -- in this midst of all the things our military could focus on -- would we really rather our best military officers go teach or lead units in combat?
I think we should promote guys w/ the right intellectual stuff - but if you're a lousy Bn or BDE commander with a PHD -- you will probably be that much more of pompous smart GO.
Tom - I know you have been rough on TRADOC and the Service Academies - but I've been on active duty since 1994 and must admit today's Army might not be as focused on these TDA activities as it once was -- BUT I DON'T MISS THE GLORY DAYS - where a TRADOC assignment to NTC made you a shoo-in for promotion. Must say I don't think a generation of COLs and Generals in 2001-2004 benefited a wit from the system that you seem to fete and miss - the vast majority of them were/ are lousy.
The USAF had three levels of PME (probably still does) -- Squadron Officer's School, Air Command & Staff College, and the Air War College. SOS was fun back in the 70s but I'd be hard-pressed to recall any lasting value I derived from attending. ACSC is probably the right level -- O-4 & -5 -- and I agree that AWC is probably a luxury we can't afford these days. So we should bag most of the PME and above all (for the Air Force), get it out of Alabama. We just can't attract good scholarly talent down there. Carlisle and Newport are soooo much better!
War College versus Staff College
Tom -
As you may or may not know, Newport is the home of both the Naval Command and Staff College and the Naval War College. The same faculty teaches both courses.
I think reform of the war college system would be more productive than obliteration. I taught for a number of years in civilian academic institutions, and have some pretty good ideas about the strengths and weaknesses of both undergraduate and graduate programs in a range of disciplines (I still teach as an adjunct at a major foreign policy-focused graduate program). The number of schools that could run a decent course in military strategy, much less a program, can be counted on two hands. The number of schools that could teach a decent course on grand strategy - which is what senior level Professional Military Education is supposed to incorporate - might get as high as twenty (although I would tend to doubt it - what passes for "grand strategy" in political science is a bit unfocused, for the most part). But at each of those institutions, there might only be one or two faculty qualified to teach such a course. And the hiring preferences of both political science/government and of history departments across the country has moved away from the study of war and military affairs.
Civilian schools lack the faculty, training, and expertise to teach strategy to the number of officers who are required to get JPME II qualifications - which, by the way, includes a large dose of operational doctrine that NO academic institution in the country could possibly deliver (and whether they would want to or not is a political question that I'll leave for others).
Dumping all the faculty and resources into staff colleges won't fix that problem. It will simply leave a gaping hole at the level of strategic education that private institutions will be utterly unable, and almost certainly unwilling, to provide in the sense of current law and regulation.
To me, that suggests that reform is a better way to go.
Tim Hoyt
Tom - have you actually been to the AWC beyond giving a speech?
You need to sit with us for National Security Seminar week. Maybe you already have and you found the program still lacking. Let me know, perhaps I can find you a seat for that last week. I can't promise any time for golf but perhaps you can be a bit more open minded.
As for me, I believe I've benefited from looking at problems from a strategic perspective (which also comes from a vast international fellow presence).
Send me a message if you want to go.
Please send info to
ricksblog@cnas.org
I have to do a lot of research at Carlisle at some point, so this might actually be doable.
thanks,
Tom
more to follow by end of the week.
will send info to your email
It may be that discussions like this one (off campus and out of the official realm) and the periodic revisits of the subject by ike Skelton are the closest this topic comes to actual review and judgment. The whole realm of PME and Service academies have the characteristics of a vaca sagrada, a sacred cow not to be touched or discussed by practical mortals. What deserves objective hearing may have no venue where such is possible, at least inside official circles.
This is a good noise to continue.
You'll find my rebuttal to Tom's last April Washington Post Op-Ed that originally started this entire firestorm in this month's February edition of Proceedings under the "Nobody Asked Me But" column. I wholeheartedly agree with Tim Hoyt (who was one of my instructors at Newport...) -- a reformation of the War College / PME system is in order, not wholesale destruction. And I also concur with MG Scales that the respective service personnel systems are much to blame for putting priorities in the wrong place regarding war colleges. But remember that the personnel systems reflect the service priorities for their officers -- which in turn is driven by Title X U.S.C. requirements, which frankly comes down to timing before statutory retirement gates coupled with meeting career milestones for upwardly mobile officers. Start with reforming the Title X requirements (which provided more time in an officer's career pre-Goldwater-Nichlols), and you'll get more flexibility and better officer quality in the war colleges, but you'll also have the ability to send more officers to advanced degrees. Hopefully that will happen this next year under the DoD Pay and Personnel Review. Absent that, it has to happen at the local level. As a CO, I sent all my best officers to Newport. If it isn't forced or made a priority, it will never happen.
1) JPWREL: What is SQT?
2) Tom: To what extent do specialized staff schools at the 0-6 level fulfill their function? I'm thinking specifically about the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, which I'm assuming is different than more generalist schools.
Thanks
O-5s and O-6s. Has been referred to as "the government's senior spot-welding institute." of course, this was from folks at its across-the-street neighbor, The National War College, which ICAF students invariably call The House of Lords.
ICAF is another senior service college, with emphasis on the industrial base and logistics. But shares elective courses with National and often has joint lectures. ICAF students tend toward techies, loggies, etc. Less specialized than you might imagine, but also a lot more substantial than many think. I'm a creature of National, but I have never knocked ICAF; co-equal in my view, with useful/necessary focus and high standards.
SQT is the final phase of BUD's called SEAL Qualification Training and takes place in Alaska. If they get through this they get their Tridents.
RubberDucky:
Apologies for the curtness of my reply, and thanks for the length of yours.
Regards,
Anon_Anon
JPWREL:
As with RubberDucky, thanks for explaining what SQT is.
Anon_Anon
Good on you for recognizing the Royal Marines. I thought they got overlooked with a training program as long as theirs. I saw a documentary on them, and while I know all military documentaries on elite units emphasize the toughness of the training, I was struck nonetheless (in particular by the youth of the candidates).
The RMC is very good, 32 weeks of Boot. They can then screen for the SBS or SAS in 3 week selection course followed by a long Operators Training Course. The SBS used to have there own selection but were forced into one selection course with the SAS. The SBS and SEALs work together a lot on the East Coast and the West Coast works with the Aussie SAS a lot who are better than most anyone at RECCE, even the Brits.
SQT is about 6 months now really, SERE as a class (2 wks), Navy Static/MFF (4wks) as a class and 15 weeks of tactics, shooting, etc..with another week as well, ending with 3 weeks in Alaska add up to 22 weeks at present time. They just started a new qual for them to go through 12 weeks of Language Training when they check into there teams.
the 3 weeks in Alaska are at the end of the 15 weeks of tactics and training, as in they start in Alaska after the 12th week. I really miss the edit button. :)
It's much worse and a little better than you think.
Having worked at a few PME over the years I have been shocked (but not surprised) by serious plagerism. Only when leadership takes it seriously is it addressed and that's more rare than common in my direct personal observation.
There are many retirement guys staffing them, both on the civilian AND military side. That's not all bad if the syllabi are up to date. With notable exceptions, uniformed staff are soft on developing cutting edge classes. Many civilian instructors are publishing and keeping up to date with developments but their mil colleagues are not trained for that or building classes. In the fields of strategy and culture the mil guys do warfighting courses very well but tend, tend, to not see the grand strategy piece. The reason for the war colleges generally.
About 1/2 my war college students are engaged in higher level work that required PME preparation. About 1/2 retired. Better screening is called for. Perhaps a middle ground should be to abolish the duplication of non resident PME as a prerequirement for resident.
We could probably do away with war colleges and concentrate on staff colleges if we can get students to focus the first time they do the material instead of making it breathtakingly easy for them to cheat. But they do sometimes act, for example when the CIA student ( who was due to the go on faculty after taking the class) was caught cheating and kicked out. If they were any good they should Not have been caught!
BTW civilians are employees of the services not KBR etc their tentacles have not reached that far, yet! Give it time. ;-)
Unless much stricter standards are applied and people failed for not meeting the standard, staff or war college won't matter as much as what either produces.
Oh and BTW, typically the services take an obstacle course at OCS much more seriously than PME. Both professionally and morally. Think about that. In a war of ideas intellectual dishonesty is a sure path to failure.
I agree with MG Scales that the US officer corps must take the core of its professon seriously -- i.e., expertise in the use of organized violence to achieve political outcomes -- and tailor its professional education programs to knowledge (as opposed to information) appropriate for officers to practice their profession at their rank.
But I was dismayed at his (I am sure accidental) implication that civilian employees of the Department of Defense who possess terminal degrees (read: Ph.D.) in an approporaite field (military or diplomatic history, strategic or security studies, appropriate subfields of anthropology, sociology, and economics) should not be employed as faculty. Those civilian Ph.D.s are the professionals in this field and I found it ironic than in his call to value letters over action MG Scales ignored these men of letters.
As FrustratedInDC recognized, these civilian employees embody the institution. They remain employed year in and year out as uniformed faculty and leadership come and go. They write the curriculum. They spend a good deal of time engaging in the "professional development" of their uniformed colleagues on the faculty who have operational, leadership, and technical experience but whose only exposure to education has been on the other side of the desk. And they hold the line as best they can against the tendency to socially promote officers whose work would not be acceptable on a staff, in the field, or in an operational traning setting. We fight that fight constantly and, at least of late, my leadership has backed us. As FrustratedInDC stated, we have ended some careers over plaigerism.
In 1949, Bernard Brodie wrote a similar article in World Politics. Change is slow. Enjoy the suck.
LOL, Mr. RICKS Has Awful READING COMPREHENSION!
General Scales LAMENTS a military culture that UNDERVALUES institutions like services academies and the War College!
He WARNS AGAINST encouraging officers to disregard periods of reflection among peers.
The old Ricks article regarding the service academy closure idea - and thus Ricks himself - was so thoroughly discredited that he must still be struggling to comprehend new articles through the self-loathing tears flowing from his eyes. Perhaps reading slower would help him improve his reading comprehension.
With luck, the next Ricks article will be an EPIC RETRACTION!
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