By Yasser M.
El-Shimy
Best Defense
Cairo bureau chief
A consensus appears to be emerging that the
Islamic Republic of Iran is working day and night to construct a nuclear arms
arsenal. Adherents to this belief cite Tehran's clandestine activities, such as
the installation in Qum, evasive diplomacy and lack of cooperation with
international inspectors. While Iran has, in fact, been guilty of all of the
above, there is little evidence to suggest that once Iran reaches enrichment
technology, it is going to cross the threshold. On the contrary, it has many
disincentives not to.
First, should Iran become a nuclear power,
it is likely to confront "crippling sanctions" that would not only target its
military, but the economy at large. Iranians are not willing to see their
country become another North Korea. Furthermore, in spite of its repressive
inclinations, the Iranian regime goes through parliamentary and presidential
elections every four years. This electoral mechanism ensures that politicians
are subject to review by the public every four years. While Iranians
overwhelmingly support their nation's right to peaceful nuclear power, it is
not clear if they would support a nuclear arms program that retards their
country's economy.
Second, a nuclear-armed Iran is likely to
induce balancing behavior by other actors in the region, including Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Israel and Turkey. These countries would buttress their defenses
(presumably with state-of-the-art American weaponry) and might even develop
their own Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities. Countries that used
to maintain cordial relations with Iran, such as Turkey, would probably sever
its relations with Tehran; therefore, amplifying Iran's international
isolation. In other words, Iran would trigger a robust U.S. -sponsored
anti-Iran alliance.
The Islamic Republic has incentives in
maintaining its current strategic postures that are even more strategically
compelling:
First, the Middle East has been profoundly
polarized since 2003 between the pro-American "moderates camp" including Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries as
well as Israel, on the one hand, and the anti-American "resistance camp"
including Iran, Syria, Sudan, Hamas and Hizbullah, on the other. The lines of
that division are becoming progressively blurry, however, as Iran attracts some
regional actors away from the moderates.
This strategic gain, to be sure, is conditional upon Iran's image as an
influential regional actor that has no bone to pick with its Arab neighbors.
Although Iran is more militarily powerful than her Arab neighbors, its
confrontational strategic posture is almost exclusively directed at Israel and
American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. This image buys Iran a lot of goodwill
among Arab masses. It also makes it possible for traditionally pro-American
countries like Qatar and Turkey, as well as movements like the Lebanese March
14th, to seek better relations with her. The goodwill of the Arab
populace and the diplomatic relations with some of her neighbors corrode the
otherwise salient "rogue state" perception.
Second, over the past seven years, Iran has
come to enjoy unprecedented strategic influence in the region. Iran, in many
respects, is quite present in the politics and policies of Iraq, Lebanon,
Syria, Qatar and Gaza. This influence is predicated on Tehran's ability to
project her power without appearing as too menacing to her Arab neighbors. An
Iran with the technology to build nuclear weapons would be just that. A nuclear-armed
Iran would trigger large-scale regional balancing.
Third, and perhaps most significantly,
Iran's threshold status dissuades both Israel and the United States from
launching a military strike on it, let alone attempt coercive regime change.
The fear is that an attack on Iran would accelerate rather than eliminate their
nuclear weapons program.
It is far more likely that the Islamic
Republic of Iran is going to become an opaque nuclear power. To put it
differently, Iran would develop the technological and infrastructural capacity
to build nuclear arms, without actually taking the final step of making the
bomb. Strategically speaking, this is the scenario that bolsters Iran's
regional influence without incurring costly repercussions.
Read More
(11)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE