Just what happened at Wanat?: The Army finally thinks it knows

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Monday, February 1, 2010 - 4:41 PM Share

Interestingly, the military has released a report saying that something indeed did go wrong with command of the battle in Wanat, Afghanistan in July 2008.

If anyone has a copy of the new investigation, please do send along. As far as I know, families of the fallen have not yet been given one.

Spencer Platt/Getty Images

EXPLORE:SOUTH ASIA, AFGHANISTAN, MILITARY

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N75

7:52 AM ET

February 2, 2010

Actions Speak Louder Than Words

"US defence officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP a Central Command investigation faults three officers, including a battalion commander, for their role and suggests possible disciplinary action."

The officer who commanded the battalion at Wanat currently commands the same brigade now deployed to Afghanistan. If the investgation results in disciplinary action, one wonders if it will result in a change in tactical methodolgy, or if we will see the same errors in leadership, judgment, and tactical acumen multiplied by a factor of three. Certainly both the CJTF and Bde commanders share the responsibility for the failures at Wanat, but the battalion commander bears the final responsibility for accepting the risk this platoon had to bear.

GTWICKLER

4:50 PM ET

February 2, 2010

Facts

"The officer who commanded the battalion at Wanat currently commands the same brigade now deployed to Afghanistan."

Incorrect. As far as I know he’s currently DCO of the Ranger Regiment.
COL James H. Johnson III commands 173rd Airborne Brigade in Afghanistan, right now. He served two tours as battalion commander of 2-327 Infantry in Iraq.

DHC_USA

1:08 AM ET

February 5, 2010

COL Johnson

COL Johnson was the Deputy Brigade Commander of the 173rd during Wanat, and was the Investigating Officer on the flawed 15-6 investigation that formed the basis of the coverup presented to COL Brostrom and other families. Not only did he violate Army regulations by serving as Investigating Officer of an event (establishing a Combat Outpost at Wanat) which he ordered and supervised in the Brigade Commander's absence (Prysler), but he also violated the Army's core values of duty, honor and country in whitewashing the 15-6 report in order to advance his career. Never once did he consider the ethical lapses in what he was doing, or the consequences that any officer with a modicum of intelligence would readily grasp (i.e., the tremendous pain and suffering inflicted on the family members of soldiers killed and wounded at Wanat - a travesty that he commanded from his safe haven in Jalalabad). He is living up to the new Army creed of "it's not about serving America, it's about getting my star(s)." No accident that the Army is not releasing the CENTCOM report - they want this to go away like the other investigations they were forced to conduct. Petraeus had his chance to do the right thing and failed. Senator Webb is the only hope that we have to re-establish accountability and responsibility in the Army's broken system of fixing blame on the lowest ranking soldiers, and rewarding anyone at the BN command level and higher with promotions and medals.

RUBBER DUCKY

1:26 PM ET

February 5, 2010

WaPo

Today's Washington post has piece that says the report has been held up in the Chairman's office and the Mullen is doing so to give Army more time to decide if disciplinary action should be considered for others not yet identified. Sounds like a desire by that sailor to get it right before it gets published.

ERIC_STRATTONIII

7:32 PM ET

February 3, 2010

Washington Post has a Good Read on it

Three Officers are being recommended for disciplinary action according to the report being done by the Army via the Washington Post. The OIC, the O who sent them there and the CO of the Group. The OIC was awarded a Silver Star for his action on but is still be recommended for disciplinary action.

N75

10:17 AM ET

February 6, 2010

Accountability for tactical failures

Holding a chain of command responsible for tactical failures isn't new to the U.S. Army. But it has taken nine years of war to remind us that commanders are responsible for everything their unit does or fails to do. Check out http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_FSB_Mary_Ann for the similarities between the fights at Wanat VPB, COP Keating, and Fire Base Mary Ann in Vietnam in 1971. The battalion, brigade, and division commanders were all held accountable and relieved for the fiasco in Vietnam. Has anyone questioned the CJTF-101 commander's role in Wanat or the CJTF-82 commander's role in Kamdesh?

As DHC_USA pointed out, the Senate may the last line of defence for a senior commander's accountability. The Army may select a colonel for brigadier general but the Senate has to confirm the selection.