Wednesday, January 27, 2010 - 1:30 PM

When retired Army Col. Stuart Herrington talks about intelligence, and especially about interrogation issues, I listen. His time in Vietnam was captured well in his book Silence was a Weapon also published under the title Stalking the Vietcong. He ran a secret interrogation operation on an island off the coast of Panama after the invasion of Panama, where, he says, much was learned about Noriega's relations with Cuba and the PLO. He ran a similar secret operation after the 1991 Gulf War. In 2004, he was asked to look into U.S. intelligence operations in Iraq and produced a scathing report that, to my knowledge, has never been released. (As I understand it, the report wasn't classified, but only two copies were made of it.) To my knowledge, he was one of the first people to blow the whistle on Abu Ghraib and on the broader abuse of prisoners that was occurring in many locations in Iraq back then.
Last November, Herrington gave a speech at Fort Leavenworth, sponsored by the CGSC Foundation, in which he explored how U.S. interrogation operations went badly off track after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, becoming both abusive and counterproductive. But he also worries that the remedies instituted could cripple our intelligence gathering efforts.
One of the most striking aspects of his talk is the cold professional contempt he has for Cheney, Rumsfeld and others who not only encouraged a brutal approach, but were amateurish in doing so.
Herrington began his talk by looking back to Vietnam, where he insisted on providing his prisoners(and intelligence targets) with "unconditional decent treatment-food, medical care and clothing." He showed his Vietnamese colleagues, fond of using "water torture and electrocution," that "One can employ legions of effective stratagems to achieve control over a potential recruit, but brutality, abuse and torture have no place."
He used the same approach after the invasion of Panama and the Gulf War, in each case establishing "guest houses" were prisoners were given air conditioned rooms and treated well. "We afforded unconditional decent treatment to our Iraqi guests," he said. "We did not gloat over the coalition's lopsided victory, but channeled their anger towards Saddam Hussein, who had set them up for defeat and humiliation."
His bottom line:
"There was no room on our team for charlatans who believed in sleep deprivation, inducing hypothermia, stress positions, face slapping, forced nudity, water boarding, blaring heavy metal music, or other amateurish, ineffective and ethically flawed tricks."
We would do well to read the story of Hans Sharff, the greatest interrogator ever. Incidentally, he was never known to have even so much as raised his voice, let alone lay a finger, on any Allied POW.
If we only had a Gestapo we could use to threaten to turn over our prisoners to unless they talked (Sharff's main questioning technique)????
Thanks, but no.
The threat of being sent to a state prison
and there subjected to unprotected prison sex provides a powerful interrogation tool, here in my country. No need to shout, or spill scalding coffee. The 'ringleader' in doing the rubber-glove Abu Grab was a state prison guard, before his ANG MP unit was mobilized.
There's never been an expose of how JSOC handled things at the Bagram prison. We do know that US prison conditions provide fertile conditions for Muslim recruitment.
Just to set a scope of accountability...
does anyone know what the chain of command existed from the national command down to the enhanced interrogator. the real path, not the official line...who at JCS was the go to man or woman...who knew and then condoned the activity....general officers and admirals....if it was corrupted who was the Cheney/Rummey action officer...
Ibn Shaykh Al Libi - does that name ring a bell?
The man was snatched-up in Pakistan having fled the Spin Ghar mountains, in late 2001. After initially interrogated by the U.S., he was turned over to Egypt for further "questioning."
It seems Al Libi provided information that there was a connection between Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons production capacity and al-Qaeda. And as everyone should recall, this was cited to justify our run-up to invading Iraq. President Bush himself used this information in a speech, and Colin Powell, also noted this information among the amateurish evidence he presented to the U.N., despite concerns from some American intelligence officers that al Libi was feeding information he wanted us to hear (perhaps someone specifically wanted to hear?).
al-Libi later recanted stating he had been tortured. It would seem the information he gave turned out to be false, as some in the intelligence community suspected, since no WMDs were found in Iraq.
Rank amateurs indeed!
Can someone provide insight on this:
-The vice President is not in the Chain of Command. Anything he said, or directed, COCOMs and those in the military do not have to follow. Why is the CIA and military taking direction from a VP? From the SECDEF (Rumsfeld), yes he was in harge, but what is the VP in charge of. What military commander can say "it was the VP's policy? As detestable as he may be, are there any military officer's out there saying they took orders from the VP? I think that the VP giving orders to the military on interrrogation may be misguided, or am I way off on this?
The answer, I think, is that Vice President Cheney's role in the Bush administration was without precedent.
Everyone in the chain of command during Bush's first term assumed that Cheney would only be giving directives and asking questions because that was what Bush had told him to do. That is the way things had worked in all previous administrations; Vice Presidents did not exercise autonomous authority. The idea that Cheney might do what he did, not because Bush had ordered him to, but rather because Bush did not object or did not know about it, does not seem to have occurred to too many people. It evidently did not occur even to Bush until his first term was almost over.
This is one of the less discussed ironies of the younger Bush's administration. Few Presidents made greater, more sweeping claims of Executive authority or made a greater show of exercising Presidential power. However, few Presidents, and none of the modern ones, allowed so much of their authority to be usurped by subordinates. Just as Cheney could not have taken over direction of government policy in so many respects early in Bush's administration if Bush had made any effort at all to stop him, Treasury Secretary Paulson could not have committed unprecedented financial resources to staving off the financial meltdown at the end of Bush's administration if Bush had been anything more than a rubber stamp.
It's worth considering whether this experience -- that of a weak President making sweeping claims of Executive authority without significant challenge from an enfeebled Congress, a sclerotic judiciary and an entertainment-oriented, easily distracted media -- represents an exception in our history or a precedent.
The Nation is hardly an objective magazine
JSOC is set up so it can actually function outside the box, it is not dangerous and most Generals are ALL about control and Risk Adversion, JSOC is not. It should NEVER be put under conventional controls, it is not what it is designed for.
Never underestimate politics at that level, once a guy makes 05 he is all about politics, 06 even worse and so on and so on, they are at that point very little about being combat effective or thinking of the big picture as it relates to military success. There is and always will be a huge battle for control between the Conventional and Unconventional Forces. The Army is the worst about this and hates that way that Unconventional Forces act, are regulated, take risks, etc...If many of the Conventional Force Generals had there way they would abolish JSOC and place control of those elements in it under Conventional or at least SOCOM (Which is becoming more and more conventional all the time) and that would effectively kill the whole idea behind them. A lot of times it is all about protecting one's Rice Bowls, the Flag Officers are repeat offenders on that, Powell, as great of a man as he continues to be, is no exception when he was on AD. Dont think those guys forget old grudges too. Risk Adverse and Control, keep those terms in mind whenever looking at ANY Conventional Gen or Admiral, it does not effect the Marines as badly but the other branches are horrible about it.
It's weird, because there seems to be no way of knowing whether this guy is completely full of crap or not, which may say something abut the corrosive nature of secret interrogation camps.
Regardless, it seems he never had to do any actual interrogation during hostilities, so I wonder if such an experience would change his views. I mean, it would seem to me, just as an ignorant observer, that there would be a big difference in getting information from a vanquished combatant once hostilities have ceased, and one that was more motivated in the midst of hostilities. As well as distinct pressures on those trying to get the information.
I, too, am a fan of Sharff and I'm not a big fan of torture, both ethically and professionally. Torture can work and has worked. Isrealis have tortured terrorists, who subsequently gave up new information that was reliable and the US did the same thing after 9/11. The single or handful of cases where it works, however, does not justify it professionally or ethically.
The problem has been and remains that if you torture someone to get information, its difficult to determine how reliable that information is. Sometimes it is reliable, sometimes it is an intentional lie, sometimes it is a story to make the torture stop. Lawyers have noted that coersive questioning like the Reid Technique have produced false confessions. In Algeria, it was noted that false confessions obtained through torture were counter productive as the intel was useless and analysts were tied up confirming the fact that the confessions were false.
The question becomes, when you use a tool like torture are you creating more uncertainty than you are dispelling? In 98% of the cases, I'd say it isn't worth it. Ethically, the ticking time bomb scenario justifies torture, but isn't realistic. You never know exactly what another person knows or exactly what it will take to get it out of them. You are always commiting an act of certain evil (torture) with an uncertain reward (questionable intel).
Bottom line: Torture is bad.
Torture certainly worked for the French in Algeria, but you'll note, Gen. Jacques Massau toward the end of his life stated, "it wasn't indispensible, we could have gotten along without it very well."
Incidentally, you had better know a few of the details before resorting to the use of torture, or as you allude to, you'll be chasing around the globe wasting time, on possibly perishable information, trying to vet it.
My bet is we filled in the blanks - blanks that kept scared men awake at night - on general information that would eventually be supplied to us by cooperating foreign intelligence agencies. Too bad we didn't know when to stop.
Just a caveat: before we canonize Colonel Herrington, you can also bet most of the Vietnamese brought to him had been softened up prior.
Tom
I think you've gone overboard on Herrington - I am a fan too, but I've read Herrington's reports on interrogation in Iraq 2003 - they are strong and pointed, but are far short of pointing out abusive behavior.
HIs paper refers to the uses of music, stress positions and face slapping as unhelpful as concepts and not in terms of a first person witness account at Abu Gharib.
Sighting him as a whistle blower for Abu G is factually incorrect and if the Col is fashioning himself this way in speeches these days, he's overblowing his own horn.
His paper in 2003 site the shortcommings of FM 34-52's harsher approaches to gain positive intelligence and do recommend the types of debriefing strategies that he employed successfully in Vietnam and in the 1st Gulf War -- techniques that Hans Sharff employed well as your readers note.
I still have his papers - they are a solid primer on putting together a debriefing operation. I would be happy to e-mail them to you if your're interested or I can post them after reviewing their classification.
I thnk you are referring to another Herrington document. I am traveling and don't have the Iraq Herrington report with me, but I remember falling off my chair when I read it. It was very clear about abuses, about specific units, and specific problems. I actually discussed some of this in Fiasco.
That said, feel free to post the other stuff. The more Herrington the better, I say.
Thanks,
Tom
TYRTAIOS, if torture worked for the French . . .
If torture worked for the French, why did they lose the war,? In part because the French people were appalled by the depths to which their military had sunk. Don't forget that their equivalent of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs was found to be complicit in a plot against the government and that a LTC was executed for his role.
Thanks,
Tom
I think TYRTAIOS was being facetious otherwise the rest of the post is out of context, as would all his anti-torture posts.
Indeed Tom, you are correct, France lost Algeria several years later. The repugnance by the French population upon learning of the barbaric methods used there was also a catalyst, though not entirely, for the downfall of the Fourth Republic and ushering-in Charles de Gaulle.
I have had many talks on this subject with a French para, who as a young lieutenant served in Algeria, my Father-in-Law. It is his opinion, and others, that many felt the shame for Indo-China and the humiliation of Dien Bien Phu, and vowed they would not let it happen again.
I wonder if some good men didn't blindly feel the same way after 9/11? Certainly Dick Cheny pressed the Agency hard knowing they too were humiliated with their intelligence failure and would do his bidding - the end justifying the means.
You will note my reference to General Massu's late in life contrition and very public renouncing of the use of torture (did you know after le Grand Charlie's death, each year Massu would ride a horse 150 miles to pay his respects at his old general's grave site? He and his second wife adopted several Algerian orphans.
If you ever run into retired LtGen. Bernard Trainer, ask him to recount how they got a rather defient Viet-Cong POW whom is command had captured, to spill his guts when they noticed he was getting rather agitated over a minor cinematic masterpiece being previewed by the interrogator-translator team in the rear, and how they arranged a conjugal visit by his wife.
Obviously there are enhanced methods of interrogation. : )
So there were no Generals or Admirals outside of JSOC....
and a hapless AR or NG who had any knowledge. Neither Myers nor Pace(CJCS) nor Giambastiani(VCJCS) (at one time aide to Gates, Rummey and Cheney, friend to Rice, Scalia) and all those other Joint Command dukes who AORs became way stops and torturer brothel locations. Knew nothing, aided nothing or condoned anything. This doesn't match with those who are entrusted with knowing what is going on - detail oriented commanders all - All hundreds of them on the Defense payroll.
Whistlers who walk by a murder or rapr as Peggy Noonan would define a hero of her political persuasion - a German or Pole or Austrian in the land of the Third Reich who never smells the odor of burning or rotting flesh in the air of that strange facility nearby. We had none of that type among our general officer corps?
Curious?
Stu Herrington's Methods May Work on Ninety Percent of POWs
I've known Stu Herrington for 35 years and he's an honorable man who’s well-intentioned. However, the interrogation methods that Stu espouses will only work on ninety percent of all POWs and enemy combatants. There's a ten percent element of hardcore recalcitrant fanatics who will interpret humane treatment as a sign of weakness, and dig in their heels and play hardball and never divulge any useful information. The only thing that these "ten per centers" understand is violence! And in life and death circumstances, seasoned professional interrogators must have the option of using varying degrees of violence to extract information from captured enemies known to possess valuable information that can save the lives of American citizens.
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