Toasted Eikenberry?

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Tuesday, January 26, 2010 - 3:55 PM Share

The New York Times today offers up the text of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry's previously disclosed cables from last November opposing Gen. McChrystal's proposed surge and counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. I'm not sure what the purpose of printing them now is, but I found the cables interesting.

Eikenberry makes a lot of well-reasoned argument about why he thinks McChrystal is wrong. But as I read them, I had the nagging feeling that he was mounting exactly the same set of arguments that Eikenberry's long-time friend Gen. John Abizaid made against the Iraq surge back in the fall of 2006, along with Gen. George Casey and just about everybody else in the leadership of the U.S. military establishment. "Rather then reducing Afghan dependence, sending more troops, therefore, is likely to deepen it, at least in the short term," Eikenberry writes. "That would further delay our goal of shifting the combat burden to the Afghans." Yes, that was indeed the Casey plan in Iraq, too.

But then there is the troublesome role played by Pakistan. Eikenberry argues -- I think correctly -- that:

More troops won't end the insurgency as long as Pakistan sanctuaries remain. Pakistan will remain the single greatest source of Afghan instability so long as the border sanctuaries remain, and Pakistan views its strategic interests as best served by a weak neighbor.

Good argument. On the other hand, how different is that really from the role that Iran is playing in Iraq, especially in the goal of having a weak, pliable neighbor?

I find myself ambivalent about Eikenberry's memo, I think partly because I remain ambivalent about the surge in Iraq, which I think succeeded tactically but failed strategically. That is, it improved security but didn't lead to a political breakthrough. It certainly is possible to have the same thing in Afghanistan. On the other hand, even that half-baked outcome beats the alternative.

That said, I am more optimistic about Afghanistan (but not about Pakistan) than I am about Iraq. We have a great ace in the hole in Afghanistan: The Afghan people have experienced Islamic extremist rule and they generally don't want it to come back. We don't hold a similar ace in Iraq.

I don't know why this memo was leaked now, but I don't see it making it any easier for Eikenberry to work with President Karzai -- or with General McChrystal. I wonder if he is a short-timer. Maybe replace him with old Holbrooke?

Meanwhile, in other COIN news, this Gian vs. John piece captures the debate well. Everybody else already has blogged it but I still wanted to point it out.

Alex Wong/Getty Images

EXPLORE:AFGHANISTAN, MILITARY, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, POLITICS

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NORWEGIAN SHOOTER

5:24 PM ET

January 26, 2010

Really?

"I'm not sure what the purpose of printing them now is" How about the public's right to know what our ambassador thinks about Afghanistan?

"How different is that really from the role that Iran is playing in Iraq?" Iran was supporting the majority who controlled the government in order to be able to suppress the minority, Pakistan is funding a minority trying to overthrow the government. Since the both governments are on "our side," Iran is supporting a stable Iraq while Pakistan is undermining stability in Afghanistan.

"On the other hand, even that half-baked outcome beats the alternative." How about considering the alternative as the status-quo, instead of rapid withdrawal and chaos. Is the Afghan surge really better than keeping 68,000 troops in country and protecting the amount of civilian population that is possible with that number?

"But I don't see it making it any easier for Eikenberry to work with President Karzai -- or with General McChrystal." You don't think these men can work together because the latter two know what Eikenberry really thinks about the situation? Lack of candor helps the relationships?

ELIOT

10:22 PM ET

January 26, 2010

"The very fact that the

"The very fact that the Taliban persist and grow in strength is a counter argument that our polling is accurate."

Demographics will always limit the appeal of the Taliban. Their Pashtun identity isn't universal nor are their cultural and religious assumptions. It doesn't help that they were incredibly brutal in repressing threats to their government back in the 90s.

SEANROSSI

3:54 AM ET

January 27, 2010

Unserious

Tom - it must be the newspaper man in you that sees the McCrystal/ Eikenberry, Karzai relationship as the story here...but I think you missed it.

Reading the cables makes me think Eikenberry is going after President O's and the NSC's deliberative process and strategic focus throughout the cable. Eikenberry gives faint praise to McCrystal's assessments and logic before dissing his "narrow focus on military matters."

Eikenberry has a solid argument about the issues of governance w/ Karzai, but his solution to outsource a new strategic review was unserious and wouldn't pass muster as a rational COA for a brand-new Major on the BDE staff. Why do people in charge of strategy and policy for the USG want to bring in "bi-partisan former somebodies" to do the work we are paying them to do....

The cables for all of their solid facts are devoid of solid recommendations and it isn't unsurprising that Afghanistan began it's slide toward chaos when Eikenberry was wearing stars and in charge if this is the best he can offer in terms of strategic direction and argument.

By the way - I heard Eikenberry kicked all of the US Defense Attache's out of country...wonder what that is about????....other than former General Ego.

SOLDIERSDIARY

12:48 PM ET

January 27, 2010

General Ego

Anyone have any insight on the relationships of all the Generals in AfPak? Eikenberry, McChrystal, Petraus, and even McKiernan? Some worked for others and then were in charge of those they worked for, etc...how do these relationships affect their ability to recommend COAs to the NSC and POTUS?
Just looking for insight.