Quote of the day: Ike on the French

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Tuesday, January 26, 2010 - 3:49 PM Share

French divisions are always a questionable asset." -- Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1945.

(Quoted p. 596, Russell Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945.)

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JPWREL

5:06 PM ET

January 26, 2010

It should be noted that what

It should be noted that what Ike was likely referring to was the almost 'civil war' between the 'Free French' dominated units and those ex-Vichy troops who also formed divisions. There was no love lost between he two and the Free French often referred to their countrymen in the ex-Vichy dominated formations as the ‘Nazi’s’.

In the post war period the French spilled a lot of ink attempting to rewrite history to create an image of the ‘resistance’ as being dominated by Free French types when in fact the most effective and numerous members of the resistance were Communists. They also attempted camouflage the contentious relationship between FF and ex-Vichy and manufacture a myth of a population of simmering with Free French loyalties when in fact the French people as a whole had always been more inclined towards Vichy. All these political dynamics took its toll on the fighting effectiveness of the allied equipped French Army.

GRANT

5:20 PM ET

January 26, 2010

I have no idea where the

I have no idea where the people's sympathies lay during the war years, but I am forced to agree about the Free French. The work of the resistance was impressive considering the risks, but the eastern groups had more of an effect (though limited) in holding up German divisions.
As for the quote itself, that was probably a reference to the French soldiers and resistance groups of WWII, and not a commentary on French military capabilities. When you consider the size of France's military today and relatively high (for a Western European nation) willingness to use it.

TYRTAIOS

6:09 PM ET

January 26, 2010

haut-lieu de la resistance?

Good historical perspective. I used to live in Marseille, an expat of sorts. I was always amused by how many older Frenchmen (and women) professed to having fought for the resistance during WWII. Generally speaking, most of these self-described resistance fighters all hopped onto the war wagon, when they saw the allies at the gates of Paris.

Toujours Fidele : )

GRANT

1:46 AM ET

February 1, 2010

You should speak with my

You should speak with my parents some time. In their research in oral history, they discovered that people who had lived in Nazi-occupied nations later convinced themselves of the most unlikely things. Human psychology is not as honest and practical as we think.

MOHANCOJ

5:33 PM ET

January 26, 2010

This is probably more de Gaulle than anything.

During the Bulge, Eisenhower wanted Sixth Army to pull back from Strasbourg and other French territory to counter Hitler's follow-up offensive in the South. DeGaulle made a big fuss, refusing the idea of giving up retaken French soil for tactical reasons. In effect, the French (de Gaulle) were placing French interests over allied solidarity in the face of Germany's last offensive. Eisenhower, for political, not military, reasons, compromised and allowed the French to continue to try and hold Strasbourg, while conforming to Sixth Army tactical withdrawals elsewhere. Eisenhower also was unhappy about the French slowness in wiping out the Colmar pocket, which remained a threat to the south.

The French contingent in Korea fought very, very well, and did a good job in the First Gulf War.

JPWREL

5:46 PM ET

January 26, 2010

The Colmar pocket was never a

The Colmar pocket was never a threat not even close. The Wehrmacht units holding the area were virtually dismounted and without transport and fuel to launch anything but small local counterattacks. And of course the Germans did not control the most vital part of the battlefield the airspace above it.

VICTOR

6:45 PM ET

January 26, 2010

I think you're correct. From

I think you're correct. From my reading, it seems Ike was worried about it, probably more than he should have been. But the pocket, and the German forces in it (the relatively weak Nineteenth Army) were not an offensive threat.

The pocket's continued existence only really affected the allies as a whole by requiring more divisions (the entire French First Army) to keep it contained through the winter of 44-45. Prior to the Bulge and the German Alsace offensive around New Year's, if the pocket had been eliminated, 6th Army Group would have been able to concentrate more forces for their northward drive into the Palatinate (on the right flank of Third Army).

JPWREL

6:53 PM ET

January 26, 2010

Very good analysis.

RALPH HITCHENS

9:41 PM ET

January 26, 2010

OK, but.....

You need to take what Ike said seriously most of the time. But it's beyond dispute that the French divisions (mainly North African troops) fought well in Italy, and were highly regarded by the Germans in that theatre. Given that the French Army as an institution was militarily shattered and politically divided from 1940-43, their combat performance in 1944-45 was not too bad.

TYRTAIOS

12:03 AM ET

January 27, 2010

Well Lead - Fight Well

Quite simple: where the French were lead well, they fought well.

Some historical perspective by some should be in order, starting with the mindset of the military and political leadership and the numbness still lingering from the Great War and its aftermath of the general population.

As for le Grand Charles, he was French first and an allie second - it could be no other way, something Ike should have known since he himself had to pursue objectives with the political in mind, instead of the purely military, as supreme allied commander.

VICTOR

12:22 AM ET

January 27, 2010

Agreed - the divisions which

Agreed - the divisions which fought in Italy (four of them I believe) were key to the allies finally breaking through the Gustav line. They penetrated German defenses in terrain that the other allied forces had largely dismissed as impassable. This outflanked the Germans holding up both the US II Corps (on their left, along the coast) and the British Eighth Army (on their right, trying to get into the Liri valley). Their breakthrough, along with the capture of Monte Cassino by the Polish corps and the breakout of Fifth Army from Anzio, allowed the allies to finally get moving after almost 6 months of stalemate, capture Rome, and force the Germans to withdraw to the northern Appenines - basically achieving the last of the real (though admittedly dubious) objectives of the Italian campaign. And everyone, including the Germans (and, unfortunately, the Italian civilians too), were terrified of the Goumiers that the French brought with them to Italy.

JPWREL

12:27 AM ET

January 27, 2010

Very good point. Personally,

Very good point. Personally, I have always subscribed to the old notion that their are no bad troops just lousy officers. While the French have suffered a tradition of military defeat for the past two hundred years this has a lot more to do with the incompetence and venality of the French political and military establishment than any inherent characteristic of their soldiers.

During World War One particularly from 1914-197 French soldiers did whatever was asked of them usually with élan and a growing competence. Unfortunately, in 1914 they went to war with an obsolete doctrine that ignored the effect of modern weapons. But they suffered and adapted and the cost to the French nation in blood was beyond measuring.

That is more than can be said of American military leadership that had three and a half years of war to observe and study and yet went into battle with tactics long discarded by British and French troops as too costly and ineffective. The arrogant Pershing and his commanders repeated every single bloody blundering mistake the older allies had made for the last three and a half years out of hubris and bloody mindedness.