Take it outside, NoSho.

At any rate, I think you lack perspective. Iraq and Afghanistan are nettlesome, but neither one looks to me like the challenge the Americans faced in 1940, not knowing if the British would collapse, and wondering if they faced a Nazi-dominated world.

I'm still deep into my reading on World War II, so I expect you're gonna see a lot more Marshall references.

Best,
Tom

Certainly WWII could have had worse results than either Iraq or Afghanistan, but creating a new state during a war is a much more complex task, and we control fewer of the variables. Did we have to deal with tribal and sectarian politics after we landed at Normandy? Did the Nazis remain in control of half of Germany while we tried to reconstruct the other half? Did the Soviet Union give aid to East German saboteurs to put land mines in West Germany?

The first Germany should be France.

"Iraq and Afghanistan are nettlesome." Please print that out and re-read it each January until all American troops have left both countries.

Were you the model for the yellow-nosed figure in the FP covers ad?

Hunter,

I think the missplaced optimism that I and others had for GEN Casey's tenure was that being CSA is different from being a field commander. I still believe that GEN Casey's career trajectory, education and experiences - on paper at least - are well suited for the role of CSA. I naively assumed that his strengths and prior Beltway experiences as the Director of the Joint Staff and VCSA would rise to the occasion and get the Army on a better footing. In other words, he has the conventional experiences and insights that his predecessor lacked. I was wrong and regret being so naive ... it just makes the disappointment even worse.

Try to remember, when Marshall was Chief of Staff, he was effectivly Commander of the Army. There were no COCOMs, title 10 authorities, and th National Security Act of 1947 had yet to be passed. Marshall was responsible for everything. Current Chiefs are not commanders and hence are sometimes referred to as "Title 10 Mother-F**kers"
Try to keep this fact in mind when you argue complexity of the position.
I find this all facinating, interesting, and as ususal, way off the mark!

Yes it does look nice. And good to know that at least one officer in My Favorite Army prefers to appear in an actual uniform rather than dressing up like GI Joe in his pajamas.

For those of you who think the uniform makes the man. Casey is one of the biggest offenders in the Army Combat Uniform as all purpose wear. (See the recent Army Navy game as an example - every Army officer is in Greens, every cadet in their Dress Grey, the Chief was in in his utilities). I personally don't give a shit what they wear - which is why I made my earlier "puke" comment.

I'd rather be concerned what his duty performance is. And furthermore, when our Congress acts deserving of their station is when I will worry about their being offended about what uniform a person shows up in. It just ain't a big deal.

To some of the earlier points. I can't understand how a man of retirement age in the highest position in his profession should really care about anything other than doing the best he can for his service. Shinseki should have fallen on his sword when his bosses told him to attack Iraq with 1/5 the force he recommended. Casey should do whatever he deems best for the service, make those recommendations to the boss, and when enough of those recommendations are overruled or ignored move on to his much-deserved retirement.

How can you be a 4 star coward and not stand up to your convictions? It defies logic. It's not like you don't have the $5000/plate speaking circuit waiting or some other company isn't gonna hire you for their board of directors or something (witness Franks on the Chuck E. Cheese board - hilarious and somehow appropriate). Sickening to those in the trenches. Totally sad.

sometime I think it is not a matter of not standing up for your convictions, but rather just being wrong. We assume he is not giving proper advice...have you considered he is saying what he believes, but is just way off the mark?

to judge his performance, or condemn him for not resigning the MNFI command rather than carry them out.

The civil war and Iranian backed attempt to run the table in Baghdad 2005-2007 was seeded in MNSTC-I's 2004-6 stand-up of the Shiite army. Again, we'd have to know Petraeus, Dempsey et al's orders, to judge the performance of their commands in that effort.

Reading between the lines of "Gamble" and other accounts, recalling 500-700 war homicides a day in mid 2005, MNFI's inactivity immediately after the Samarra bombing, I propose (on limited evidence) that Gen. Casey was mandated to let Baghdad bleed toward a Shiite victory, and get his MNFI command on a path out before the 2006 mid-terms.

Given the high US casualties built into the Iraq counteroffensive, announcing such a plan before Nov 2006 would have amplified Pres. Bush's losses in those elections. President #43 was playing politics with the war plan, expressing public confidence in the failing national strategy, and Gen. Casey was the patsy.

What is your point?

A proper history would examine the direction given by US civilian authority to Gen. Casey, before parsing blame. We know that there was significant micromanagement from the civilian command going on at various times, such as during Gen. Mattis' misadventures in the 'attack now, no, wait' first battle of Fallujah.

To my knowledge, no one (including Rick's) has written authoritatively on the curiously reduced level of engagement of US forces in March 2006, after the Golden Mosque bombing, the point from which Gen. Casey's command never regained the initiative.

were documented by the UN, in the Summer of 2005. Not per day, as stated in error above. The 2005 head-rise of mayhem came before the Samarra bombing in late Feb. 2006, which apparently resulted in a partial stand-down by US troops in March 06, when our casualty count dropped by 50%. Militia warfare in Baghdad took the monthly toll over a thousand a month going into the 2006 midterm elections, a period when Pres Bush was expressing confidence in Gen. Casey's war.

Incompetent or mediocre - I'll let history make the call. One aspect to keep in mind was his commander-in-chief, who at the time was being lead by his VP and SecDef Rumsfeld, may have been treating him like a mushroom. That is to say, feeding him shit and keeping him in the dark.

Remember Jaffir, war is actually pretty simple, it's those damned details in plannning and executing it that are complicated. : )

Maybe the generals lost the war (not sure it's lost - how can you lose something you can't win?). But they were aided in that by the dysfunctional culture and condition of the Army itself. Many years ago the US Navy identified its three key capabilities as mobility, flexibility, and offensive power. The Army, by worrying only about the last characteristic on the list, completely lost sight of the other two (which should apply to any Service). And it defined offensive power as heavy, big-war force on force, with little use for SOF and LIC and COIN and anything else that had not been needed in the Fulda Gap. And then, when shifted to occupation duty, Army blew that too. Now, with the most extensive support in history at its call, the Army can't figure out how to move 30K troops in timely fashion and look like deer in the headlights when the Commander in Chief says 'Go do your job. Now.'

Casey's fault? No. Something as screwed up as the US Army can't be blamed on one guy. Blame the Army itself. Culture. People. Plans. Tradition. The United States Army has not performed well since Korea or even perhaps WW II. Wholesale reform is the only right answer - don't fault Casey alone for being one in a long line of leaders unable to see that or get it done.

The Army’s tactical and operational performance in World War Two was merely average and totally reliant for success upon massive superiority in material and air support. The Germans referred to this kind of war as ‘materiellsclacht’. For the U.S. Army ground forces it is difficult to come up with any tactical or operational innovations that contributed to a better execution and understanding of conventional war.

Close air to ground support doctrine was developed by both the RAF in WW1 and the Wehrmacht prior to WW2. Centralized fire control for artillery was again a shared British/French and German innovation in WW1. Armored doctrine was an original development of the British and heavily refined and devloped by the Germans. The British invented true special operations forces while the Germans developed the critical technique of infantry/tank (Panzer grenadiers) cooperation for mobile armored warfare.

The list goes on.

Bill,

I think you mean the "Soldier's Creed" rather than the "Code of Conduct." If you mean the Soldier's Creed, I agree 110%. The "Warrior Ethos" that replaced the Soldier's Creed in late 2003 certainly has a noxious and ahistorical tone. This "ethos" profoundly redefined the soldier's relationship with the Army and Nation s/he serves and was implemented without debate, discussion or analysis of the inevitable second and third order effects it would have. GEN Casey's unwillingness to revisit this sweeping, knee-jerk decision made in the wake of the Jessica Lynch/507th Maintenance Company debacle in OIF I, reveals the "papal infallibility" imprimatur he gives to the unpopular and ill-conceived decisions of his predecessors.

As an aside, GEN Casey, like myself, attended both a Jesuit High School and University. He was not educated by the Augustinians at Villanova.

A.M.D.G. (Motto of Jesuit Education)

yes..Creed and Jesuits (BC) need apply.

Gates' action, welcomed by all thinking observers, suggests another reason for civilian control of the military: the leaders in uniform lack the wit to lead themselves (even if those uniforms are are straight from the GI Joe leisurewear collection).