Does the intel suck? Here’s why

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Thursday, January 14, 2010 - 2:26 PM Share

Here Army Maj. Nathan Murphy, who toils on AfPak counterterrorism issues in the SO/LIC salt mines of the Pentagon, suggests that more collection platforms and more computer databases are not the answer to the problems that plague the American intelligence community. 

We now live in a time where a simple order of any item is just not good enough. It has to be faster, bigger, and the very best ever seen by mankind to this point. It's not good enough to have a burger and fries; we have to make them enormous providing enough calories for a long day toiling on a construction site which very few of us do. Our quest for portion dominance on the world's culinary table pours over into other aspects of American culture as is evident from our oversized SUVs to our 42 roll packs of toilet paper. Am I against such luxuries afforded to us as arguably the world's last super power? Of course not. The 72 oz. big gulp sitting in the cup holder of your Hummer is a part of modern Americana but is unfortunately an indictment on our society as a whole.

I do not view this as a downfall as much as an impediment to progress when we take these expectations into the realm of intelligence and how we support the war effort. We must have more surveillance platforms, more analysts, more images, more reports, more systems, and more actionable intelligence - a term which I find redundant but remains popular. All that comes together to form this unwieldy giant we have come to know as the Intelligence Community (IC) as a result of perceived necessity. We have neglected the single point of failure which is to be able to think critically. We are currently involved in an insurgency in Afghanistan against a force that is routinely better informed than US forces. The enemy provides a painful example of doing more with less. What's that you say? In the age of information dominance are we not the standard bearers for information gathering and sharing at the speed of light? Yes, we are in the academic sense of having forms to fill out, processes to follow, and more systems than we can efficiently use. We must be dominant because we have a line and block diagram for every occasion. Unfortunately, we focus on the form far more than the function of intelligence. So that there is no confusion among my tactical brethren who do more with less every single day, I am referring to those organizations that exist "for the benefit of the Warfighter." A buzz phrase that held so much promise when I was commissioned, but a phrase now that elicits a wry smile and knowing nod among those of us who depend more on each other as tactical intelligence officers and enlisted analysts on the battlefield than those who have never set foot on blood stained ground.

As I was reading the 2007 - 2012 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Strategic Plan, the lack of emphasis on critical thinking was clearly evident.  DIA has laid out eight overall goals for the next five years during which we will undoubtedly face some of our most serious challenges and threats to US foreign policies and objectives. Unfortunately, the objective to "foster critical thinking and promote long-term strategic analysis and warning" is ranked as subset number three to goal number three which it to "produce the right intelligence for the right customer at the right time." This third goal is superseded by goal number one which is to "transform the defense intelligence enterprise" and goal number two which is to "achieve next generation collection capabilities." We still do not promote the ability of the analyst to think critically on a problem. Original thought hurts plain and simple and is not always possible when facing a deadline. So an analyst Googles a particular item and reads the thread of reporting without 1) having a base of knowledge and 2) the ability to sift through what is important and what is not. An experienced analyst can achieve that rapid rate of return on a requirement but that ability takes years to mature and usually involves the analyst playing catch-up for most of their career. E-mails, report reading, meetings, and section softball games all compete for the time needed to focus on an issue and wrestle with it until useful intelligence is gained as the prize for the struggle. That unfortunately is the world in which we operate and represents the true intelligence cycle. Deadlines will always exist but they have come to foster an environment of microwave analysis. Stick the problem in and press a few buttons and out comes the answer but not always necessarily the solution.

The world of intelligence is, on paper, divided into divisions and work groups that address current and future issues, but we have become an entire organization focused on, if not rewarding only for, analysis of current events. Thought pieces do not get the same attention as daily briefs to the Joint Chiefs and so remain unexplored or entirely ignored territory until a catastrophic event occurs causing us to blow the dust off of them to answer the question of why it took place when and where it did. Analysis of current events is obviously necessary especially when a tasking affectionately referred to as a snow flake is sent down from the galaxy of stars residing in the beltway. But those in the position of producing long term analysis must be left to do so and be rewarded like those who answer requirements on a daily basis.

William Graham Sumner, who was a lauded professor at Yale University during the late 1800s, eloquently proposed an objective that should be addressed by the IC and especially those who direct it. "The critical habit of thought, if usual in society, will pervade all its mores, because it is a way of taking up the problems of life. Men educated in it cannot be stampeded by stump orators ... They are slow to believe. They can hold things as possible or probable in all degrees, without certainty and without pain. They can wait for evidence and weigh evidence, uninfluenced by the emphasis or confidence with which assertions are made on one side or the other. They can resist appeals to their dearest prejudices and all kinds of cajolery." The transformation that must take place within the IC does not only involve technology and information flow. It involves training analysts either a tie or a uniform to think critically.

etacar11/flickr

EXPLORE:CENTRAL ASIA, AFGHANISTAN, INTELLIGENCE
 

TYRTAIOS

3:53 PM ET

January 14, 2010

Shape Changing

An appropriate picture featuring a rabbit - or is it a Pooka?

According to legend, the Pooka is an able shape changer, capable
of assuming a variety of forms such as has happened by our creating more where less may have been needed within the national intelligence community.

One error many analysts ( even renowned former DIA analyst John McCreary) fall pray to, is making the simple error of assigning equal value to every report, and in many cases, are looking solely for patterns - you must assess each report with critical thinking as pointed out by good Major Murphy.

Which is why, I personally feel a president should have margin notes available on the PDB during the first year of his presidency to track analysts working notes, to other analysts, to get an idea of how conclusions are arrived at - a practice no longer utilized supposedly because it's too confusing?

 

NORWEGIAN SHOOTER

4:46 PM ET

January 14, 2010

Critical thinking! That's it!

So can we move $100 billion dollars from the DoD to pre-natal to higher education now? That would get us better critical thinking in the IC for sure! Might take a while, but think of all the fringe benefits it would have!

Seriously, the problem with the above and Marine's AARs is that they expect us to come close to the ideal of war and intelligence operations. We can't! Not by a very long shot. How can we be even passable at COIN when hardly any grunts can speak the local languages? We can't. How many stars have to align perfectly to get actionable intelligence? A lot. The best COIN tactics and critical thinking in the world won't work if they can't be executed.

 

HUNTER

5:20 PM ET

January 14, 2010

The tragedy of ice cream

Yes, ice cream. While running convoy security in and around Iraq we shipped on average 320 trucks of food, fuel and equipment North every night.

None of the food we ever ate was really bad (just tiresome) but it was a mxim that the further you went North the better the quality and variety of options. Steak and Lobster or Steak and Shrimp is de rigeur on a Wed night in most places.

I often wondered what it would mean for my convoy security elements if we simply shipped two varieties of ice cream North (instead of the 6-8). Or extrapolating to the macro, if we rationed the food (rather than making it virtually all you can eat). How many tubs of ice cream do I save in a day? How many trailers does that save in a week? At 40 trucks per convoy, how many convoys can I take off the road? Therefore how many crews do I get a little more rest or safety?

Our World War II vets would be appalled at what our warfighters have in theater. I don't begrudge a guy that is sweating and fighting his ass off on the streets of Baghdad anything....but I have to ask: Just because we can give them all of these creature comforts, doesn't mean we should.

A look at some of the fatass Fobbits that never leave the wire waddling over to the "trough of shame" ice cream and dessert station is enough to validate my thinking.

 

TYRTAIOS

6:03 PM ET

January 14, 2010

Ice Cream now - Beer back then

Well Hunter, if it's any consolation to you: many Marine grunts in northern I Corps Vietnam, when in the rear, stood in line outside the club - a conned box - to get two warm, rusty steel cans of beer. And you are right about WWII vets which included our top and company gunny, who let us know we were lucky to get that and to stop the bitching (we were a spoiled bunch of ingrates). In addition, our fellow comrades in the rear made sure the field mess "just closed" by coincidence five minutes earlier to our arrival – Marines take care of their own you know!

I think I'll waddle-over to the trough now and graze, while critically thinking what’s for chow later. : )

 

STEVE358

9:46 PM ET

January 14, 2010

Logistics/Input/Output

Tyrtaios:

You put the nail on the head.

Somewhere, one of Mullah Omar's military intelligence analysts (who probably went to London School of Economics) put together (formally or informally) an Input/Output Model with logistical constraints as the key factor. What is the maximum amount of transport capability into and out of Afghanistan for the US (which, unlike others,is constrained from movements through Quetta, Iran, etc..)?

Of the total volumes, how much Ice Cream and Lobsters can be shipped before they have to cut back on bullets, truck parts, concrete plants, etc...?

Once you know that constraint, and recognize that the US has apenchant for operating without enterprise-wide considerations, constraint recognition, or functional efficiency, you can figure out just how much trouble you have to start by the least effort in order to assure ultimate success against the US.

Why train (and minimally support) some soldiers who are already there "holding" to do routine minor agricultural advisement with the farmers they are trying to establish a rapport with, when, instead, we can send whole specially trained battalions for agriculture, and civilians, too? Why do with one what you can do with three?

Think of all the funny alternative scenarios Mullah Omar's analyst is modeling on his spreadsheet.

Yet, as Major Murphy notes, we don't even have a consolidated picture, let alone an enterprise-wide plan.

I was reviewing a lot of existing source documents in response to MG Flynn's comments, and thinking about my prior experiences where there were plenty of people duplicatively analyzing and reporting on the same things (over and again)---from within the war zone---and realized that: (1) a lot could be done to reduce unnecessary duplications while putting more resources into a focused and productive ends of the spear; and (2) there is plenty of enough collection going on (maybe of the wrong things), but it is wisdom (a common collector, interpreter, picture) that is lacking.

Why not do more and better with less, and leave more room in the supply chain for better performing resources. Rocky Road? Rum Raisin?

Steve

 

STEVE358

3:06 AM ET

January 15, 2010

Wiki-Kwiki

I focus on provincial and district administrative and political boundaries (one of the areas mentioned by MG Flynn for which the US is blind.

After reading Major Murphy's explanation of time pressures, lack of background information, and googling intel, I decided to test the accuracy of this source which the US intelligence system is now relying one for background "intelligence" on Afghanistan.

There are two Afghan provinces (Nimruz & Farah) along the Iranian border where, due to internal administrative changes, the provincial boundaries have shifted like the sands of the desert (100 miles). First, Lash-e Juwayn district shifted from Nimruz province to Farah province a few decades ago, according to my map sources. Second, in a disputed 2005 action, Delaram shifted from Nimruz to Farah.

The wiki previncial boundary map for Nimruz includes the area of Delaram, but it is not shown in the table of districts, nor in the population table. The wiki map for Farah does not show it, or its population,

So, if you wiki-ed Delaram, which borders Helmand province, a stone's throw (in Afghan terms) from Now Zad, neither the district nor its population even exists---like a Hole-In-The-Wall from an old Western movie.

There have been several major district and provincial reconfigurations in Afghanistan recently, each of which substantially changes the political/administrative map and structure. Sure would be nice if the intel analysts were actually following this stuff and not just googling it in.

Yes, I'll fix update the wiki like I did in December to reduce the Afghan population count from 33.6 to 28.4 million (the significant downward revision by the CIA) that is still 4 million more than the Afghan Census Bureau's 2009 figures. No one actually knows what province or district these phantom 4 million people are, but you can be assured that our civilian reconstruction effort is planning, contracting and servicing them (especially since they vote early and often).

I guess military intel for Afghanistan is now a self-help operation dependent on US civilians keeping wiki accurate and timely. Doing our part for the War Effort is a little different than in WWII.

Steve

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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