A Marine's Afghan AAR (XI): On being ‘pinned down'

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Wednesday, January 13, 2010 - 2:58 PM Share

Here CWO2/Gunner Keith Marine says that being trapped by enemy fire is just something you think.

"Pinned down." I have heard this term a few times out here. Being pinned down is a state of mind, nothing is holding you there. Get your base of fire going, firing only at targets and at the sustained rate. Use the marksmanship fundamentals and you will rapidly reduce their numbers. Then assault. In areas we have done this, we killed them and they didn't come back to play. They go and play in other folks' areas [where they] . . . sit and wait for supporting arms.

I take his point, but also of course there are situations where there is an enemy machine gun staring at you and enemy mortars ready to plop on you. I guess he'd say that is all the more reason to get moving.

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TYRTAIOS

4:18 PM ET

January 13, 2010

IA Drills

The Gunner knows: the key to a small unit's ability to accomplish this, is everyone knowing their immediate reaction to contact and taking instantaneous responses instinctively with one mindset - instead of mourning over your possible departure from the living. :)

This is accomplished by rehearsing and practicing immediate action drills,
In another war, during another era, when others were loafing, I was running IA drills during down time. It became infectious throughout the command.

I think our infantry weapons officer, CWO-2 Marine is a good infection to have!

DOOFOUS

7:41 AM ET

January 14, 2010

The tactical situation should dictate the response...

...not some simplistic gung-ho formula. Is the situation an on-trail ambush? Is it a heavy-weapons attack on your defensive position? Are you caught in the open? Are you isolated, immobile, encumbered by wounded or low on munitions? What are the odds? What is the terrain, the proximity to safety and on and on. The small unit leader needs to evaluate these factors in an incredibly short time, and THEN commit to the response.

I do agree with the statement about drills, practice and simulations...the idea is to counter the natural human reaction to hunker down, to prepare your people for action and then to move aggressively into that tactical solution. But it isn't a "state of mind" to be subjected to an overwhelming volume of fire, and an inappropriate reaction will cost a lot of lives for no good purpose. It isn't just the blind courage of a leader that inspires troops...it's also belief in the wisdom and the knowledge of the man in charge that leads to successful execution of that tactical solution.

Old platoon sergeant and tactics instructor.

TYRTAIOS

3:40 PM ET

January 14, 2010

DOOFOUS

Old platoon sergeant and tactics instructor - me too, and a bit more. Don't confuse one mindset with state of mind. I.A. drills are geared toward the situational; no one fits all, with situational awareness always being evaluated.

During operations the Gunner will assist the commander in tracking the fight. He can be sent forward to oversee the battle(s), reporting directly to his commander - unique billet re-created within the Corps' infantry community some years back. : )

WALKING WOUNDED

7:38 PM ET

January 13, 2010

Without challenge to the premise

that fortune favors preparation and swift bold action: what would the red team prepare in response to blue's adroit 'attack into the threat'? Is it winning, protecting population, to be killing or driving off the village 'sniper', who's mission may simply be a 'broke wing' draw play away from the village and/or uncovered women out working in the fields?

Forward patrolling- pushing our security zone out, probing the enemy's position, taking prisoners- is a kind of ground truth, basic intel. But it doesn't change the core fact that they're all 'umma', and we're infidel.

Have we answered the first question, what kind of crusade this is? On what foundation are we betting our super-democracyr credibility, the jewel we are really defending. We're committing our treasure and reputation to the first successful European occupation of Pashtunistan? On our superior small unit tactics? Our weapons? Karzai's legitimacy? Our behavior at Bagram?

And on the level of red force assessment, can the Pashtuns and/or their int'l insurgent allies put together a winning strategy that includes freely spending the lives of expendable locals? Anyone remember ropadope? How about 'align with wars of national liberation'?

Has this all happened before, and we just got too busy 'surging' to read the book on core allies and regional powers that aim to make our efforts work to their ends? Bless them all, but I fear that our fine troops and they ghosts they hunt are all betrayed from the rear.

TYRTAIOS

8:47 PM ET

January 13, 2010

Walking Wounded

You will recall the Gunner previously discussing the type of fire a unit is being taken under and how it can be a clue as to what your enemy has on their mind? Re-read, AAR Lesson VI, and it will answer your first paragraph.

As for the grand strategy? Well, uh, umm. Hell, I don't know. Let's hope these men aren't backward pawns, because losing them that way is bad for the endgame - and the end game is as much about bring them home alive as anything else.

PROMETHEUS II

8:57 PM ET

January 13, 2010

Isn't this basic

This series of lessons is great, but they seem to be very basic platoon level tatics, that I thought were formed the basis of Marine and Army Infantry drill and training. Am I missing something here? Are soldiers and marines going into combat without appropriate training? Is this a result of 8 years of deployment cycles and losses of seasoned NCOs? Please tell me I am wrong.

5:27 AM ET

January 14, 2010

They are basic and fortunately you are wrong.

PROMETHEUS II,
These lessons are very basic for the two of us, but they are probably good lessons for less-experienced FP readers to review.

Fortunately, these lessons are also very basic for the Marines with whom I served, and I would bet the same holds true for infantry soldiers. Infantrymen in both services are well-trained before deployment, which includes reviewing basic lessons learned from those who have been there, done that.

Tip of the hat to the Gunner for taking the time to codify his lessons.

PROMETHEUS II

6:26 PM ET

January 14, 2010

Glad to know I am wrong

If - Thanks. Glad to know I am wrong. My worry was that Gunner's great writing indicated that we were deploying Marines and soldiers without basic patrolling and platoon/squad level infantry knowledge and that experience platoon leaders and platoon sergants were having to, in the words of the "Ole Ball Coach," Coach 'em up.