Do we care if Iraq exists in five years?

the prospect of a saudi/iranian armed clash isn't very appetizing. could that society really endure a war with iran--fighting side by side with us infidels (even though its against the apostates)?

The article linked below explains why Turkey is most likely to move south, since Iraq once belonged to the Turks.

http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:EJs743aXHSMJ:www.sandersresearch.com/index.php%3Foption%3Dcom_content%26task%3Dview%26id%3D1247+Sanders+Research+Meyer+Turkey&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

Note to Obama. As US troops pull out, Iraq will fall apart. The Generals will tell you must send more US troops over, forever. They will not mention the other option, call on NATO ally Turkey to takeover the peacekeeping stability mission. They will jump at the chance if secretly promised they can keep part of Northern Iraq in the future, the area around Mosul, with its oil.

About the only thing the region can agree on is that that's what they don't want. I'm not saying Iraq won't cease to exist, but there are some substantial hurdles to de jure Kurdish independence (if not de facto independence, which I think you could argue already exists). They will (and have) face strong opposition from even the United States because of demands from U.S. allies, and I can't see that changing in just five years.

If the other pieces of the puzzle come together as this expert predicts, I think it is far more likely that whoever is doing the swallowing will swallow up the Kurds as well, in all likelihood fracturing what your map shows as Kurdistan.

Tom:

The Myth of Iraq as a made-up country, and thus, always pending disaggregation, is pretty strong, but it really is a myth.

It makes a great screenplay to think about Gertrude Bell and Dear Winston carving up Iraq out of remnants of the Ottoman Empire, but any serious research shows that the general area known as Iraq has existed for at least a few centuries (plus or minus the vagaries of other imperial incursions, trade or security based agreements, or internal sub-national conflicts).

Let's back-pedal to the 1920's. Reality is that the Iraq/Iran Border (plus or minus the Iran/Iraq War and the never ending disputes about the thalweg (the wandering river line), but heavily defined by Russian troops. The Northern Leg of the Syrian Border goes back to the Mosul/Baghdad Ottoman Provinces. The British worked with the Kuwaitis to lop of Kuwait, and establish desert no-man's lands with the Saudis (that were settled in far later years). Most of the Kurdish areas were part of the Mosul Province, but carved with careful attention to land barriers and forms, and then-applicable security concerns (mosty Russian/Bolshevik related).

Other than "Trans-Jordan," where is this "made-up"place?

Well, beyond that argument, there are a lot of reasons for Iraqis to stay together that didn't exist before: First there is oil. Then there is oil. Last there is oil.

Oh, and I think that internal security/defense is another: Not a lot of Iraqis itching to share their wealth and dominion, whether with Syria or Iran. Friends is not always family when a vast wealth is at stake.

A positive turn of events is Barham Saleh's steady hand in Kurdistan, and the relationships being worked out with Turkey. Kurdistan has faced the issues of possible independence, and they are not all positive at this point in history.

What intrigues me from the 20's is that, back then, there were two big games afoot. Germany was pushing for a railroad link from Berlin to Basra, as much to challenge the British Maritime Monopoly as for oil. And second was oil that pools on the ground in some places.

Of the British (and later US) interests from that era, keeping the Germans, Russians, French out was key. One big negative for the Anglo side is that those countries, and not the Anglos, are gaining all the commercial control. Wasn't the whole point of empire to create or secure some kind of commercial interests as a residual of war?

Iraq, to me, is still a very dangerous ball in play, but if you watch the forces that keep it together, along with the forces that pull it apart, you have abetter process for evaluating which way this still-spinning top will veer.

That's my two cents.

Steve

I would look at changes in the governance structure (same in Afghanistan) to throw out the US high school textbook structures of democracy: Nation, States, Counties.

They don't fit well in Iraq, and many of the poorer provinces will not be sustainable as free standing political entities with independent tax revenues.

Look to a real place like Maryland, and you have five tiers of political systems: Baltimore City (a full and independent large city), and 23 counties. Of the Counties, some are full governance counties (the big ones), some have partial self-governance but rely heavily on the State for many services, all within a spectrum of Charter, Code and Home Rule Counties. Smaller cities, too, are a spectrum of responsibilities based on their charter.

Go back to Iraq. Baghdad, like Baltimore City, is its own entity (although associated with a province). Some cities are big and important enough for City home rule (Kirkuk, Basrah, Mosul, and maybe more if they choose---especially the religious centers). Some should, like Maryland's smaller and less affluent counties, have the amount of home rule they can afford and manage, just like Maryland.

Mosul was, throughout history, an independently run political entity regardless of the empire or nation surrounding it. There would be nothing ahistorical, for example, to establish Mosul, Kirkuk, etc.. as independent city-states.

Has anyone studied the history of City-States, that really came to the fore in Iraq while Western Europeans were still in caves? There is still a lot for the "Lost Generations" of Iraqis, deprived of schooling during conflict, to re-learn about their histories, but there are some interesting answers there.

The idea of a Kurdish Autonomous Region is really nothing more than a Home Rule County on steroids, when and until, perhaps, more autonomy evolves.

Look at the Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission that governs significant parts of both Prince Georges and Montgomery Counties. Nothing shocking about that. That didn't break the rules of democracy.

But Iraq is neither Maryland nor the US. The Land Between Two Rivers cannot prosper without substantial centralized efforts at watershed controls, rangeland management, etc... And Oil. Some might have it, but only Basra has the means to both produce and export it without relations with the others (pipelines, refining, rail, etc...). Iraqis have to find their own way...

So, what somebody might call "the end of Iraq" might be the end of a pretty naieve, ahistorical, and, at best, challenged governance structure, but that might not be a bad thing. Sooner or later, Iraqis may look to an alternative governance structure that, in fact, looks more like real governed places than a high school textbook oversimplification from another country.

And some of these political/administrative experiments and reconfigurations can be testy or bloody, as anyone knows who has studied the many sub-national reconfigurations in german and indian history. Do brth pains count as failure, or they just the price of progress (Creative Destruction).

Answer: There is not just an either or to Iraq's future, but many tiers in between. They have tried many of them over the centuries, and might, to a degree, look to their past, rather than ours.

In March 2008, along with some well-armed friends, I took a little drive from the historically important city of Tikrit for a holiday in Baghdad.

No triple-A triptik, but there is only one road, Route 1, and it goes north to Mosul (and on to Turkish & Syrian border crossings), and south the Baghdad.

So we drove past the big turkish construction company that makes all the T-Walls, past the Turkish plane that arrives everyday to shuttle Turkish businessmen/contractors back and forth, past Samarra where Turkish expert historical restoration craftsmen were rebuilding the Golden Mosque for UNDP, and past hundreds of Turkish long-haul trucks moving goods up and down the corridor.

Bottom-line: Turks know Iraq very well---both its opportunities and problems. There might be oil, but developing and delivering it to market, while rebuilding enough infrastructure to keep a captive population passive, would be a trillion-dollar effort.

I can just imagine Mr. Maliki going to Turkey with the keys to the store and saying: Here is Iraq, take it. They would pay a large ransom to make him go away. Turks know too much, are too sophisticated, and too economically prosperous on their own, to follow the US path into Iraq occupation.

Our history there, more than anything else, is like a "Hazard" Warning Sign that will last for generations.

Similarly, it would break Iran, a country still struggling with Kurds, Sunnis in pockets and borders throughout the country. They just have the Iran/Iraq War as an additional Warning Sign. A million dead???

Nothwithstanding that Turkey might, at any time and for limited purposes, launch an incursion to pursue PKK, or protect Turkmen rights, and Iran test anything they can, invasion/occupation has kind of lost favor in the wake of our Iraq and Afghan experiences.

Yes, I will put money on that bet.

Steve

Why couldn't a balance of weakness in the region hold a federated Iraq toghether?

Turkey won't move formally on the North because it risks widespread rebellion (one of only several damages) as a punishment for making such a dumb move.

Iran won't budge because it knows the Khaleej Sheikdoms and Egypt would go apesh#t if it did. Plus it already exercises a fairly strong stranglehold on the Shi'i majority government in Baghdad and southern provinces.

The same goes vice versa for Saudi Arabia.

Jordan is a joke. And Syria has a hostile Israel on its flank that has developed strong ties in Kurdistan since 2003.

I think the more plausible scenario is that of a federated Iraq with relatively autonomous North, Central, and Southern regional governance.

Also if there is going to be armed conflict, it's going to likely come in the guise of proxy warfare between Sunnis and Shi'is, not open 'Hot' war between the Gulf states and Iran or Turkey or Syria in Kurdistan.

that you would highlight information from your friend with experience, who says foreign countries will annex parts of a sovereign nation that will have still have a renewed SOFA with us within about 5 years.
While you ridicule Joe Biden for proposing partition years ago? Say it ain't so, Tom!

Iraq is floating on oil, no one in the west (particularity US and other Western powers) is going to let the Mullahs in Iran control any drop of Iraqi oil.

Indeed, this split could help the 30M Kurds from Turkey, Iran & Iraq unite, to realize their 130 year dream and become a sovereign nation and under one government.

As for Israel vis-a-vis Syria. If Syria does end up with chunk of Iraq, (they already absorbed more then 2.3M Iraqis) that could help Israel to retain the strategically important Golan Height, and who knows, form peace between the nation

what are the objectives of a Syrian move into Iraq?...you'd have to move to Basrah or Kirkuk to obtain oil... How and Why does this experienced intel officer think the Syrian military is capable of such a difficult logistic support and sustain mission into Iraq?

Why will Iran have difficulty moving into a Shia area adjacent to their border which will be in range of their SF, militia proxy forces, arty and missile systems against two Sunni military forces that have not projected or sustained military power over such extended geography.

I'd be interested in hearing more about this scenerio, I think Iraq will unravel, but I'm not sure this timeline and op set makes much sense -- I see a bit of Is mirror imaging US capabilities put upon foreign arab armies who lack solid campaign experience, sustainability and capability.

What do they want?
What can they get?
What will they settle for?
It's a complicated sort of interactive calculus.

Israel doesn't want a revolutionary Iraq, nor a prosperous one able to pursue a unified foreign policy. The same could be said for Iran, or Arabia's interests in Iraq. Syria has those 2mil-plus refugees.

Too many cooks trying to keep the Iraqi pot simmering might end up seeing things boil over.

The one person that was insane enough to kickstart a land-grabbing race between all the regional parties that desire the various portions of Iraq was hung a few years ago.

Khamenei's Iran is too internally unstable. Things are going too good economically for the AK Party in Turkey. Asad doesn't have the wherewithall of his father and Saudi Arabia only deploys its 'troops' when the odds are heavily in their favor conventionally.

The only other party left are the Iraqi Kurds and they can't move without backing from the US, and the US has no interest in an all-consuming regional war.

This theory might be a fun intellectual exercise, but it's almost impossible in the current context.