Wednesday, January 6, 2010 - 6:58 PM

Here CWO2/Gunner Keith Marine, who knows how to walk the walk, offers several small but interesting lessons from the ground in Afghanistan. I'm impressed. For example, I've been around Quick Reaction Forces, and in fact was embedded in one once, but haven't seen it made standard procedure to have the QRF platoon leader sit in on the pre-patrol briefs of other units heading outside the wire.
Gather round, little grasshoppers!:
Defensive Positions. Every position is not laid out for Final Protective Fires. Despite what IOC says, sometimes Close Defensive Fires is your best option. Recognize the most likely place for the enemy to take a few shots at you i.e. covered and concealed escape route, within small arms range and lay your weapon system on that. Proof your range cards frequently. You may have set in your guns initially when no corn was up and a month later the tactical situation has changed. Guns are also heavy and generally they are resting in sand. As they sink, your range card becomes worthless, guns become unleveled and your traverse ends up becomes a search and traverse. Conduct frequent training with the Marines on post on machine gunnery and how to manipulate the weapon system/use the range card; along with telling them why the gun is positioned where it is and aimed at that spot. Commanders at individual positions should tour their posts daily.
Make sure your guns are cleaned and lubed. Most Marines make sure the weapon is clean and to keep it clean, they don't lube it. Take that into account with failure to clean the ammo and then you will have a guaranteed jam when you need that weapon the most - this happened to one of our COPs when they caught a couple of guys laying in an IED and the guys got away.
Make sure you use good judgment on where optics are placed, what kind of optics you use, and do detailed sketches of the surrounding areas. Not sure how many times, I have gotten on post and asked, how long has that loop hole been in that wall across that field? A Marine has never been able to give me an answer and a lot of them look like recent additions to the local décor.
You have to battle track your squads and get frequent position and radio checks. Keep abreast of the type of air on station and where it is. You should have redundant com and be able to operate your COC effectively day or night.
Use the right weapon system for the right threat. .50 cals and MK-19s are great but if your sector of fire/observation is 200 yards probably don't need it, especially if your Marines aren't competent in using the system.
Have supplementary and alternate positions. Basic fundamental but most posts don't have them. Also make sure they are labeled. A good system I saw was numbers for posts and letters for Supplementary and alternate positions. It's confusing to the Marine if you tell him to take his men to the position next to the post at two in the morning under attack. Be able to say take your team and divide them between bravo and charlie.
Have a planned reaction force on standby. The leader of that force attends the patrol brief the Marines going outside the wire. Your briefing area needs to be set up as user friendly as possible, so your Marines will use it. Have a GRG map up big enough to trace a route along with a regular 1:50,000. Put up a skeleton order with freqs and call signs on it. If you can put benches in there to encourage Marines to sit down and take notes, do so. Make a write board so Marines can draw formations and do ROC talks for cordons etc. (I used the back of a laminated map and it worked fine).
Make sure you are conducting continuing actions. Take a look at those claymores and your wire every day. Often when I walked the wire, claymores were camouflaged with mud in front of them or had fallen over and were pointing to the sky.
Know your neighbors. You should know each of them by name and visit them a few times a week. If you aren't visiting them frequently, bet your ass the enemy is and probably observing you from their homes. But it just isn't as exotic to stop by the neighbor's house and visit, besides who wants to add more time to their patrol by stopping just outside the wire either coming or going. Generally, your neighbors are the most important people to talk to and know.
Use log books on post and log in things that are important tactically, not radio checks and worthless shit. Change your relief times (had one post where they only got shot at right after or before changeover and Marines could only identify general directions vice locations, just change up your times and make sure the COG is keeping an eye out prior to relief).
Just like patrolling, get a hold of a 6-4 and read the chapter on defense. Lost art and you will never be surprised with what you find. By the middle of the second company, I could tell platoon commanders what I was going to find. They thought, never on my post and they ended up walking back steaming in most cases and changing how they did business.
'Nuff said?
I appreciate our Infantry Weapons Officer, Gunner Marine's comments, obviously drawn from his on site observations with his battalion.
I am beginning to wonder if he belongs to a battalion that is lazy, or, having the skill sets, just hasn't put those into training on how to apply them to differant situations in front of them?
Lubing weapons, and appropriately for the environment - damn - who'd a thunk it?
Drive-on Gunner, it sounds like your battalion commander has a good man taking care of business - and business appears to be good. : )
A lot of what CWO2/Gunner Marine is saying can be boiled down to Marines relying on the experiences of the Iraq conflict where urban combat was a mainstay and a lot of "traditional" skills were lost (i.e. the fall of patrolling, the general disregadr for steps like establishing supplementary and alternate firing positions). The problem is that many of the junior NCO's who are currently filling squad leader and platoon sergeant billets have only had that type of experience. It will take a major effort by the senior leaders of our corps to change this culture of indifference to the doctrinal ways of war.
P.S. I am currently serving as a Marine and I've seen this type of behavior firsthand.
This is an exceptionally important point
In the think tank community, the idea that counterinsurgency succeeded (at least tactically) in Iraq and therefore should be adapted to Afghanistan is accepted wisdom. The think tankers, though, don't have to do the adapting.
Even a lifelong civilian can see that there is a big difference between urban warfare and warfare in a rural environment. Troops experienced in the first need training and time to succeed in the second. The training can be done, even if it has to be done on the fly, in the field. The time, though....
The commitment in Iraq, which starved the Afghan campaign of resources for so many years, has also bequeathed the American effort in Afghanistan legions of soldiers and Marines who have to unlearn lessons learned in Mesopotamia. I'm sure they can all do it, given enough rotations. The best of them won't need more than one, but the legacy of Iraq looks like a drag on our campaign in Afghanistan in a way most people probably haven't considered.
To illustrate how Iraq how caused many basics to atrophy, Ricks' team appropriately selected a picture of Marines smoking on patrol and grabbing the magazine while firing. We suck.
Those are not Marines Fist Pump. The photo shows them wearing triangular patches on the right shoulder - Marines don't wear unit patches - kapish?
In addition, the Marines also have a special computerized camouflage pattern that incorperates little, itty, bitty, globe, anchor, and eagles into the pattern - also not present.
I'm sure a good intelligence officer would have picked-up on that, which apparently ain't you? : )
to be fair, the cigarettes are not lit, i think.
cheers,
tom
Are evidently hard to find.
Take a closer look at those "triangle patches" on their shoulders. They look awfully like the square patches found on the Marines in this picture.
http://www.marines.mil/unit/iimef/2ndmeb/_layouts/imagemeta.aspx?image=http://www.marines.mil/unit/iimef/2ndmeb/PublishingImages/091225-M-9915H-003.jpg
And as to the absence of the little, itty, bitty, globe, anchor and eagles....certainly tough to tell with the resolution of that picture, field wear of the uniform, and presence of combat kit.
Having no connection to the Marines, myself, could the patches be IR Identification Tabs/Badly faded US Flags/Battle Roster Numbers/Blood Types?
The mark of a commander is the staff he assembles. This is why I have you as my S-3 CAPTAINVAN, to point-out possible incorrect assumptions. You may well be right. I will fire my S-2 immediately, whomever he is! : )
They actually are Marines. The Marines are wearing FROG gear (Flame Resistant Organizational Gear), which have velcro on the shoulder patches for unit patches (Usually has the EGA, Unit, and the Marine's name, or IR patches. They appear to be IR patches in this case. The triangles next to the IR patches are Lance Corporal Chevrons.
As for not being an intelligence officer, you got me there.
photo analysis vs Lawrence cost analysis
The gents of whatever parentage are kinda bunched up, no? It didn't strike me until I compared it to the guys trompling the turnip patch in a more recent item. The potog is even more exposed than fire team. I'm thinking this is a 'cheeze, for the camera' moment. And a good composition at that.
Well, if the armed forces cannot sort out basic infantry tactics and discipline then I don't know how they will sort out the complex nature of intelligence gathering and assessment. Once again it seems that we have a full-blown case of the ‘American Disease’ which is that we big and powerful so we must be the best at what we do.
Yeah, we do have the problem at times but a lot of what the article touches on is that what the Marines are getting back into is mostly classic Land Warfare vs Urban in Iraq, some of the skills are different and may have gone a bit soft since they have been involved in MOUT for so long. The Marines as a whole still do the best job I have seen out of all the regular forces, including foreign units (I do not include the RMC as regular though, they are Commandos in my book) and they also adapt quicker too. Just MHO, but I think they are just re-setting on basics from what it seems like and also, this is just one group, I really have not seen to many problems with the USMC overall compared to other groups. One of the biggest problems I have seen is Non-Infantry Army guys, they are not prepared and not set up for success due to the system they are trained in when they are used in traditional Infantry roles.
Your view makes a lot of sense to me. My kid (SEAL) has worked with Aussie SAS, Brit Marines and Para's and some Scot's infantry and says they are excellent and usually in better physical condition than U.S. troops. Believe it or not even though we both speak English he found the accents of some of the Brit's so strong and their slang to different that it was difficult understand what they were talking about. Loves the Marines when in Af/Pak but detests them when in San Diego. :-)
The Gunner has good points (as always) but the most important point is this one. Even when (or maybe ESPECIALLY when) you are in a combat environment you need to, you must, continue TRAINING.
Soldiers need to have sustainment training in the skills they are supposed to be using daily in the execution of their mission. They also need training in skills they might need to use in the conduct of their mission.
e.g. The Army now uses the HEAT trainer (HMMWV EGRESS something something) to train soldiers on how to react to and survive a rollover. Basically a HMMWV cab attached to a carnival ride. We did that over and over before we got into theater, then while we were in theater I made my guys continue to do it. We all complained that the trainer didn't properly replicate our newer HMMWVs (and tried to fix that) and that the interior didn't reflect the crowdedness of our operaitonal vehicles (and tried to fix that). But you know what, it was still good training - and the deep dark secret they didn't know was, it was a GREAT disincentive to driving stupidly.
I was once one of those guys who never wore a seatbelt in a HMMWV on the training battlefield, the HEAT trainer convinced me of the error of my ways. Doing the HEAT trainer every couple months reminded my Joes that rollovers suck and they don't want to cause one.
Unit before us had many rollovers and one KIA, unit after us had one rollover and one KIA....our unit had no rollovers period. This isn't self-aggrandizement, its stating the facts. Soldiers remember and do that which their NCOs train (repeatedly) and their commander checks.
We also did OPDs and PT tests and many other things, none of which were popular but all of which were successful.
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