...but I would suggest that the report's title could be trunkated to read "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant" and be just as important.

Question: Why would these 'village elders' give the American troops assembled in front of them armed with M4's at the ready and clad in armor from head to toe even the time of day?

Among the many great points in this paper, Gen Flynn makes the point that intelligence is a command function, not an intelligence specialist function. The saying in the SOF community is that if you want actionable intelligence, you must take some action (IE, getting out, patroling, talking to people). A battalion S-2's priority is avoid ticking off his boss. If the boss wants powerpoint slides on IEDs, that is precisely what he will get. Even the most well meaning intelligence officer is a slave to that imperitive.
Perhaps Gen Flynn's decision to publish this fantastic report via CNAS, instead of making it an obligitory white paper to his subordinates, is to inform (and influence) his customers (commanders in Afghanistan) as well as the larger civilian government and NGO community. Had commanders been asking for these things earlier, I'm sure more intelligence officers would have provided them. Or, more of them would have been fired.
I wish someone had written this 4 years ago, about Iraq.

Tom:

Thanks for spot-lighting this critical report.

I served in that ad hoc role in Northern Iraq in Dec 2007-August 2008 for DoS/PRT until I was re-targeted to the UN Disputed Boundaries Team to essentially do the same thing---collect critical information across the boundaries.

Except for that assignment, my civilian trade is regional analysis for infrastructure/development, markets/demographics, and economics, so I am used to all the modern toys and technology. Going to Iraq and seeing the quality and capabilities of US civilian and military was like a journey back to kindergarten, or the Stone Age.

From my arrival in Baghdad in December 2007 through my final departure in December 2008 (one of the last DoS occupants at the Presidential Palace), I was amazed at how little the US "knew" about the Country. There was plenty of information lying around, or to be had by relentless snooping, but none of it had found its way into any usable format, and few people in decision-making had access to it.

To JPWREL's comment: Nobody will give you anything. As the report notes, you have to start pout by understanding the kinds of basic information needed, then relentlessly pursue it.

In March 2008, I was trying to identify the population in the walled enclosure of Samarra. The data available ranged from 200,000 to 450,000. Excuse me, but how can you plan any credible civilian or military activities around that type of uncertainty?

The answers (about 200,000) didn't come from just house-to-house counts, but from numerous data sources: census and air photos of dwelling units, identification of damaged/uninhabitable units, tracking refugee movements, and, among other things, Iraqi Food Ration registrations. It's not rocket science, and seldom requires begin for inaccurate "guesses" from war-shattered civilians.

The trouble with what is being proposed is that US ground folks have worked so long with inaccurate, and often useless US data, that they don;t trust it, use it or resource it. MG Flynn, the chief military intel officer in Iraq recently called the US effort at useful and accurate information "Fortune Telling," owing to the lack of resources and information in Afghanistan.

What, hopefully, this report does is send a call to establish the kinds of quality and real-time information gathering and reporting adequate to turn the corner.

Like Iraq, we spent too many years there "one year at a time" and battlespace-by-battlespace," always facing unforeseen problems and unknown enemies. It would be nice to bring modern and technically valuable "enterprise-wide" approaches to the information requirements needed.

At some point, the NSC, who I now understand to be spearheading much of this, needs to get focused, understand this report, and take actions to address it.

As Lord Kelvin, father of quantitative sciences, liked to say: "If you count it, you can know something about it." MG Flynn's comments and this report remind us that, in large part, our lack of strategic focus and success derives from the little we know about Afghanistan.

Stephen Donnelly, AICP
Former Senior Urban Planning Advisor, Iraq/PRT

I supose better late than never? It is interesting that at this late date, among issues, the good Major General pointed-out this war is being driven by the media!

Well, of course it is! The DOD has continually mounted a propaganda campaign using retired military officers, primarily of flag rank, working as on-air analysts.

And why a commander would accept mediocre performance and product from his S-2 is beyond me - perhaps someone more current in uniform than myself might comment?

"But, except in rare cases, ineffective intel officers are allowed to stick around."

Raises the question, how do effective intel officers fare, if they are delivering bad news? As per IRONCAPT's coment, how did it go for them in Iraq?

Re JPWREL's comment, I have to keep reminding myself that Rick's pics are file photos dug up by his staff, not directly attached to a blog item or narrative. I got a big smile out of this one. The sheep are a nice touch. Kudos, web-elves.

Aren't officers taking off the no-eyes shades for doing sit-downs with the locals these days?

that when I worked for him, he was BG Flynn and ran JSOC's intel shop.
Not the advance force operational packages with JSOC; the entire shop. He's been McChrystal's briefer since the dawn of time. McChrystal specifcally requested that he get Flynn, VADM Harward and...other people if he was to take the ISAF assignment. He did, so he did.

Now-MG Flynn was the protege of this guy:
http://www.yaf.org/SpeakerDetails.aspx?id=306

He knows his stuff. Anyone in dispute of that probably doesn't know what they're talking about. He's much tougher and more refined than LTG Boykin ever was.

I hate S2s...or I have always joked about hating them. The old saw (which I made up is) "they aren't accountable for anything, they give you a most probable COA and a most dangerous...they recommend the commander counter COA X ...then when the TOC is burning and the OPFOR are blazing through the field trains they look up at the CDR and say 'Sorry sir I f'ed up'"

OK, that was my old joke growing up until I really needed an S2 to give me the skinny. My attitude is more mature and now I will defend those hardworking S2s.

My S2 was very proficient for her level of experience (yes, she). Indeed as a 2LT and 1LT she regularly ran circles around her CPT peers and her BDE MAJ and CPT counterparts in sheer collection and WORTHWHILE analysis - and assisting me in directing further collection (most important part). But here's the facts, most of what she was doing was entirely of her own recognizance and per my direction as CDR. As IRONCPT alluded to earlier the S2 is most beholden to the CDR's guidance and direction. Most of the tools she was using were built by our immediate predecessor or she built herself. The MI schoolhouse is largely at fault here - they aren't moving fast enough to deal with the threat.

Now having said that I'll talk about mediocre performance. I tend to think S2ing is more art than science. We joke about it, but there is some real art (and luck) to reading those chicken bones and tea leaves and finding that one key bit of information (in the maelstorm). We ask a lot of our S2s and honestly many CDRs don't know how to properly use them. Because the S2 is an MI billet which is actually filled by MI officers in the line units, combat arms guys have little experience doing the job (unlike S1, S3, S4 which is almost always filled by combat arms guys). People who have no experience as an S2 may have a hard time figuring if their S2 is doing a good job. So...counter to Tyrtaios (and as someone more current in uniform) some CDRs probably can't recognize mediocre performance in an S2 cell. The key I would say is if they are spinning wildly out of control and can't make any useful products than that is an easy delineation. If they are making products that are hit or miss things get a lot more dicey. Sometimes, you know, the enemy DOES GET A VOTE...and they haven't followed our OPORD per our instructions or desires.

I was blessed to have a good, although very junior, S2 and a mission where S2 data was important but not 'as' critical as others. I know my HHQ S2 was all but worthless...first because they were being outdone by my own S2 and second because their products were uniformly useless, overly complex and ultimately un-utilized. (I could spend a long time explaining but one example was explaining that the area of interest my unit was interested in really did extend beyond the first 500 meters on either side of the MSRs/ASRs we used everyday). My S2s work routinely became the pattern for BDE-wide products. (All of which I take no credit for, she and her troops did a super job).

So the MI schoolhouse needs a re-look. CALL products need to be generated and updated early and often. Military 'journals' like Armor and Infantry need to carry the stories. And this brings me to this final point.

I don't think the good MG has done a good thing in publishing through CNAS. Indeed (I don't know if there is any rule against it but) I think it sets a BAD example. First of all this guy is in charge of this stuff at the highest levels of the Army (if he was a DIV CDR it would be slightly different, more like sharing TTPs). His first job should be getting with TRADOC to FIX these problems by all means available...starting at the schoolhouse. Tom said "By the way, the report has the effect of an order from a two-star general -- I believe that's a first in think tank history. " NOT TRUE. His report doesn't have the effect of an order ...because it is a paper published through CNAS...it ain't an order. He should be making those orders in the conventional manner, and probably a long time ago, before he started writing a 28 page manifesto. The other reason this is a bad idea is that CNAS (which I really have no issues with) isn't a well known clearinghouse of information for the service that needs it...right now.

To those of us on this forum CNAS is a household name...but most of the Army has never heard of it and if they heard the whole name spelled out they would likely run the other way. Many people do known Nagl, Exum, Fick, and Ricks names but that still doesn't mean this report would get much eyeball time.

Bottom line is this report should have been a CALL product or a War College SSI (sp?) or it could have been flash forwarded via SIPRNET to the field. Methinks that the MG is lining up his post-retirement job, and if he really wanted to be heard he would have used the more recognizable paths. Typical f'ing S2 type....hedging his bets.

Can we go home now? Sorry, Tom, but can't help it. CAPTCHA: officer Templar

less soldiers, more intelligence officers walking then dirt.

Walking Wounded makes an interesting point. Intelligence officers often vacillate between being cynical pessimists or Vicars of Bray. If you tell the commander that it is going to rain on the battalion golf day, and you are right, you are a great intelligence officer. If you are wrong, the commander is so happy that it didn’t rain that he won’t mind so much that you were wrong (especially if you convince him that his tactical genius parted the clouds).

Hunter also makes some good points. The fight between S-2s and S-3s is as old as dogs and cats. The Marine Corps has a remarkable old publication called Frontline Intelligence that I found in the bottom of a old footlocker as a 2nd Lt . It’s a World War II era pub that reads like it was written as a turnover file for a brand new battalion S-2. It deals with the problem of being a Captain (or 2nd or 1st Lt) on a staff with an S-3 Major who REALLY, REALLY wants to be a Battalion Commander someday and isn’t above throwing the S-2 under the bus regularly to make that happen. It also suggests getting out of your office, wandering around winning friends and influencing as many fellow officers as you can so that you can 1. Learn some functional knowledge (cause Lts or Capts ain’t experts on anything). 2. You can, at least, talk to people who leave the wire and get some perspective on life outside the TOC 3. They like you and will help you when you need it. A good, 50 year old lesson on skills all intell officers need and that is alluded to in the report.

Hunter and Kunnio, I’m as cynical as the next guy (probably more) but I think the reason the good General published this in CNAS and not as a CALL paper or White paper or official memo or order is because the smart people (commanders, senior officers, state dept folks, NGOs) actually read CNAS reports or the Small Wars Journal or, to a lesser degree when they aren’t spouting Field Grade Techno babble, Military Review or the USMC Gazette. The not so bright guys read these things to impress their boss, but the result is the same. Commanders start asking the right questions. Intel officers start providing the right answers. Progress is made. How many 30 page General Officer Bright Idea papers did you pretend to read as Lt?

Kudos to Mr Ricks for embracing blogging. It’s not every day you see a Pulitzer prize winner use the word “Hot Tranny Mess.” I’ll be cynical and say he’s angling for a blogging job when his newspaper lays him off.

I appreciate the summary and excerpts of Gen. Flynn's paper, and the comments on this thread.

I have nothing really to add to them, beyond a question about counterinsurgency in Afghanistan that I've asked once or twice before. Better local military intelligence is certainly part of a successful counterinsurgency; analysis of that intelligence at higher levels by officers who know enough to tell good information from worthless material is too. Gen. Flynn's prescriptions seem sound to me, so far as that goes.

They would have been just the thing in January 2002, and would probably have been very useful in January 2006. Today, in January 2010, we are months into a counterinsurgency campaign after over eight years of war in Afghanistan -- and a senior General is calling for overhauling military intelligence operations there? The question boils down to whether it is realistic to expect our own military (let alone those of our NATO partners) to do the things counterinsurgency doctrine calls for, in the time needed for a counterinsurgency campaign to be successful. If the answer, in the obviously critical area of local intelligence, is that it is not at all realistic, how likely is it that the answer more generally is anything else?

Time has consequences. One of them is that if you get in the soup by doing some things wrong, resolving to do those same things right is not necessarily the way to retrieve the situation.

Tom

I'll offer a more cynical view of why this paper was published through CNAS and it involves insight into how the media is driving the war. Flynn and McChrystal are trying to gain time and space by reaching out to a COIN-friendly think tank filled with people who will blog, write for newspapers and perhaps even appear on television to say how smart, different, focused, solid and worthy the US effort is in AFG. These guys know info ops really well and this paper is part of the strategy --- which is why it isn't coming through TRADOC or FORCECOM or CENTCOM as a deployment primer.

The paper is solid in several of its recommendations and it will garner a bunch of media attention. Journalist-types like you will fawn over it and the hope is you will endorse it and pass it along to other enlighlighed media types who routinely appear on television or write oped...oh wait looks like you already have.

Finally, I find it really rich that Flynn is now lecturing the military on how to focus on strategic/ tactical intel and reduce focus on man-hunting efforts. This guy used his previous position to suck ISR assets away from conventional units in theater along with their best interrogators and analysts to support his shooting coterie -- looks like he wants to go in a different direction...
That said, this is a man who knows that the distinction between strategic information requirements and tactical ones are small if they even exist in a COIN fight. This paper does a great job at putting commanders and S2s on the right road of asking what questions they should be asking and seeking in their PIR process.

The part of this report that struck me was the dedication to secrecy trumping a desire to share. This was one of the lessons observed during Tsunami Relief, Katrina, Pakistan Earthquake relief, Georgia, Lebanon, pretty much every military operation since the military realized it would have to work w/ non DOD partners (we are equally as bad sharing w/ other militaries if they don't fall in an easy REL/NATO catagory).

The sad thing is that every GO stands up at the end of these operations, maybe even the beginning, and emphasizes the importance of sharing w/ our partners. But then in the classification guidance they have on the books, almost everything is SECRET. So when you call the 2 shop, they look at the books and say, nope can't make that UNCLASS. The FDO is often mistakenly called, but they really are just applying the sharing w/ other country rule gurus, they can't tell you classification. And so everything comes out SECRET.

So the problem is the rules, which the GOs write. Change the classification guidance and then, most importantly, train the folks on what is SECRET and UNCLASS for their given operation. And pull back the guard dogs of the 2's State Security Organization (SSO), everyone is afraid of losing their clearance if they share something they shouldn't (but down on the ground, that is often ignored, cause the job needs to get done). SSO's only intrepret the rules in place, so, again, change the classification guidance.

Clear guidance as to what we can share along with training (don't forget the training) will be fundamental to actually implementing what MG Flynn and so many others have already identified as a key lesson to actually learn.

Classification was an ongoing problem when we created solutions in Iraq in 2008, but not a big one.

The problem MG Flynn is trying to resolve is structural.

These civilian/military endeavors are different. They are not traditional wars so much as combined operations in and about civilian political and administrative "targets," and they are not traditional civilian disaster/development initiatives because those same "targets" are still in contention.

Military intelligence is optimized to identify that 50 people are gathered in that building, but not to identify why they are in that building, what the gathering is for, and how that gathering may, or may not relate to their military efforts. Anything a satellite can see or map, they have.

What they do not have is the basic CIMS (Civilian Information Management Systems) that we take for granted: population data; organizational, economic and industrial structure information; property maps and ownership records; electrical and water system map; and one and on....

They have little to no background information of the operating framework of the country to understand the context of what's going on around them. So every event is a surprise, every activity a threat, and every step a potential misstep.

The White House review was chock full of experienced civilian government leaders and administrators who wanted to know the basic CIMS set. How many people are in that province or district? What are their background conditions? What needs to be improved to strengthen our hand? And factual issues like where are the opium supply routes, and who operates them?

As MG Flynn disclosed: We don't know those things. We just know about the bad guys in front of us.

The essential question raised for Afghanistan is, beyond just the war-fighting operations, Who has the big picture?

MG Flynn's response: I don't know, but to create one we need more of a different kind of analysis and information.

Now, MG Flynn being the C2 of ISAF, this troubles me quite a bit. We're 8 years into this war and 6 into Iraq and even Generals still have little clue on what their collectors do. You had HUMINT going to Afghan villages and buying back vacuums and thumbdrives the LNs were stealing for years because unit commanders didn't know how to utilize them. Now you have *surprise* Flynn slamming his collectors for NOT doing something out of their job scope.

This report would of been completely fine if he mentioned anything about we need more Psyops and CA in the area. Is it a Intel Collector's job to collect information on markets? Sure, if the collector comes across it, but that's a Civil Affair's soldier's job. Is it a Intel Collector's job to collect on radio stations? Sure, if it happens to come across a conversation, but that's a Psyops' Soldier's job.

Lets make no mistake, it's the bottom end of the IC that's doing alot of the heavy lifting in these low intensity conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that's USMI. It's why TRADOC opened the floodgates and let anyone and everyone be a 97E/35M in the mid 2000's, and still are. Your average "Intelligence Officer" is a 18-27 year old enlisted male who wanted a break from college and a clearance, or a Tanker/Parachute Rigger/Dental Hygeneist who got paid alot of money to Transfer their MOS.