Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Share

A couple of weeks ago, I carried a post about a speech Zalmay Khalilzad, the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan (and to Iraq, and to the United Nations) gave about the Afghan economy. Today Zal checks in with a response to that post and a subsequent one from Kabul:

Two weeks ago when I spoke at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies one of my points was that creating a functional economy and improving living standards are as important to success in defeating the enemy as our military effort. I argued for leveraging the purchasing power of the NATO and ISAF forces to stimulate the Afghan economy-encourage the creation or strengthening of Afghan businesses and putting more Afghans to work. We did this successfully in Korea and Japan and we can do in Afghanistan -- where last year unemployment was estimated at 40%.

One development worker on the ground -- the director of the Peace Dividend Trust, a non-profit international NGO operating in Afghanistan -- in a letter to Tom Ricks stated that it was already happening. Tom in turn shared the letter on his blog at Foreign Policy.

It is true that some progress has been made because of the "Afghan first" policy. The Department of Defense is considering ways to do more. However, the steps taken-which I applaud-are very small compared to the potential, and it is this potential that I was talking about the other day and will be addressing in more detail here.

Presently, some 80% of our bases and facilities in Afghanistan -- both NATO and US -- receive food supplies imported from outside Afghanistan through one foreign company: chicken and meat, bread, sugar, honey, jam, eggs, vegetables and fruit juices. In fact, almost all food items, with the sole exception of water and soda, are imported.

The beverage industry represents a small success story.   It began in 2003--2004.  A number of water bottling, fruit processing, and soda production businesses have been successfully established in Afghanistan. The US military buys some of its water and other beverage needs from local companies. Why can't the US military use its purchasing power to encourage the growth of business to supply local fruits, vegetable, juices, chicken, eggs, honey, bread and jam? The potential exists in Afghanistan to supply these needs. The success in regards to water and some others drinks can be replicated in these other areas.  I believe it serves our interests that we increasingly do so.

There is also Afghan potential in the construction material industry. The US military and NATO need large amounts of cement, steel, wood and other materials to support its local construction efforts. There is also considerable local need in this regard. At present the construction materials used by the US and NATO and local builders are imported.  Millions of dollars leave Afghanistan every month to import construction materials.

Take cement as an example. Afghanistan imports thousands of tons of cement from Pakistan and Iran every month. Afghanistan produces cement at the Ghori factory, but in low quality and quantity. Two other cement factories still need rehabilitation. Although the Afghans should be blamed for not rehabilitating the two factories (Jabal Siraj and Herat), the US could work with the Afghan government to find ways such as privatization to rehabilitate such factories and enhance their capacity. Another cement factory was supposed to be established in Jalalabad but that never materialized. Developing this industry will not only help the Afghan economy but will also mean that less cement will be imported from Iran, a country that is essentially hostile to the US.

The same applies to many other construction materials such as bricks, pipes and electrical supplies, to name a few. In all case there is existing infrastructure for producing these items locally and reducing the reliance on imports. However, the businesses that are interested in producing construction materials have been unable to compete with imported materials. All that is needed is assistance with rehabilitation, simple technology improvements and, support -- by letting these businesses know that the US military will be their customer.

Many problems plague the contracting process for a multitude of services. Foreigners companies have been providing all services to NATO and ISAF forces; from logistics and cafeteria management to laundry services and instead of Afghans, foreign personnel are recruited. There are great shortcomings in our contracting mechanism -- that favor foreign companies. The mechanism is so flawed that Afghan companies most of the time get to work on projects only after the project had passed through layers after layers of contractors and intermediaries, leaving only a fraction of original allocation available for the actual work.

The oil supply sector is one of the sectors in which Afghan companies are not awarded the prime contracts for fuel supply because they do not have direct access to the whole contracting processes. Most contracts are awarded outside Afghanistan.

Security and quality are legitimate issues. But as the case of water demonstrates they can be dealt with. It is a fact that currently the Afghan private sector does not have the capacity to fully meet the demands of the international forces in Afghanistan but the purchasing power of the military can be used to incentivize an ever increasing capacity of local businesses. This is an issue that needs to be discussed and better understood, so that it becomes a key element of our strategy.

Hiroko Masuike/Getty Images

 

JPWREL

4:39 PM ET

December 29, 2009

One problem I see ahead

One problem I see ahead concerning the purchasing power of the NATO coalition is that if these Afghan businesses get hooked on military contracts and size themselves accordingly they making themselves susceptible to collapse once the coalition effort winds itself down and moves out. The second problem is that while some would have you think the economy is on the rebound the likelihood of a second half of 2010 relapse are rising significantly. In that scenario it is difficult to see Americans willing to finance the rebuilding of Afghanistan or any other basket case country.

The military high command in particular who often seem so unconscious and indeed isolated from our economy here at home had better use some of those government purchased advanced degrees to clue themselves into the ramifications of a possible enduring American economic winter and its consequences. The Taliban’s greatest ally may not be its own battle worthiness but a Japan like multi-decade era of slow or no economic growth here in the USA. Under such circumstances the public may begin to consider our current wars and contemplated wars (Lieberman) as luxuries we can ill afford thus dispensable.

 

SOLDIERSDIARY

5:00 PM ET

December 29, 2009

Another Problem

Sooner or later there will no longer be the requirment for the large number of police and Afghan Army Soldiers. The Afghan gov't can not afford to keep them on the payroll once we leave. Lots of unemployed young men that the gov't can't afford to pay or train, or feed.

 

PHILIPSMUCKER

9:56 PM ET

January 2, 2010

Buying Local

Even if it creates a dependence, it is a good thing for the next decade while we are there on the ground. Indeed, when you think about the issue of embattled supply lines, it sounds better and better. Troops in the field already EAT local when they are making the rounds.

Khalilzad is not in the government, but he has an Afghan's sense of what is needed to create a stronger economy. Washington bureaucrats have created massive barriers to the innovation he suggests and so it will likely require an
executive order to move the idea ahead.

R u listining Prez?

Best, Philip Smucker

 

ADMIRAL

6:12 PM ET

December 29, 2009

Neocon Zalmay Khalilzad War Criminal

Who's next, John Yoo to discuss human rights in Afghanistan? Zalmay Khalilzad should be in prison.

 

NORWEGIAN SHOOTER

1:34 AM ET

December 30, 2009

another reason to leave

It's really nice of Zal to express his hopes and dreams for Afghanistan now that he is out of government. If he had any cojones, he would remind us of what happened with procurement contracts when he was proconsul. Then he would tell us what company owns 80% of the food supply contract, how the contract was let, when it expires, and who negotiated the deal. As for changing this arrangement, it ain't gonna happen.

But to get back to the real world, this is a great example of how much of a challenge enabling more than subsistence agriculture (besides poppies) will be in Afghanistan. Or even rudimentary manufacturing - cement is not difficult to make. Our annual expenses in Afghanistan dwarf its GDP. Producing a relatively stable Afghanistan will take at least 5 to 10 years. Enabling a self-sufficient Afghanistan will take decades.

Again, Rory Stewart is the man to read - and listen to.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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