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Posted By Thomas E. Ricks
Wednesday, December 23, 2009 - 11:52 AM
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Susan Glasser, who was there, says that one of the biggest mistakes of the last 10 years was letting Osama bin Laden escape from Tora Bora:
The disaster flowed from one bad idea: that the United States could win in Afghanistan without a "big footprint," using locals who wouldn't trigger the renowned Afghan hostility to foreign invaders. Not to mention that deploying a small contingent of special forces armed with cash would prove Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's ideological point about the need to transform the U.S. armed services from a lumbering Cold War conventional force into a leaner, meaner, high-tech military capable of lightning strikes.
Rumsfeld may have been right about the need for transformation. But Tora Bora was a case study not in innovation but in the arrogance of a superpower that made bad decisions in the face of overwhelming evidence that they wouldn't work.
Peter Feaver, who was on the staff of the National Security Council, responds that she is wrong wrong wrong. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan succeeded, he says, because of the "light" approach used. Losing OBL at Tora Bora was the price of that light approach, he concludes. "We had bin Laden within reach at Tora Bora precisely because we were willing to try the very light-footprint approach they denounce," he writes.
Interesting argument, made all the more so because both Ms. Glasser and Prof. Feaver are friends of mine. Also, both are crackerjack smart.
So who is right: the White House aide turned professor or the foreign correspondent turned bigtime editor? I think Susan is, and not only because she is my boss. My reasoning is that the CIA's Bernsten asked for a battalion of Army Rangers (a light force, Prof. Feaver) to be deployed and was turned down.
But I decided to ask someone who was in the middle of this operation. His bottom line, I think, is that this was indeed a terribly screwed up operation, but that Rumsfeld's philosophy was the least of its problems. So he thinks Glasser's facts are correct but not her conclusion, and Feaver's analysis is correct but it misses what was really the lesson of this operation.
Here is his response:
A boy runs to his father and breathlessly shouts, "Paw, come quick. The hired man and sis are up in the haymow, and he's a-pullin' down his pants and she's a-liftin' up her skirt. Paw, they're getting ready to pee all over our hay!."
To which the father replies, "Son, you've got your facts absolutely right, but you've drawn a completely wrong conclusion." That is, both authors do have some facts correct, though not necessarily their conclusions.
With respect to Susan Glasser: Yes, Bin Laden escaped. To make the leap from that fact to the many other tidbits offered, such as it was a bad idea to think that we could win without a big footprint and that this was about proving Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's ideological points tells more than a little about her perspective (from amongst the many journalists who outnumbered the U.S. Forces). Full disclosure, I was not there at Tora Bora. But I was down the road a little at the intersection where the collection of senior leaders from varying organizations collided with modern technology (which as I recall were predominately venerable LST-D's ... forgive me if a wax nostalgic for a moment). As such my recollection of "what really happened" differs some from hers. I would also argue that she misses the mark with the comment that we are still suffering the consequences of the decision not to fight at Tora Bora. I for one would not be willing to bet that much would be different today regardless of a different outcome there.
With respect to Peter Feaver: I happen to agree with his assessment of the options available, either deploy now with a light 'more unconventional' force or wait until 2002 with a more conventionally footprint. I also personally believe that we had multiple chances under this construct to capture/kill Bin Laden.
Where I tend to differ from many is that I believe most critical observations to be symptomatic of the command relationships at the time and not the ends unto themselves. I think that our proverbial Achilles heel was, and perhaps still is, unity of effort. Gary Bernsten and BG Dailey "arguing" describes to a tee what I see as the Achilles heel of the entire war at that point -- unity of effort. While Gary was the commander on the ground the vast preponderance of resources being utilized at the time were obviously military. When his request for additional resources was denied (Rangers and others) I vaguely recall Gary offering to the military leadership to take over the operation (at that time it wasn't just BG Dailey on deck, but also BG Harrell and RAdm Calland - which no doubt helped simplify the situation immensely). What has forever stuck in my mind was the collective response: "Conditions had not been met for the military to assume responsibility for the operation."
JOEL SAGET/AFP/Getty Images
I'd throw Peter Bergen's fine piece into the mix also: http://www.tnr.com/article/the-battle-tora-bora. Key quote: "I am convinced that Tora Bora constitutes one of the greatest military blunders in recent U.S. history."
None of this brings honor to Tommy Franks and his superiors all the way to the (alleged) Commander in Chief. And - again - My Favorite Army looks flatfooted and incompetent, all dressed up for the wrong war but unwilling to change clothes.
The whole point of the intervention in Afghanistan should have been to kill OBL and as many of his cronies as possible and then get out. It's easy for a first world power to topple a third world government, or what passed for one in Afghanistan, but what do you do after that?
It reminds me of a story one of my friends told about the birth of his first child. After the drama and excitement of the pregnancy and birth the happy couple got home with their baby and sat down in the front room. They looked at the sleeping baby and the mother said to the father 'what the f##k are we supposed to do when it wakes up?'
It rapidly became obvious that Cheney, Rumsfeld and their trained chimp didn't know how to change a nappy or breast feed and when their second child came along they were left trying to put both of them up for adoption. Unfortunately their neighbours held their noses and told them they should have used birth control.
I thought the modern Rangers were part of the light foot print; a small group of highly trained and motivated soldiers who assault airports and other very hard targets ahead of Big Army. TB was a perfect mission for them. They would have succeeded and UBL would have been killed. Maybe the AQ organization would have gone on. Who knows, but a dead UBL would have been a better outcome than a UBL making videos. The failure to deploy the 800 Rangers at a critical moment on the battlefield, no matter the command structure, speaks to a failure of the military command to use the tool they built for the specific circumstance they faced. Inserting the Rangers would have been a continuation, not a break, of the light foot print approach to Afghanistan. It wasn't like Mr. Gary was asking for the Army to drop an airborne division or make an armored division appear.
I didn't realize this was a R rated blog!
I have a little difficulty with the "command relationship" excuse. This is as old as combined arms warfare - probably older - and is an excuse for nobody having the guts to take the ball and run with it.
I should add that there are two types of footprints; boots on the ground and brass conglomerations. It seems as if the brass footprint was heavy enough for four or five generals and admirals to argue over who was in charge and to decide nobody was willing to take the responsibility of getting a few competent special ops guys in there to do the job the entire operation was designed to do; get OBL. If the inability of the brass to order a single battalion-strength unit of Army Rangers into the operation is considered:
- too heavy a footprint, or:
- nobody was willing to take responsibility for sending them in,
it begs the question of if these guys can't figure out who is responsible this side of the Pentagon, what can they be trusted to do competently?
Feaver is just conducting a CYA operation.If he isn't smarter than his justification for why the thing didn't work he doesn't deserve to be considered an "expert." Glasser is just giving her opinion. THis entire exchange makes me even more depressed about our chances in that part of the world and of our commanders (ground commanders anyhow) ability to do anything right. to get
The issue that had the biggest impact for our perfomrance at Tora Bora was, upon approaching who we felt were key warlords for assistance, we didn't evaluate who we could trust, which was the fault of the Agency, not the military.
From reading the publicly available information, it appears that the Agency was first-in and they rapidly and successfully aligned tribal/warlord/political leaders to overturn the Taliban. The Agency appears to have ridden the locals as far as they could take the USG, which was right through Kabul, and when they realized that the locals couldn't finish off UBL, they asked for assistance from a small unit of elite US soldiers (Rangers) who were readily available and specifically trained for the TB type mission. The Agency appears to have recognized both the uses and limitations of the locals. Unless the literature is wrong, the Agency asked for US military assistance in a timely manner and the military did not make use their own perfectly aligned resource to complete the mission.
The above comment is the crux of the issue at Tora Bora, and it had little or nothing to do with the size of the footprint we had on the ground at the time in Afghanistan.
Deploying the Rangers in a timely manner would certainly have increased our chances of killing or capturing UBL. I believe Tommy Franks was absolutely the wrong man for the job in the early stages of the war - he demonstrated a complete lack of understanding and of Special Operations and embodies the Big Army mentality.
UBL was able to buy his way out of Tora Bora by turning one of the warlords that opened the door for his escape. He and his entourage were then escorted out through a rat line up the Konar valley and into Pakistan. A timely and effective use of US forces that were available, along with some basic intelligence and surveillance work would have prevented this.
It's hard to understand the lack of accountability in our military. How many years did we stumble around Iraq before finding a way out--I know we're not there even now? How many years in Afganistan before understanding that we had a losing strategy?
Our military sadly is poorly led and it's not all the civilian's fault.
But then, this happens allot (historically). Takes some time to 'shuck the corn' and get leaders in position who "get it." Civil War, PI Insurrection, WWII, Korea, Vietnam - why is this war any different?
The big deficiency (IMO) of the post-Vietnam military was a failure to develop pre-war "strategic" General/Flag Officers. Great tactical guys, poor operational and strategic commanders. Franks (and Meyers, and others) was a no-so-glowing example.
That, and the joint world these guys now operate in is more directly linked to bureaucratic, governmental processes - turf between agencies, budgets, personalities, competition. Makes it tough to run a war on the ground with gov't policy guys picking away at resources and micromanaging non-strategic issues.
The real problem was a failure to replace the GO's who didn't succeed (in a timely manner). Took almost 4 yrs in Iraq. We're just getting there in Afghanistan.
Anyone who studies this issues knows the White House wanted OBL to escape. The CIA officer in charge has basically said so, and a U.S. Congressmen recently confirmed this. Recall, Bush was telling everyone the "War on Terror" would last for decades.
Does anyone here really think the Bushites wouldn't do this?
And for another memory refresher, keep in mind that OBL didn't have any direct knowledge of 9-11, and neither did the Afghans or Taliban. He was just a figurehead for a loose Muslim nationalist movement. 9-11 was planned by an American educated Kuwaiti who hung out in Manila, and executed by Saudis who somehow got US visas and trained in Germany and the USA. So why are we in Afghanistan?
If I recall correctly elements of the 10th Mountain Division were also involved in the Tora Bora fight. That is a big area, and a battalion here and a battalion there, along with warlord forces of dubious loyalty, simply weren't enough to close off all the avenues of escape. I recall reading an account of a firefight in which aviation assets were unable to provide fire support for the infantry because of the weather; at the time there was no field artillery in-country because Donald Rumsfeld is said to have scratched it from the 10th Mountain's deployment. Whether the Ranger battalion would have made a difference had it been there is second guessing.
The problem with Afghanistan is that the country is nearly the size of Texas. High tech and special ops forces can only partly compensate for the lack of boots on the ground.
And if you give up before you start...
These guys were in caves! Located. Vulnerable. It weren't a sure bet, but actually making an effort might have carried the day. A dark day for SecDef, the US Army, and the Putz in the White House. And special mention of Tommy Franks, the McClellan of our time.
Operators in my kids SEAL community tell me that the 10th 'Mountain' Division is in fact a 'Mountain' division in name only. Where the old Alpine Corps of the Austrian, German and Swiss armies were actually in superb physical condition, highly skilled and trained in mountain warfare that is not their experience in observing the 10th Mountain in Afghanistan. In their view it is just another name for a run of the mill infantry division.
I was thinking of Operation Anaconda in March 2002 in my message above. As best I can tell it was in an area of about 60-70 square miles and involved one battalion from the 10th Mountain, two from the 101st Airborne, elements of several special operations organizations, local warlord forces, and air support.
After six decades of II world war and collapse of Soviet Union the final words on Hitelr's last days in his bunker made into the history books. Three decades from now, OBL's escape from Tora Bora caves and him dying of natural causes will be written by an ex-ISI offcier of Pakistan, under pseudo name and most probably living in London!
some ??'s the 2nd guessers need to answer -
- what battalion of Rangers was hanging around incountry looking for something to do ? that early, we didn't yet have sufficient assets incountry to do what the critics propose & did not have the means to get them & their equip there by 12/01. who incountry was trained & equipped for that mission, in that inhospitable terrain ? what vehicles were going in with them ? fuel ? supply ? medevac? who would have backfilled the mission of any incountry forces sent to Tora Bora?
- how many helos were avail incountry @12/01 capable of operating at Tora Bora's alt ? how many would have been needed to mount & support an op of the size proposed ? where was that much jet fuel coming from ?
The reason we had a light footprint, early on, was not just philosophical. We had yet to establish the seaborne deployment & logistics channel from Karachi through Pakistan, or the Northern Distribution Network's air bridge via the Stans. Look how difficult it was just getting 2 partial MEU's & their helos into Camp Rhino by 12/01.
The critics never address the actual order of battle avail @ 12/01 or the logistical realities/constraints.
Isn't the absence of troops and logistics part of the debacle? This was a colossal screw-up, quibble as you may about it's proximate cause.
RD hits the nail squarely on is head.
I am re-reading my Korea books because of another thread. I am at the point just before the Chinese launched their second offensive at the end of November 1950.
Right then the 8th Army and X Corps (excepting the Marines, who were prepared) were on their "victory" offensive, heading towards the Yalu with limited artillery ammo, limited small arms ammo, no Winter clothing, limited air cover, minimal lateral communications, and almost no knowledge of where the Chinese were or how many were there.
Confidence is a great thing, but it consistently seems to morph into suicidal hubris. Regarding TB, did the Bushies and the commanders on scene and at the Pentagon think they could do it with what they had, did they think it wasn't that important (the revisionist or CYA story), or beyond some less senior commanders on scene were they beside themselves because of lack of resources and the possibility that the mission would not succeed because of that?
This is a movie we have all seen before; not taking the enemy seriously for one reason or another. Why is thins an issue over and over again? Do we never learn? Have we taken the lessons of TB on board now that we have seemingly committed ourselves to going whole-hog in Afghanistan? McChrystal and Obama's team seem smart, but this is a chronic issue. Not just an American problem, but still...
RD - Tora Bora was just 3 mos after 9/11 & barely over 1 month after our military ops commenced. How would you have gotten more troops there by 12/11 ? How would you have supported them ? Have you ever looked at a map ? How do you think all our troops, equip, & supplies get there ? A major reason we had such a light footprint early was because there was no way to get more there sooner, especially in time for Tora Bora. You facile critics have no concept of the realities involved in conducting warfare. What you deride as quibbling is recognition of real world limitations. The only nail you hit on the head is your own preconceived notions, which are totally detached from tactical reality.
Yes, logistics rule the battle field. But the Rangers were on the ground and could have got in the fight. It would have been on the very ragged edge of their support chain but it was possible. Again, no one asked for a brigade on Abrams. I have heard this argument before and I do not buy it. If the Army cannot move 800 men on the objective three months into a war, think about the implications. I've looked at a map and kicked the dirt. It was doable. To say that getting Rangers on objective was not possible three months after 9/11 because the logs tail was wobbly is a cop out. The whole point of SF is that they are not locked into the US Navy swimming their kit into theatre.
The Marines could have done it. One order can get an ARG with SOF capabilities anywhere on earth in less than three months. But wrong union, huh.
If, as you state, the United States Army can't muster sufficient force to flush a cave system on three months alert, well thank you for making my point that the US Army is a mess.
JAFFIR - thanx for the serious response. How would you have proceeded ?
I've yet to read a viable plan, but I still have an open mind.
Would you have brought the 800 Rangers from stateside ? I see the most critical limitation as the # of high alt capable helos avail incountry to support such an op.
Would you have airdropped the Rangers & resupplied them that way ?
How much time was avail from the time the request was made until OBL slipped away ? Was there sufficient time avail to prep & mount such a complex, high risk op ?
Was sufficient confidence in the intell warranted at that time, given the potential risk vs reward ? ...certainty is ez in hindsight.
Our Army is now (imo) a lot more adaptable, better trained & equipped to mount such a short notice mission in that unique battlespace than we were circa 12/11. Would Abizaid or Casey have ordered such an op, were they in Franks' shoes ?
Look what the USMC had to do just to get ~ 1000 into Camp Rhino (secretly, via Pakistan)..
Tell me now how they'd get enough H-53's & H-46's there to mount such an op (you might also want to examine the performance charts for those helos at Tora Bora's altitude).
There wasn't 3 mos avail. from the time OBL was thought to be in Tora Bora until the time he slipped away.
Prior Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance
"There wasn't 3 mos avail. from the time OBL was thought to be in Tora Bora until the time he slipped away." Aha! That's why you plan.
Franks never said he couldn't go heavy. He said he didn't want to.
So let's try this again: we wanted OBL 'dead or alive.' We had entered combat in his vicinity. We could have mustered sufficient force and assets to have a serious go at him and to be prepared to react to locater information. We Did Not Do That.
The right time to fail is after you've tried. Again, Peter Bergen: "I am convinced that Tora Bora constitutes one of the greatest military blunders in recent U.S. history." You're saying it was just too hard to give it a real go. Hogwash.
'For of all sad words of tongue or pen,
The saddest are these: "It might have been!" ' John Greenleaf Whittier
RD & JAFFIR - there wasn't 3 mos avail to prep for Tora Bora. When did the request come in for more forces for Tora Bora ? Early on, the size of our footprint was constricted by lack of a direct supply route. We couldn't get sufficient forces there to go conventional until the overland convoy route through Pak & the northern airbridge were established.
The prospect of 800 Rangers trapped in Tora Bora, taking heavy casualties, with no support, back up, or way out, seemed a lot more likely than a successful capture/killing of OBL. Hindsight is 20:20. How much confidence would you have had in that intell? Enough to potentially sacrifice an entire Ranger Batt ?
There were certainly three months to prepare for TB. On 12 September any elite unit that wasn't thinking about how they might play a role in killing UBL was, brain dead. Afghanistan was the maximum obvious objective.
Flowing support to conventional forces into Afghanistan as a whole is irrelevant to moving SF on the battlefield at TB. Perhaps I am wrong, and I am sure I will be corrected by smart folks, but the airlift and willingness was there. It was a command decision?
As for taking heavy casualties. It would have been a bitch. But thats the job.
Jaffir
Turn to Lincoln for the answer...
"If McClellan is not using the army, I should like to borrow it for a while."
If Franks was uninterested in one of his primary objectives, perhaps another commander might have been.
Sure there's a lot of logistics and lift capacity and time-distance calculations and quality-of-intel concerns, but in the end it's all twaddle if you never even gave it a go. "Might have failed" does not trump "might have tried."
The civilians got in fast. The SF community couldn't? Why?
1-Franks primary purpose seems to have been using the invasion of Iraq merely as an opportunity to generate material for his book to be published after his heroic retirement. Afghanistan seems to have been an annoyance to him while the thoughts of a good old fashion ‘blitzkrieg’ were swimming in his head.
2-For some to suggest that the Marines and Navy SEAL’s could not have mustered a force of adequate strength to attack TB with less than three months lead time seems to me to lack credibility. My guess is that the last thing the ‘Army’ wanted was a USMC/SEAL force to be seen doing it’s work.
RD - helo lift avail was the long pole in the tent at Tora Bora. Without more helos (& fuel & maint support), capable of lifting sufficient bulk at those altitudes (essentially, H-47 Chinooks were the, only suitable option), the Tora Bora Op was a non starter. Here's testimony from then Deputy Cent Comm, LtGen DeLong (from the Kerry comm report) :
"DeLong defended the decision not to deploy large numbers of American troops. ”We didn’t have the lift,” he told the Committee staff. ”We didn’t have the medical capabilities. The further we went down the road, the easier the decision got."
Mike DeLong is a career USMC helo pilot. I trust his judgement on this critical issue much more than I do the conjecture of Glassman, Bergin, Kerry, et. al.
What the hell is the huge DOD budget for if not to have the proper logistical resources to get boots on the ground with decent BBBs in good time? Why do we spend dough on all this stuff if there aren't resources for a given vital mission at hand? Are we still spending our dough to stop the Soviet hordes at the Fulda Gap? Or preventing Saddam Hussein from gassing or nuking people?
If all your points are correct, and there is no reason to believe they aren't, it is a huge indictment of our senior commanders that they didn't foresee the need for the resourcing you say wasn't available for the TB operation.
My understanding of this operation is that the civilians were willing to go with virtually no medivac capability and very little follow on flow-on-force. I am new to this blog and do not want to be abrasive, so let me know if I am out of line If I might respectfully say, you are describing the support required for a conventional operation. Yes, even in unconventional operations you have to get the lift in to manage casualties. But that cannot be allowed to define the battle field.
JAFFIR - getting 800 dismounted Rangers into mountainous terrain & supporting them as they go down rat holes in the maze of Tora Bora's caves,
is hardly unconvential SOF ops. That many boots on the ground requires a substantial support chain. (see previous post on helo lift).
Our Generals don't throw away their troops on high risk/ low probability of success missions, based on historically unreliable intell.
A high casualty fiasco at Tora Bors would have destroyed public support at a very critical point. Our national secutity was not at stake at Tora Bora.
Grant would have done the same thing as Franks re Tora Bora.
What would Jim Gavin or Max Taylor have done?
Support does not drive mission
Supporting a unit once it gets engaged is a critical issue. However, winning is also right up there as a key US objective. The civilians and SF guys were ale to feed and maintain them selves for 48 periods. The Ranger assault at TB would have been over in 24 hours. The logs would have caught up.
Support does not drive mission
Supporting a unit once it gets engaged is a critical issue. However, winning is also right up there as a key US objective. The civilians and SF guys were ale to feed and maintain them selves for 48 periods. The Ranger assault at TB would have been over in 24 hours. The logs would have caught up.
how do you known that the Rangers would have been done in just 24 hrs ? - then begun walking out (carrying their wounded & dead).
things have never been ez for us in E Afghan.
...to where - their hotels in Kabul ? That aptly demonstrates how ridiculous this entire backward looking, 2nd guessing is.
Reasonable, prudent tactical decisions by Military Commanders, 2nd guessed by politicians & journalists, 8 yrs later, to score political points, sell books, magazines & newspapers.
The civilians really did get in
The civilians were on the ground well ahead of the military with cash, guns, helos, food, and a plan. Their admin chain worked; the military's didn't. Ya? The horrible lag in the military's Special Operations ability to get on the ground is, worthy of discussion.
JAFFIR - You make legit points. Agree. the CIA had been there, in small #'s, & had developed a civilian support network. By "civilians,"I thought you were referring to the throng of reporters Glasser had used as her analogy to deploying a Ranger Batt to Tora Bora. We also had a military SOF force at Tora Bora, with their own specialized/integrated helo squadron.
What we did not have (yet) was sufficient helo support for an entire Ranger Batt, even if they'd gotten in via air drop. A dismounted Ranger Batt of 800 is not a light SOF op that can operate (for long) with minimal helo support in that terrain.
We had sufficient $$ & assets in the US inventory, & sufficient airlift & sealift to get them there. However, @12-13-01, we did not yet have the time/logistics channels to have them avail in time for the Tora Bora op. In a few months, such a mission could have been conducted, on relatively short noytice, using assets that were (by then) incountry.
RD - your bravado is amusing, but not relevant, unless you consider outcomes like "Blackhawk Down" as acceptable.
The Rangers could have got on objective.
what Rangers ?
how would they get ...(1) IN (2) around (3) out (4) resupply (5) medevac
how many H-47s incountry @ 12/01 ?
Tora Bora wasn't the only thing going on at the time.
The Marines & SOF were still pretty busy down south.
Gotta be a sure thing. Got it. Do the math and give up in advance if any factor seems contrary. That's the old warrior spirit.
Look, I extend full respect to the fighters and have no adverse comments about bravery, honor, or dedication of those on the ground. But the generalship surrounding the debacle at Tora Bora has to be judged atrocious and self-serving statements by these 'leaders' (leading what? where?) don't attenuate that.
Comparing Franks with Grant is laughable. Among other contrasts, Grant acted with superb wisdom at Appomattox in preparing the nation for the peace that followed. Franks just didn't give a shit after the fall of Baghdad. And I doubt Grant would have waited for helos...
Let's end this. We agree to disagree. The colossal screw-up at Tora Bora (or the wise decision to enable OLB's escape, as you would have it) now lies with history. Judgment so far: we really could - and should - have tired to get the bastard.
false bravado from armchair generals
you probably also supported going after Adid in Mogadishu in '93, with the forces on hand.
Not a comparable situation.
1. Going after Adid was a political decision that was made well after US forces entered Somalia. Arguable it was a very dumb political move. Going after Adid was not part of the original mission. Going after bin Laden in Afghanistan and the NW frontier was very much part of the STATED reason why we went into Afghanistan. Remember "wanted, dead or alive" and all that other well thought out hyperbole?
2. Mogadishu ain't TB. One is a labyrinthine built-up urban area, the other a trackless (well, OK there are goat paths) mountain wilderness.
3. We had locals working with us at TB. The very fact that the US interjected itself into a Somali civil war - ongoing to this day - and took sides immediately made about 99% of all locals on the ground in Mogadishu against us - the Rangers there had no friends on the ground to help once they crashed.
4. If I remember correctly, the Adid mission was worked up in a day or two. Very ad hoc and spur-of-the-moment. If the same is the case with the TB operation it is yet an even bigger indictment on the senior US leadership. Again, a very real part of the entire Afghanistan invasion in 2001 was to get OBL.
So the crack about Adid wasn't relevant or necessary. Neither was the armchair general comment.
Mogadishu '93 <-> Tora Bora "missed opportunity "
Both bad ideas.
Driven by political rather than sound tactical factors.
Fortunately, the 2nd was not attempted.
Are you saying that all military action should be governed by tactical factors and not political ones?
Huh? Please elaborate, because that doesn't make any sense.
-in Mogadishu, the Commander was denied the assets he requested, yet was ordered to capture Adid with just the forces he had on hand. The order was prompted by pressure from the UN.
- in Tora Bora, the Commander based his decision on the forces on hand (& those he could conceivably get their in time). He concluded that those forces were inadequate for anything other than what was done. There was no political pressure (6000mi screwdriver) which generated an order to proceed with less than adequate assets for force protection.
- in Mogadishu, Pak APC's came to the rescue. The Paks couldn't/wouldn't have been able to get their APCs into Tora Bora to extract us this time.
why does no one want to answer my question about the # of H-47s (other than the 160th SOAR) avail incountry ?
how many Operation Jawbreaker donkeys did Gary have lined up to move & support the phantom Ranger Batt airdropped from conus ?
ftr lol, I didn't compare Franks with Grant.
RD compared Franks with McClellan.
I responded that Grant would not have approved a plan as flawed the Tora Bora missed opportunity fantasy request.
this ia a political hit job & a stunt to sell books, magazines, & newspapers.
nothing more.
Are you comparing OBL to Adid? The guy you are after makes a difference - Adid was a local player in Somalia. He's no OBL. The urgency - as stated by the president, his secretary of defence, and his top commanders in the field of getting OBL "dead or alive" was pul;icly stated over and over again. You think that doesn't make a difference? Why weren't the assets there? Your point about how there was other important stuff going on elsewhere in Afghanistan is beside the point if we are to take the public statements of the president et al seriously.
In retrospect we know that the president at that time was not a serious person, but that is also irrelevant.
An ill-conceived mission to go after a Somali warlord is not the same thing as an ill-conceived mission to go after the most wanted guy (and his "staff") on the planet.
So - this discussion really is about resourcing. If we assume that what you say is fact; that the choppers and other hardware and resources were necessary to put the rangers or other special forces assets into the area of operations (TB), it begs the question of why those vital resources weren't available at short notice.
Either the commanders on scene didn't take Bush and Rumsfeld's orders seriously, or there was a massive logistical screw-up. No way around it.
As to your comment about how this is all BS to sell books, well we are all entitled to our opinions. Franks doesn't come out particularly well in a lot of people's opinions.
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