The shallowness of General
Dempsey's presentation was all the more striking to me because on the same
day I read a similar piece
by retired Army Lt. Gen. David Barno. Like Dempsey, Barno is grappling with
change and trying to look into the future, but he shows much more rigor and
originality in doing so. He also challenges the Army far more than Dempsey did.
First, Barno observes that:
... our military today
is in a sense operating without a concept of war and is searching desperately
for the new "unified field theory" of conflict. ... Today, no agreed-upon
theory of conflict drives all of these critical vectors toward a commonly
understood paradigm; the result is a profusion of disparate outlooks leading
toward the risk of professional incoherence.
Strong stuff, and far more thought-provoking than what
Dempsey was saying. Barno then drives home the point:
Warfare is
changing, and Western militaries to date are having serious difficulties
keeping up-intellectually, materially, and psychologically.
He is sounding an alarm. It doesn't sound like he thinks
TRADOC is meeting the challenge head on. Indeed, he is calling out a generation
of generals when he writes that:
Comments often
made by senior U.S. commanders that "we cannot be defeated militarily" and
"this war cannot be won by military means" should send shudders down the spines
of all serious students of war. War is nothing if not a political act; it
always serves political ends.
Barno's thoughts have more saliency if seen as comments on the US Army.
IMHO...
The Marine Corps knows exactly where it is and where it needs to be.
The US Navy is also solid in its mission, though probably too big for current needs.
The US Air Force is as always, a corporate conglomeration of internal institutional priorities and the external interests of the major aerospace firms.
The Joint system and the Unified Commanders are functioning satisfactorily (to a first approximation).
It's the US Army that's wondering through the wilderness. Barno's right regarding his own Service and it continues to mystify where is the assigned Army leadership and why is it so surprised by life.
Rubber Ducky comments match my own thinking. However, one service he failed to mention which I give very high marks to is the USCG. Unfortunately, for most even those on this forum they are off the radar screen yet they play a critical and effective role in our national security. To their credit the USCG also seems to fully comprehend and execute their missions without half the whining and confusion of the U. S. Army.
Rubber Ducky, your assessment about the current situation of each of the services appears quite astute. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War appears to have caused much of the confusion in the US Army. The Navy's objectives remain pretty much the same - control of the seas - whether the Soviet Union exists or not. The Navy's just tinkering with second-order changes and assets in order to be able to accomplish that mission. The Army's challenge is accepting that the primary mission it is likely to face for at least the next fifty years isn't the one it wants and is structured for. Worse, if it reverts back to an older structure which dealt with similar circumstances (a la Fort Apache and the conflicts with the Native American population), it loses its reason for existence because the USMC is structured to move overseas to fulfill that mission. It's no wonder the Army is wandering in the wilderness, so long as the overall defense structure retains its pre-Cold War collapse form.
As I recall, BG Dempsey was early (2003 or early 2004?) to strongly voice the thought that what his division was facing included a pre-planned, pre-provisioned Sunni insurgency strategy. His arabist creds were sufficient to publicly protect him from Rummy's state of denial, and the puzzle palace guard's insistence on message control.
I only know what I read, but at least he was not pretending to adhere to a policy of strategic blindness. Pretense turned out to be nearly as bad as the real thing. Dempsey was posted in Arabia the year before the Iraq war of choice was launched, and did multiple command tours, including the ever-messy MNSTC-I job in 2005-7.
MNSTC-I is where I would look, if I wanted ammunition to criticize our command's (lack of) strategic vision. But then I'd also have to look at the orders guiding Petraeus, who preceded him there. Fiasco and Gamble seemed to bracket the stand-up of GOI forces, without really throwing light on the US policies that helped enable their role in the 2005-7 civil war.
If Gen. Dempsey's 4-star rhetoric sounds tired, maybe he is.
I wonder how Ibrahim al Douri is feeling about the changing nature of warfare, over the border in his Baathist/FRL HQ?
I have seen COs relieved for guys getting to many DUIs on Cruise. Where does the babysitting start and stop? Even I would be ok with that if they allowed them to make any mistakes but they do not, it is the zero defects problem still in play and causes them to be way overcautious. Sub Skippers will not go into the shallows, even though that is what they should be doing for the purpose of NavSof, Intel, Littoral Combat, etc..but they are more afraid of grounding the boat or even a minor accident and getting relieved. It is one thing to say you are "fired because your crew is out of control" it is another to say you are "fired because you took risks toward a combat objective". I am going to have to disagree with you on this one.
Well, I think if you take a close look at recent Navy CO’s being relieved of commands the reasons were pretty overwhelming. One has to keep in mind that regarding the recent submarine reliefs that these boats are nuclear propelled and sometimes armed. Under these circumstances there can be no excuse for driving ones boat into an undersea Pacific mountain or into an LPD in the highly congested straits of Persian Gulf. While there are always extenuating circumstances it is the job of the CO to mitigate those circumstances. If he uses the wrong charts or is flopped out on his bunk in his quarters studying for an exam he not only risks his career but also endangers the lives of his shipmates.
You are right on some of the recent ones, some I do not have the details on yet so cannot say for sure. Driving into another boat is one thing, hitting the bottom when doing something worthwhile is another. The job itself is dangerous, it is one thing to not take crazy chances, it is again another to not want to go into an area with less than 300 feet under it. I just see the effect it has on the choices they make at Sea, the days of Nimitz are dead ;)
The guy with the drunks? Should have been fired. The nation's prestige goes with its flag.
And having spent a fair bit of time submerged with very little water under the keel, your wrong that score as well. Submarines go where they need to be, with due concern for the balance of operational necessity with safety of ship; in wartime, the balance goes heavily towards mission.
Sorry, I beg to question where the baby sitting starts and ends. I do not want a bunch of boy scouts on a combat ship or in any branch. But, fair enough on that though, that can be looked at either way.
As for the subs, that is totally off. I have been on them, dove off them and they are far more concerned about that than ANYTHING else. They do not go into the littorals, they stay out of danger zones, even the NavSof subs did that and caused the dives to be a lot longer due to it. Sorry, you are wayyyyy off on that one. We have been at war, they still avoid the shallows, maybe it will change when and if we get into a real fist fight with someone but as of now, they do not. Surface Skippers are the same way. They balance career over operational needs more than anything else.
Tom,
I am telling you what I saw on the James Polk and several other of our subs that were set up for DDS Ops and now have almost all moved to Pearl. If he was a D Submariner, that is a bit of a different day than what we have now. I am sure Rubber Ducky had a VERY different time than we are now having. Sub Skippers and Surface skippers now need to be allowed to make mistakes, they need to be allowed to take chances. Smashing into another ship in the middle of the ocean is not what I am talking about, combat initiative is and being allowed to make a good faith error is.
I know things were obviously different in your day but I am telling you, things have changed. While I do not agree they should be monks in port and that it has worked fine for the Brits to let the "boys" loose, I can at least understand your point on that. The difference is that the Zero Defect Policy has killed Commanders Intent and Initiative. We still have very capable skippers but they are risk adverse. I even saw a full bird skipper tell the IAs from the Navy in Iraq that he did not like seeing sailors with weapons and it made him nervous and this was in 04'. There are still ships with VBSS teams that do not allow the sailors to have a round in the chamber for fear of an AD. I can also tell you of my own times on the Polk and another boat that the skippers were very concerned about less than 300 feet underneath. It is not the same Navy, things might change if we go to war but by then it is a little to late.
Also, I actually thought you were a girl for a while, so I will say I am sorry for the confusion on that, that was me obviously making a assumption and making the first part of the word my name on that one. You did however confirm my suspicion that you are an officer ;)
As a former CO, I say pile on the rules and make it a challenge to conform to the standards of the day. But let me have the command. The rules define the playing field. It's the play that counts.
I respectfully disagree with you, when to many rules are on hand all it does is create bureaucracy and problems for leadership. The play is not around for the skippers anymore due to that and the fact that the zero tolerance is in effect.
When the commander of the Pacific submarine force sent a navy message to all submarine COs that said 'the next CO who bends a periscope will be fired,' all the COs understood. Zero defects, eh? There have always been zero-defect issues and that's just part of the tradition. This is not a new thing.
And there have always been a few shaky-jakes who make it to command, too, and no one defends the fearful CO. But fear is not what drives the vast number of skippers - that is not the command climate they live in. COs want to do the job right and they don't want to screw up.
As former CO Charlie White said it to a class of prospective commanding officers, 'running a submarine is the easiest thing in the world ... if you don't plumber it up. So don't plumber it up.' The game's the same.
Again, in my view rules and regulations do not inhibit the ‘play’ on the field. It seems ludicrous to believe that naval commanders are losing their commands for petty reasons. And equally ludicrous to think that superior officers who are judging these actions are bereft of their own command experience and common sense.
Those CO’s and subordinates relived of their commands that I have read about over the past number of years seem to me entirely proper and in fact in some cases even tardy. All first class navies are sensitive to command failings especially at sea; this has always been so and is a reflection of the unique circumstances of war at sea.
An interesting discourse, which one would expect with the Duck involved in the fray. On a parallel note JPWREL: I knew of a Lieutenant Colonel who was ordered to vacate base housing, relinquished command early, and whose career was effectively stalled-out. The reason: his son was caught dealing dope aboard the base.
If one cannot control a family, how can we expect him to command others' sons and daughters entrusted to his/her care? A leader is responsible for all his men do or fail to do - adverse liberty incidents included in this day and age, i.e. Okinawa resentments.
However, it's ok to crash or damage property with fast mover airframes screwing around, in Naval aviation - that I've always seen as a duel standard vice the ground forces.
JPWREL and Ducky,
Here is a safe bet, go to the Officers Club or even the Chiefs Club sometime and I think you will get a different read on this after a few drinks from the guys. Do a lot of the incidents that have happened merit being fired? Yes. Do all of them? I doubt it.
Ducky, I find it hard to believe that having the zero defects policy is not different. Everything I have seen, read or even been told drives me in the other direction. JPWREL, what I mean about zero defects is that NO mistakes are allowed to be made, I just do not see that as a feasible way to run a combat oriented Navy. I also have not seen a change since the war started on things that they (the O's) are obviously more worried about than being combat effective in relation to the GWOT/OCO-VBSS w/unloaded weapons or fear of sailors being armed are just a couple of them. I am just going to have to disagree with you guys on this one, I see it as a negative and maybe I am wearing "misty" colored glasses for the "old times" but when I hear enough people complain about micro-management and see first hand how risk adverse our leadership is I just cannot agree with you that this is course we should continue on. If it is really something that has always been there, then maybe you are right on this one Ducky, that it won't or shouldn't make much of a difference, I just cannot see it is all.
Mistakes happen in ships all the time. Some are small, some are big. Some get guys fired and some don't But the many COs I've talked to in command of new submarines right now have as positive an outlook as any in my experience, certainly better than the last crop of diesel skippers (sorry: the blood was getting thin). They know their jobs, their boats, and their people. In some pretty revealing conversations there was zero mention of a 'zero-defects' approach to command. These guys are good and they're not shy.
An old skipper, Cruncher Don Kniss (may God rest his soul) said this: 'In the Navy there are no new problems ... just new people.'
Everyone loves 'the Old Navy,' but no one can agree when that halcyon period actually was. Emphasis may change. New elements may be added. But the basic rules for submarines are the same: don't run aground, don't hit nobody, and keep the ocean out of the people tank.' Sounds easy, but success invokes all the skills and knowledge and leadership a new skipper can conjure up and his only aim is to do it right. Zero defects? Get out of my way...
It might just be me looking back on the "good old days", and while I do not agree with you on a lot of things, I have to say you are right on this one. Sometimes we forget that the more things change the more they stay the same, I still have to argue against to many rules, I am a big fan of decentralized leadership that goes with the Commanders Intent and Initiative, which I still see being cut down a lot due to micro-management. The Navy is at least looking at revamping the Senior Enlisted Academy and NavSof is starting to send there guys to the Joint Special Operations NCO Academy in 2010, so I still have hope.
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