We can expect more of this. WHen the SOI leader in the story below was arrested by GOI in the spring, US commanders on the ground were already concerned it would open up a pathway for AQI to return in force to Baghdad and had intelligence along the same lines, i.e. an AQI return. Regardless of Mashhadani's character, or lack thereof, he was hugely stabilizing and would have likely continued to have been so.

http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=64975

slipping into Iraq necessarily even foreign? Some good estimates claim that about half of Iraq's Sunni population has been killed or is living in Syria and Jordan.

For months, our attention has been on AfPak and properly so. But the white elephant in the national security room that US policymakers would likely prefer not discussed is the fragile nature of the situation in Iraq and that we cannot say with confidence that the insurgency there has been defeated. What do people in the Defense and Intelligence communities believe that the coordinated bombings this week represent? Is it an outgrowth of the political process not resolving disputed issues? What is the appropriate American and Iraqi government response? And what are the risks there in the months ahead?

Basically, what Iraq needs is a new long term and persistent (many years) 'surge' or more precisely a renewed 'pre-surge' effort of laying the groundwork by checkbook diplomacy? I think we have forgot we merely rented these characters we did not buy them. Tom has always been right, the original 'surge' was tactically successful but strategically a non-starter and we see the consequences of the brevity of that initial surge today.

Maybe, with growing bloodshed and disorder in Iraq the hawkish McCain’s, Graham’s and Lieberman’s of the world will find time to check their self-congratulation over the ‘success’ of the original surge and reflect a little more deeply on their foolish ineptitude. But I doubt it.

"Proven provider John McCreary's bottom line: "Day by day, the security situation is deteriorating ... [I]t will get much worse in the next few months."

Based upon what? There is no evidence that security is getting worse. The latest reports from the U.S. military on attacks show that weekly security incidents have actually consistently declined since April 2008 to the present. Since Sep. there have been on avg. about 200 attacks per week. From Dec. 08 to Sep. 09 there were about 300.

Casualties in Iraq has also not gone up. 2009 has seen the fewest deaths since the U.S. invasion and the trend has been for them to go up and down each month. Nov. 09 saw the fewest monthly deaths since the war started.

Here's the numbers from Iraq Body Count comparing the first year of the war compared to 2009.

2003
May 545
June 593
July 650
Aug. 790
Sep. 553
Oct. 493
Nov. 478
Dec. 529
Avg. Monthly deaths: 578.8

2009
Jan. 276
Feb. 343
March 416
Apr 484
May 332
June 488
July 395
Aug. 593
Sep. 299
Oct. 438
Nov. 212
Avg. Monthly deaths: 388.7

Since Nov. 09 had few casualties you could predict that there would be more this month. The massive bombings have followed the same pattern, Aug, Oct., Dec. They actually show the weakness of the insurgents because they can't launch these operations every month. They get one big bombing, then have to regroup and resupply for a month before they can do it again.

There were predictions that violence in Iraq would go up before the Jan. 09 elections and they actually went down. There were predictions that attacks would go up after the elections, that they would increase before the 2010 elections, and it simply has not happened. In fact, Sunnis have decided to participate in the political system, even some insurgents such as in Ninewa, and so attacks and casualties are down across the country as a result.

I'm afraid most U.S. prognosticators on Iraqi security are doing so from reading press reports, which is akin to ambulance chasing. Since the press hardly reports on anything but violence it gives the impression that Iraq is always in a state of total chaos and devastation, when if you look at it in context you see that while there is still an unacceptable level of violence in Iraq, it is nothing like it was during the sectarian war from 2006-2007 or even like it was when the insurgency first started in 2003. There is also hardly any knowledge of the Iraqi political scene, which is the driving force in Iraq right now and shapes the security situation.

As for the SOI, the deal the U.S. signed with Baghdad was to only pay them until Dec. 09, but I'm sure that will get renewed. The problem is Iraq has a severe budget deficit this year, and probably next, and has a hiring freeze as a result, the bureacracy works at a snails pace, plus the government has never been excited about any of them getting a job in the first place because they considered them an American creation.

That being said, there have been less than 5 reports I've ever read that had Sons of Iraq members going back to violence. Most will simply wait around for a paycheck from the government because they have no other means, or they will go look for another job. These guys became Sons of Iraq because they gave up. They didn't want to get killed by Al Qaeda, the Shiite militias or the U.S., so they switched sides. If they went back to the fight, they'd still get killed, especially because all their background information is known to the U.S. and government now, so it doesn't seem like a real choice for them.

Today, MG Caslen, who just left command of my old stomping grounds, MND-North (Northern Iraq), gave a very good account of things.

He explained that at first he was highly reluctant to back out of Ninewa, seeking a SOFA Waiver. Odierno convinced him to try, and he was very pleased with the result---Iraqi Army did step up, proud to take responsibility for their country.

Is it perfect? No. And it wasn;t before June 30. In fact, last week, Salah ad Din's lead anti-terrorist investigator was blown up in Tikrit with his deputies.

But, according to MG Caslen, the provincial election made a big difference in the effectiveness of governance in the North. The post-2005 provincial governments were weak and ineffective (the Sunni Boycott impact), but, according to the American guy most likely to know, the new officials are more focused, engaged, and respected; side-benefits? Violence down.

Diyala has been a substantially unstable place since.... the days of the Silk Road. Many confluences that persistently result, over time and history, in periods of substantial instability. Iran border. A gateway in the Qom to Mecca religious path. Mixed populations: Sunni, Shia, Feehly Kurds, Kurds, Turkomen.MEK.

The KRG issue remains unresolved as it has since the 1920's when the idea of a Kurdish State emerged in advance of the organization and resources to establish/maintain it. Times always change, but historical opportunities only come and go.

Beyond Iraq, the influence of neighbors can be a curse and a blessing, but Turkish/KRG relations are strengthening, according to the General, with good results.

Tom's pictures from Diyala hit anyone in the gut, and they are, in most instances, intended to have that effect. But, behind the radicals, there are 28 million moms, dads and kids who just want to get on with life. Maybe their odds will improve AFTER the next elections...

Not perfect, but my enjoyment of Iraqis I met, and respect for their challenges, leads me to continue to cross my fingers for them (and sometimes hold my breath).

Steve

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