"Gentile's article has the deep flaws of so many such articles written by the 'Traditionalists.' It criticizes counterinsurgency strategy/doctrine/population centric strategy without presenting any alternative strategy/doctrine."

Is the suggestion here that one cannot make a valid criticism without having a well-developed alternative at the ready?

I understand McCuen's argument but it fails the relevancy test here. Let's assume that Abrams had the right strategy - it doesn't matter because it was too late and too little to influence American interests in the country, no? After six years of heavy fighting, you reach a point where you just begin to see progress, but the cost is too high and the public support is gone. That's always been the problem with COIN, and nit-picking about who did what to whom doesn't really matter if you DON'T UNDERSTAND STRATEGY.

And that's Gentile's point, not that conventional operations are better than COIN, but rather the myopic focus on COIN has caused the US Army to forget about the higher art of strategy, that non-military aspects, money, politics, and public support are in fact significant factors in the execution of military operations.

As for "how to fight insurgencies and hybrid warfare" in the future, the answer is - understand the strategic objectives BEFORE you get involved in the country. That is to say, if you can't count on a strong, legitimate central government, then DON'T go in and believe that COIN will solve it, because your fundamental problems will still be there after you declare "success."

We need to plan and fight military operations that are linked to achievable political objectives and that are sustainable and that can be resourced without crippling other sectors of the government. That's all Gentile was trying to say (IMHO). And he's right. The COINdanistas are confusing the discussion and ignoring the strategic aspects of this problem, but then again, the Army in general has ignored strategic warfare for the past 35 years. But it needs to wake up and pay attention. COIN is not strategy, it's an operational tactic.

Minor point, your html link to McCuen's book is off, take out the 81 at the end.

The real misunderstanding/misreading of Gentile is that all of the COIN enthusiasts aren't thinking strategically or long-term enough. Consider what McCuen says:

"How does Gian Gentile recommend that we do this and win these insurgent or hybrid wars, such as we are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan - - AND ARE LIKELY TO BE FIGHTING IN THE FUTURE? " (emphasis added)

This is perhaps the worst assumption currently being made by COIN enthusiasts. Is is the right strategy to succeed in these current conflicts, YES it probably is. The question is, at what long-term cost? Does anyone REALLY think we will be fighting similar wars in the future? Given the fiscal problems at home, the lack of public will, the debatable strategic value/compelling interest in fighting future insurgencies, we seem to be jumping the gun by moving toward the wholesale reorganization of our armed forces around fighting small wars. I can't help but wonder what affect this potential future track will have on our status as the leading great world power. THAT is the issue many have with the COIN enthusiasts.

One of the points I think Gentile confuses is quite where the military will come in in "choosing" how and where we fight our future wars. He is right to argue that COIN cannot become the be all and end all of the US armed forces, and that other capabilities must not be completely neglected. But as I see it it is at the political level that the nature of the campaigns the US military has to engage in is generally determined. These past eight years hopefully will lead the politicians of the next 20 years to think twice about commiting to such conflicts. It is also rightly noted that the Iraq and Afghanistan counter insurgency campaigns have been the product of error (at the political level) rather than deliberate choice. This should not however mean that the whole concept of preparedness to conduct a COIN campaign should be willfully neglected as after Vietnam, as if thanks to a new national security doctrine it would never have to do it again.

Overall the military should not make COIN its "new way of war" as Weigley would put it, but it has to be able to do it now and to retain the ability to do it in the future because it will not be the US military that decides what the next war will look like (RMA anyone?) but the US political leadership and the circumstances they face.

Also I would be interested to know why in his conclusion Gentile cites the "British Empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century" as a model for strategic thought to follow? Seeing as this period saw the scramble for Africa, with its shameful and largely unneccessary wars, and which culminated in the Boer War, a miserable and embarassing quagmire if ever there was one, I just want to know what Gentile was getting at.

Personally, I find your view of the danger of a wholesale doctrinal conversion of at least the ground forces of the U. S. military to some sort of small wars structure very compelling. The cornerstone of all efficient military and naval organizations is to maintain balance in their organizational, doctrinal and equipment structure.

Secondly, The Army may be preparing for a future of small irregular wars but it seems quite evident that as the American public has gained painful experience it is not the least bit ready for that future. It is quite likely that it will be very difficult for future Presidents to cavalierly commit our forces without deep and sustained pubic sentiment behind them.

How does Gian Gentile recommend that we do this and win these insurgent or hybrid wars, such as we are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan - - and are likely to be fighting in the future?

Gentile would probably argue that we need to do extra to avoid getting drawn into these types of wars. Meaning that when some jackass talks big about The Next Big Threat, Warning Signs In The Form of A Mushroom Cloud, and Promoting Democracy, he needs to be scrutinized with deep skepticism.

In any case, it's not Gentile's responsibility to present a better alternative, anymore than it's movie critics' responsibilities to write a better movie.

I'm uneasy with the use of "classic" to describe anything having to do with counterinsurgency theory.

In my view, there have been nowhere near enough successful counterinsurgencies for us to speak of "classic" principals or "classic" texts on the subject.

This is not nitpicking: I believe we are still very much feeling our way through this; it is possible -perhaps likely - that the dynamic nature of insurgent warfare might prelude any talk of hard-and-fast guidelines for counterinsurgency.

On the other hand, I think it's fair to talk about Mao's classic texts on protracted war, although I'd like to hear a good argument against this notion.

So, you're saying we should invade Iraq?

The Army shouldn't have to make an artificial either/or decision about whether its doctrine should be for conventional warfare on the one hand or for low-intensity conflict, including counterinsurgency, on the other. The Army needs to be able to do both, and doctrine and schooling should reflect that requirement. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command should ensure that at least 30 to 40 percent of the time spent on teaching tactics at combat arms basic and career courses is devoted to low-intensity war and COIN. It should be quality instruction, not years-old hand-me-down PowerPoint slides. That being said, the more traditional conventional warfare doctrine ("Fulda Gap") should continue to be taught as well.

It's very worrying that the 'really we were winning in Vietnam but we were stabbed in the back by a lack of political will' argument is still being trotted out.

COIN in Vietnam didn't work for the same reason it won't work in Afghanistan. The armed forces, in particular the front line forces, are being asked (told) to do the whole job, war fighting, COIN, reconstruction, etc. Where is the broader political strategy? The army will do it's best but it's being asked to do the impossible.

Where is the longer term strategy? Who is looking at the causes of Islamic fundamentalism? The wellspring is resentment at US support for Israeli repression and Arab despots. The start of a solution is forcing the Israelis to negotiate (from a position of strength with guarantees of fundamental Israeli integrity) and disengagement from the deeply unpleasant Taleban lite regimes in the gulf.

You can keep putting antiseptic cream on the running sores or start taking a course in antibiotics.

Great comments all around. It should also be noted that many critics of COIN aren't as concerned with the strategy itself, but the amount of enthusiasm with the endeavors that would go along with any COIN operation, which is, in essence, at least some for of nation-building by nature.

The mere fact that at every instance of a COIN critique, we see many of its supporters immediately hyperventilating is telling of the problem. The biggest concern, from my view, is the manner in which the strategy has become a quasi-ideology being pushed by ideologues (not all COIN supporters would qualify of course).

With the Eric Prince story coming into focus, light is being shed on the secret war in Pakistan and Blackwater/JSOC death squad activities around the region. Public COIN debates amoungst the self appointed serious, never seem to discuss the occult side of COIN, almost like it does not exist.

Our goal as the occupier of Afghanistan is to break the people and force them to obey us and the puppets we install in their land. Death squads, rendition, torture, etc..., are common tools used to enforce our will upon the occupied. This is common in the history of COIN. Those who say, "It's different this time", are fools or liars.

Certainly a lot said above, but a few points I'm not clear on.

In my view, the Surge in Iraq worked, but only for its main and focused objectives: (1.) to completely engage the Iraqis (not the Americans or "Coalition")in carving their own future (better or worse); and (2.) to provide a fairly respectable exit strategy for the US and its military partners.

The message that I got "loud and clear," as one of those actual civilian senior reconstruction experts recruited to bring an end to US Iraq involvement was delivered prior to my departure by one of Ambassador Crocker's senior reconstruction advisers, Ambassador Henry Clarke, in December 2007: 'Everything is screwed up over there, so don't take anything for granted---change things to make it work! Get the Iraqis engaged, and get us out of the middle.'

His observation of what is now recognized as the $53 billion US civilian reconstruction fiasco was on point. US military and civilian agencies running amok, often defeating each other in their endless quest for "turf" and "low hanging fruit," which for six years of effort, had, to that date, amounted to nothing.

Brave military commanders like then-MG Hertling, a veteran of many Iraq deployments, were, no doubt, given the same assignment. While he did plenty of fighting in 2008, his goal was the same---consistently pressing his brigade and battalion commanders to (1.) upset the opposition; and (2.)push the Iraqis forward to solve their own problems.

Nothing, in my opinion, demonstrates the shear capability of a well-trained military leader as the standoff between the KRG and Iraq's military at Khanaqin in September 2008, where MG Hertling bravely waded into the middle of the near-explosive confrontation, to diffuse it by telling both that if they came to blows, the US would not engage---they would have to take the confrontation all the way, but on their own. This singular act of diplomatic heroism, by an otherwise aggressive Armored Division Commander, was, in my opinion, the final underpinning (the last major internal confrontation) that completed the mission of the Surge: pushing the Iraqis to tackle their own problem, and extricating the US military.

General McCrystal's SF operations were,in fact a mainstay of disrupting bad guys in Iraq, but just one piece of a combined puzzle. As recent coverage of the White House deliberations reveal, until recently, he was directed in Afghanistan to kill bad guys (the Taliban), and that's what he was dutifully doing. Not COIN, and not Iraq Surge.

It is against the successful "Way Forward" from Iraq backdrop that I view both Gentile's comments and the current mission.

Gentile reminds us that COIN, and its related nation-building and community engagement components, can often lead wise men down a wrong path, but that all paths,including diplomacy and extrication, are other paths to be heavily considered in the right time and place.

This is especially true in the complex multi-ethnic, multi-national landscape of Afghanistan where big powers have been jockeying through this country for eons: India, Greece, Persia, Britain, etc...

My concern with the Obama Administration's currently announced focus, and the hundreds of confused and competing agencies, NGOs, and mixed military endeavors, is that the real lessons of the Iraqi Surge have not been learned or embraced. Strategies must be realistic to be achieved.

My hope is that, by next year, the Obama Administration will fully understand the real lessons of Iraq, and establish a meaningful and sustainable strategy for Afghanistan grounded in pushing Afghans to solve their own problems, halting the corruption-inducing flows of billions of scattered-US and international aid programs, and extricating our military from the endeavor.

Like Iraq, it might take one or two years, and the results may be, at times, disconcerting, but the limits of Empire ultimately catch-up in these circumstances.

It is not that we cannot "win" in Afghanistan or Iraq; it is that our definition of winning must be consistent with the realities of that country, and our resources and resolve.

On the civilian side, I have my fingers crossed for the day I read in the Washington Post the same message that Ambassador Crocker sent in April 2007: "Send some real experienced civilians to help."

What is that 12-step idea? You have to hit bottom before you can start on the next path?

Their path is just beginning, grasshopper.

Might I make the gentle suggestion that perhaps the US Army might try to organize, train, and equip itself so that it could confidently walk and chew gum at the same time? How is this either/or, COIN or main force? The correct answer to which way the Army should go is 'yes.'

If it's leaders can't figure that out, get some new leaders. And if middle management can't understand that the argument at hand is about false choices, well then maybe the Army isn't doing a very good job of training its people at strategy or much else either.

How can anyone see this discussion and the past eight years as anything but an indictment of the US Army's leadership, training, and abilities? It's just like Vietnam: 'Give us pretty much everything we want and by God we'll lose anyway.'