One reason is the strict "up and out" career system allows no second chances. No General can be demoted, and must keep a perfect record lest he is quickly retired after failing promotion. I have a solution for this, which is detailed here.

http://www.g2mil.com/tenured.htm

The idea is to make all new Generals "tenured" like professors and allowed to serve until age 62. Then they are never really promoted, but just assigned, so they can move up and DOWN in the system.

Given that the Air Force and Navy are more technical in nature, it may be easier to quantify the missteps of the commander. My understanding is that commanders are expected to be, and perhaps are required to be, more into the weeds regarding technical details of their submarine or misplaced nukes. In the Army, things are less technical and thus less quantifiable, which makes it tougher to get the paperwork past the JAG.

I don’t know about high ranking officers, but I know that in Special Forces it seems like a Team Sergeant is more likely to be relieved than to serve his whole two years in that position. SF is full of hard headed, aggressive, difficult to control personalities. The management of these personalities is very difficult and requires excellent personnel management. The SF Master Sergeant is responsible for the training, moral and standards of 12 guys who like to do their own thing. I have seen many of these experienced NCOs relieved in the middle of a war zone because they could not control their men.

One would certainly hope that officers are subject to the same scrutiny

A couple of years ago, a small group of us were discussing this very topic. Several comments worth mentioning were: who in the armed forces - specifically the largest branch, the Army, feels comfortable sitting in judgment of another flag officer's performance of command?

A follow-on comment was added that in recent conflicts, the measure for success were clouded due to the time consuming nature, and lack of expertise in counter-insurgency, compounded by lack of clear goals and policies set by civilian masters to measure success by.

A caveat was added that although the authority to select flag officers from the slate rests with the president, their confirmation comes from the Senate. It was doubted few presidents within recent memory have the political courage, or may lack what they feel to be the requisite background in these matters, to call for relief.

Our solution? A tough call, but the commander-in-chief must set clear definable goals and if not met, no matter what the excuse (and some may be valid). He must force a relief of command for cause. And until that precedent is set, it's doubtful you'll see a uniformed general officer in command relieving a fellow subordinate general officer any time soon.

Not surprisingly, I would recommend Donald Vandergriff The path to victory and Douglas Macgregor.

Douglas Macgregor Fire the Generals:

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/macgregor_generalship.htm

Robert L. Bateman Cause for relief:

http://www.afji.com/2008/06/3468975
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/forums/showthread.php?t=3468975

First off, being more "technical" has nothing to do with the Navy and why it kicks out COs, it is a tradition, in the Navy at least, that ALL that happens in his/her command is on the shoulders of the CO. They get all the credit or blame depending on how the crew operates. At one time this was a great thing but due to the "Zero" defects policy guys are not allowed to make mistakes and hence you have a VERY risk adverse Navy, even in the NAVSOF Officer Community. Big Navy is also still VERY business minded when it comes to style of leadership, ie; they are not much in the way of being Military Leaders in the Classic Sense and more like Managers at a large Business Corp.
Second, the Army is notorious for the micro-management of it's troops and Junior Officers. It is a common complaint among West Point Grads when they are asked why they are not staying on after they have finsihed the obligation for school. I have also witnessed it over and over again in OEF and OIF, troops are micro-managed to the hilt. I was pretty impressed with the way the USMC was overall and the mentality they had towards leadership, mind you, no one is perfect and there are both good and bad in the Corps Officer Community too. I think overall the USMC has done the best job though.
Third, some suggestions for change would be to go back to the old style of "Commanders Intent" and actually preparing these kids for Combat and not hoping that all the tech, air power and whiz bang gadgets are going to save the day. Tech has it's place but it should be in addition to the solid basics of soldiering and tactical training for the soldiers and big picture/strategic training for the officers. I suggest people read "The Enlightend Soldier", "Storm Troop Tactics" and "Fourth Generation Warfare" as well as many other articles by Lind and his group for ways to move forward on the poor leadership that is everywhere in our Officer Corps.
The only thing still saving the Service time and time again is a professional NCO Corps, SF Reed is correct in a lot of what he says but even they (Senior NCOs) are getting to heavy into the admin side and away from the Warfighting side of things.
Lastly, A combination of PC, Business Models of Leadership, Micro-Management, Lowered Physical Standards, Career First-Troops Second Mentality and short term over long term views have combined to give us a terrible senior Officer Corps at the top levels (06 and up). The SOF Community and the USMC have done the best job of keeping things balanced but the other services have a lot of work to do as far as Military Leadership goes. I have seen a lot of hope in the Junior Officer Corps and can only pray that they stay in past 0-4.

http://www.ndsu.edu/ndsu/bresimmo/busn351/wsjdowdy.doc

Interesting piece about the relief of Col. Dowdy after failing to maintain operational tempo under General Mattis in Iraq 2003-2004.

Dave lost how many AK-47's? Promoted. Stan lies about Pat Tillman and allows troops under his command to murder, torture and abuse prisoners. Promoted. Mattis speaks/acts like an SS officer. Promoted. I'm surprised that any enlisted person would follow the orders of these idiots. The system is so broken down, it can't be fixed. Let's face facts, the senior officers in charge of our military are nothing but a bunch of crooks and liars wasting the lives of teenagers for their own personal gain, not to mention trillions wasted down a rat hole. The worst senior officers in American military history. Their disgusting record of total failure to the people of the United States speaks for itself. Many of them should be brought to trial for crimes against humanity for waging agressive war. Following oreders is not an excuse for commiting war crimes. They are no different than those who followed and obeyed Hitler, and should meet the same fate.

In looking for insights, you might want to ask for some feedback from recruiting firms that deal with former junior military officers. They routinely see OERs from all branches of the military and know how to read through the glorification and hype that is standard fare in rater and senior rater comments. Those who have been in the industry for a long time can probably give some insights into how those comments have varied in their degree of glorifying the rated officer, with each new change in the rating system (such as getting rid of center mass ratings and tweaks like that). They can also probably give comparisons between the services.

There’s a lot that can be said about this topic. I find it interesting that many of the posts decrying the current micromanagement and general “service has gone to hell” position are echoed in the comments on a recent USNI blog posting of a 1958 article by Col. Robert Heinl on Special Trust and Confidence (http://blog.usni.org/?p=4886). I’m convinced that no matter where we are in history, you can find articles and memoirs declaring that the service, or the officer corps, or discipline, or fighting ability, etc. has been severely degraded. The golden age always seems to be yesterday.

I’d agree that, in addition to a cultural aspect, the reasons that Navy and Air Force commanders are relieved are much more measurable than those for an Army or Marine commander in combat (of course, I’m sure there are more Army and Marine commanders of various stripes and units relieved, or “transferred early” out of the combat zone that don’t make news).

The issue of reliefs in the bygone age of World War I and II were under different circumstances. In almost every case, those commanders were relieved for not making adequate progress (lack of aggressiveness). In general terms, Col. Dowdy’s relief in OIF I matches these types of reliefs. Usually the commander isn’t meeting his boss’s expectations and many times, over-concern with casualties, at the perceived detriment to the mission, is a prime characteristic. Interestingly, the aggressive behavior and acceptance of casualties that was the mark of successful commanders in WWII, would be more likely to get the commander fired in today’s COIN environment. There was an interesting comment in one of the earlier posts on the battle at Wanat that if a commander pulled back and let a village fall to the Taliban, there were no real repercussions, but when soldier was killed, it was an automatic investigation.

While relief is one tool, it can also be overused (see Tom’s post in July that references MajGen Bolger’s critique of the US First Army propensity for firing in Europe, 1944-45: http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/16/the_leadership_errors_of_col_steele_iii_patton_responds) The real issue is how do we make the military more effective and how does it learn and adapt. It will never get things correct from the get-go. Firing is great when the methods of success are clear, but some leaders just can’t muster it; either because of ability, fatigue, or just not matching their boss’s expectations (there is something to be said for the idea that the best group individual commanders comprises the most effective team of commanders). However, when the way to success is not clear, and there are questions of approach and effectiveness up and down the chain of command as to how the campaign should be executed, it’s pretty hard to hold commanders to a measurable standard (excepting of course obvious poor judgment, criminal or unethical conduct, etc.).

Let me expand upon my first post and the excellent posts that followed that noted a flexible (up AND down) rank system was used prior to WWII. If a General makes mistakes or is not up to speed today, his superiors have two options. The first is to replace him, and today's system means forced retirement under a cloud. The other option is to kick him upstairs, to a higher rank back in the USA where he does less harm. As a result, a third option is usually chosen, do nothing.

A flexible system means that a two-star division commander who screwed up needn't be retired, but could be transferred stateside to an administrative post and remain in service for years, at a lesser rank if needed.

A related issue is how to keep incompetents from becoming a General in the first place, which often happens as the result of nepotism. One step is to ban children of Academy grads from attending the same academy. As detailed here:
http://www.g2mil.com/inbreeding.htm

The second is to require a GMAT test to help keep out the feeble minded, as detailed here. http://www.g2mil.com/GMAT.htm
Anyone who has worked around Flag officers will affirm that most are brilliant, but some idiots get stars.

The Navy IS different. The concept of Navy command (and navy command — USN and all navies) derives entirely from command of a warship at sea. One person in command, totally in charge and totally accountable. Although screening and training do much to reduce individual command risk, these are not absolute barriers to having the wrong person assigned to command. Thus trial by fire and some fail. Additionally, the risks of ship operations are significant and accidents happen, so sometimes even good skippers get in trouble. Those of us who have had command at sea were aware every minute of that time that our status was contingent on doing the right things the right way and then having it turn out right ... and we had no excuse for failure. It concentrates the mind wonderfully.

Contrast that with the Army situation, in which the concept of 'command' is relative. One 'commands' squads, platoons, companies, battalions, brigades, regiments, divisions, corps, and armies. A unit's actions and successes are contingent as much on the quality of leadership above as within. At least in recent times, anywhere in that chain accountability is relative and blame seems to attach to blatant individual errors and misdeeds rather than to unit performance. And — generally (forgive me) — generals fire generals. One could find merit in asking whether the current crop of Army flags just like to be nice to each other: I think that's a valid observation. For both Army and Air Force (much less for Navy), performance of subordinates in the command chain reflect on their superiors. Thus the primary reason Army and Air Force persons get fired is to deflect blame and accountability from the firing senior and not to uphold the absolute standard of command.

Which system is better? I've thought (and written) that the Navy's approach ('it's the skipper's fault') sometimes avoids a deeper pursuit of systemic problems. I've argued that the quick DFC (detachment for cause, the Navy term of art) of submarine commanders has tended to deflect a proper review of the role of submarine training centers and submarine support squadrons/groups in preventing submarine accidents and in training and screening crews to assure the proper level of readiness. But I will also argue that the Army and Air Force systems often mistake apparent performance of a commander for the real and lately have been very shy about firing a subordinate lest the highlighted poor performance reflect on the senior. In other words, Army and Air Force prefer the appearance of competence over the facts and if a firing forestalled can provide an illusion of good performance (or at least the absence of indication of poor), keep the bozo in place.

A final note on Air Force: although a Service almost entirely derived from its US Army background and shows it throughout its culture, it has found corollary with the Navy in the area of command of aircraft squadrons. If someone in the squadron prangs a plane, the squadron commander is in real trouble. (Lose some nuclear weapons for a few hours or ship nuclear-weapon components to a non-nuclear nation and it takes a bit more time and external pressure to get folks canned).

In conclusion, my summary: the Army and the Air Force want to look good; the Navy wants to operate well. YMMV.

During the Second World War the Wehrmacht was vastly more intolerant of inferior combat performance from it officers than the western allies. I am not referring to Hitler’s manic tendency to replace commanders because they could not spin straw into gold but the army’s own enforcement of its high standards of combat leadership. The same can be said of the Red Army where you either produced (often at the bloody expense of your troops) or were knocked out often literally.

Now I am sure some here will be offended and say that we cannot compare the Wehrmacht to our own forces because is not p.c. and I grant their point. However, the fact remains that the very best officers of the Wehrmacht were a class unto themselves and really had no peers, not even close in the western allies who could fight their formations with such astounding effectiveness even when they were at gross disadvantages in logistics, airpower, etc.

Before the Soviets took the finish off the German Army the German officer corps possessed a standard of battlefield tactical and operational competence probably never matched before or since. They may have been a ruthless and unpleasant bunch but they were highly proficient and if not they were dismissed.

No, I am not recommending that we become the Wehrmacht; our nature is such that we couldn’t even if we wanted to. But the point is that commanding combat officers must to be held to a merciless standard of excellence and if they cannot measure up they need to be promptly separated from their commands. War is the one place where we must be totally intolerant of the slightest incompetence. To suggest anything other more tolerant policy is unfair to the troops who must go in the way mortal peril.

Mattis speaks/acts like an SS officer.

I imagine Gen Mattis would find this hysterically funny, so wrong yet so right ....

The lack of accountability amongst senior Army commanders is but another symptom of what I have "COIN-ed" as the proper acronym to describe our current missions in Iraq and Afghanistan: COOGE or "Combat Operations Outside a Garrison Environment." As an Army fighting two wars going on eight years, precious little has changed regarding the way we do business. Even though many talk the talk, the Army has yet to truly embark on an all-out effort to win either conflict and hold senior leaders accountable for their lack of results. Peacetime promotion policies, mandatory training and other programs lead officers into thinking that taking soldiers into battle is just another "assignment" to be carefully managed before the next block-check school. Deployments to OIF/OEF have become akin to NTC rotations to be completed every 2-3 years. Let's either commit to winning (and honestly, after 8 years it's a little too late) or get the hell out.
The only SR GO anyone had the guts to fire was McKiernan who was ripe for the picking after his less than stellar performance in OIF and his lack of PhD/PT stud/Spec Ops/COIN FM-drafter background. Actually there were other senior commanders who were "relieved" by Rumsfeld when they didn't toe the neo-con party line such as Shinseki, Eaton, Batiste etc but perhaps that is a little harder to prove.
One of the smartest ideas I've heard (and I can't remember where) involves the concept of dumping all the students out of AWC and USASMA and sending them to be embeds at the BDE and DIV level of military units or into public utilities and similiar areas. That would be one way to show the military that we are serious about ending this thing and coming home.

And what about the tradition of promoting a failed battlefield commander to Army Chief of Staff?

It's happened twice in recent history: General Westmoreland and General Casey.

I was relieved for cause from a company command in 1983. The command was a Quartermaster Corps supply and services company and I was a field artilleryman who went outside of my branch to accept it--the colonel who gave me the command didn't want to force it on an unwilling officer because the company had major discipline problems. Shortly thereafter we had a change of command and the colonel who gave me the company left. My first sergeant told me that about two years before I took command the company had set the record for the greatest number of Article 15 punishments in a company-sized element in the history of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The relief ruined my career and several months later caused the Army to strip me of my commission, although I received an Honorable Discharge. I wasn't fired for moral turpitude, it was for alleged substandard performance. The battalion commander who relieved me also relieved another of his company commanders. Relief for cause probably still happens to company-grade officers. It is the kind of failure that stays with you for the rest of your life.

Tom, while I cannot compare how it is written in Army or Marine regulations, I recommend you take a look at Navy Regulations, specifically chapters 8 and 11. Chapter 8 talks is about the responsibilities of the commanding officer. In Chapter 11, look specifically at paragraph 1131 "Requirement of Exemplary Conduct:

"All commanding officers and others in authority in the Naval Service are required to show themselves a good example of Virtue, Honor, Patriotism and Subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their Command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy all persons who are guilty of them; and to make all necessary and proper measures under the laws, regulations and customs of the Naval Services, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge."

This paragraph is referred to as the "Exemplary Conduct Statute." It is discussed in great detail at Command Leadership School

I would disagree with those that point to the technical aspects of Navy culture. Without looking at data, reasons for relief are largely not technical. I believe the difference lies in gravity of responsibility and accountability upon the Commanding Officer and the fact that within a commissioned unit (ship/squadron/battalion), there is only one CO. This is desrcibed in Chapter 8:

"The responsibility of the commanding officer for his or her command is absolute, except when, and to the extent to which, he or she has been relieved therefrom by competent authority, or as provided otherwise in these regulations. The authority of the commanding officer is commensurate with his or her responsibility."

It's been 15 years, Tom, since the Army went all "zero defects".....it seemed much more into that than the other services....and I bet a case can be made that such an unspoken policy, always denied but certainly in play, did a lot to elevate mediocrity and minimize risk taking, which in turn led to fewer cashierings....

From the website of the Royal Naval Museum:

JOHN BYNG

Born in Southill, Bedfordshire in 1704, the fifth son of George Byng, Viscount Torrington, a prominent figure in both the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 and the fighting against the Jacobite risings that followed. Byng entered the navy in 1718 and on 31 July of that year, he served in HMS Superb at his father's victory over the Spanish in a battle off Cape Passaro, in which he helped to capture the enemy Commander-in-Chief's flagship. In 1722, Byng passed his Lieutenant's examination at the age of 18 but he continued as an able seaman on HMS Dover and HMS Solebay until 1724, when he was appointed as a Second Lieutenant to HMS Superb, the first ship he had served on.

On 23 April 1727, Byng was appointed as a Fourth Lieutenant to HMS Burford, later being promoted to Third and Second Lieutenant. He was then appointed as a Captain to command HMS Gibraltar in the Mediterranean Fleet and then to HMS Falmouth in 1731. In October 1739, he was appointed to command HMS Sunderland and to join Vice-Admiral Haddock off Cadiz. Much of Byng's career at this time was generally uneventful. Though the War of the Austrian Succession began the following year, Byng did not have a part in it until 1742, when he was sent to inspect the fisheries in Newfoundland.

In 1744, Byng would then receive his largest command so far as the Flag Captain on HMS St George as part of the Channel Fleet under Admiral John Norris. On 8 August 1745, Byng was promoted to Rear-Admiral of the Blue. This was unusual as he had never commanded a squadron or fleet in a naval battle nor had he particularly distinguished himself and it is likely that it was his kinship to Lord Torrington that gave him the advantage in progressing up the ranks. In the autumn of that year, Byng hoisted his flag on HMS Kinsale and led a patrol of the eastern Scottish coast against the threat of a Jacobite invasion by Charles Edward Stuart, the Young Pretender.

In 1746, Byng was ordered to serve on a court-martial concerning the aborted actions of a British squadron at the Battle of Toulon in May 1744. Admiral Mathews and Vice-Admiral Lestock were both tried for failing to act by the Fighting Instructions, (i.e. the official directives on how to fight a naval battle). Byng concurred with the court's verdict that although Mathews had engaged with the enemy, he had violated the Instructions by breaking away from the line of battle to do so. Lestock had refused to join up the rear of the line with Mathew's van and centre divisions but he was acquitted. The irony of Byng advocating this verdict was that it would affect him later in his career.

In 1747, Byng joined Vice-Admiral Medley in the Mediterranean. He was promoted to Vice-Admiral of the Blue on 15 July and then became Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, after Medley's demise. In 1755, tensions increased between Britain and France mainly over the ownership of dividends in North America. The prospects of a possible French invasion of the British Isles caused much alarm throughout the country. By the beginning of 1756, the Whig Government had been warned by intelligence of ships being prepared at Toulon for an attempt to seize the British-held island of Minorca. On March 17, Byng was promoted to Admiral of the Blue and then ordered to leave for Portsmouth to prepare his squadron and to wait for further instructions.

Hoisting his flag on HMS Ramillies, Byng was surprised to find that nine of his thirteen ships were desperately short of men but the Admiralty refused to allow him to enlist men from the other ships in the harbour. Some of the ships, such as HMS Intrepid and HMS Captain were old and leaky and when Byng had received the instructions from the Admiralty on April 1, he found them to be rather vague. He could not understand why one of his orders was to replace the Marines in his squadron with soldiers. After a voyage marred by north-westerly gales in the Channel, Byng reached Gibraltar on 2 May. He was informed that the French army had already landed in Minorca and were laying siege to St. Philip's Fort, the last position held by the British garrison under General Blakeney. Byng met Lieutenant-General Fowke, the Governor of Gibraltar with orders to receive a battalion to transport to the island. Fowke refused, as he was fearful of a possible French assault on Gibraltar. Surprised and angry, Byng turned his attention to the refitting of his ships but he was appalled by the poor conditions of Gibraltar's dockyards.

On 8 May, Byng led his fleet towards Minorca. He sent out Captain Hervey with three frigates to establish contact with Blakeney and to observe the situation of the siege. Hervey found St. Philip's Fort still in British hands but its garrison failed to respond to his signals. On 19 May, the French fleet led by the Marquis de la Galissonniere, was sighted and Byng gave the signal to chase the enemy. The wind became light and the two fleets did not engage until the following morning. Byng set up his line for battle with himself leading the rear and his second in command, Rear-Admiral West, leading the van. Byng's intention was to attack the French line on a diagonal course. The problem was that none of Byng's captains were aware of his plan and the signaling system was too ineffective for him to be able to explain it.

As his fleet approached the French, Byng was horrified to find that his van division were breaking the diagonal line and steering on a parallel course. His signals for them to head towards the enemy were not enough so he gave the order to attack. Many of his older ships were wrecked by the powerful cannons of the French vessels, which stood on the defensive throughout. Whilst Galissonniere sent many of his lead ships out of his line, the British ships kept to the Fighting Instructions and did not break the line of battle to pursue them. As HMS Ramillies was shot at, many of her men grew impatient and fired without Byng's orders. Although he did not stop them as the smoke concealed them from the French gunners, it also confused the British in telling their ships apart from the enemy. Two of Byng's ships both held up his division but to prevent them colliding with the Ramillies, he had to signal his whole squadron to stop.

Unwilling to break through a gap in the British line, Galissonniere signaled his fleet to retreat. Many of the British ships were severely damaged. Byng was unhappy with the behaviour of the ships in his division. On May 24, he called for a council of war with his captains and the senior army officers. They came to the agreement that it would be better to leave Minorca and return to Gibraltar to defend it against a possible attack. Byng sent his dispatch to London before arriving back in Gibraltar on 20 June. However on 2 July, HMS Antelope arrived there with Vice-Admiral Hawke to replace Byng and to send him back to England. Byng was disgusted to learn that the Government had received and had accepted Galissonniere's report of the battle, before his own had arrived but he handed over his command and prepared to return with dignity.

When he arrived at Spithead on 26 July 1756, Byng was placed under arrest to be brought to trial for his actions. The Government were embarrassed both by St. Philip's Fort's surrender to the French on June 29, and by Byng's dispatch of the naval battle. They became determined to ensure that he would become a scapegoat for their own mistakes in the affair. Parts of Byng’s dispatch were censored for publication and he soon became the subject of pamphlets, newspaper articles and ballads, which either condemned him or defended him against allegations of cowardice and incompetence. There was a nationwide call for an explanation for Minorca's loss and rioting erupted. Byng was moved from confinement on HMS Antelope to HMS Royal Anne in Portsmouth Harbour and then on to the Royal Hospital at Greenwich.

On 27 December 1756, the court-martial of Byng began on HMS St. George in Portsmouth Harbour. When questioned by the prosecution, many of Byng's captains and the other witnesses to the battle attempted to shift the blame onto him, but his own questioning of their actions revealed their own share of mistakes. Byng was confident of being acquitted. He claimed that he had done his utmost for Minorca and that he had been prevented to do more, due to the superiority of the French fleet and to the poor conditions of many of the ships given to him by the Admiralty.

On 27 January 1757, after hearing the evidence, the court-martial agreed on the verdict of guilty but their final resolutions were confused and contradictory. It was agreed that Byng fell under the Twelfth Article for cowardice and negligence of engaging with the enemy, which meant a sentence of death but the court wanted to plea to the Government and the Admiralty for mercy. King George II received a petition from the supporters of Byng and his date of execution was delayed from 28 February to 14 March. However, despite the continued campaigning and parliamentary debates, the king and the Admiralty were adamant in allowing Byng's execution to proceed. They wanted to make an example of him "pour encourager les autres" [Voltaire]. The City of London were also demanding that the guilty had to be punished and it is said that because of their funding for his military interests in Hanover, the king was anxious not to upset them.

On 14 March 1757, Admiral Byng was shot dead by a firing squad on HMS Monarch in Portsmouth Harbour. He was buried in the family vault at Southill.