The New ForeignPolicy.com
Global News : Passport : Ricks : Drezner : Walt : Rothkopf : Lynch
The Cable : The AfPak Blog : Net Effect : Shadow Govt. : Madam Secretary : The Call

What must be done in Afghanistan (IV): Better training

Fri, 10/16/2009 - 12:13pm

The fourth bit of advice from the smart, seasoned officer we're calling Sam Damon:

CSTC-A is a failure, not in leadership, but in capability. The capability for training host nation security forces resides in the BCT, not a stovepiped, parallel chain of command of 'ad hoc-ery' at best. The manning for those advisors are the black and blue squad of the Army in a football team sense. They ain't the first string. If this partnership is the main effort in word, then why are not holding the BCT CDRs accountable? Gen Petraeus knew about this before he took on Iraq and he changed it. Must happen here."

U.S. Army

Thomas E. Ricks | Permalink |

| Comments? Login or register

( filed under:

Middle East | Afghanistan | Military

)

Translation?

by Norwegian Shooter on Fri, 10/16/2009 - 1:52pm

Anybody have a refresher on Petraeus' job on training the Iraqi army? I seem to remember that they weren't quite ready to stand up when he finished, but that he has received lots of praise for his job.

Yes, I do.

by Don Bacon on Sat, 10/17/2009 - 8:47am

General Petreaus was in charge of the training of Iraqi army battalions from Jun 2004 to Sep 2005. In September 2004, in the last throes of the US presidential campaign, with candidate John Kerry saying the war was being mis-managed, General Petraeus wrote an Op-Ed -- yes, a mid-level general officer in the midst of a political campaign writing political propaganda -- that there was light at the end of the tunnel in Iraq.

Sep 2004–Petreaus:

“I see tangible progress. Iraqi security elements are being rebuilt from the ground up. . . .Six battalions of the Iraqi regular army and the Iraqi Intervention Force are now conducting operations. . .Within the next 60 days, six more regular army and six additional Intervention Force battalions will become operational. . . Nine more regular army battalions will complete training in January”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49283-2004Sep25.html

A year later, the Iraq commanding general testified that Petraeus's Op-Ed was pure bullshit.

Sep 2005 (the end of trainer Petraeus's assignment)–Gen. George W. Casey Jr., who oversees U.S. forces in Iraq, said there are fewer Iraqi battalions at “Level 1" readiness than there were a few months ago. . . The number of Iraqi army battalions that can fight insurgents without U.S. and coalition help has dropped from three to one, top U.S. generals told Congress yesterday.
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050930-secdef4002.html

(That's a classic Pentagon press conference, by the way, all about rabbits, and such.)

General Petraeus was rewarded for his campaign activities five years ago, as we know. More from his Op-Ed:

"The institutions that oversee them [Iraqi security elements] are being reestablished from the top down. And Iraqi leaders are stepping forward, leading their country and their security forces courageously in the face of an enemy that has shown a willingness to do anything to disrupt the establishment of the new Iraq."

Five years ago, and the US has the same troop strength in Iraq. Five years ago.

nice work, Don

by Norwegian Shooter on Sat, 10/17/2009 - 1:52pm

I'm been calling Petraeus a political general for his congressional testimony on the anniversary of 9/11 (Betray-us episode), but I knew there was more. Thanks for digging that op-ed up.

I've got another assignment for you. I keep hearing President Obama "handpicked" Gen. McChrystal. But I can't imagine that he was offered two (or more) candidates with equal recommendation from the joint chiefs. Wouldn't it be more accurate to say Petraeus handpicked McChrystal?01

Theater commanders work at

by Cow cookie on Sun, 10/18/2009 - 9:15am

Theater commanders work at the intersection of political decisions and military strategy. They would be remiss in their job if they weren't "political."

I'm not defending Petraeus. Some actions can be too political, and that's worthy of debate.

Yet these commanders work at the interface between military and political decision. It would be just as undesirable, if not impossible, to be completely apolitical. Their job requires them to make political decisions or enter into a political discussion - even if the public isn't always aware of a political discussion, as some argued should have been the case with McChrystal's report.

Of course, this is different than being partisan.

Like many labels, "political general" is a simplistic term that ignores the nuances of reality.

room for one more

by Don Bacon on Sun, 10/18/2009 - 10:17pm

old: Duty, Honor, Country
new: Duty, Honor, Country, Politics

Documentary on MNSTC-I

by For the Queens ... on Sat, 10/17/2009 - 4:33pm

"Iraq: Inside the Transition", a documentary about MNSTC-I, premiered on HDNet's World Report on 22 September. GEN Petraeus was a key feature.

You download a copy of it from iTunes for $1.99 at:

http://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/viewTVSeason?i=3327517
79&id=288815459&s=143441

insufficient trainers

by Don Bacon on Sat, 10/17/2009 - 8:58am

The U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT) personnel assignments for the Afghan National Army (ANA) were only at 44% (1175 of 2663) in May, 2009 according to the Brookings Afghanistan index. National Police, same deal (44%).
http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index.pdf

But hey, you gotta love the stylish USA goggles and the cammy earmuffs on the little guy.

Gotta agree with Bacon on this one

by Cow cookie on Sat, 10/17/2009 - 10:04am

I'm not sure BCTs could've done any better given the resources CSTC-A had.

This is from an April news story:

Regardless of the details, he’s already certain they’ll be put to good use. CSTC-A has been short of manpower for a while. It was initially supposed to train just Afghan army units, but was later assigned to train the police as well. Police training now takes up 45 percent of the command’s manpower, while both army and police training teams are undermanned.

"Do we have a plan for them? Yes. We’ve already had requirements all along that we are ready to fill," Morris said. "It’s not like: ‘Oh my God, what are we going to do with these people?’ "

The extra manpower’s effect should be seen clearly in the command’s Focused District Development program, officials said. The program pulls a district’s entire police force off the streets, puts them in a regional training center and temporarily replaces them with a more professional Multi-ethnic Afghan National Civil Order Police unit. The local police then take over from the Civil Order Police once they finish their eight-week training and are paired with a team of advisers.

The idea is to train the police, teach the community what a professional police force looks like and use the advisers to help them continue to grow. But just 52 of the 365 police districts have gone through the program, and it would take eight to 10 more years to cycle all the districts through with the current manpower.

The 4,000 extra advisers, though, should allow all the districts to complete the program by December 2011. Even if many of the extra soldiers are assigned to the NATO training mission instead of CSTC-A, Morris expects that to free army advisers for police adviser duty.

The capability for "training host nation security forces" actually rests with the Special Forces, which have been primarily focused on kinetic activity. If there's any mismatch between structure and purpose, that's the one that needs reconsideration.

I will concede that the lack of a unified chain of command is a problem, but it isn't limited to CSTC-A. On a larger level, you've got two American mission in Afghanistan - one with NATO's ISAF and another with U.S. Forces Afghanistan. And of course within ISAF, you have all the competing national agendas.