The fourth bit of advice from the smart, seasoned officer we're calling Sam Damon:

CSTC-A is a failure, not in leadership, but in capability. The capability for training host nation security forces resides in the BCT, not a stovepiped, parallel chain of command of 'ad hoc-ery' at best. The manning for those advisors are the black and blue squad of the Army in a football team sense. They ain't the first string. If this partnership is the main effort in word, then why are not holding the BCT CDRs accountable? Gen Petraeus knew about this before he took on Iraq and he changed it. Must happen here."
U.S. Army
 

NORWEGIAN SHOOTER

6:52 PM ET

October 16, 2009

Translation?

Anybody have a refresher on Petraeus' job on training the Iraqi army? I seem to remember that they weren't quite ready to stand up when he finished, but that he has received lots of praise for his job.

 

FOR THE QUEENS OF WAR

9:33 PM ET

October 17, 2009

Documentary on MNSTC-I

"Iraq: Inside the Transition", a documentary about MNSTC-I, premiered on HDNet's World Report on 22 September. GEN Petraeus was a key feature.

You download a copy of it from iTunes for $1.99 at:

http://itunes.apple.com/WebObjects/MZStore.woa/wa/viewTVSeason?i=3327517
79&id=288815459&s=143441

 

COW COOKIE

3:04 PM ET

October 17, 2009

Gotta agree with Bacon on this one

I'm not sure BCTs could've done any better given the resources CSTC-A had.

This is from an April news story:

Regardless of the details, he’s already certain they’ll be put to good use. CSTC-A has been short of manpower for a while. It was initially supposed to train just Afghan army units, but was later assigned to train the police as well. Police training now takes up 45 percent of the command’s manpower, while both army and police training teams are undermanned.

"Do we have a plan for them? Yes. We’ve already had requirements all along that we are ready to fill," Morris said. "It’s not like: ‘Oh my God, what are we going to do with these people?’ "

The extra manpower’s effect should be seen clearly in the command’s Focused District Development program, officials said. The program pulls a district’s entire police force off the streets, puts them in a regional training center and temporarily replaces them with a more professional Multi-ethnic Afghan National Civil Order Police unit. The local police then take over from the Civil Order Police once they finish their eight-week training and are paired with a team of advisers.

The idea is to train the police, teach the community what a professional police force looks like and use the advisers to help them continue to grow. But just 52 of the 365 police districts have gone through the program, and it would take eight to 10 more years to cycle all the districts through with the current manpower.

The 4,000 extra advisers, though, should allow all the districts to complete the program by December 2011. Even if many of the extra soldiers are assigned to the NATO training mission instead of CSTC-A, Morris expects that to free army advisers for police adviser duty.

The capability for "training host nation security forces" actually rests with the Special Forces, which have been primarily focused on kinetic activity. If there's any mismatch between structure and purpose, that's the one that needs reconsideration.

I will concede that the lack of a unified chain of command is a problem, but it isn't limited to CSTC-A. On a larger level, you've got two American mission in Afghanistan - one with NATO's ISAF and another with U.S. Forces Afghanistan. And of course within ISAF, you have all the competing national agendas.

 
 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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