Logistics aside, the predicate for a successful US counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan would be that a critical mass of Afghanis perceive our soldiers as supporting a “good guy” government against a “bad guy” insurgency.

But there is apparently very little Afghan respect or affection for the Karzai government, particularly after the recent “election”.

Perhaps the current enthusiasm for counterinsurgency among McChrystal et al is a product of the phenomenon that if you’re a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

I think it would be even more telling to ask this same set of officers what are the last five books they read (and the time period that takes them back five books--2 months, 5 months, a year, two years?). I doubt they are reading the 1986 version of FM 100-5 and internalizing Airland Battle either. if anything, they are probably reading journal articles and recent memoirs (which are primarily from pre-2007 right now).
Our officers aren't internalizing COIN or any other approach primarily through what they have read, but through the training and example (word of mouth from respected superiors and peers).
I don't think that's a good thing and they should be reading Galula and FM 3-24. They should be reading these texts critically and they should be reading history also. My concern is that the vast experience being amasseed in our Army and Marine Corps now becomes a prison which we do not look beyond, rather than a foundation and context for further learning. Many of our problems in post-WWII conflicts came from an attitude of competent and experienced officers who didn't think that books or further education had anything worthwhile to teach them.

. . . if the Army, with all their weapons and hierarchy and disciplinary options, can't get its people to read, the ordinary professors amongst us shouldn't feel so bad.

I have to disagree with TTP. The same engaged approach required of any conflict/problem is exactly the value that Clausewitz brings to the profession of arms and all others involved.
We can't fight any conflict with checklists. The really useful military texts and histories require the reader to engage and wrestle with the concepts. The writer must be able to prove worth in the reader's mind. Insight and learning is not a fait accompli from merely viewing the words.
Clausewtiz drags us through tortured logic and obtuse arguments because that is as simple as conflict really is to grasp (beling his famous statement). If we just look for answers and "how to" we will fail to adapt to ever-changing situations and challenges.
Similarly, we can't read history for the "lessons" to apply. We need to uderstand why what was done happend, what were all the influencing factors and what were all the consequences. Understanding the relationships helps identify patterns, contnuities and discontinuities that inform judgment--not provide presecriptions.
Learning and engaged study should prompt more questions than answers. Most who's knowledge of On War only comes from from others are really just learning quotes. I cannot claim to understand all his thinking or agree with it. But I have to think when I read.

More than Galula's book, it's very troubling that so few would read the manual issued by the military. Do they think that they can somehow internalize the lessons in a few weeks? I'm a civilian and I've read it, they have no excuse. Of course I do note that there is no mention of how many students were asked that question, it could be that the class size was ten or so (not that this changes things). Also the article mentions at the end that "By the fifth day of the course, the curriculum seemed to be working." The war hasn't ended yet.

Much of the Army's COIN expertise was destroyed with the formation of the Special Operations Command back in the 1980s. Army Special Forces (Green Berets) were merged with Army commandos (Ranger, Delta) and moved toward macho tactics they learned from TV while growing up. Physical fitness became key to success (e.g. General McChrystal) rather than foreign language and cultural expertise.

Here is more: http://www.g2mil.com/Summer2007.htm

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"...to march when the army marches, camp when it camps, fight when it fights - for the great majority of officers this is what is meant by having served, campaigned, grown gray in the harness. For this reason one sees so many soldiers occupied by trifling matters and rusted by gross ignorance." from Memoirs by Frederick the Great, contained in The Sword and the Pen by Liddell Hart

This is why study and thought become a trivial check mark in the daily routine of a beast of burden that the officer becomes.

It also may have helped if Obama had read it before he blindly committed to a strategy he quite obviously didn't understand - if he had read it he would know that Galula says it is vital the country seeking to implement a population centric COIN does not display weakness to the target population or give those people a reason to doubt the strength of the commitment - like spend weeks, months debating a strategy you for all intents and purposes were already ostensibly in agreement with. How are the troops supposed to have faith in a strategy that puts their lives in greater peril and that the commander in chief himself doesn't seem to understand and is unwilling to commit to?

Per my prediction Obama is already well on his way to becoming a worse president than Carter - if we're lucky there's a Reagan waiting in the wings willing to correct all the mistakes being made here.

When I was in the Aviation Captain's Career Course, I complained incessantly to the cadre about the Fulda Gap-style mock battles we were fighting (and even went so far as to go public with it here), but the attempt was fruitless. There are a lot of pockets where COIN really hasn't penetrated (and I will lump the Army aviation community in there as well at times).

OK, I've read the article and some of the links, and the comments, but I can't figure out why there is a picture of Dimebag Darrell accompanying this post. Any help?

This is probably more than just a COIN issue. Go back to DESERT SHIELD/STORM and take a stab at the number of junior officers who had read Guderian or Patton or studied the Arab-Israeli wars. I suspect the figures would be pretty similar. As long as the training emphasis is on drills rather than thinking your way out of a problem, education will continue to be seen as little more than a check in the box, rather than a means to develop critical thinking skills.

I picked Dimebag Darrell for two reasons: First, it is a weak pun on the COIN/dimed out/get off the dime theme of the post. Also, I liked his "Warhead" hat.

Thanks for noticing the photos. This has been an unexpected pleasure of blogging for me. I pick about half, I'd say, with the other half selected by staffers at Foreign Policy magazine. (If I can't find a photo that fits, I'll ask them to take a try.)

Cheers,
Tom

"Toward the end of the course, I tracked down Lieutenant Lewis. He was more worried than when he had started the week. "There are so many smart people here with great ideas,” he said. "It sounds like we know what to do. So what’s the problem? What’s taking so long?”

"Sometimes the military option is known but impossible to implement." - Sun Tzu

It might also be helpful if the civilian leadership of this country had some idea from administration-to-administration just what our national security interests are besides the free flow of oil.

I think some of the comments here in Ricksville were less than charitable considering what this nation has been asking of our Army and Marine Corps to do for the last eight years.

I was given a copy of Galula's seminal book back in the 80's by a French military officer, whose command I was observing. I offered him a copy of the Corps' "Small War Manual" (written in 1940). He said he already had a copy, but would be interested in a particular Louis L'Amour western novel.

You all want a quick good and easy read? C.S. Forester's "Rifleman Dodd." Never read it? Where you'all been?

Thanks for another thoughtful post, Tom. Here's a question for you:

Broadly speaking, is it fair to say that "real" COIN requires:

a) some kind of quasi-legitimate social/political order that the COIN actions serve to protect (i.e. something worth fighting for)

b) a willingness on the US side to pay a price in casualties and treasure (i.e. a sense in the US that there's something worth fighting for)?

In your opinion, does the present war in AfPak satisfy either of these criteria - aside from a general sense that the consequences are going to be bad when/if the whole thing slides totally out of control?