A lousy weekend in Afghanistan

David Kilcullen's view is an excellent summation of the paradox of the war in Afghanistan. Hopefully, from Obama to Gates to Jones to Mullen to Petraeus to McChrystal they have read that article and will give it the serious consideration it is due.

My immediate concern is the tendency of Army commanders in particular to establish small outposts, which are remote and difficult to support. They seem to be nothing more than perfectly isolated objects begging to be attacked and it is difficult to understand what tactical contribution they make commensurate with the potential risks.

I also sense that our operations are not secure. My guess would be that like the South Vietnamese Army the insurgents have heavily penetrated the Afghan army and police.

is (I think) a non-Pashtun area, more or less embedded in an expanding Pashtun population, adjacent to the old British-drawn Durand Line border that 'leased' E. Pashtunistan from Afghanistan, bisecting the Pashtun homeland.

It occurs that Pashtun insurgents may feel freer to operate, intimidate, and precipitate a costly battle on Nuristani villages, where the moslem bond is tenuous. (Remote Nuristan resisted moslem conversion.) The onset of WInter may have also been a tactical factor, closing walk-around routes. Or maybe this op is strategic, grabbing for headline momentum, with 40,000 fresh US troops in the balance.

A US unit spending most of its deployment planning a withdrawal from the Kamdesh position kinda supports the thesis that we are still stuck between 2nd and 3rd gen warfare, at least in that environment.

The reported lack of utility lift (Russian?) to support a contraction from outside Kamdesh, an outpost where we never sat for tea, highlights other contradictions. Quite a gap between how we see ourselves, our ability to manage and predict outcomes. A month ago the Col. was wangling an invitation to discuss amnesty and compensation for civilian causalties. The s__t starts flying, and this week we're pouring aerial fire from attack helos into the mosque and whatnot, to hold the enemy outside the perimeter wire.

What would Crock do?

“I don’t foresee the return of the Taliban,” National Security Adviser James Jones said on CNN’s “State of the Union.” “And I want to be very clear that Afghanistan is not in danger – imminent danger — of falling.”

So no IMMINENT danger but just everyday danger?

The military situation looks good:

"Islamist militancy is spreading north from Afghanistan into Central Asia, threatening to disrupt NATO supply lines snaking through the former Soviet region, Russia's ambassador to Afghanistan said. A string of clashes between troops and militants in Central Asia this year has prompted talk of Islamist fighters infiltrating the volatile and impoverished region used by the United States to ship supplies to its troops in Afghanistan.

Congress has provided approximately $18.95 billion to the Afghanistan Security Forces, so that's paid off.

Oct. 2 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. faces “major” hurdles in increasing Afghanistan’s police and army, including a “significant” challenge to improving the army’s ability to move supplies and maintain equipment, according to the Pentagon inspector general. Other obstacles include “insufficient leadership capabilities” and “systemic” corruption and shortages of communications, howitzers, mortars and training ranges, said the 210-page assessment delivered to lawmakers today.

The government looks solid:

As many as 30 percent of Karzai's votes were fraudulent, and lesser fraud was committed on behalf of other candidates. In several provinces, including Kandahar, four to 10 times as many votes were recorded as voters actually cast. The fraud has handed the Taliban its greatest strategic victory in eight years of fighting the United States and its Afghan partners.--Peter W. Galbraith

Not to worry. No imminent danger.

so much less interesting than Wanat? Just the same lessons to learn, nothing more?