Hill and Odierno: the civil-military mail from Baghdad

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Wednesday, September 30, 2009 - 5:11 PM Share

Several notes have come in from people with first-hand knowledge of the Hill-Odierno relationship. The tone generally is that yes, there is a problem, but not so much between the two men as between their two missions. The American military has a gung-ho attitude and the feeling that they have seen, repeatedly, what happens when the Americans try to rush the transition. The U.S. embassy has the feeling that the military guys are looking too much in their rear-view mirrors and that eventually you have to hand this mess over to the Iraqis, and that it better happen soon because U.S. troop numbers, more or less steady this year, are gonna fall off a cliff next year.

Plus, the military guys keep on rotating to Iraq, while they see the dips do one "hardship tour" and then get a dream assignment in Paris or Rome as their reward, never to come back to the balmy climes of the Tigris. And the alcohol-fueled social life of the embassy leaves the soldiers, who can't drink in Iraq, on the outside looking in.

My feeling: It's six of one, a half dozen of the other. People clash because they represent clashing interests. I think Sanchez and Bremer could have gotten along famously if they had a clearer command relationship. As it happened, no one was in charge, and the missions clashed. I think the same thing may be happening here.

I've also gotten several e-missives from Hill himself, and seen some he launched to others. He certainly does like the word "bullshit." His problem is that his rep with the diplomatic press corps is that the more accurate the story about him, the more he tends to use it.

KHALID MOHAMMED/AFP/Getty Images

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WALKING WOUNDED

11:41 PM ET

October 1, 2009

Scuttlebut: more please...

It wouldn't be surprising for the occupation wind-down in Iraq to go thru some of the same turf-war and command-confusion ground that was trod during the wind-up.

I'm still waiting for enlightenment to present itself on the aborted ZInni ambassadorship. What was his history and chemistry with our SecState? Zinni's CENTCOM tours were knee-deep in the military misadventure that drove Les Aspin out of the Puzzle Palace, and discomfitted Pres. Bill's WH.

Also, isn't the Great P. at CENTCOM supposed to keep Odierno's MNFI/USF-Iraq command authority covered from the rear? Petraeus' lines of communication back to the WH (and possibly with Gates DoD) are rumored to be muddy and frought with personal history. He's been quiet, maybe too quiet...

I'm just asking.

NORWEGIAN SHOOTER

8:00 PM ET

September 30, 2009

Hill - get back to work!

If the Ambassador has spent more than 5 minutes writing to you to lodge a protest - I think "Sir, you are incorrect. Please join me in Baghdad and we can talk about it" is about right - and anytime at all in writing other people about you, he is not suited for his job.

Now I have to take my own advice, but damn it Ricks, you're writing too much good stuff today!

CMSBELT

8:53 PM ET

September 30, 2009

Civ-Mil in Baghdad

Having served in Baghdad both in Army uniform during the Bremer/Sanchez era and as a State Dept civilian during the Khalilzad/Casey and Crocker/Petraeus days, I have to agree with your observation that the problems usually exist more in the next layer or two down rather than with the guys at the top.

The senior leaders don't delve into the "who has it nicer" details. The complaint about dips rotating to Paris after a hardship tour ignores the history of the last 30 years. Even now, only about 25% of the Army is deployed while nearly all diplomats are overseas. Paris is nice for dips, but soldiers have it pretty good in Seoul and the posts in Germany and the vast majority are presently stationed in the US.

The current OPTEMPO may be twice as high as the average of the last 2 or 3 decades, but most soldiers only spend a year or two in combat during an entire career with the rest in decent garrison assignments. On the other hand, dips (especially USAID) spend half or more of their careers in tiny remote embassies in Africa or Asia.

And, the fact that the Army hasn't figured out how to take adequate care of its troops in-between combat tours isn't a problem that can be laid on the doorstep of the State Dept.

If Iraq and/or Afghanistan "break" the Army, it won't be because of the combat OPTEMPO but because junior leaders go from having tremendous authority and autonomy in a combat zone to "painting rocks" in garrison assignments back in the institutional Army.

The civilian side lacks management and leadership experience and formal training. The State Dept has relatively little professional education after the initial entry "A-100" program, while the average Army colonel has completed more than two years of education in their basic branch course, captains career course, intermediate level education, and one of the war colleges. Most embassies are fairly small. The average company commander is in charge of more soldiers than the number of diplomats under the average ambassador.

Yet the real problem is that while "Joint" is more or less an effective concept for the military, the US Government has not managed to develop an interagency national security corps where the uniforms and suits spend enough time in each other's boots/wingtips to understand the complexity needed today to integrate the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power.

JWING

12:30 AM ET

October 1, 2009

Civilian-Military divide in Iraq

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has talked about the civilian-military divide in Iraq in his reports after his last few trips to Iraq.

His main observation is that the military is planning for the U.S. presence after the U.S. withdrawal, while the civilian side is not. After his meeting with U.S. officials he thinks that to many civilians are concentrating on short-term goals like finishing reconstruction projects, etc. and not thinking about what the U.S. stance/strategy should be for later on.

From my own observations I think a problem with the military side is that they still think they can achieve all these goals in Iraq (Kirkuk, corruption, Arab-Kurd divide, etc) before the U.S. troops pull out when Baghdad is listening less and less to the U.S. and are FAR more concerned about domestic political issues.

RUBBER DUCKY

12:35 AM ET

October 2, 2009

Two Missions? Whoa there, Buckaroo!

Two missions? What is this crap? Unity of command starts with unity of purpose. If any senior-level professional in the employ of either State or Defense wants his own mission, he should start his own country.