The essence of strategy, of
course, is making hard choices -- figuring out what is essential and what is
merely important, one the key distinctions that General Eisenhower made in
planning the implementation of grand strategy in World War II.
Krepinevich
and Watts make the important point that in order to do so, it is necessary
to have some pretty tough arguments. Under President Eisenhower, they note, the
members of the NSC's "Planning Board" "sought to deal with disputes among their principals by emphasizing differences
and conflicts rather than by sweeping them under the rug."
So, I think, one of the key
measures of a strategic process is this: Does it identify and explore these
disputes? On the Iraq war, I think the Bush administration sought to
downplay differences (for example, the running feud between the CPA and the
U.S. military) and so expensively and sadly wasted three or four years of
blood, treasure and power.
Krepinevich and Watts suggest
re-establishing the NSC's Planning Board, an idea I think should be explored.
It strikes me that Eisenhower is
getting a lot of good press nowadays, coming to be seen as perhaps our only
strategically minded president of the last 50 years. In my recent travels (I've
moved from subways to airplanes) I've begun reading Dear General:
Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall. In the introduction, Joseph
Hobbs, the editor the volume, notes that in 1962, a poll of historians rated
Eisenhower "near the bottom third of American presidents." His reputation
certainly has risen through the decades.
Hey, maybe I'm becoming an
Eisenhower Republican -- just as the last of them are becoming scarcer than right whales as they are marginalized by the
out-of-power and out-for-blood radicalized GOP. One of Ike's most scathing
terms of criticism was "hysterical."
Whatever happened in Eisenhower's NSC, the policies that emerged from his administration were described by one knowledgable observer as resembling treaties negotiated by sovereign Cabinet departments.
More important was the foundation of the Eisenhower administration's national security policy, which emphasized deterring Communist aggression with the threat of massive -- that is, potential nuclear -- retaliation. Strategy this may have been. It was also reckless and irresponsible, saving money on conventional forces by increasing the likelihood that an international crisis would lead to an exchange of nuclear weapons.
I'm an admirer of Eisenhower on several levels, but not on this one.
Any studies of the NSC process will show that there is no proper format for it. Other than identifying who will be part of the NSC, each President can run his meetings, invite other members of the cabinet, and listen to, igmore or heed advice as he chooses.
To say that Eisenhower was reckless, welll I believe he was the last President to enjoy two full terms of peace (He ended the Korean War shortly after taking office, so I do not count that).
Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.
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