Ex-Petraeus aide smacks Brits on Iraq

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Thursday, September 3, 2009 - 3:32 PM Share

The Times of London today carries an interesting article summarizing the new issue of the internal, non-public British Army Review. In it are several essays sharply critical of the British military's performance in southern Iraq and southern Afghanistan in recent years.

It is no surprise that the British performance was weak, but I was surprised to see this tart quote from recently retired U.S. Army Col. Pete Mansoor, who was a close aide to Gen. Petraeus in Iraq over the last couple of years:

Only through a thorough appreciation of the mistakes it made in Iraq can the British Army turn defeat into victory as it fights the untidy wars of the early 21st century. It should not ... gloss over its recent experience in Iraq ... Although the conditions [in Afghanistan] are different, the lessons of Iraq are still relevant.
"The British failure in Basra was not due to the conduct of British troops, which was exemplary. It was, rather, a failure by senior British civilian and military leaders to understand the political dynamics ... in Iraq, compounded by arrogance that led to an unwillingness to learn and adapt, along with increasing reluctance to risk blood and treasure to conduct effective counter-insurgency warfare ...
"British commanders attempted to cut deals with local Shia leaders to maintain the peace in southern Iraq, an accommodation that was doomed to failure since the British negotiated from a position of weakness.'

Christopher Furlong/Getty Images

EXPLORE:AFGHANISTAN, BRITAIN, IRAQ, MILITARY

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ADAGIO

4:46 PM ET

September 3, 2009

Criticism such as, "failure

Criticism such as, "failure ... to understand the political dynamics" and "arrogance that led to an unwillingness to learn and adapt" strike me more than a little as pot/black calling. I would expect it to be received as such by the Brits. For us to be pounding our chests about how perceptive and adaptive we may have become at the eleventh hour in Iraq - particularly when viewed through the lens of the quagmire we seem to be stumbling our way into in Afghanistan - is the height of arrogance.

RPM

5:27 PM ET

September 3, 2009

you both miss the point

After several years of failure, the US Army underwent a dramatic internal review of its own strategy. This careful, and painful process led to the relatively successful current situation in Iraq. It is very difficult for any organization to undergo something like this - particularly to do it without an outside mandate. General Petraeus is almost single-handledly responsible for this achievement.

The British Army on the other hand, failed miserably in Basra, eventually withdrawing in literal disgrace. The city became a lawless wasteland under the direct control of Iran. The Iraqi Army (with a little help...) had to go in and take control. That's right - the Iraqi Army succeeded where the British had failed.

Finally, early in the occupation of Iraq the Brits, claimed some innate understanding of how to deal with counter-insurgency (don't wear your helmets seemed to be about the only concrete idea they had). They never missed a chance to point out the errors committed by the Americans, and quite loudly as I recall.

To this day there does not seem to have been a serious internal review of why they failed, or even an admission that they were less than successful. It seems to have taken an American to point out that this emperor still needs some clothing.

BILL KELLER

2:31 PM ET

September 4, 2009

The strategy results debate...UK vs US

Two bald men fighting over a comb, maybe?

NICK CUBA

1:16 PM ET

September 4, 2009

Step Back

For the final third or so of the US's time in Iraq that country has seen improvement due to a switch to the "Surge/Sunni Outreach" policy switches. Though the day-to-day may have gotten better as a result, there exist associated costs as well: the heavy reinvestment in the war may create complications or awkwardness for a US withdrawl.

We can judge British operations against those of the US conducted in the last two years and find them lacking, but it's yet far from clear that the underlying strategic goals US operations sought to achieve are indeed those that best serve the interests of the US, the UK or Iraq. Not to defend the British strategic thinkers, I don't think it's exactly "pot/kettle," but has the US really succeeded to where Iraqis and Americans now view recurring problems as issues for the Iraqi govt/people?

WALKING WOUNDED

6:23 PM ET

September 4, 2009

Baghdad vs Basra output results (perceptions)

At the end of the Brit occupation of Basra, the central gov't rolled in and asserted lethal hegemony, if not monopoly. Huge gains in legitimacy for Maliki, sufficient to ride out the subsequent MNFI Green Zone artillery dual with JAM.

On the face of it, the result is Iraqi sovereignty/governance in Basra, for now. Maliki/GOI won the day, and Team Bush looked credible for a change. I understand that the combat reality was much different, that JSOC (using Brit intel I'd guess) rescued the Basra battle for IA troops struggling without ammo or water. Iran's Quds commander brokered a political deal with the Hakim clan.

But politically, perception is the reality. A political result is the aim of war. Basra is at relative peace, on GOI initiative, without security lockdown, blast barriers, or half its population displaced. The actual output of Brit policy in Basra is a better model than what we've achieved so far in Baghdad.

A kinetic Brit win there might not have the same output. I'm not saying it was better Brit strategy, or that Team Petraeus/Odierno/McChrystal didn't roll with the punches from pacified Baghdad. But a win for Maliki over Shiite rivals is a happy result that occurred in the face of relative Brit passivity.

That's good. For now. Barring draught and famine.

We don't really know what Baghdad will look like this time next year, after Iraq elections and US withdrawal is fully engaged. Baghdad 2009, terror-murder of 400 citizens a month, only looks good today because of how terrible it was 2005-7