The 10 most common strategic blunders?

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Share

I'll read anything by Andrew Krepinevich, the fine strategic thinker who bears a strong resemblance to Dwight Eisenhower circa 1939. Right now my subway reading is a new essay he has done with Barry Watts titled "Regaining Strategic Competence."

I was especially intrigued by the list of 10 common strategic blunders they attribute to business strategy expert Richard Rumelt

1. Failure to recognize or take seriously the scarcity of resources.

2. Mistaking strategic goals for strategy.

3. Failure to recognize or state the strategic problem.

4. Choosing poor or unattainable strategic goals.

5. Not defining the strategic challenge competitively.

6. Making false presumptions about one's own competence or the likely causal linkages between one's strategy and one's goals.

7. Insufficient focus on strategy due to such things as trying to satisfy too many different stakeholders or bureaucratic processes.

8. Inaccurately determining one's areas of comparative advantage relative to the opposition.

9. Failure to realize that few individuals possess the cognitive skills and mindset to be competent strategists.

10. Failure to understand the adversary.

There is a whole book of military history to be written just finding good illustrations of each of those mistakes. I think the United States was guilty of No. 2 and No. 10 in Iraq from 2003 through 2006. I'd say the British tripped on No. 3 during the American Revolution. I think Hitler committed No. 4 when he tackled Russia. No. 10 is probably the most common error.

I'd be interested in other examples that you see.

AFP/AFP/Getty Images

 
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GRANT

4:00 PM ET

September 2, 2009

For the U.S in Vietnam I see

For the U.S in Vietnam I see numbers 3, 6, and 10.

 

JJH722

4:09 PM ET

September 2, 2009

afghan women?

How about #4 for afghanistan, where we were supposedly going to impose a social revolution for women? Remember Laura Bush's PR tour? That was her Hillarycare, and it was very much hyped under the bush democratization push. Still, I don't know how much this adversely affected the war, but it reflected a broader arrogance.

 

RPM

5:14 PM ET

September 2, 2009

Falklands War

Argentina ran afoul of #8.

To be fair, it is not hard to see how they figured that all that ocean + a supposedly washed up colonial power gave them an advantage... Oops.

 

GRANT

6:35 PM ET

September 2, 2009

If we believe the account

If we believe the account briefly given by Wired for War than number 9 as well, apparently the ability of the RAF to bomb airfields caused mass panic among the leadership.

 

ZATHRAS

6:42 PM ET

September 2, 2009

Another Question

How many of the errors listed here did the Bush administration not make in Iraq?

By the way, the picture of Eisenhower here is from 1944.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

7:05 PM ET

September 2, 2009

GWOT blunders:

If we accept #9, the Straussian masses of us who are intuitive, tactical, or just screwy in our thinking are possibly not to be trusted as senders or receivers of those terms. Even after we've gotten specialized training in their use.

The list relies on near tautological recycling of "strategy" terms. It has 'strateginess", in the Colbert sense.

Re GWOT and Iraq in particular, I see evidence of 'all of the above'. And it aint funny. Gen. Odom said it best "We can't win a war that wasn't in our interest in the first place."

 

JJH722

8:28 PM ET

September 2, 2009

nice

Hah. That's the most appropriate quote I've ever seen regarding that war.

 

DON BACON

8:34 PM ET

September 2, 2009

a strategic blunder -- considering only the military

Krepinevich and Watts refer to a decline in "US strategic performance" only in military terms. That's wrong. National power, national political power or national strategic performance, whatever you might call it, has other components besides military power. The diplomatic/economic power of China, for example, has clearly made the Seventh Fleet, with its seventy ships and 40,000 personnel, a rusting anachronism in the Pacific.

Recall Eisenhower: ". . .each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs -- balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage -- balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration. . .In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the militaryindustrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist."

Strategic performance, in other words, is too important to be left to the military, or even a to "business strategy expert", for that matter, and should encompass all the facets of national power including health, education and democracy as well as military and business interests.

 

GRANT

4:23 AM ET

September 4, 2009

Don't assume that a fleet

Don't assume that a fleet means nothing. The world we would like where a fleet isn't important simply does not exist. Although diplomacy is the primary form of conflict resolution for the moment, all the diplomats in the world mean nothing if you lack the ability to project power.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

9:31 PM ET

September 2, 2009

The Eleventh Rule

11. Never forget: strategy is not solitaire!

 

SAINTSIMON

9:59 PM ET

September 2, 2009

gotta love academic lists

gotta love academic lists that purport to explain everything. Here's a question: if before engaging in some 'strategic' pursuit an agent were to address all the failings stipulated above, would said strategic effort then be assured success? Ah.... Here's another question: if academics ruled the world how long before it would be a cloud of dust floating between Venus and Mars?

 

CHARLIEFORD

2:15 AM ET

September 3, 2009

Rory Stewart's article,

"The Irresistible Illusion"

http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/pdf/RoryStewart/LRB_RoryStewart_IrresistibleIllusion.pdf

describes the Afghan adventure in terms of 2 to 7.

Other adventures that might be illuminated by this list:

Manned mission to Mars: 4.

Health care reform: definitely 7.

McCain campaign, 2008: 9.

John Brown at Harper's Ferry: 6.

Anyone who teaches: 10.

 

TOM RICKS

1:32 PM ET

September 3, 2009

John Brown's body

That's a great example of strategic mistake no. 6--it hadn't occurred to me. Thanks!

 

CHARLIEFORD

2:28 AM ET

September 3, 2009

Question about the photo:

Why's Eisenhower talking to a minstrel troupe?

 

DON BACON

3:29 AM ET

September 3, 2009

He's saying: "It goes like this--

"Way down upon the English Channel,
Far, far from home.
You're goin' to get dusted on those beaches,
Nev-er more to roam."

 

ZATHRAS

4:11 PM ET

September 3, 2009

I'm not near my reference

I'm not near my reference sources, but I believe the photo is of Eisenhower talking to paratroopers shortly before D-Day. American paratroopers in World War II often used burnt cork to blacken their skin, reducing their visibility during jumps in low light.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

11:09 PM ET

September 8, 2009

June 5, 1944-full res pic at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Eisenhower_d-day.jpg
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d6/Eisenhower_d-d

101st Airborne troops, prior to boarding for Normandy drop? If so, most of these guys won't make it thru Market Garden, to the Bastogne crossroads.

 

C.E.HOUSENICK

2:34 PM ET

September 3, 2009

The Maginot Line

I've probably been reading a little too much on World War Two lately, but the French decision to build the Maginot Line hits pretty well on points #5, #6, and #7.

 

RAS

4:41 PM ET

September 3, 2009

There's a case one can make

There's a case one can make that the U.S. made all those mistakes in 2002 and after. It might take a little thought to make the case for #8, but the rest almost make the case simply by stating them.

 

JALEFKOWIT

2:32 AM ET

September 4, 2009

Secession

The Southern decision to secede from the United States seems like a good example of #8 ("Cotton is king", "one country boy can out-fight ten Yankee factory workers", etc.).

 

TOM RICKS

3:35 PM ET

September 4, 2009

The Confederate example

That's a good example, and also intriguing to me because it was a pre-war decision--indeed, one that led to war. I think in strategic analysis we often forget that the most important stratgegic decisions often are those made during the runup to the war.

Like, "No prob, we can get out of Iraq in about six months."

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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