Iraq, the unraveling (XXI): An Iraqi mayor's worried assessment

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Share

The former mayor of Tel Afar, the northwestern Iraqi town that saw the first major successful counterinsurgency campaign in the war, has written a paper warning that Iraq may again be drifting toward ethno-sectarian conflict, which is to say, a form of civil war. This is particularly striking on a day when another round of bombings killed at least 50 people in the country.

Najim Abed al-Jabouri was mayor of Tel Afar when the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment took the city back from insurgents and terrorists in 2005-2006. He is now a senior fellow at the National Defense University, at which the study was written. It runs sharply contrary to the optimistic view lately advanced by some experts and observers in the United States that the chances of sectarian fighting have dwindled in Iraq. 

In contrast to American views of the Iraqi security forces, or ISF he writes: "Iraqi assessments suggest that without separating the ISF from the incumbent ethno-sectarian parties, the ISF will be a tool for creating instability in the country. Iraqis realize that the reasons and justifications for a civil war are still at play in Iraq."

A major reason that the army and police can drive the country apart, he said, is that political meddling has created a divisive situation within those forces. "The majority of [Iraqi army] divisions are under the patronage of a political party," al-Jabouri asserts. Unusually, he then lists the political affiliations of various units:

  • "the 8th IA division in Kut and Diwanya is heavily influenced by the Dawa party"
  • "the 4th IA division in Salahideen is influenced by President Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan"
  • "the 7th IA division in Anbar is influenced by the Iraqi Awakening Party"
  • "the 5th IA division in Diyala is heavily influenced by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq"

Similarly, he adds, many of the forces of the Ministry of Interior actually operate beyond the control of that ministry and instead report to political parties. Officers who blow the whistle on the role political parties play in the Iraqi army risk losing their personal security guards as well as their jobs, he notes. 

To my knowledge, word of the report was first published by the Washington Times.  

Steven Pettibone/US Army via Getty Images

 
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JWING

2:06 AM ET

August 11, 2009

Iraqi Security Forces

This is very true for the police, which are local in character and thus more open to influence by whatever power brokers exist. The National Police are supposedly all cleaned up since they fired almost the entire officer corps and leadership. The Army I think less so. One exception is Kurdish units which have proven to be loyal to the KDP and PUK rather than Baghdad. Ex: when Maliki sent forces into the Khanaqin district in Diyala in July 08 one Iraqi unit of Kurds refused orders, and another commander marched his unit back to Kurdistan. The army and police in Anbar are also mostly from the tribes and Awakening. At the same time, the Iraqi army has taken in thousands of former officers, many of them Sunnis, from the old Army.

That being said I see one major problem with Iraq's different factions going to war, a cause. Sheikh Abu Risa in Anbar for example, wants to be as close to Maliki and Bahgdad as possible. If the SIIC was to fight anyone it wouldn't be the Sunnis at this point but rather Maliki, and I don't think he could do anything that would provoke that kind of response, especially because he's flirting with rejoining them in the United Alliance for the 2010 elections.

Look the political parties are going to have all kinds of influence in Iraq whether it be the security forces, the ministries, etc. I still don't see any signs that they are going to go to war however. Remember every couple months there is a Shiite religious event and they ALWAYS get bombed, yet there's been no retaliation for almost two years now. I think that says a lot.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

5:15 PM ET

August 11, 2009

Talafar mayor was a Major General?

In all the press attendant to the second battle in Tal Afar, and the great success we declared for McMasters 3rd ACR, I never heard it reported that the Mayor was a retired 2-star officer from Saddam's air defense force. I still don't know whether he's Turkmen, which flavor of mosque his family favors, or how 'mayors' were selected during his term. Mayor/Gen. al-Jabouri's use of US Army-english is genius level, if that's his third language.

I do remember that our press in 2005 was so puzzled at those Turkmen (whazat?) refusing to evacuate the free-fire zone their town had become for the safety of a refugee camp guarded by Kurdish troops. ('The Pesh are some kind of Sunni, the Turkmen mostly Sunni, what's up with all the fear? Those crazy Iraqis...')

I don't say these things to discredit a faculty member or paper presented at one of our command colleges. I do wish to note that ignorance of the human terrain we war in is a feature of info ops against what Rumsfeld termed 'the strategic center'; that's us, fellow voters, the guarantors of the war-debt. It's almost like a patriotic duty to not notice.

Mr. Rick's link to the Mayor-General's IA sectarian order of battle info is welcome, even if it is so staggeringly unusual that cross-checking the line-up is a job for pros with classified access. Interesting that no IA divisions were identified with Barzani's clan, which brings me back around to the question of al-Jabouri's provenance and career path.

The Rand study linked by FP/Abu Lynch says that armed tension between GOI and Barzani's KRG is the single most destabilizing factor in the coming withdrawal period.

http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/06/rand_usip_withdrawing_from_iraq

 

JAYESLOS

1:35 AM ET

August 12, 2009

Iraq, redux

Another day and more bad news out of Iraq. Are there any solutions? There seem to be mountains and mountains of problems, and every time I turn again, it only gets worse. What's to be done? What can be done? The center clearly cannot hold, so what can be done to stem the anarchy? (Other than a slouching rough beast, obviously.)

 

ERIC C

8:41 PM ET

August 12, 2009

At least America's army

isn't predominately filled with people from one political party or religious group.

Oh wait, it is.
(www.onviolence.com)

 

WALKING WOUNDED

6:47 PM ET

August 13, 2009

Military Religious Freedom

As long as we're taking advantage of Tom's vacation to post plugs, I'll toss Air Academy grad and honorably retired adjutant Mikey Weinstein's crusade on the table.

http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/

Eric C, your URL reminds me of a cartoon I once drew to the tag line: "Eschew Wonton Violence"
;)

 

JWING

5:14 AM ET

August 14, 2009

parties and divisions

Interesting that no IA divisions were identified with Barzani's clan, which brings me back around to the question of al-Jabouri's provenance and career path.
---------
I don't think he was listing every political party and their influence in the army. Rather he covers the 4 main actors in Iraqi politics now, Maliki, the Kurds, the Sunnis and the Shiites.

 

ZATHRAS

4:22 PM ET

August 14, 2009

Now We Know

Now we know the real reason Tom Ricks didn't want to look for a guest-blogger: he can't stop himself from posting, even on vacation. I think some kind of intervention may be called for here.

 

JWING

9:29 AM ET

August 18, 2009

My take on mayor's paper

Here's my take on the mayor's paper:
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2009/08/critique-of-mayors-warning-of.html

There is definitely politicization in the security forces, especially the local police. There's better leadership in both Defense and Interior Ministries, which is a good turn, but Maliki is trying to appoint commanders loyal to him, something not mentioned in the paper. There are some major problems with the mayor's examples. He uses quotes that he says are about the armed forces but aren't. Says that Maliki's use of the security forces in northern Iraq are what should be done to stop politicization, yet the deployments and removal of Kurdish officers, is a political move by Maliki to pressure Kurdistan. Says that Sunni neighbors should be brought in to influence Iraq's political parties not to interfere in Iraq's security forces, when those Sunni Arab countries have little influence in Iraq and are largely standoffish towards the Shiite and Kurdish parties. He constantly warns of a sectarian civil war but doesn't mention that most of Iraq's problems are increasingly being dealt with in the political arena. In the end he does have some good recommendations like rotating units around the country, but his argument is all over the place and could've been done much better.

 

CLEARANCEDIAMONDS

3:42 PM ET

August 23, 2009

Iraq is coming back?

Iraq issue is becoming hotter
now. It comes back :)

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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