Colonel Timothy Reese's suggestion is appealing, of course. And he is good in listing everything that is going wrong. Reading his lists, you'd almost think the situation in Iraq is unraveling:

  1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.
  2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki
  3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.
  4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.
  5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.
  6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.
  7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.
  8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.
  9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US's business.

And:

1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.

2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread

b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm

c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues

d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system

e) Laziness is endemic

f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm

g) Lack of initiative is legion

h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress

i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining

j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

The question the colonel's memo begs is just how bad it gets after we leave, and whether Turkey, Iran and more intervene more than they have already. What are the chances of a regional war? Feeling lucky, punk? Well, are you?

What happens after we leave? How do we mitigate the damage done? I really don't see how hanging a "mission accomplished" banner would work any better for the Obama administration than it did for the Bush administration.

Dioboss/Flickr

 

JWING

3:27 PM ET

July 30, 2009

Status quo

When the Americans leave the Iraqis will continue to putter along like they're doing now. The insurgency sets off bombs, kills police in Mosul, runs around in the outbacks of Diyala. The Sons of Iraq wait around for jobs and checks that won't come in, and Baghdad politics will be gridlocked as ever. With the Americans there this is happening, when they leave it will continue. It's sad but Iraq is a broken country.

 

TYRTAIOS

4:16 PM ET

July 30, 2009

What also hasn't been lost on

What also hasn't been lost on the good Colonel, is an incident happening (i.e. Beirut, Lebanon 1983) that could very well cause long term ramifications, possibly accompaning our early rapid departure, signalling we were driven-out.

Incidentally, I wonder how Col. Reese's memo ended-up in these two reporter's hands - possibly wrapped around a bundle of cigars - now where did that happen before? : - )

 

TYRTAIOS

4:21 PM ET

July 30, 2009

In addition, it's also

In addition, it's also interesting that Col Reese has been so candid in his assessment. It might be further interesting to know how this matches-up with what State has to say on their side of affairs - if anyone over there could ever be this honestly blunt?

 

ADAGIO

6:05 PM ET

July 30, 2009

Point taken

Point taken, Mr. Ricks. We can't reasonably declare victory when there is none, and realistically there never will be one. We WON'T declare defeat. So, let's call it a draw and GO HOME.

 

JWING

7:04 PM ET

July 30, 2009

How bad afterwards?

It should be noted that nothing in that paper says that things will get worse, or that there will be an increase in violence or a return to the insurgency, or the sectarian war will restart once we leave. He said that most of the violence is political to make points and score against rivals, that the insurgency is dead, and that all that's left is Al Qaeda blowing things up every now and then. In fact, he said much of the violence aimed at the U.S. is to make political points or to get us out, so when we leave there actually might be less violence than there is now.

As I said before, Iraq is at the dysfunctional state where it can continue on with nothing getting worse, and nothing really getting better into the foreseeable future.

 

MARCOS EL MALO

3:24 AM ET

August 4, 2009

Ethnic Cleansing, etc.

There could still be ethnic cleansing of the Sunnis, who could be re-infected by AQ if driven to it by sectarian violence, whether officially sponsored by GOI or otherwise. That's one way it could get worse and that could lead to even more regional conflict, possibly regional war.

There are plenty of other scenarios where internal strife could grow to the point where it becomes a humanitarian disaster, escalates into regional war, or both.

What we now call "The Surge" (but which was much more than just throwing more troops into Iraq) worked in that it DID buy time for GOI, which GOI has seemingly wasted. The question now is what would or could GOI accomplish if we bought them additional time. Would it further stabilize Iraq or merely put off inevitable collapse?

 

JWING

12:03 PM ET

August 5, 2009

Shiites getting it, not Sunnis

The problem with your scenario is that it's the Shiites that have consistently gotten it, and not the Sunnis. Almost all of the bombings in Iraq are aimed at Shiites. When Sunnis do get bombed, it's almost always by other Sunnis, i.e. the insurgency or Al Qaeda in Iraq. If the Shiites can put up with all those attacks and not retaliate against the Sunnis it doesn't appear to me that Iraq will fall back into sectarian war soon.

Also the chance for Iraq to turn into a regional war seems to have already passed. Up to and during the sectarian war of 2006-2007 all of Iraq's neighbors were already involved. Turkish special forces got caught by the U.S. more than once in Iraq. Saudi Arabia and other countries were pumping money into the insurgency. Iran was supporting Shiite parties, along with all of their militias. It seems like if these parties didn't go to war when the violence was at its worst, it doesn't seem like a large possibility of happening later on.

As for the Iraqi government, they will accomplish very little, which is what they have done since 2005. Any major legislation that gets passed besides voting laws and the budget, usually don't work out. Ex: new deBaathification law has never been implemented. Amnesty Law says 130,000 have been given amnesty, but only about 7,000 of those have actually been released, everyone else were on wanted lists or on parole.

 

MARCOS EL MALO

3:54 AM ET

August 8, 2009

Ethnic Cleansing, etc.

Point taken that ethnic cleansing against the Sunnis has effectively stopped, but I think this is one of the successes of the surge strategy and possibly contingent on keeping our forces in Iraq.

I hope you are right and I am wrong.

 

TOM RICKS

7:10 PM ET

July 30, 2009

Also in the New York Times on-line version

Just fyi, the NY Times on-line people asked me for comment, so I gave them something similar to here. The link is:

http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/30/out-of-iraq-by-next-year/

 

WALKING WOUNDED

8:41 PM ET

July 30, 2009

I gots to know.

How come your munchkins put up a fat Dorothy
.. but manage a skinny Harry?
Something's not square in the Emerald City.

By the by, where can a mere voter lay hands on Colonel Reese's 'official Army history of the Iraq war'? Is it the 'pentagon papers' of the new century, or more like the old SLA Marshall?

 

JASON SIGGER

11:16 AM ET

July 31, 2009

On Point II

You can get the electronic version here or order it through the GPO.

 

WALKING WOUNDED

11:34 AM ET

July 31, 2009

Thx, a treasure trove of truth

You gots to know there are nuggets in titles like

Use of Field Artillery in Mil. Ops Other Than War
or
Understanding the "Victory Disease"

Interesting that the 'learning institution' is digging back into the frontier (ours) indian wars to understand its role in the 21st century.

 

BILL KELLER

6:00 AM ET

July 31, 2009

Calming in the manner of a flight attendant......

who is tasked serving cocktails as the plane is caught in a flat spin.

Kori in her mother-like assurances would have qualified as a finalist doing the tango on Dancing with the Stars.

In the past, Condi was best at this as she could ice skate and play the piano in a classical manner while making any activity appear on track and respectable. And O'Sullivan liked calling it all a work in progress; however unknown the trajectory might be.

 

JASON SIGGER

11:21 AM ET

July 31, 2009

Come on, Tom

No one is suggesting a “mission accomplished” banner or to emulate the Bush administration's desire to exit stage left from Iraq as it was trying to do in 2003-2004. Here's an amazing thing - there are more ways to achieve regional stability than merely through sheer military power. Certainly military power is part of the solution, but it doesn't have to be IN IRAQ and it doesn't have to be the MAIN SOURCE.

If President Obama continues diplomatic and economic assistance to Iraq and offers regional security to Iraq (i.e., warning Turkey, Iran, and Syria to play nice or else we have this little 7th Fleet in the area), then he has a way to continue assisting Iraq. These actions would not reflect "walking away", LTC (ret) John Nagl. Time to think of a better grand strategy than just status quo.

 

GARYC

7:53 PM ET

July 30, 2009

Call the Helicopters

Time to go. A member of congress once called the space shuttle the best way of burning up billions in taxpayers dollars for nothing...until Iraq. Hopefully the space shuttle saga will also end.

 

BILL KELLER

9:02 PM ET

July 30, 2009

We left the herpes in place and embedded along the....

...nervous systems of the Iraqi society where it could lay dormant when periled and strike like shingles when not..

"The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment." says the Colonel.

Our generals like the German general staff in 1914 made the strategic errors at opening that made it all a folly for those to follow.

I suspect that the Agreements in 2004 and 2008 will be viewed as the Yalta of the day negotiated by an Administration eager to escape from its self inflicted trap while leaving the Marines and Soldiers to rear guard its backside.

 

EMRYS56

12:40 PM ET

July 31, 2009

I doubt that Reese is any

I doubt that Reese is any link of Obama's. For whatever reason, Reese is probably painting the most negative picture of Iraq's capabilities, although I must agree with a number of them. I think the largest problem with his memo is that he doesn't understand Iraq culture, and therefore doesn't understand that some of these conditions result from actions that are socially acceptable in Iraq.

When we leave, there will be no mission accomplished banners, only crossed fingers that the Iraq government will hold up for a reasonable amount of time. A regional war over Iraq is unlikely; we will continue to be the guarantor of Iraq security for some time. Turkey, a member of NATO and EU aspirant, isn't going to seriously rock the boat. As the Shiites are the winners in Iraq, the Irannians, while continue to mettle, aren't going to directly interfere. The Sunnis don't appear able to seriously link the Shiite dominance, so at the moment, they are unlikely to be a major threat. The Kurds and Kirkuk are going to continue to be a festering problem. The Shiite government, which is materializing in Iraq, will not be any model of Western democracy, but it will be Iraqi. In that, there is hope that the Shiite Arabs of Iraq will eventually tire of Persian meddling and put an end to it, as the Vietnamese did with Chinese when we finally left them to there own devise. Its time we did the same in Iraq.

 

STEVE358

12:57 PM ET

July 31, 2009

Two Threads...

With and without our help, Iraq faced a near-biblical set of circumstances: great wars of the Persian/Arab variety that decimated many areas and set vast minorities populations to flight; successive occupations by foreign powers that just further confused and frustrated any post-war re-stabilization; the political pressures of the "great wealth and power" of oil; and, a hundred-year regional drought cycle that, of itself, has caused Exodus-level agricultural flight as destitute and ill-equipped farmers fled to the cities (planting the seeds to further destabilizing them).

The great empire builders helped to organize the people to manage their watershed for greater productivity, and, through that productivity, moments of shear wisdom and enlightenment occurred, as well as general prosperity and some personal freedoms. The same would probably apply to oil and other key resources now valuable to the
"Land Between Two Rivers." We have done nothing to organize the watersheds or the oil, or to improve general prosperity. Is it surprising that personal and/or societal advancement has not followed?

Against this context, we cannot measure our brief interlude as either a mission accomplished or failed. It was just a fleeting sandstorm in the course of greater events.

Does it surprise anyone that our minimalist and disorganized efforts left little enduring marks?

The "Old" Soviet saw: It is amazing to here US soldiers rattling on about Soviet-style socio-military structures---as if we learned nothing from six years on the ground. Soviet-central planning and control was nothing more than the latest "bumper sticker" heading for the older Ottoman-Style centralized state, where local provinces and districts largely fended for themselves under the all- seeing and all-directing eye (or the blind eye?) of a vaster bureaucracy. The old Ottomans, the later large land owners, and the later military dictators, always worked to keep central control, and routinely co-opted even well-meaning "soviet-inspired" centralized bureaucracies.

The challenge for all post-Ottoman societies is not whether to become western or not, but to find some new and better evolution/revolution that can carry their people and culture forward to some definable and agreed end. Few of them have found that formula, and, not surprisingly, the US military and diplomatic efforts in Iraq have left no enduring marks.

What's new?

Send as many soldiers and diplomats as you like. Absent focused accomplishments in the major areas, they are all just passing through.

Unraveling implies that there was a time when things were "ravelled." When---exactly---was that in the recent history of Iraq?

Steve

 

MARCOS EL MALO

3:32 AM ET

August 4, 2009

Do you even know what you are talking about?

"a hundred-year regional drought cycle that, of itself, has caused Exodus-level agricultural flight as destitute and ill-equipped farmers fled to the cities (planting the seeds to further destabilizing them)"

Exodus level? The Iraqi farmers were escaping slavery?

I basically stopped reading at that point, because it's clear you have no idea what you are writing.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

1:04 PM ET

July 31, 2009

Turn out the lights, the party's over...

The Iraq syllogism is horribly flawed. It's basic terms now are: 'we broke it; we gotta fix it." No logic beyond that - it's nothing more or less than the sunk-cost fallacy played out with American lives and dollars.

I commend Col Reese for arriving at the argument I've been making for several years.

Turn out the lights, the party's over...

 

DA BUFFALO AMONGST WOLVES

4:09 PM ET

July 31, 2009

It's eaaaasy

Reese stated our presence was an 'irritant'

AN IRRITANT?

The deaths of what must be a million Iraqis, the destruction of most of their cities and historic/archeological sites, the millions more wounded or displaced... No 'irritation' at all until now...

...and we wonder why most of the citizens of the planet are either hating us or disgusted by us.

Just GET OUT!

It's SIMPLE:

Declare intent and a unilateral ceasefire. Open discussions for coordination immediately with major militias who enjoy local popular support. Prepare Kuwait with transient tent city for a BIG influx of troops and vehicles next to the airport.

Throw out the embedded press (they will turn it into a circus of perceived US humiliation).

Orders to leave everything non-essential. Prepare to destroy-in-place lethal armaments that are not carried. Begin pre-positioning convoy support.

Set up tactical air support corridors from base to base leading south, and run serial convoys with massive force (base to base) to Kuwait, reprovisioning at each base from pre-positioned logistical stores.

Vehicles that break down for more than two hours would be destroyed-in-place with thermite (an incendiary that melts the engines).

Airlift the remaining troops from the bases into Kuwait. Airlift all from Kuwait to the US. Establish airlift security at each base with whichever militia enjoys the most local popular support.

Whole process: one month to get into Kuwait, a couple more to complete the redeployment out of Kuwait.

Courtesy of Stan Goff, Feral Scholar, EX-Special Forces

 

MOHANCOJ

8:45 AM ET

August 1, 2009

Don't Repeat the Vietnam Mistake!

Understand the dynamics are not entirely the same, but our rushed departure from Vietnam should teach us something. Iraq remains an important regional cog in the Middle East, and a relatively stable, somewhat friendly government would contibute to balancing our strategic interests in the region, particulary regarding Iran. We invested great treasure and lives in Vietnam, but did not play out the end game well in our rush to the exits.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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