Monday, July 20, 2009 - 1:39 PM

Michael Eisenstadt and a member of his posse have a good piece on the barriers to political progress in Iraq. His bottom line: "National reconciliation, if it occurs at all, could take years."
Here are the hurdles he sees:
Vested interests. Perhaps the biggest challenge is that key political parties have successfully exploited ethnosectarian grievances as a means of mobilizing support. These parties have a vested interest in perpetuating the political status quo and would stand to lose a great deal if a postsectarian style of politics in Iraq were to emerge as a result of a successful reconciliation process.
Persistent violence. Ongoing violence, although at greatly reduced levels, prevents old wounds from healing, opens new wounds, and creates the potential for renewed civil war. This reality lends immediacy to one of the principal conclusions of a landmark World Bank study on civil conflict: nearly half of all countries emerging from civil war suffer a relapse within five years.
Elusive consensus. Fundamental disagreements remain among Iraqis on a number of key issues, such as de-Baathification, the oil law, and Kirkuk. The fragmentation of Iraqi politics (more than four hundred parties and entities participated in recent provincial elections) complicates efforts to identify individuals capable of speaking for and negotiating on behalf of broad constituencies.
Justice denied. Many of those responsible for the worst bloodletting in recent years -- including leaders of antigovernment insurgent groups and government death squads -- are still involved in public life as members of provincial councils, the ISF, or parliament and show no contrition for their actions.
Demographic complexity. Because various population groups remain intermingled throughout the country despite years of ethnosectarian cleansing, incidents in one place may have broad consequences elsewhere.
Multilayered conflicts. Iraq's civil war involved conflicts within, as well as between, communities: the "nationalist resistance" vs. AQI, Awakening councils vs. Islamists, Jaish al-Mahdi vs. ISF units aligned with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. For this reason, intra- and intercommunal reconciliation is needed. To date, most reconciliation efforts have focused on the legacy of intercommunal conflicts, though ultimately both legacies need to be addressed.
Iraqi political culture. While Arab tribal culture and Islam have provided the normative justifications and mechanisms for reconciliation at the local level, the desire for revenge, a zero-sum approach to politics, and religious extremism have hindered reconciliation at the national level.
Election-year politics. In March 2009, when the government expressed a willingness to reconcile with some Baathists, a number of civil society organizations (all apparently linked to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq) were formed to thwart these efforts. It will be difficult for the government to ignore these organizations in the run-up to the January 2010 elections, lest it appear "soft" on Baathism and lose the support of key constituencies.
External meddling. Syria, the Gulf Arab states, and Iran supported groups such as AQI and Jaish al-Mahdi, contributing greatly to the 2006-2007 Iraqi civil war and ongoing violence. Preventing the arming, training, and funding of such spoilers is key to keeping the peace in Iraq and moving the reconciliation process forward.
For all these reasons, Iraqis are likely to coexist uneasily for the foreseeable future."
Remind me again of why it was a good idea to invade these guys?
Jayel Aheram/Flickr
Tom:
It's ironic to see all these folks emerge---now---with the reasons behind the lack of reconciliation in Iraq.
Anyone who studied the actual history of these conflict areas knows that the wash of one conflict over another, one minority over another, has been going on for generations.
A responder to a previous post about Kurdish problems pointed out, correctly, that the Turkmen dialect is not Turkish but Azerbaijani. Yes, but, during Ottoman rule, the Turkmen lived in the plain south of Kirkuk as Ottoman sentinels and messengers about Kurdish activities. Pre-1950's, pre-oil jobs, and pre-Saddaam, Kirkuk was a majority Turkmen municipality with strong historical, cultural and trade ties to Turkey. So the link to Turkey is deeper and more historical than simple ethnography suggests.
I find the comment about the maps pretty funny for personal reasons. As a geographic/demographic expert, I served on the UN Team in 2008, to "create" the maps to define the conflict areas. Yes, I said "create" because all the US maps were a complete mess, and probably contributed to later problems.
Mapping the shifting populations and conflicts over-time, is a sure way to reveal the breadth and scope of issues yet to be unraveled---now, once again, an Iraqi problem.Like so many conflict areas: everybody has a claim, and everybody is right, but there is only one piece of real estate.So, any solution will be complex and difficult to achieve.
H.L. Mencken said, "for every complex problem, there is a perfectly simple solution that is entirely wrong!"
At this point, the US can rest assured that it tried all the simple solutions.
of Turkmen/Azeris and Kurds occur thru much of greater kurdestan; their communal competition is part of Iranian and Turkish geo-history too. McMaster's brigade leading Kurd battalions to 'liberate' Tal Afar was a bit like Kit Carson using Ute warriors to 'pacify' the Navajo. Expedient, but reads differently thru local eyes.
Maps and census are tools of resolution, unless they re-ignite old fights. Perhaps you recognize this 2003 map defining the forward line of Saddam's army in Kurdistan, linked below. It shows a 'no man's land' snaking between the two Kurdish factions. I suspect that some of the post-2003 party HQ bombings were blood feuds between the KDP and PUK clans, just as there was ayatollah-murder in the air at Najaf.
The KRG opted out of 2009 provincial elections in their 3 provinces, but pesh forces provided 'security' for polling in parts of the other provinces they control.
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_kurdish_areas_2003.jpg
Walking wounded:
Here, again, is one of the many, many maps showiung some version of a putative "Green Line," demarcing a possible KRG boundary.
The transitional constitution (TAL), identified an alternative (position of KRG forces as of March 19, 2003----prior to the US effort). The more recent constitution indicated that there would be a census, with a subsequent referendum in areas with majority Kurd populations. None of these references became official.Same with a prior 1973 un-adopted boundary. And on, and on.
Today, on any map on any web-site, you will see the routine US map error of showing Mahkmour district as a part of Erbil, instead of a part of Ninewa (as it formally is until changed).
The current stand-off between the central government/Ninewa province and KRG in Mahkmuhr district must seem strange to any outsider looking at those incorrect maps. Like I said, US map errors and confusion only underscore, if not create problems.
Yes, it is probably true that, in 1976, Sadaam attempted to damage Erbil by transferring Mahkmour to Ninewa, and two provinces to Tamim (Kirkuk). But it really happened, and has yet to be formally changed.Another flash point unresolved...
Maps can either illuminate or confuse; bad maps only confuse.
KRG's policy of boundary opacity
was my earlier point, not that maps aren't available. If you go to krg.org, there is talk about boundaries, a featured article on the map they presented to Baghdad (rejected), but no map to look at. Makes me think that there's taqiyya and kitman going on, re what they'll negotiate for now, or fight for later.
My reservations are not so much with Kurd land claims, as with Clan Barzani's willingness to lose, or even hold elections on a regular basis. It's the difference between a party and an army.
BTW Steve, your map link isn't evident. I am curious to see anything from someone with 'gertude bell' experience in creating maps. ;)
When we chose to start this war, Iraq was pretty nearly white space on most on-line maps. Who'd a thunk that God cared so much for Mosul that he'd send Jonah all the way to Ninevah in the belly of a great fish?
Kurds have changed Tamim's province as well
I just read recently that the Kurds also added a few Kurdish villages from Kurdistan to Tamim after the 2003 invasion to ensure a Kurdish majority there when they were hoping for the Article 140 referendum on the future of Kirkuk.
“There is no history of ethnic conflict in Iraq.” – former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, explaining to Congress in February, 2003, why Gen. Eric K. Shinseki’s prediction that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in postwar Iraq was ''wildly off the mark.''
Would generally agree with the points made in this report. On the positive side, many of Iraq's problems are now being fought in the political realm rather than with force. That being said, Iraqi politics will continue to muddle along for years probably. I would blame the major parties (SIIC, Dawa, PUK-KDP, Islamic Party) for most of the problems. While they are actually the ruling coalition behind Maliki they are actually completely divided and power hungry, and are united in only one other thing, trying to take Maliki down. That's basically held up most major legislation.
There have actually been cross-sectarian coalitions in parliament made up of Sadrists, Allawi's Iraqi National List, Fadhila and others, which are united on nationalist issues. They are completely disunited as well however and pose no real threat to the major parties and rarely get together enough to push anything through parliament, although they did play a major role in the 2008 provincial election law, and a few others.
Except that the second hurdle for iraq was "persistent violence." If Iraq is going to get better, this is the most important hurdle to overcome.
-- Eric C, www.onviolence.com
Yes, I followed in Gertrude Bell's footsteps, but unlike the Map Makers of the earlier 20th Century, useful modern maps are multi-dimensional.
It doesn't matter "where" things are so much as what they mean. The best maps today for political/historical analysis are more like multi-layered power points. I use them, for example, to show how, between the 1950s and 2003, the districts and sub-districts were carved and recarved, and how economic initiatives, political strife, war, temporary accords (like the KRG basing agreements), and refugee patterns pushed and pulled people across the landscape. It creates a much more clear understanding of what is faced in Iraq.
The KRG's issues are real, but,sometimes difficult to grasp on the ground today because of the huge number of villages destroyed during the 70's and 80's (Anfal, Iran/Iraq War). Plus, as they were displaced/resettled, this often came at someone else's expense (including Turkmen). Some of these major resettlement areas, including in and around Sinjar, create that complex environment that just takes a lot for people to resolve amongst themselves. The next map (the one that is most important) has not yet been drawn and agreed on---that is the nature of conflict zones.
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