I think that the current wave of bombings in Iraq, with 41
dead today but not much noticed here (I didn't see anything on the Washington
Post's home page about it
until late morning), was to be expected. I still think that a long-term
unraveling is likely, but I think it is likely more to be a matter of Iraqi
forces operating in a divisive, sectarian matter, and of militias re-emerging.
For example, Stars & Stripesreports
today that some Iraqi units are saying they have been instructed by the
Ministry of Defense not to conduct combined operations. So I will not get real
concerned about the current bombing
offensive unless it continues, widens and intensifies.
The New York Times does take
notice: "Attacks in Baghdad and a city in northern Iraqkilled at least 41 people and wounded dozens more on Thursday, the worst
violence since Iraq celebrated the withdrawal of American troops from cities
and towns last month."
Be real concerned about the current bombing offensive.
Sectarianism is a real force in Iraqi politics, but so is democracy. The current government represents a constituency that happens to be the primary target of terrorist bombings, as it was earlier in the decade. At some point, if that constituency cannot obtain security from the Iraqi government, it will demand revenge.
If we get to that point, it won't do us much good to shake our fists at the Iraqi government's security forces and say, "Bad sectarians! Bad!" One aspect of the surge period that hasn't been discussed much is that the Sunni Arab militias co-opted by the United States military, and the Sunni Arab political leaders expressing willingness to give up "resistance," never expressed much in the way of contrition or sorrow for the many thousands of Shiite Iraqis killed by the Sunni Arab-led insurgency. The olive branch offered to the Americans has been expected to be taken up by the Shiites -- a nice thought, but reconciliation rarely works in quite that way anywhere. We shouldn't expect it to work that way in Iraq.
Of course, most Sunni Arab Iraqis aren't involved in the current campaign of bombings. Recent history suggests how fragile that distinction may be in the minds of the Iraqi government's primary constituency.
One aspect of the surge period that hasn't been discussed much is that the Sunni Arab militias co-opted by the United States military, and the Sunni Arab political leaders expressing willingness to give up "resistance," never expressed much in the way of contrition or sorrow for the many thousands of Shiite Iraqis killed by the Sunni Arab-led insurgency.
It goes both ways. Have you heard a Shiite apology for the ethnic cleansing in Sunni neighborhoods, which came replete with similar violence? This is part of what has been often stated here: The Surge merely put a hold on Iraq's sectarian war. There really hasn't been either widespread remorse or a power-sharing agreement to safeguard minority rights.
It's worth noting that some American units did create reconciliation boards (different from the Awakening) that offered amnesty to certain insurgents in exchange for expressions of remorse and a promise to abandon their resistance. But this was on an individual basis, not a collective one, and typically only applied to low-level fighters who had not participated in the most egregious violence, such as suicide bombings or kidnappings.
I think Ricks' point here nails it. The unraveling will come as government forces are perceived to operate in a more sectarian manner and militias rise to combat them. Assertions like yours - ie. the Sunnis are bad and need to apologize (or vice versa) - will likely fuel the fire. Hell, that's already a common theme among Shiite politicians, while Sunnis frequently complain that Iraqi forces supposedly dominated by Shiite militias never had to account for their actions. A body like South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission wouldn't be a bad idea to help bring some of this finger-pointing to an end.
No, actually it doesn't go both ways. We are not dealing with equal parties to the conflict in Iraq; the Shiites are the majority of the population, have effective control of most of the government and nearly all of the security services. From their point of view, they could win a showdown with Sunni Arab militias even if these were united (they aren't), and they are convinced that Sunni Arab groups started the sectarian bloodletting after the American invasion (they did). And this is not even counting historical grievances left over from Saddam Hussein's regime.
I've always been skeptical that we were going to get where we needed to go in Iraq by pursuing a "let bygones be bygones" reconciliation that assumed a rough balance of power between the contending factions. Too much water has passed under the bridge for that to work. It isn't really a question of rights and wrongs. It is instead a matter of whether the Sunni Arab minority is prepared to do anything to acknowledge longstanding Shiite grievances as part of a strategy to abate hostility in the sectarian group that now controls the government. If it isn't, and the bombings continue, we very likely are headed for an unraveling.
It was a minority of Sunnis – many of them foreign fighters – who deliberately sparked the sectarian fighting. The situation spiraled out of control from there, and moderates on both sides looked to the militias for security. It is ridiculous to hold one sect accountable for all the violence since it was perpetrated by both sides. Jaysh al Mahdi initiated widespread ethnic cleansing as it expanded out of its strongholds. It then rented Sunni homes to fellow Shiites to guarantee a constant revenue stream. The Shiites shouldn’t be absolved just because their greater numbers allowed them to win the Battle for Baghdad - with as much help from Shiite militias as Iraqi security forces.
It isn't really a question of rights and wrongs. It is instead a matter of whether the Sunni Arab minority is prepared to do anything to acknowledge longstanding Shiite grievances as part of a strategy to abate hostility in the sectarian group that now controls the government.
Agreed, but that isn’t going to happen if the Sunnis don’t have some assurance that minority rights in Iraq will be safeguarded. It’s always easier if one side caves, but the truth on the ground is that an agreement won’t happen without concessions from both sides. The Shiites may have controlled the government, but they only governed for Shiites – at the very least until Maliki consolidated power. Yeah, the Sunnis compounded the problem by not voting, but the fact was there was a serious credibility gap for the Iraqi government. The JAM-dominated Interior Ministry was often seen to work directly against the population in a very un-COIN-like manner. The Health Ministry and Amanat refused to deliver services in Sunni neighborhoods (admittedly, partly from fear of violence). The fact that Shiites happened to control the government gave them no more legitimacy in Sunni eyes than Sunni militias who were often providing more social services than the actual government.
This is part of the reason a one-man-one-vote approach doesn’t always work. Iraq needs some power-sharing agreement that allows the Shiite majority to govern Iraq but safeguards the rights of minorities like the Sunnis, Kurds, Turcomen, Yazidis and whatever Christians are still there. Perhaps certain key institutions should have had sectarian representation instead of purely demographic representation – sort of like a Senate approach instead of the current House approach. That was the approach the Presidency Council took - and it was part of just the type of power-sharing compromise the rest of the country needs to do.
I've always been skeptical that we were going to get where we needed to go in Iraq by pursuing a "let bygones be bygones" reconciliation that assumed a rough balance of power between the contending factions.
Not sure if you’re referring to the truth and reconciliation idea, but these are not about letting bygones be bygones. To quote Wikipedia:
A truth commission or truth and reconciliation commission is a commission tasked with discovering and revealing past wrongdoing by a government (or, depending on the circumstances, non-state actors also), in the hope of resolving conflict left over from the past. They are, under various names, occasionally set up by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil war, or dictatorship … As government reports, they can provide proof against historical revisionism of state terrorism and other crimes and human rights abuses.
The comment upthread about a "let bygones be bygones reconciliation" was directed at the assumptions Americans, including the American military and the last administration, make about what is required for a political settlement in Iraq. It was not intended to apply to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission idea, skeptical though I am about that. Such a commission served a valuable purpose in South Africa, but the former white government's army and security services weren't killing civilians with car and suicide bombs on a daily basis.
Iraq is different, and that's my point. To account for the differences means accounting for the perceptions of people in Iraq, not those of people here in the United States. It may seem "ridiculous" to us that Iraqi Shiites see Sunni Arabs as primarily responsible for the sectarian violence in their country; I guarantee you it doesn't seem ridiculous to them. If Shiites and Sunni Arabs were in a rough power balance some kind of deal that glossed over Shiite grievances might be possible, but they aren't -- or rather, they are now, only because the United States has an army in the country keeping a lid on things.
This doesn't exclude the possibility of a deal that assures Sunni Arabs and other minorities that they will not be abused by the Iraqi government and will have a say in how it is run. The Iraqi government, strong enough to crush any one of its factional enemies by itself but probably not strong enough to confront all of them, has a strong interest in getting to such a settlement. But it has a constituency to respond to, a constituency that would be much more comfortable with concessions to recent enemies if Sunni Arabs didn't insist that the government make the first (and the second, and the third) move. We in the United States have developed something of a constituency ourselves among the Sunni Arab tribes, because they stopped shooting at our people. We therefore see them as more reasonable -- a perfectly sound view from our standpoint, but we're not the ones who will be left in Iraq in five years (Tom Ricks notwithstanding) and to secure a durable settlement those Sunni Arab tribes have to acknowledge the grievances of the Shiites who will be. As far as I can tell, they haven't.
My point is not that Sunnis don't have to acknowledge Shiite grievances. It's that both have grievances to acknowledge and blaming one side or the other is counterproductive. I've been in Saddam's torture chambers, and I've been in JAM's torture chambers. Both had blood on the floor.
I have no doubt that Shiites see Sunnis as primarily responsible for sectarian violence. But I also have no doubt that Sunnis see Shiites as responsible for that violence. Peace will ultimately come down to resolving these different perceptions in a way acceptable to all parties. That's going to take both sides moving toward some middle ground simultaneously.
The Americans may not be in Iraq five years down the road, but both Sunnis and Shiites will be. The Iraqi government simply doesn't have the power to control areas outside its Shiite base through coercion. That means there must be some type of political reconciliation for the country to move forward. That's not an American perspective.
I find it necessary to go to Google news every day. I Google Iraq and then I Google Afghanistan. Even so there are surprisingly few new news stories on a day to day bases. I read Spencer every day because I still feel an obligation to at least know the names, ages and hometowns of our war dead.
Iraq has been fading from America's headlines since Jan. 07. March 08 was the first time Iraq did not make the top ten news stories overall in America. In the first four weeks of June 09 Iraq did not make the top ten news story in any media format in America (TV, radio, internet, newspapers) for the first time.
Tom,
I don't know why you were surprised not to see much coverage of the war when there are more important events happening: Michael Jackson has died and there are questions about his will, the custody of his children, where his shrine will be built, etc.
If the WP carries anything, it will be on the inside.
If you look at the death and attack statistics a definite pattern appears. In the second half of 2008 deaths declined as the Jan. 09 provincial elections neared. Jan. had the fewest casualties to that date since the 2003 invasion. Since then deaths have climbed back up to what they were before the decline. If this pattern continues then you should see another decline in deaths starting in perhaps July or Aug. as the Jan. 2010 parliamentary vote nears. The cause was that the Sunnis want more representation so the insurgency backed off to allow them to participate.
There are several different sources for Iraqi death counts but they all follow the same upward/downward trends.
Here's the numbers from the Iraqi ministries. You can see the decline in late 2008, and then climb back up after the Jan. 09 election with a dip in May, but then right back up in June.
Sep. 08 440
Oct. 08 317
Nov. 08 340
Dec. 08 316
Jan. 09 191
Feb. 09 258
Mar 09 252
Apr 09 355
May 09 165
June 09 438
For more see: http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2009/07/iraq-casualties-see-large-increase-in.html
Also if you want news from Iraq read Aswat al-Iraq. It's an Iraqi news agency that has their stories in English and Arabic.
Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.
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