Wednesday, July 8, 2009 - 3:17 PM

The Afghan insurgent is incredibly able at adapting. He will closely watch your patterns and your response to his attacks, then adapt...to capitalize on any perceptible weakness....More impressively, he will undertake defense, reinforcement, attack and withdrawal based on an impressive understanding of both terrain and our capabilities. He will attempt to flank you. In short, respect this enemy.
This is good to keep in mind as you read the current news about the fighting in the Helmand River valley.
US Army Korea - IMCOM/Flickr
The Gazette article is well done. The quote sounds like the Lt. Col. is channeling Col John Masters in Bugles and a Tiger.
I applaud the pearls of wisdom by 2/7's S-2, though I hope his comments aren't met too much by surprise?
But then, I'm reminded of my talk with an old Marine, long ago, that campaigned in Nicaragua, by the name of Col. Bill Lee, a peer of Chesty Puller, and comparing notes as to my first recent adventure in RVN, and found myself surprised also, that my experience wasn't quite as unique as I thought!
That's certainly sensible . . .
. . . but, while it's best to keep saying such things to be safe, it's a little unnerving to me that it still NEEDS saying.
I just see these conflicts from an historian's perspective (and by no means a specialist in military history), but from what I've read about the American Revolution, the Indian Wars, Vietnam, etc., you'd think that one would assume that in any counterinsurgency.
Certainly if one knows the history of Afghanistan you would assume that. Wouldn't you?
I'm not at all trying to be snarky here, but am curious (and professionally motivated since I'm writing on this): to what degree is this "news" to the forces deploying? Is there a general assumption that the enemy, because poor and ragged to our eyes, is ineffective? How different have the perceptions of the enemy in the Afghanistan War been from those, say, of our perceptions of the Vietnamese?
If it's true to say that the US was originally rather dismissive of the Vietnamese and had to learn some hard lessons (and does anyone disagree with that? I realize I'm generalizing, which leaves a lot of wiser voices out, but was it generally the case?), how different has our experience in Afghanistan been?
Have we, as then, had to re-learn the hard lessons of experience all over again (in regard specifically to respect for enemy capabilities)?
Who would have thunk it Charlieford? Meeting an enemy that would exploit a careless unit's exposed flank?
Going back pre 9/11,, I personally could understand all, but a few in the Army turning their backs on hard lessons learned in Southeast Asia. However, as for the Corps? This was inexcusable considering the history of that organization revolves around involvement in low intensity conflict.
Some of us early on reminded whomever we could that a valuable source lay on the Marine Corps' shelf - the Small Wars Manual - which has been recognized - dusted-off, and updated, and sets alongside FM 3-24.
if they call them S-2's at Pendleton. After my aromatherapy.
So what is the late breaking news, from the big move inland? The SD and Oceanside rags seem to be as blacked out on Helmand as everyone else, once things started to bog a bit.
We seem to have reverted to a scattergun 'gallup thru the war' MSM reporting style. I do see where the Brits lost 7 this last week, and good ol' Nuristan is featured in a bad way. Roggio has a map and some order of battle detail.
In other news, Michael's still dead... but his sales are up. Sigh.
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