Well said, I think steeles statement regarding the training received at home as opposed to the reality of war speaks volumes about his competence in the field. In fact most competent commanders expect that much of what they prepare for before going into a war zone will most likely have to be fine tuned and in some cases radically changed in order to be effective

"spent many hours in the library reading Swinburne, Masefield, Lafcadio Hearn, Ibsen, and many other poets and playwrights."

Wonder how many among our senior officers would consider this as useful.

How many Superintendents at the Academies would desire this sort of foundation for officer character development?

While my brief experience with COL Steele consists only of hearing stories of his exploits in Iraq, its enough to know I don't agree with his counter-insurgency theory. Unfortunately, holding COL Steele as an example ignores how many maneuver commanders were not practicing counter-insurgency. COL Steele was only the most brazen example.

GEN Petraues didn't just bring in the surge, he changed the minds of field and company grade officers on how to wage counter-insurgency. Unfortunately, that didn't happen until five years after we invaded Iraq.

Michael C at www.onviolence.com

Tom,

The Leadership Department at the Army's Command and General Staff College is using a detailed case study of Steele as a "Toxic Leader" in its current curriculum. Although there was significant resistance to using a case study on an officer who was still on active duty, virtually all of the students that I saw recognized the importance of studying Steele's command environment. I think by contrasting Steele with General Collins would have made the study much better.

IDMAJ,

I would love to see the final product of that case study. While controversial, I think that personal, real-world vignettes (good and bad) can best reinforce learning. The Army has mastered this in their leadership training.

It's unfortunate that it took misconduct and tragedy in Iraq to focus appropriate attention on COL Steele's toxic command climate. A similarly toxic environment existed during his battalion command of 2-22 Infantry at Ft. Drum a decade ago. Despite all the indicators of a poor command climate, Steele was lionized (in the pre OIF/OEF Army) for his exploits in Somalia, promoted and given Brigade Command. As a Company Grade officer it was a bit demoralizing to see Steele annointed for greatness while several of his (very fine) peer battalion commanders didn't get recognized for their leadership abilities.

Mr. Ricks,

I just finished reading the New Yorker article and I can see how soldiers would misunderstand the ROE. This just makes a stronger case that the leadership--especially COL Steele--did not help in making it clear. Having "been there," I know that how well a unit understands the ROE is a direct reflection of its leadership and their commitment to the Law of Land Warfare. If there was confusion, and between COL Steele calling for bodies and a fuzzy mission statement there seems like more than enough evidence to indicate that, then leadership failed the soldiers on the ground and the Iraqis.

Michael C at www.onviolence.com

After some debate on whether or not to weigh in on this subject, I have obviously decided to enter the debate.
I respect the opinion found in all of the previous posts here but have to also respectfully disagree with the vast majority of the information so far concerning the entire COL Steele scenario.
I have the good fortune of understanding many of the facts involved in this case, of which most have not ever, and will not ever be released to the public, nor am I able to express them here. However, after having served with him, I can say unequivocally that COL Steele was not the criminal or monster that everyone conveniently makes him out to be.
On the contrary, I found him to be sharp witted and a natural leader. I have also never encountered a Soldier, be it officer or enlisted, who would speak poorly of him, which is in extreme contrast to what most stories like to make the public think. Actually, from as far as I can tell, they (his Soldiers) all loved him and were sad to see him go when the time came for his change of command.
It is easy for people who have never walked a mile in his very worn and dusty boots to make him the target for their failures, but it is impossible for those same people to produce anything that substantially corrobrates their misguided accusations. And because of this, the Army has now lost the potential that COL Steele had to continue to show leadership in the face of adversity.
No one has ever been recorded in the history books, as a flawless commander of troops, whether in wartime or peace, and last I checked, the record still holds.
I do not pretend to think that COL Steele was any different, but I do know, and so does every one else that served with him at any point during his very distinguished and decorated career that he does not deserve the treatment that is levied against him in many public venues.
Let's not forget that this is still a Soldier who has dedicated his life, and sacrificed more than his share for well over 20 years, in order to preserve the freedoms that we so gladly take for granted each and every day.

I just wish more would take the time to understand the person. Maybe someday, someone will write a book to clear all of this up.

And one last point. If COL Steele did foster such a horrible climate, one that supposedly led to "War Crimes," than why over the course of the entire year is there documented only ONE ISOLATED incident as opposed to an entire year's worth of war crimes? Could it be that the indivdiuals who actually conducted the heinous act, actually bare ALL of the responsibility for their criminal act(s)?

I think the answer may be staring us all in the face.