. . . do COIN? Is it, perhaps, just too demanding it terms of long-term commitment for a democracy (especially a partisan, media-saturated democracy) to support? Might it not require the kind of inattention from the domestic population Britain largely bestowed on its empire back in the 19th century, when the mass of ordinary folk hadn't the foggiest what was going on most of the time and didn't care either way?

what is commonly called "the surge", was a big push on America's part to institute COIN doctrine in Iraq. General Keane has said that effort won the war.

Tom, you've written 11 posts now on the unraveling of Iraq, so what does that say about COIN? Is our success unraveling there because COIN wasn't as successful as promised, or because we are leaving too early? Or is it some other factor?

Additionally, what does Iraq's unraveling say about our prospects in Afghanistan?

Regards,
Keith

Ricks appears to imply that we had/have a choice as to whether we leave or not. The government of Iraq has asked us to leave; by treaty, unless renegotiated, we have little choice. Could the result be otherwise, as suggested by Silverman? Perhaps, but in my view our behavior in Iraq has been so egregious so as to precluded any other outcome. In other words, it was more than just the SOFA treaty that turned the Iraqis off toward us. It may be that the Sunni harassment of the Shias, alluded to by Ricks, will cause the Shia leadership to reconsider; however, my reading of the situation is that Iraqis of all stripes, by and large, want to see our backside. From the viewpoint of stability for Iraq, is this the best outcome? I don't see any evidence that staying, say, another ten years of our presence will make the Sunnis, who feel that they have been riped off, any more gentlemanly. Perhaps staying longer could help us prepare the Shia governing clique better for the eventual conflict. But then, is that our true role in Iraq, to help the governing clique retain power? As implied by Silverman, there was always much more to the invasion of Iraq then just freeing the Iraqis from a horrible dictatorship. If that had been our objective, we might have done a better job of it. But then again, as it was carried out by an incompetent administration ...

Bring everyone back home. How many minutes does it take to burn a million dollars of the taxes Americans pay in Iraq and Afhganistan? What exactly are we accomplishing in the middle east for what we have spent in blood and treasure? I was hoping and praying Obama would get into office and a couple months later in a suprise operation everyone would come home. Has not happened. Every single one of the million or so people who have died over there has a family and friends that will never stop hating America. Do we think they are some different breed of human being that doesnt really mind having their loved ones murdered? Add to that the people who may be relatively untouched but are sick of living in sqalor and after so many years have no hope of a better life- they blame us. Call me a quitter but I do not think it is going to work- the truck bombs are not going to stop exploding. Very few of those people want us there anymore and we have already burned up public money that could have rebuilt our own nations infrastructure. We are screwing ourselves and it just needs to end. Will the world end if there are no more Americans in Iraq and Afhganistan? Many players are manipulating the public with fear. If we lose Vietnam the communists will take over Asia and then the world; remember that? It is the same old story. I think I gave up when I saw that magazine spread of U.S. Women Soldiers; bikini's, tatoo's, and M-16's lounging around the pool in Baghdad. If the Military did not understand how offensive those photos were to Middle Eastern Muslims and let them be released to the public, I do not think they are smart enough to win.

Or are contractors now considered veterans?

Tom, we are being rolled around the world. The Iraqis have mastered Scheherazade and are fighting to maintain the right to tell the next night story for cash. House of Saudi has their personal hessians in the buffer with Iran. China is getting a ward in debt and a future in annuity. The rest have the giant blind, in sclerosis and spilling assets and new opportunities for market share.

OIF and OEF are at best sideshows and at worst strategic draw plays.

It's almost like the Democrats and Republicans split the good ideas on Iraq 50/50 just so that they can bash each others' policies without actually changing them. So during the surge, the Democrats say that political reconciliation needs to be emphasized while dropping all of our military leverage. Then Bush refuses to emphasize political reconciliation as the key to tamping down violence. Obama doesn't seem very willing to do much to irritate the government there by talking about reconciliation, and now we're leaving. Let's hope the title of this series of blog posts doesn't become a book.

1) "but they're in no way broadly capable of doing that yet. While some units are, not all of them are."

Yes, a recent Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report on the U.S. effort to get the Iraqi Army to be able to supply themselves notes that they are completely incapable despite four years and millions of dollars. The Defense Ministry refuses to take responsibility for the program so the Americans will doing it for the foreseable future, beyond 2011.

2) "The opening was supposed to be used for the reconciliation of societal elements, so that there would be tethering, both horizontally to each other and vertically to the state, in order to achieve actual progress in Iraq. The Bush Administration squandered that opening by trying for a pie-in-the sky SOFA agreement"

A completely American perspective. The reason there wasn't reconciliation is because the powers that be in the Iraqi government, namely Maliki, didn't need to reconcile. The Sunnis got beat, they still don't have any strong leadership, and Maliki has been able to use a carrot and stick approach with the SOI and some Sunni parties quite successfully. Why reconcile with them when they are weak and defeated? The Americans were not going to change this dynamic. In fact, they strengthened Maliki and took care of most of the Sunni insurgency to allow the government to do this.

"The Bush Administration squandered that opening by trying for a pie-in-the sky SOFA agreement that media reports indicated would have kept large numbers of troops in Iraq in perpetuity on huge bases located to stage for Iran and Syria."

Disagree with this as well. If Iraq and the U.S. military has its way there will still be thousands of U.S. advisers in Iraq past 2011 and some bases too. The SOFA says combat troops need to depart, not advisers and trainers.

"The Iraqis rolled us on this, then rolled us and IHEC/UN on the Provincial Elections."

??? How did they "roll us" on the provincial vote? The U.S. wanted a strong and unified Iraqi state and that's exactly what Maliki ran on successfully with his State of Law list in the Jan. 09 vote. He even tried to reach out to some Sunni parties, unsuccessfully however, when putting together ruling coalitions. That sounds like the kind of reconciliation the U.S. has been pushing for.

"that the Iraqi Parliament has appropriated the funds for the referendum on if we stay in Iraq. If they call that referendum we will most likely lose! "

If you read the Iraqi/Arab press no Iraqi politician is in any rush to have this vote. The parliament needs to pass a law laying out the rules for the election, the Election Commission then needs 2 months to set up the vote. If this vote happens at all, it MIGHT happen in Jan. 2010, which by the way would mean that the U.S. would have until Jan. 2011 to depart, one month more than the current withdrawal plan.

3) "The Iraqis recognize this and that's why the violence has been creeping up."

Overall attacks leveled off in Nov. 08 and have only marginally increased since then. The major reason why they went down was the Jan. 09 elections because so many Sunnis turned out. The insurgent held off to allow them to participate. The attacks are going back up to what they were before. There will obviously be other attacks because the U.S. is leaving the cities and the insurgents want to test things. That being said deaths have gone up and down since Jan. 09. April had one of the highest death counts in month, and then May had the lowest number since the U.S. invasion.

Overall, too much U.S. analysis of Iraq is based solely upon U.S. thinking and concerns. Iraqis are operating now based upon their own internal struggles, and U.S. influence is declining. To determine what's going over there now you need to understand the Iraqis themselves.

If there's any major fighting after the U.S. leaves it will not be between Sunnis and Shiites, but rather Arabs and Kurds, and could lead to the breakup of the country.

Motown 67's prediction is consistent with the current widespread view that the Arabs and Kurds are the likely future fight. I am not so sure--I think there is still a lot of unfinished business betweeen Shiia and Sunni. And also intra-Shiia.

"it MIGHT happen in Jan. 2010, which by the way would mean that the U.S. would have until Jan. 2011 to depart, one month more than the current withdrawal plan."

I got my dates mixed up. The current withdrawal date is Dec. 31, 2011.

1) I think the Sunnis have accepted their defeat. That's why so much of the insurgency switched sides and now are part of the SOI.

2) The SOI are fragmented, and have done absolutely nothing when the government has gone after them for the last two years. None of these SOI commanders gets along at all, which makes it easy for the government to pick off selected ones and intimidate the rest.

3) All of the SOI's biographic information is recorded by both the U.S. and now Baghdad. The government has shown no problem tracking down and arresting people they want. The rest run off, and that's fine by the government because they are intimidated and get the message that the security forces and Maliki are in control.

4) Maliki has been reaching out to selected Sunni parties. The Anbar Awakening for example want to run with Maliki in the 2010 parliamentary vote. The Anbar Awakening is the largest and most well organized of its kind in the country and now controls Anbar. They were also integrated directly into the local security forces from the get go. The difference, the Anbar Awakening is an indigenous movement, the SOI were created by the U.S. He also might run with the Al-Hadbaa party that now runs Ninewa. Maliki also tried to form an alliance with parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq's list after the Jan. 09 vote.

Basically the vast majority of Sunnis have given pu the fight, its unlikely that the SOI can pose any kind of real threat, many Sunnis are now trying politics.

some thoughts...

Things are neither as bad or as good as they seem in Iraq. Pronostications on the imminent collapse of the current system or the arrival of a fully democratic polity are not realistic.

When, after 30 June passes and the sky doesn't fall, we discover that the security provided by Iraqis is 'Iraqi good' enough and the extremists lack the capacity to cause the collapse of the system, it will be apparant that our role in Iraq will have fundamentally changed - to both our long-term advantage.

We've given Iraqis an opportunity, time to gracefully bow-out.

All this entails to consider US military actions in Iraq in the light of Iraq's History. This is why I'm convinced one has to cautiously analyze the interactions between military actions at all levels (be it counter-rebellion, "reconstruction" or political discourses at home) and the endogenous dynamics of this wars (plural) seen in the light of a longer process: the building of a Nation(-State) here since the end of Ottoman rule.
This would suggests that success or failure is not the key question, but rather the extent of social-political and identities transformations (to say nothing about economic ones) since 2003....
Best
Stéphane

With some dignity thrown in for good measure.

Implementation of the security agreement and where the Iraqis are taking it renders combat operations all but finished. Sure, there might be some activity but, for the most part, we're turning another corner in our Iraq experience.

We are no longer in the driver's seat and we have to accept the fact that the Iraqis will be calling the shots.

Election season has begun and the parties are already jockeying for position. The PM, who owes his existence to US support, will be positioning himself as the leading insurgent who did what the other insurgents couldn't do - he got us out of the cities and out of the country.

Our feelings undoubtedly will be hurt but, if we desire a strategic partnership with Iraq, we're going to have to swallow some pride and accept this new reality.

You're right - 'gracefully' hasn't previously been associated with our 'adventure' but we are entering a brave new world and it is the grace and dignity we exhibit in light of our diminished role that will be an important aspect of 're-setting' our relationship with Iraq.

Tom:

While I understand all these folks are focused on military and foreign policy "big think," what is really playing out in Iraq re: the US relationship is about little speak stuff like a dysfunctional government and non-existent local services.

I spent 2008 in Iraq as one of a handful of civilian planners/senior advisers trying to unravel the US civil/reconstruction mess. Yes, it really was a mess to anyone who understood the scope and impact of the US effort.

Competent civilian planners and public administrators were such a rarity amongst the thousands of US military, foreign service and US agency assignees (ill-prepared and lacking serious civilian experience, however well intentioned), that we were routinely welcomed and embraced by Iraqi local, provincial and national counterparts.

But what we heard from them was what was mirrored in the streets---a dangerously dysfunctional system driven by and/or smothered by Americans.

The tales of US incompetence and bureaucratic confusion and infighting on the reconstruction side, as reported in the Wash Post and by SIGIR, scratch the surface of a very deep problem with the US efforts to restore basic Iraqi public operations and services.

Nobody was seriously building Iraqi institutions, and things remained horrible for the average Iraqi citizen throughout the US occupation. (How about, instead of all the COIN and Humint BS, we look at civilian life in the streets as a measure?)

Gen. Petreaus' significant accomplishment was not on the ground in Iraq, but to stabilize things enough to create a domestic US pretext for US withdrawal. He, and the hundreds of thousands of US military and civilians that put themselves in harm's way to implement his plan, did that, so let's go forward from there.

The upcoming SOFA vote, which all the US pundits thought would never happen, will not be a referendum on the current Iraqi government, but one on the years of mismanagement by the US on the civilian services side. How, in the face of continued deplorable civilian conditions, can we expect the average Iraqi to say yes to a system they believe (rightly or wrongly) that we are responsible for.

My hope, as with any public issues, lies in the beliefs expressed by Iraqi Ambassador Sumadai, that Iraqis, in general, are tired of War and all that represents War (including us), and will take a vote for a complete stake in their own future, regardless how perilous that vote may be in the short-term. They do not have a national death wish, but there is a lot to be done that only the Iraqis can do.

Maybe unraveling (creative destruction) isn't such a bad thing if it comes as part of a hope for a better future? But

While I would have liked US efforts in Iraq to have been productive, they were not, and the time and will has passed for us---let's give them their country back.

I posted this on the UPDATE VET section too.

Mr. Silverman is part of the US Army TRADOC Human Terrain System which is one of the most seriously mismanaged (and recycled) programs since the design and testing days of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. If hybrid-COIN-human terrain operations are now central to US National Security Strategy, then we'd best do better than HTS.

Here is a link to 17 articles on HTS based on 43 sources: active, retired, gray beard, new beard in/out of theater. You can also find the pieces at cryptome, intel daily, pravda, seoul times and danger room. There are 3 books I know of coming out on HTS plus a stage play. The program has seen murder, civilian deaths, troop woundings, sexual harrassment, and widespread accusations of fraud (under investigation). The academic community is usually singled out by HTS supporters as the program's toughest detractors but it actually is people in the program who are its harshest critics.

Take a look at the threads on these pieces as they provide some great debate.

http://openanthropology.wordpress.com/2009/06/08/john-stanton-us-army%E2%80%99s-human-terrain-system-like-swine-flu/