Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Share

Central Command, the U.S. military headquarters for operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan, released its report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan's Farah Province at 4:52 on Friday afternoon -- and in the summer. That is typical of military public affairs -- in fact, I once heard an Army PA officer boast about good they were at using late Friday to disclose embarrassing information. Among other things, the late hour makes it difficult for reporters to find outside experts who have read the report and can comment on it. 

Stunts like these are not cute. They undermine the credibility of the military and increase public suspicion of its statements. If General Petraeus is serious about improving strategic communications in his command, he'll tell his subordinates to stop throwing the bad news out the back door late on Fridays.

EXPLORE:MILITARY
 

TYRTAIOS

7:33 PM ET

June 22, 2009

Five O'clock Follies Returning?

You must remember Tom, the institutional cultures of the two communities - journalists and the military, are antithetical.

At least you and your colleagues won't have to endure the infamous Five O'clock Follies and hopefully won't hear the now famous line repeated from that era, "We had to destroy the village to save it," or will you? : - o

 

IRR SOLDIER...

9:13 PM ET

June 22, 2009

Army Public Affairs ...

Tom,

As I've said before, Army Public Affairs takes military public affairs ineptitude to a whole new level of bad.

The Army remains the ONLY service that does not view public affairs as an initial-entry, officer career field. The Navy, USMC and USAF all track their public affairs professionals from the point of commissioning. The Army cobbles together its cadre of public affairs officers from the wretched refuse of who remains in uniform after 7-8 years of active duty commissioned service and who affirmatively opt out of staying in their "operational" career track. At the point that an Army Public Affairs Captain begins the first day of his/her first PA assignment, his USMC and USAF counterparts already have 7 to 8 years of cumulative experience.

What does this mean?

The overall talent/quality of the Army Public Affairs community is objectively lower than that of the other services. The persons best suited to PA work cannot pursue that career field right out of ROTC, OCS or USMA. Of this natural talent pool, how many stay in uniform to even be eligible to become PAOs? Of those that remain, how many good performers opt to remain "operational" in their branch and forgo PAO opportunities - even if their God-given abilities are best suited to that sort of work? Why would solid performers in the Infantry, Intelligence or Logistics choose to derail their career to become PAOs in an Army where promotion to Lt. Colonel is virtually assured regardless of performance or ability?

After watching serial dissemblers in the Army PAO community like COL Bryan Hilferty and COL Steve Boylan over the past few years, I'm continually surprised that its taken people this long to "call out" Army Public Affairs for its performance during OIF and OEF.

 

TOM RICKS

9:08 AM ET

June 23, 2009

Slamming people

As I've said before, I have a policy of not deleting comments on this blog. But this last paragraph comes mighty close. IRR, I don't think you should use the veil of anonymity to attack people and not say why.

 

IRR SOLDIER...

12:35 PM ET

June 23, 2009

Tom, I apologize for not

Tom,

I apologize for not putting my "issues" with COLs Boylan and Hilferty in better context. For that I apologize. I will post some links (below) that highlight my concerns for each of these high-level PAOs.

COL Boylan -

My main issue with COL Boylan is his blatent efforts while at MNF-I to curry favor withe right wing, partisan media/bloggers and to selectively provide them with information. Glenn Greenwald at Salon has exhaustively documented many of Boylan's actions - particularly those related to the "The New Republic"/PVT Scott Beauchamp affair in 2007. Of particular note is COL Boylan's snide, hostile and nonresponsive e-mail to Glenn Greenwald from his MNF-I e-mail account that he later claimed was "sent by somebody else." I will let the readers take a gander if they wish:

http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/10/28/boylan/

COL Hilferty -

Although I initially knew COL Hilferty as a Division PAO, my "issues" with his performance center around his service as the Army G-1 PAO and at USMA. Re: his G-1 service, there are ways to faithfully serve the command and the American public without employing partisan talking points. Here's a Hilferty quote from 10/12/05 alleging that the dreaded "biased media" may be to blame for Army recruiting woes: "We get the news, the truth, out to local people, unfiltered by possibly biased media," Hilferty noted." Amazing. In October of 2005 (see article) he was trying to side step the notion that the war might be the primary suppressor of enlistment propensity. Instead, it was the "great economy", generous benefits from private sector employment and possibly the "biased media."

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18096

In other instances (documented by the NYT and Boston Globe), COL Hilferty spoke positively about proposals promulgated by both Max Boot and the folks at AEI to actively recruit foreign nationals residing outside of the U.S. for service in the Army.

In his role as USMA PAO, I became disappointed with his attempts on this very blog to downplay and obfuscate the recent attrition of USMA graduates from active duty. I pointed out the glaring shortcomings in his argument that "everything is just fine."

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/27/cracks_and_fissures_pentagon_says_6_percent_of_force_is_highly_stressed

 

BHILFERTY

6:52 PM ET

June 23, 2009

name calling

I resent being called a "cereal dissembler." I have never even spoken about corn flakes or Cheerios.

 

BHILFERTY

7:17 PM ET

June 23, 2009

Name Calling

Never mind--now I see I am being called a "serial” dissembler.

Now I guess I really will have to respond.

Reference recruiting, the Army got beat up mercilessly when we missed our monthly recruiting goals in 2005. Yet how many stories has anyone read that trumpet that the Army has made mission for something like 4 straight years? How many stories have been published about the fact that we just REDUCED the 2009 recruiting mission by more than 10,000?

And in that DoD link given above, I didn’t side step the notion that the war might be a primary suppressor of enlistment propensity:

“Hilferty acknowledged there's a tight recruiting market, partly because parents are concerned about their children enlisting and then serving in war zones. And "the economy is very bad for us, because it's so good," he pointed out, noting that young people have other choices for employment other than military service.”

Now that recruiting is going gangbusters in a bad economy while we still have more than 100,000 troops deployed during a protracted war, I think I sound like Nostradamus.

Reference West Point graduate retention, I have gotten retractions and apologies from several reporters who have repeated untruths about that. The Boston Globe story that started all this is http://bit.ly/zQEeP I don’t have space here to debunk all the gibberish in it, but read the first sentence and then look at the accompanying graph—don’t need a PhD in math to see a problem there. More unfortunate truths (to quote old Army PAO Al Gore) here http://bit.ly/fo6Kp

Contrary to media editors/producers beliefs that Bush's war is so illegal and so immoral and so dangerous that all intelligent people must be fleeing the Army, West Point graduates, and soldier in general, are not leaving at a rate particularly different from 1999. I know that goes against the story frame that media has, but it’s the truth.

Fortunately, I love the Army and I love my job. (And I’m better at my job because I am an Airborne Ranger with a CIB who was an Infantry platoon leader and company commander so I know what I am talking about while a newly accessed 2LT PAO might know communications but couldn’t tell a Bradley from a Paladin.)

 

TOM RICKS

11:21 AM ET

June 24, 2009

Thanks and an apology

Brian, thanks for stepping up and responding.

I am embarrassed to have the anonymous attacks carried here. I believe they are unethical. I apologize for (involuntarily) being part of it happening to you.

 

IRR SOLDIER...

4:57 PM ET

June 24, 2009

COL Hilferty, While you

COL Hilferty,

Re: USMA retention. I'm not talking about the Boston Globe article. I'm talking about your comments in response to mine on this blog about 6 months ago (see link above). Mistaking me for a misinformed fool, you used your usual "hand wave" statistics about USMA officer retention in the commenst thread. I called you out on it because 1) you ignored the impact of stop-loss on 5 year retention (i.e. if you are stop-lossed, you can't leave the army; and 2) your comparison of previous class-year attrition in non-analogous PERSTEMPO scenarios (e.g. no VSI today and no "stop loss" in the '90s.

Your quote: "Contrary to media editors/producers beliefs that Bush's war is so illegal and so immoral and so dangerous that all intelligent people must be fleeing the Army, West Point graduates, and soldier in general, are not leaving at a rate particularly different from 1999. I know that goes against the story frame that media has, but it’s the truth."

This is a dangerous red herring that has no place in this debate because I am not talking about the "big bad media". I AM talking about the means in which you choose to dismiss valid concerns about officer career persistence in an Army with challenges in field grade strength and already a ~90% promotion rate to LTC. A nearly 100% selection rate for civilains applying to OCS (commissioning source of ~50% of RA 2LTs this FY) and virtually automatic promotions to CPT and MAJ only exacerbate these mid to long-range concerns). Perhaps more importantly, your characterization of journalists as a monolithic group of Anti-military zealots is nothing short of alarming. Are those sorts of views - and the willingness to express them publicly - suitable for someone who essentially serves as the spokesman for West Point?

YOUR QUOTE: "Fortunately, I love the Army and I love my job. (And I’m better at my job because I am an Airborne Ranger with a CIB who was an Infantry platoon leader and company commander so I know what I am talking about while a newly accessed 2LT PAO might know communications but couldn’t tell a Bradley from a Paladin.)"

Another Red Herring. No one questioned your love for your job or the Army. The questions concern whether fielding a PAO workforce from post Company Command CPTs is prudent and attracts the best talent to the job. Under the current system we will not attract the best Army PAO talent for the following reasons: 1) they will be dissuaded from joining because they can't serve as a PAO out of the gate; 2) they will commission in a basic branch with the intention of going 46 (PAO) and leave in frustration after their ADSO; 3) they will excel in their basic branch and remain operational rather than go 46 because they see better career opportunities. To be sure, some outstanding basic branch officers will still track PAO regardless of the career impact but they will only comprise one segment of the annual cohort.

 

STARBUCK

6:19 AM ET

June 25, 2009

What are all the "P"s again?

The questions concern whether fielding a PAO workforce from post Company Command CPTs is prudent and attracts the best talent to the job. Under the current system we will not attract the best Army PAO talent for the following reasons: 1) they will be dissuaded from joining because they can't serve as a PAO out of the gate; 2) they will commission in a basic branch with the intention of going 46 (PAO) and leave in frustration after their ADSO; 3) they will excel in their basic branch and remain operational rather than go 46 because they see better career opportunities. To be sure, some outstanding basic branch officers will still track PAO regardless of the career impact but they will only comprise one segment of the annual cohort.

In other words, peacetime personnel policies persist in times of war. I agree that this is a major issue. If the enlisted ranks can have dedicated journalists who start out as privates, why can't the officer ranks have dedicated journalists who start as lieutenants?

 

BILL KELLER

9:26 PM ET

June 22, 2009

In the age of the timeless internet.....

does PAO print or television media deadline manipulation really matter?

 

TOM RICKS

10:27 PM ET

June 22, 2009

Yep

Yeah, it does, mainly for the reason I listed.

Btw, thanks for the great comment, which I made a separate item today.

 

BILL KELLER

5:42 AM ET

June 23, 2009

Medical Equipment Arms Race....

After studying system analysis for nuke weapons requirements at MIT, Navy made me the lead engineer at a regional medical center. Had to install Specialist's equipment along with all the utilities and structural improvement to make them operate. It was`like watching an arms race among the hospitals and departments. A blinking light with color tone shift added to an xray machine would start a feeding frenzy for capital money. Benefit to patient survivability over existing, little. Chemotherapy, a medical derivative of the mustard gas, runs the same new and costly ballgame against questionable long term survivor rate improvements.

Saw same mentality in the Bell Systems as more money was thrown at networks and computers in dot com days.

A cadre of beneficiaries for the money invested forms, dominates the org and the money flows. Little returns. A small group does quite well from expenditure benefits. Even fewer have the balls to challenge these people who are first to scream that "real" risks will be created if investment not made...sounds like Cheney or Addington doesn't it?

 

JAMES S.

1:45 AM ET

June 23, 2009

What's the difference?

The only difference between a Military PA official and one in another organization is the uniform. I've seen pundits from both sides complain about the same thing from Treasury, State, and the White House. This isn't a breach of integrity. You got the information. You just didn't get it at a time that was convenient. I am sure that it is annoying. Just realize it is PAs job to protect the Military while not compromising its integrity. In military terms, while journalists are not considered nessesarily hostile, are certainly not considered friendlies. Your interests are not the same interests as ours. You are not dealing with an unbiased source. This means that, while information that could damage the military is given out through PA, it will be done so in such a way as to minimize the damage. This is really no different than newspapers printing corrections in a small block at the bottom of page 12. Smile, tell the guy he's doing a good job of making your work hard, buy him a beer later and, maybe, you might be able to obtain an "unofficial" copy at 8am next time.

 

TOM RICKS

9:09 AM ET

June 23, 2009

But

But is the PA's action consistent with Gen. Petraeus' recent guidance that the US military should be transparent to outsiders and "first with the truth"?

 

COW COOKIE

2:59 PM ET

June 23, 2009

Typical: Doing what they can rather than what they should

The PAOs just don't seem to understand that because an action is allowed - ie. kicking a reporter out - it isn't necessarily beneficial. This is the same problem they've shown with their refusal to declassify gun-cam footage from airstrikes where civilians are alleged to be killed. It's like an entire career field doesn't get COIN.

The military cultivates a hostility to journalists. This is usually just minor ignorance when it's a low-level soldier, but it's downright counterproductive when those tapped to deal with the press have this same perspective.

 

IRR SOLDIER...

3:20 PM ET

June 23, 2009

Cow Cookie, You raise an

Cow Cookie,

You raise an excellent point. I would submit that part of the reason that many feel that the Army PAO community "doesn't get COIN" is because the PAO community is disproportionately filled with risk adverse personality types whose "operational" career/promotion prospects have hit the skids.

What do I mean? As I stated above, Army PAO is a self-selecting functional area that officers can't really serve in until their 7th or 8th year of commissioned service - at the very earliest.

Currently, promotion to Lt. Colonel is just about assured on active duty (LTC promotion rates north of 90% with CPT and MAJ being virtually automatic). Given these promotion odds, why would CPTs who have excelled as Company Commanders voluntarily opt out of the operational career track where they have a proven record of success to be a PAO? Surely some will, but most won't - even if they have the personality and skills best suited to service as a PAO.

The hard truth is that the Army PAO and Acquisition communities are increasingly being drawn from the "bottom half" of the available officer pool. While I am not saying that this is the case for all PAOs and CPTs/MAJs choosing to enter the Acquisition Corps, it is becoming the "rule" rather than the exception. Lower performing officers have already been chastened by their superiors, peers and subordinates for 7 to 8 years yet have chosen to remain in uniform. This experience is a breeding ground for a risk adverse mindset and a desire to "go along to get along" until retirement.

What can the Army do about this?

MAKE PAO AN INITIAL ENTRY OFFICER CAREER FIELD! The Army could make PAO an area of concentration within the Adjutant Generals Corps (just like the Public Affairs enlisted are) and groom its public affairs officers over the full length of their careers. This would attract bright individuals from ROTC and OCS seeking to be PAOs from the outset and allow for the best match of talents with mission requirements. Moerover, since OCS is producing over 50% of Regular Army LTs this Fiscal Year, the Army could go out and actually recruit really bright young people to become officers to serve as PAOs. Imagine, Army PAOs with bona fide media and journalism backgrounds!

 

TOBY BONTHRONE

7:56 PM ET

June 23, 2009

Two things

a) If the Army has a screwed-up entry system for PAOs, don't blame the individual PAOs. That's bass-ackwards. I'm sure there are enough problems with the personnel system - and Don Vandergriff has written enough about that - but don't blame people for their job choices based on your edumacated guess that they're from the bottom decile of the gene pool. That's not fair play. Personal experience is no substitute for hard data in ad hominem matters. I mean, you could expose someone's incompetence through hard evidence, but...
b) You kind of got owned by COL Hilferty. Either that, or you got served. I'm still not quite confident with this American vernacular.

PS: You make a compelling case that PAO should be an initial-entry field based on the experience argument alone. No need to derail your argument through personal attacks.

 

COW COOKIE

9:40 AM ET

June 24, 2009

Six on one hand, half dozen on the other

I'm mixed on the initial entry proposal since I've worked with all branches. The upside is as you mentioned - a Navy PAO will have many years of experience by the time an Army officer becomes a PAO. I knew one PAO who was a Combat Camera photographer while he was enlisted. It took him many years of being an officer to get back into the PA field, which is what his goal was all along. He said he'd always been frustrated by that. (He was also one of the best PAOs I've worked with.)

The downside is that other branches use junior officers more and that means those officers often don't have the life or career experience that a beginning Army PAO would. This can be frustrating for a reporter who wants an answer fast, but it can also be frustrating for a unit that needs a spokesman to put an incident in context fast.

The problems with the lack of an initial entry option is more indirect, in my opinion. This sends the signal that the PAO track isn't as valued as a command track. I've known some very good PAOs who told me that they switched over to the PAO field after recognizing that they weren't on the command track so they could continue serving their country. There's nothing wrong with this, and it has produced some good officers as I pointed out . But it is hardly a way to attract the best and brightest to a vital job.

This is part of a larger Army culture of over-valuing command at the expense of roles equally important to current conflicts - military transition team leaders, non-lethal effects coordinators, etc. Conflict isn't just about leading men into battle anymore.

 

IRR SOLDIER...

4:22 PM ET

June 24, 2009

Cow Cookie, Good points

Cow Cookie,

Good points all around. While many raise the issue of junior PAOs not having basic branch experience, I don't think that anyone can say that the USMC has anything less than a stellar Public Affairs/Media operation. USMC PAOs know their own Corps very well and I don't see rifle company or maintenance company command as a prerequisite.

 

SABOT

4:52 PM ET

June 26, 2009

My 20 cents

I have been watching this discussion for several days and I have to chime up as not all the 'facts' presented are correct or at least in the correct context.
First "IRR" I would ask how many deployment AARs you have submitted to substantiate or enter into the professional discussion the shortcomings you note.
The Navy does not access ALL PAOs directly into PA. Look at their Admirals and captains. The navy strategy has been to get an officer either SWO (surface warfare qualified) or AWO and certified on a department BEFORE becoming a fulltime PAO. You can equate this to Army CFD or branch detail. The Marine Corps practiced the same policy-lead marines then become a spokesperson PAO. My deskmate at DINFOS was a marine Captain now USMC PA Colonel. That means the marines in my small group couldn't possibly have had 7-8 years service in PA beyond mine. Similarly, thre were AF Lts and CPTs both in my class. The LTs mainly had been in a wing or squadron PA section for 6 months then sent to DINFOS. ALL the cpatains had been in another AFOSI before coming to DINFOS. Again, a blend of direct commission and warrior experience but mainly the latter.
Secondly, the 'wretched refuse' is absolutely incorrect. Since you refer to one particular officer I wil tell you that the officer CFD boards for his approximate year groups were directly instructed to choose and were given quotas from each of the top 1/3, middle 1/3 and bottom 1/3 of all rater profiles. This was done to prevent just such the occurrence you stated-no one Functional area got all the top 1/3 or all the bottom 1/3. In fact I know of one particular officer that had all top block infantry OERs, rifle and scout platoons, two company commands, selected first look CGSC and usual fruit salad/badge accoutrement for excellence and was taken out of that second command to go involuntarily to PA. So your 'refuse' opinion is incorrect as evidenced by both hard fact (the board instructions) and an example.
I would also ask how you justify the comparison that the 'overall talent/quality' is lower in the Army PAOs than the other services. Your justification infers journalism and photography skills are the differentiation. you are right officers aren' and shouldn't be photographers and journalists. They are planners, operators of the operational art in the information domain. The NCOs are the expert journalists and phtographers and now they are more relied upon as PA planners, coordinators and operators.
And to all who try to blame the PAO for failure to release and provide access and have an overall uncooperative unsupportive mentality I say this: PAOs can not walk out to an AH 64 and pull the guncam footage. They cannot declass (in most cases) anything. They are not the ones who set the attitude of the command for full disclosure and support. THE COMMANDERS SET THE COMMAND CLIMATE AND ATTITUDE IN SUPPORT OF OR IN OPPOSITION TO THE PAO. Now do all PAOs get it right? No. Nor do all artillerymen, infantrymen or logisticians. But the commander sets operational goals, the priority of effort and support. I have worked for both Navy and Army flags and PAOs and commands. Yes the navy got it right in support of PA goals and objectives. The Army flags that wanted to 'get out there' only did softballs and Kiwanis clubs and never got the strategic context or processes. The newer flock of BCT and Division commanders are starting to get it. Some of them still don't. But the Petraeus memo was not aimed at PAOs. It was aimed at Commanders to support the PA and media and Public. i could go on and on but bottom line, 'IRR.' Take your personal hatchet to a private venue. If you have real recommendations-then write a credible recommendation and AAR and get it published.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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