Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Share

Writing in the Pakistan Tribune, Anwaar Hussain, a former Pakistani military officer, offers an approach to counterinsurgency campaigning that is less compromising than the current American doctrine:

"1. Never try to negotiate with a terrorist group. They will never honor the agreements but only use it as propaganda and to replenish and regroup.

2. Control the area. Deploy enough troops to occupy every single village, mountain and forest. The enemy must not have any place to rest. If they cannot rest, they will lose morale. And when they lose morale, they surrender. In the terminal phase of Turkey's war, PKK terrorists surrendered en masse.

3. Offer amnesty to anyone who surrenders willingly. You do not want to be seen as mindless killers. And ex-terrorists can become great COINOPS assets, as they know the enemy's tactics.

4. Always target the leaders; they are the poison wells, the snake heads. Without leaders the followers surrender easily.

5. Local support is very important. Local people generally support the side that does them less harm and also is physically closer to them. Build mini garrisons in the secured areas as you go along.

6. A terrorist group needs outside support. They need to have weapons and ammunition as supplies, safe resting and training facilities. This outside support is their life line. It must be severed. If borders are too long to control effectively, use political pressure to stop it.

7. Most important of all. The enemy must understand that you are ready to go to the end to win the war. That means a resolve for the long slog and a stomach for attrition. If the enemy thinks that you develop feet of clay rather quickly, he will continue fighting."

I would bet Petraeus and other American COINsters now looking at Afghanistan would agree with many of these, but strongly disagree with no. 1.

TARIQ MAHMOOD/AFP/Getty Images

 
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ZATHRAS

5:43 PM ET

June 16, 2009

Would They Really?

In Pakistan, negotiation has been given any number of trials, and the terrorist groups have responded just as Hussain says. That wasn't always the experience of the Americans in Iraq, or for that matter everywhere in Afghanistan, but Pakistan has been different -- probably because successive agreements with a government not determined to uphold their terms convinced the Taliban types they were winning.

 

FSUCESAR

7:35 PM ET

June 16, 2009

They might disagree with

They might disagree with number 1, but it is supported by number 3. I think the author is saying to "never negotiate with a terrorist group" ala Swat Valley style, but to "offer amnesty to anyone who surrenders willingly". Without the latter I would disagree as well.

 

TYRTAIOS

5:38 PM ET

June 17, 2009

"And ex-terrorists can become

"And ex-terrorists can become great COINOPS" We found this to be the case with the Corps' Kit Carson Scouts through the Hoi Chanh Vien program in RVN which worked quite well.

I wouldn't dismiss this out of hand if done properly.

There's not too much new under the sun going on here - only many seem to have forgotten or never had an opportunity to cut their teeth on it, and have reinvented the wheel, with appropriate updates. : - }

 

RPM

10:19 PM ET

June 16, 2009

depends on how you define 'group'

The basic premise is sound - and easily applicable to such core groups as AQI and the Al Queda leadership in Pakistan. But outlier groups - with less of a fanatical commitment and more of a financial/frustration/crimminal type commitment are corruptible. Those are the targets for amnesty. But negotiate with Al Zarqawi, Bin Laden, etc.? Never.

Enjoy the Appalachians!

 

MARK EICHENLAUB

2:18 PM ET

June 17, 2009

Good points they make but I

Good points they make but I don't think our enemies believe that the U.S. is ready to go to the end to win the war. In fact, they likely continue to believe the exact opposite.

 

TYRTAIOS

7:20 PM ET

June 17, 2009

And with good cause since

And with good cause since they, the insurgent, have no where else to go, but we can always go home. And history is on their side, that tells them the invader has always eventually thrown-in the towel and left, having been beaten by General Time.

 

PARKERDHICKS

8:08 PM ET

June 17, 2009

Point Four also Dangerous

We should also take point four with a bit of skepticism. I mean, hasn't that essentially been the lesson of the last 8 years of hunting Al Qaeda? It is quite possible to run an organization without the original figurehead--especially if you can make that figurehead a martyr.

 

TYRTAIOS

10:25 PM ET

June 17, 2009

Yes and no. Most would argue

Yes and no. Most would argue that the death of Velupillai Prabhakaran means the end of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, irregardless that it's reported there's money laying around to continue.

Snatching-up four-toed bin-Laden "alive," and keeping him that way in the cross-bar hotel, would certainly deal a severe psychological blow to al-Qaeda?

 

MARCOS EL MALO

11:15 PM ET

June 29, 2009

Combining #1 and #4

Korben Dallas: We need to find the leader, Mangalores won't fight without the leader.
Aknot: One more shot, and we start killing hostages!
Korben Dallas: That's the leader.
Aknot: Send someone to negotiate.
Fog: [as Dallas looks at him] Uh, I-I've never negotiated before.
Korben Dallas: Do you mind if I try?
Fog: No, sure, sure, sure.
[shouts]
Fog: We're sending somebody in to negotiate!
[Corben walks into the room and shoots Aknot between the eyes. As he falls, the other Mangalores drop their weapons and bow over him, keening]
Korben Dallas: Anybody else want to negotiate?
Fog: Wh-where did he learn to n-negotiate like that?

OK, I realize it's just a movie.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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