-
POST 9/11
The Problem: Meathead Generals
-
GOOD READS
Army Officers' Top Ten Books
-
ALGERIA
Relative Silence Amid The Arab Spring
Posted By Thomas E. Ricks
Monday, June 15, 2009 - 3:57 PM
Share
The June issue of the Marine Corps Gazette offers a nice representative slice of the Corps and the U.S. military eight years into the 9/11 era. Some of the eternal verities are mixed with observations from contemporary events.
- "The nature of warfare remains unchanged," states a nice far subhed on page 12. It is possible that this phrase appears at least once in each issue of the Gazette. Really, they should just make it the magazine's motto. It is a key point of Marine Corps culture that technology changes but that warfare doesn't, because it is fundamentally about people, not about machines. Hence derivative phrases such as "In the Marines we don't man the equipment, we equip the man."
- "IN YOUR WORLD FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTION," states a dumbass Panasonic advertisement on the facing page. I don't blame this page on the Marines, of course. But the claim made here is becoming one of my pet peeves. Actually, failure is an option, and the sooner we recognize that, the better decisions we are likely to make in avoiding it.
- The magazine bounces back with a good article about having an intelligence cell at the company level. I was pleased to see this because I've noticed in Iraq that good units have such cells, whether formally mandated by higher headquarters or informally cobbled together by a perceptive company commander who recognized the need and made it happen. "If a battalion is operating in a distributed environment the companies will never be satisfied with the level of battalion-level intelligence support," observe Lt. Col. Morgan Mann and Capt. Michael Driscoll. They also point out that company-level intelligence cells are best staffed by Marines who display "Curiosity, 'street smarts,' and effective written and oral communication" skills. They also point to one of the eternal verities: "Every patrol needs to be debriefed."
- Another key tenet of Marine culture is invoked in a discussion of the new F-35 that argues that the Marines are the only service that provides good fixed-wing close air support. (At least, that is what I think is meant by the sentence, "It was ironic that the Marine Corps was the only Service in the world that still practiced the ‘tactical air force' model perfected in WWII.")
Of course, no contemporary military discussion would be complete without a nod to Maslow's hierarchy of human needs. In the letters section, Lt. Col. Stuart Harness discusses Maslow and counterinsurgency:
Maslow's hierarchy was never meant to be a counterinsurgency theory prescribing a methodical approach starting at the bottom of the pyramid. The main failure was not a flawed understanding or misapplication of Maslow's theory but a failure to comprehend the nonkinetic effects of our own actions. Simply put, we achieved when we stopped alienating the tribes and incorporated them into our counterinsurgency efforts."
(Full disclosure: When I was a child, Professor Maslow took me canoeing on the Charles River at party thrown by the Brandeis University psychology department. I also have a vague memory that he had a dog named Chumley, but I am reaching back nearly five decades. Anyway, perhaps this is why these days I seek self-actualization in whitewater kayaking and hanging out with Labrador Retrievers.)
breezedebris/flickr
Conway speech at National Press Club
Video of Commandant Gen. Conway, on June 12, 2009
http://www.press.org/video/player.cfm?type=lunch&id=17770
Re 'nature of war unchanged', Conway says 80% of Afghan casualties are IED, which tells me riflemen are patrolling to contact with mines, taking casualties, seeking payback from an unseen enemy. War sucks.
Behind the 'awe shucks' delivery, Gen. Conway was substantive and factual in what I heard, and more responsive in the Q&A's than most. Combat vehicles and personal armor were addressed. He is one articulate and agile intellect.
I would highlight Conway's emphasis on the importance of 2:1 ratio of home dwell time for a sustainable Corps capability. Attrition is not just about head count and casualties. (Army brigades are today re-deploying after 15 month Iraq tours, with only 12 at home. The 2007-2009 15 month deployments only terminate this summer, the fine print in election year 'future news' announcements.)
It's interesting that the Marines haven't reduced recruiting standards, and have good company officer retention. If Marines do use stop-loss, it's in the context of 7 month deployments, not being drafted for a 15 or 12-plus-pre-deployment workup, as with Cpt. Mabe.
Re altitude constrained V-22 and CH-46 lift in Afghanistan, the Marines are deploying to some of the lower Afghan terrain, in Helmand and the SE.
(Having never been, I would welcome anyone's take on the indie movie 'Kandahar'. This looks like a cool satellite-terrain site to follow map-impaired reportage, although location-spelling is always a problem:
http://www.world-geographics.com/asia/afghanistan/helmand-27/all/view-all/)
The last issue of Armor Magazine (or the Armor and Cavalry Journal for the not-free version) had an article that did the usual Maslow/COIN analysis that the Armor Center saw fit to give a writing award to.
While a semi-interesting analysis, it strikes me as not very useful to anyone on the ground, so say nothing of an oversimplification of motivations and effects. I think Lt. Col Harness is right on the money
"because it is fundamentally about people, not about machines." Sometimes I wonder about that Tom. We create technology in vehicles to drive where IED's are and don't configure units smaller, and train people to travel lightly, leaning into their supporting arms - where IED's ain't?
Lastly, no one Tom - I say again, no one, brings in fixed wing CAS like the Marine Air Ground Team. All good commanders though, should plan for it's unavailability however! : - )
The Marines will use Maslow's Pyramid, the way US industry used W. Edwards Deming's concepts.
Slice, dice, only use what they feel is appropriate for themselves and their specific hierarchy, discard the rest as 'nonsensical' (Deming said when a business did well, everyone was responsible and everyone gets a bonus... You can only imagine what the managers at GM think of THAT idea), and when it doesn't work because they threw away the philosophical and ethical/moral underpinnings that cause it TO work...
Who WILL they blame?
I don't know about the relationship between the Air Force and the Army, or between the Naval air arm and anyone else, but I do know that in the pacific in WWII and in Korea the Marine close air support was superior to anything that anyone else had. Whatever is going on in the other branches, I would guess that the Marines haven't lost that touch. It made a huge difference at Chosin, and my again.
I think Lt. Col. Harness was wrong with one point though. It has been a misunderstanding and misapplication of Maslow when used to proscribe operations. Pop-psych meets pop-COIN. Not a good mix.
went right to the bottom of Maslow's pyramid of values.
Remove water and food, discourage breathing as needed; the fire goes out for a generation or so. Sherman would approve the directness of the logic. The folks who survived Sheridan's romp through the Shenendoah, not so much.
Crook, the most experienced US general in the wars of Western expansion, thought it cheaper to hire young bucks as unreliable scouts, than to deploy troopers to look for them.
I'm assuming the obvious resemblance between Maslow's hierarchy and the USDA food pyramid is coincidental. Right?
The Aussie story is a quaint metephoric trope, but I doubt its authenticity. And that's more than a "stupid wild ass guess" on my part. But your point is on sound footing, and not just unique to the Corps.
The American military has always had a problem with competent language speakers and our younger trigger-puller's representative attitude/conduct toward the culture of the countries we invade?
These wars need to diverge from national level intelligence driven special operations and our conventional forces that will wear their small units out chasing about, based on poor military intelligence, and alienating the locals - as it has always been.
Aprilaire Humidifier : Aprilaire Humidifiers & Dehumidifiers: For Aprilaire Humidifiers, Lennox Humidifiers, Honeywell Humidifiers, GeneralAire Humidifiers, and Humidifier Parts & Supplies Visit Discount Humidifiers.
Aprilaire Humidifier Filter : Lennox Filters: For Lennox Filters, Aprilaire Humidifiers, Lennox Furnace Filters, Lennox Pure Air Filters, Lennox Replacement Filters, Lennox OEM parts, Lennox Parts Visit DiscountFurnaceFilter.com.
HomeComfortDepot: The Web's top choice for Aprilaire Humidifiers and Aprilaire Humidifier Parts like Aprilaire Humidifiers, Aprilaire Humidifier Pads, Aprilaire Water Panels, Lennox Humidifiers, Aprilaire Humidifier Parts.
Silk flowers and plants look great all year round and will never die! Find beautiful artificial flowers and silk flower arrangements at NearlyNatural.com. Call us at 800-711-0544 or shop online today.
Read More
Jan/Feb 2012
-
Cover Story
-
Feature
-
Inbox
Follow us on Twitter | Visit us on Facebook | Follow us on RSS | Subscribe to Foreign Policy
About FP | Meet the Staff | Foreign Editions | Reprint Permissions | Advertising | Writers’ Guidelines | Press Room | Work at FP
Services:Subscription Services | Academic Program | FP Archive | Reprint Permissions | FP Reports and Merchandise | Special Reports | Buy Back Issues
Privacy Policy | Disclaimer | Contact Us
1899 L Street NW, Suite 550 | Washington, DC 20036 | Phone: 202-728-7300 | Fax: 202-728-7342
FOREIGN POLICY is published by the FP Group, a division of The Washington Post Company
All contents ©2012 The Foreign Policy Group, LLC. All rights reserved.
(10)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE