So - it is not the AV8 harrier owned by USMC?

Despite many of my original misgivings about the Osprey, it exceeded my expectations in Iraq. I think the situation in Iraq is showcasing the ideal role for the Osprey--it can fly light cargo missions to a number of FOBs within a day, so long as it has a relatively improved surface and secure area to land in. I still have my doubts about it being a great platform for air assault type missions in hostile and dusty landing zones. Anyone with more Osprey experience care to fill me in?

First, the results speak for themselves. The Osprey just completed about 10,000 hours of mishap-free combat flight hours over 18 months in Iraq (flown on the same 12 aircraft, with the last two Ospreys having been there for the last 12 months). Considered the safest and fastest way to move around the country, it was the aircraft of choice for high-profile VIP missions, including the transport of General Odierno and then-Senator Obama. The US military suffered unfortunate fatal crashes with a number of helicopters and other aircraft in the past year and a half, but none occurred in Ospreys. The Osprey may be the safest way to travel in combat, from both a mechanical safety and enemy threat perspective.

Second, 5000 psi hydraulics does not make an aircraft measurably less safe than, say, helicopters whose hydraulic systems run at 3000-3500 psi. The Osprey also has very good redundancy within its hydraulic and flight control systems, and provides its operators and maintainers with superior diagnostic tools. I believe the frequency of serious hydraulic leaks is far lower in the Osprey than it is in other helicopters, based on my experience flying helicopters and Ospreys.

Third, the recent G2Mil blog post has many inaccuracies and contains few citations or sources, yet respected people may take its assertions to be facts. (And unlike this distinguished FP column, G2Mil allows no space for comments). Examples of inaccuracies: folding is not avoided, I have folded and unfolded a V-22 dozens of times in many temperatures while ashore without damaging any components; repair of composite material on the aircraft can be done at the squadron level; the hydraulic lines are not "stressed" when the nacelles are rotated (there are swivel fittings to allow this movement to occur smoothly). As a taxpayer and as someone whose life often depends on the safety of military aircraft, I encourage a healthy debate on the procurement of military systems--but I want those debates to be based on facts and reasonable comparisons.

Much like other new military aircraft (and, yes, it should be considered new, its operational debut having occurred less than two years ago), the Osprey does have issues that need to be addressed, but its overall recent performance has been excellent and its capability is unmatched. Just ask the customers who know: soldiers and Marines returning from Iraq will tell you they prefer flying an in Osprey to any helicopter.

This monstrosity will be the biggest scandal in military aviation history (or it may die a quiet death in a few years). It has been kept alive by cleverly spreading out the aerospace jobs to as many states as possible thus insuring political support. It does not have a pressurized cabin so it cannot fly high enough to avoid bad weather. It cannot autorotate like a helicopter for an emergency landing after being damaged by enemy fire. It does not fly anywhere near as efficienty as a fixed wing or helicopter with the same power. Every possible maintenance nightmare from several types of aircraft are present in this airframe. It is a bastardized politicized cash cow rip-off. No matter how many people who say it is great because it is in their best interest to do so, it is a loser and the truth will sooner or later come out.

Tom,

You are to intelligent to simply regurgitate flawed and biased information regarding the V-22.

The Airbus 380 and Boeing 787 both utilize 5,000 psi hydraulic systems.

The F/A-18E/F that crashes into a carrier deck when it lands has a 5,000 psi hydraulic system.

The Sikorsky S-92 and CH-53K and C-17 use 4,000 PSi Hydraulic systems.

The only issue the V-22 hydraulic system has is that 20 years ago it pioneered 5,000 psi hydraulics. The Lessons Learned from the V-22 hydraulics have since been incorporated into the EMD V-22 and all the mentioned aircraft.

CTR

My one huge misgiving, of course is a Monday-morning quarterback issue. Would it have been better, thirty years ago, to invest in more proven designs (a much larger number of newer Chinooks and fixed-wing aircraft as opposed to only a few Ospreys) in order to get the same capabilities for the Marine Corps? I don't know. Obviously, it's a new aircraft and it can certainly prove itself.

Thomas Ricks should do himself a few favors. (1)File a SF180 and get a copy of g2mil blog proprietor Carlton Meyer's OQR and find out exactly why he was not retained in the service of the Marine Corps; (2)read all 145 pages of the Osprey thread at military.com:

http://forums.military.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/5671946761/m/591104612

and see firsthand where Carlton Meyer was exposed as a liar in attempting to pass off congressional testimony that he himself fabricated as legitimate and (3)take a trip to MCAS New River and visit VMMT-204, the MV-22 FRS, along with all of the FMF MV-22 squadrons that have already stood up. The Marine Corps might even allow Ricks to take a trip out to the USS Bataan which currently is underway and has VMM-263 embarked, as part of the ACE of the 22nd MEU, with their MV-22s:

http://www.navy.mil/management/photodb/photos/090521-M-8752R-221.jpg

http://www.navy.mil/management/photodb/photos/090527-M-8752R-078.jpg

http://www.navy.mil/management/photodb/photos/090521-M-8752R-174.jpg

and see firsthand how compatible the Osprey is with a LHA/LHD.

As someone who has dealt with him in the past I can tell you that if Carlton Meyer told you what time it is, you'd be wise to get a second opinion. A writer like Ricks shouldn't be relying on such suspect gouge as that provided by Meyer and his ilk at g2mil.

The only connection I have with the V-22 is that I am a former airedale Marine with an interest in the safety and lives of Marines and the capabilities and success of Marine Corps aviation and the truth. The Osprey has been the victim of a lot of yellow journalism and there hasn't been much objectivity from the "media", including wannabe journalists like Carlton Meyer.

I do not now, nor have I ever in the past, work on any aspect of the V-22 or for any contractor associated in any way whatsoever with the Osprey. Leveling the charge that any supporter of the program is earning a buck from it is Meyer's modus operandi. Meyer thinks that everyone is an opportunist like himself, which explains why he charges for access to his archives. Meyer has been exposed as a fraud in the past and he'll continue to be exposed as a fraud until he takes his final breath.

Here's a defense industry rag's 2008 attempt to untie a long and knotty list of V-22 counterclaims. It's an awful lot of smoke to simply claim 'nothing smoldering here, move along, nothing to see now...'

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/V-22-Osprey-A-Flying-Shame-04822/

To my mind, the issues boil down to V-22's high cost vs multiple copies of the best contemporary helo option, the cramped cabin and long load times, and the operational changes in air assault and rescue drills forced by the jet blast. None of those are 'growing pain' things, since the prototypes were flying in 1991, before the other services bailed out.

Too soon to tell whether reliability, maint. and spares issues will shake out. A re-engine program is already under discussion; neither unusual nor cheap for aircraft.

V-22 costs just under twice the C130 price, and carries just over half a CH53 load. Army aviation doesn't even recognize V-22 as a acquisition planning option.

(coming soon) Took me a while to write this, very long post appears below.

From a guy I know:

"Still a lot of relevant questions not going answered. Altitude could be a real problem in Afghanistan. Very little weight carrying / vertical landing/takeoff capability.

"FYI, unit (procurement) cost from 2010 budget docs: 2008 - $85.24 million each (23 planes); 2009 - $75.1 million (30 planes); 2010 - $78.6 million (30 planes).

"Recurring unit flyaway cost, which military and contractors love to talk about (airplane only, no spares, no maint. manuals) was about $65 million in 2009, per `09 budget submission. I believe they had to renegotiate contract with Rolls for engines last year because the cost of “power-by-the-hour” was not coming out well for Rolls due to heavy wear and tear, early overhauls."

IS THE OSPREY WORTH IT?

It is appropriate to consider the Osprey's capabilities and limitations versus its cost and recent performance. To do so in a meaningful way requires assessments made with proper context and fair comparisons.

Framing The Discussion

In the procurement of military equipment, there is always the unanswerable question of what is the best possible set of tools for the job--because nobody can predict with certainty what the next job is, how well the planned tools will work, or even how much they'll end up costing (or whether the budgets with which they are supposed to be bought will change). Our enormous military procurement machine, including the Congress, is supposed to find the best answer to this question, but it will always be terribly imperfect. Of course it is acceptable and necessary that those who are paying for all of this ask hard questions.

In these sorts of discussions, meaningful assessments can only come from fair comparisons in which capabilities and limitations are considered collectively and in context. For example, if I write that the new $70M aircraft X, during its initial deployment from the US to Kerblochistan, stranded an aircraft for four days at an intermediate point, some might understandably think, "My goodness, we paid $70M for an aircraft that doesn't work!" But to make a fair assessment, I would then put the information in context: many transcontinental deployments of military aircraft--including even mechanically simple tactical jets--involve unplanned multi-day maintenance delays. Then I should further explain that the comparable movement of the older aircraft that aircraft X is replacing either would require 300% more time to execute the same movement, or that they could not do it all without the involvement of additional strategic lift aircraft. Finally I could add that aircraft X has been repeatedly flown from coast to coast (in the US) in one cycle of daylight, a mission that takes conventional helos 3-5 days. At this point the maintenance delay--which was, to be sure, an accurate fact--can be more fairly evaluated and compared to aircraft X alternatives.

It is possible to take ANY DoD program and poke so many holes in it that its existence sounds ludicrous to the average citizen, if context and fair comparisons aren't provided. Any one of us could write an article about, say, the M-1A1/2 Abrams or the F-14 Tomcat, that would make these defense items seem like blatant taxpayer wastes at early points in their life cycles, even though they are/were eventually considered good pieces of equipment in their day. This does not mean that one should brush aside all criticisms of current systems; it means that capabilities and limitations must be considered in context and with reasonable comparisons.

As new technologies emerge, the change from old to new always requires trade-offs and support system changes. Remember when people didn't trust cell phones because they depended on a battery and a mostly invisible network? Today many people don't even have a 'wire-line' phone in their house; they accepted the limitation (battery and wireless network dependence) for the greatly enhanced capability (connectivity almost anywhere). Same thing probably happened when automobiles became available--some people pointed to all the problems with the car and all the things a horse could do better, and all of those facts were true (but only decisive if considered without context). Cars DO have all sorts of limitations: they generally need roads, gas stations, expensive maintenance, etc. But at the end of the day most of us decided that the capability trade-offs are worth it, and bought a Toyota to get to work instead of a draft horse. And along the way governments and corporations had to made infrastructure and procedure changes to support the automobile. And, it is still true today that there are certain scenarios and missions in which a horse is clearly superior to a car. This is very often the case in discussions about the tilt-rotor technology and the Osprey: writers point out factually correct (sometimes) limitations or the induced requirement for new procedures/equipment, but without context these points don't provide a good basis for making an overall assessment of the Osprey's viability because they often minimize the Osprey's immensely improved capability in the majority of common mission scenarios.

Limitations, Capabilities, and Comparisons

With these points regarding context, comparisons, and trade-offs in mind, let's consider some Osprey limitations. There ARE things the Osprey cannot do as well as a conventional helicopter. As mentioned by an astute writer earlier in this discussion, an airplane-helo hybrid will never be as good a helo as a 'pure' helo (the effect of engineering compromise)--and the V-22 is no exception to this compromise. A V-22 probably won't hover with one wheel on the top of a building or mountain ridge, it won't land in a 25' wide alley in Mogadishu, and it does take up more space on a ship than the old CH-46 with the same size cabin (although much greater lift). It can fast rope personnel, but it does so from higher hover altitudes and has greater downwash compared to conventional helos that have lower weight / rotor diameter ratios. For similar aerodynamic reasons, it is not as effective at high altitude as a CH-47, although its overall high engine power give it plenty of capability and much more than the CH-46 (and its easy aerial refueling capability could extend its high-altitude range/LZ envelope in Afghanistan). It is possible for a V-22 to set fire to grass/bushes in a landing zone--although this is only in very specific and generally preventable circumstances, I have landed in grass and near bushes hundreds of times with no fires. The aircraft is made mostly out of carbon fiber composite, which is more expensive than aluminum and fiberglass (but it can be repaired by troops in the squadron, unless the damage is severe). The V-22 is expensive, around three times the cost of a medium lift helicopter. These are actual issues and limitations; many other supposed oft-cited problems are either inaccurate or insignificant, and I'll address some of them next.

The old "it doesn't auto-rotate" argument is irrelevant for several reasons. First, the concept of autorotation capability, especially when applied to heavy dual/triple-engine military aircraft, is frequently misunderstood. There is always a Viet Nam pilot (bless you guys!) somewhere with stories of autorotating a shot-up helo into an opening in the trees, but the reality is that across decades of military helo flying there are very few instances of all-engine failures, and very, very, very few verifiable instances of successful, survivable autorotations. If one is lucky enough to be flying high and fast enough when both engines quit, a top-notch helo pilot might get really lucky to survive the controlled crash. Second, the vast majority of Osprey mission flight time is conducted in "airplane mode", in which it is possible to "glide" to a landing (admittedly not very far, but in controlled flight at least). In the final phases of a normal landing the Osprey is converted to "helo mode", but this occurs at an altitude/airpseed combination in which an autorotation would be nearly impossible in ANY rotorcraft; in most helos an all-engine failure in the landing phase would not be survivable. Lastly, most Osprey pilots have practiced auto-rotations in the flight simulator, it has just never been tested in the aircraft (yes, it would be too dangerous). Bottom line: ask any pilot who has flown both helos and Ospreys in which machine they feel safer, given all the capabilities and limitations--they will all tell you: 'give me the V-22.'

The Osprey IS shipboard compatible, but it does require adjustments in shipboard operating procedures and equipment as compared to the CH-46 (again, think car/horse and cell phone technology analogy: does the fact that we have to change procedures/infrastructure mean the new technology is a failure? Yes? Then give up your cell phone). Assertions that VMM-266 did not deploy on board ship last year due to incompatibilities or problems are simply false (I joined that squadron around that time). It is, to be fair, more complicated to manage all the aircraft in the afloat Aviation Combat Element (ACE) when V-22s are included. Deck heating on the smaller ships is currently a concern, although engineering fixes will address this. It is more challenging to do maintenance on the Osprey aboard ship compared to other naval aircraft, but it is far from impossible. The downwash on shipboard landings is significant, but simple procedures mitigate safety concerns. Should we give up the V-22 capability because it is harder to work with in some ways? Ask the a Commander and a ship-embarked Marine unit responsible for responding to events ashore--he or she will tell you, "I want Ospreys", not "It is too hard to use on the ship." For decades we have adjusted operating procedures and solved problems to safely accommodate new aircraft; it is only in the scrutinized Osprey program where critics cite every adjustment or issue as a complete failure of the aircraft. The V-22 is more challenging than its predecessor to integrate into shipboard operations, but nothing else in the ACE provides its capabilities.

I have been involved in hundreds of on-loads and off-loads of personnel on a V-22, and nobody has been injuriously shot-peened or burned by the exhaust or downwash. Yes, personnel need to train on new equipment, and often we have to adjust our procedures (again, the horse/car analogy--we may do things a little differently as new technology emerges). Regarding the previously posted comments on slow on/off-load times for V-22 operations, I would like to see comparison data for on/offload of other aircraft versus a V-22. My squadron did dozens of on/offload drills and missions with combat-loaded troops (inlcuding Iraqis), and all went quickly after a few practices (as is done with all helos). The cabin is about the same size of the CH-46, and its on/off-load times are just as quick in my experience. If filled to volumetric capacity with loose cargo, it does take a long time to load/unload (more than a 46 because it can carry so much more weight), but this is not a tactical scenario where time is critical, nor it is not significantly different from any other aircraft. Of course an H-47 is quicker to on/off-load (wider ramp and cabin), and perhaps and H-60 is a bit faster (smaller number of troops on board). To my knowledge, on/off-load time is not a significant limitation in a fair comparison (take the same troops and test their on/off-load times on both aircraft), but I am certainly open to data that proves otherwise.

To say that on/off-load is a significant portion of mission "cycle time" assumes an ultra-short range mission. For sake of argument, let's say an Osprey takes two minutes to unload 24 troops, and for comparison two H-60s take one minute to offload 12 troops each (twice as fast). And we'll say it takes eight minutes to load the Osprey, and four minutes to load the Blackhawks (again, twice as fast). Then let's say the mission is flown from a base to an destination 120 miles away. Roughly speaking, the one Osprey will get there in 30 minutes, the Blackhawks will make it in just under an hour (please let's not quibble over exact parameters...what altitude are the V-22s flying at, what exact groundspeed do the H-60s fly at, what are the winds, etc). So if we are flying a one-wave insert, the total cycle times: 1xV-22 => 70 minutes (8+30+2+30), 2xH-60 => 115 minutes (4+55+1+55). The on/offload time does not negate the speed advantage, it isn't even close. If we are talking about a quick response mission (medevac, high-value target, reinforcement)--the response time advantage makes a huge difference, and would have to balanced against a potentially smaller exposure time in the unloading phase. There are, to be sure, scenarios where an H-60 or a UH-1Y would be a better choice (very short range, tight LZ).

Let's do one more scenario to flesh out the capacity and cycle-time comparison: move 280 troops to a zone 70 miles away, using four V-22s or four H-60s. Based on Army.mil/Wiki data and being very generous, let's say the H-60s travel at 140 kts, carry 15 troops, and have 2.2 hrs of usable fuel carrying this load (which would mean no reserve, but we'll ignore that), and take 30 minutes to refuel all four aircraft (a big FARP available). Four H-60s get it done in about 6.4 hrs, the V-22s are done in 2.5 hrs (no refuel required)--this is the combined effect of speed, endurance, and payload.

So, the V-22 does force trade-offs versus conventional medium helos in important but niche capabilities like tiny LZs and building-top landings, but these must be weighed against a major advantage in total mission lift capacity. Furthermore, trade-offs must also be assessed against the V-22's own unique capabilities: what is it worth for the capability to execute a "Desert One" mission, or to be able to launch 6 aircraft from a ship to an embassy many hundreds of miles away to evacuate 100+ US citizens? What about ferrying a high-level Iraqi sheikh from his compound in the southwestern corner of Iraq to a meeting Baghdad in time for breakfast? Or the ability to fly high above threats at high ground speeds but still be able to land in a parking lot, and transit across entire countries non-stop? Only the Osprey can do these things. There are things the Osprey can't do well or do at all, but there are also things it can do that NO other aircraft can.

Answering the Question

The relevant question, therefore, is whether the Osprey's capabilities and limitations make it, overall, significantly "better" than conventional helicopters. Based on my experience flying and managing maintenance for conventional helos and Ospreys, on my time working on defense procurement in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill (where I admit to having been skeptical of the Osprey at times), and on the examples I've outlined here, I don't think it is even a close call: in the universe of possible mission scenarios, the Osprey dramatically outperforms conventional helos in all but a few cases. For the majority of what helos do on a daily basis in training and combat, the Osprey is simply much better: it is much faster, safer, goes much farther, and is currently the best rotary-wing platform for adverse weather and brown-out landings*. It offers capabilities offered by no other aircraft, but gives up niche scenario capabilities. Every pilot who has flown an Osprey and a conventional helicopter has the same opinion: give me the V-22 any day of the week.

Finally, we must consider the money. Is it worth buying an expensive machine that can insert/extract troops at least twice as fast/far and with greater safety in 95% of mission scenarios and has some unique capabilities, or should we forego this technology and only buy cheaper conventional helos that enable operations in the 5% of scenarios where an Osprey doesn't fit? My opinion is we need Ospreys as part of a fleet that also includes conventional helicopters, to enable a full range of capabilities for potential missions. We must balance the cost against other budget requirements, but there is definitely a place for V-22--it is just a question of how many aircraft we need. Our country has a unique advantage with tilt-rotor technology, and we would be foolish not to maintain it.

[ *Why: triple laser-ring gyro INS integrated with pGPS, full flight director with approach mode, hover coupler and display with drift cues, dual digital maps: the aircraft can fly itself from high altitude, along a route, to a hover over any defined point, and then be landed in low/no visibility. It can fly instrument approached in slow helo mode to maximize chance of successful landings, and its speed and range provide the ability to attempt adverse weather operations while maintaining capability to reach alternate landing sites.]

Additional Issues:

AVAILABILITY: A good point was made by a writer in this discussion regarding aircraft availability, but some clarification is in order. The Marine Corps' current procurement plan is a one-for-one replacement of H-46/H-53D units, so there is not a "forego 2-3 helos for one V-22" trade-off in the long term. The V-22 will go to Afghanistan, it was not part of this first major Marine rotation because the V-22 squadron in the queue for deployment was sent aboard ship. The phase-in of V-22 does require the stand-down of existing squadrons, but this would have occurred regardless of whether the V-22 or another helo replaced the H-46/53Ds, to allow time for re-equipping and re-training squadrons. It is fair to assume that replacement with H-60s or another in-production aircraft would have taken less time per squadron, so I'd agree that the V-22 did "cost" some available lift in Afghanistan/Iraq versus an existing alternative aircraft, but not a difference of 3 squadrons per year for the last eight years. Again, this is a trade-off of a new technology: incorporation takes time. I believe it was worth the added delay and reduction in lift capacity, but it is an open question. On a higher level, the decision to move forward with recapitalization of the Marine fleet (including H-46, H-1, H-53E, AV-8/F-18, KC-130F/R) during prolonged combat operations was made by senior Marine and Congressional leaders with the understanding that it would be challenging, but the alternative was to delay replacement of 20-30-40 year old aircraft for undetermined number of years.

V-22 EMPLOYMENT: Much has been written about what the V-22 did or did not do in Iraq ("...the unvarnished truth is that off-field landings were avoided"), and many writers imply there was some sort of secret program to restrict the V-22 to to "easy" missions or locations. I can't say for certain what happened in the year before my squadron arrived (Oct '07- Oct '08). It is reasonable to assume that the very first combat deployment of this aircraft would have been approached with a "crawl, walk, run" philosophy--if I were a Commanding General in Iraq receiving Ospreys for their first operational deployment, I would certainly not throw them in the most difficult missions as soon as they arrived. BUT I can state this with certainty: my squadron, during OIF 08.2 (Oct 08-Apr 09) flew all the same missions and landed in all the same places that the other helicopter units did--and more. We routinely flew to the extreme southern and western borders of Iraq in the same sortie (impossible with a conventional helo because of shorter range and endurance), and we landed on dirt roads and in "unimproved" zones (a.k.a. severe brownout). We regularly flew into Baghdad, and we often flew to areas near Kuwait (non-stop). The only places we did not land were the "H-1/H-60 only" established landing zones because our aircraft, like the H-47/53D/53E, was too big for these zones--and these comprised at most 5% of the established LZs in Iraq, and probably comprised far less than 1% of actual scheduled missions. The Osprey was shot at too, probably less than other helicopters because of its altitude/speed/approach profiles. We flew in the some of the worst weather, often when no other squadrons would fly because our aircraft systems and range gave us an added safety margin. We did this with aircraft that had been deployed in the desert for 12-18 months. The aircraft was not coddled during my time in Iraq.

DISCLOSURE: We all know about the past embarrassments regarding V-22 maintenance data, but I don't think there are any intentional restrictions on data availability or media access today. I know the Marine Corps recently provided reams of data to GAO and Congress; it appears to be OMB/DoD's review process that delayed provision of data for a subcommittee hearing, causing some bloggers to cite as an example of evidence of inadequate disclosure. During my recent deployment we had reporters (and GAO personnel) visit us, I don't think there was any restriction on embedding (frankly, nobody was interested). I think there is a misimpression that the Marine Corps is trying to hide information on V-22, and I don't think that is true. If there are documented recent examples of reporters being denied access, this would change my opinion (and dishearten me).

MISHAPS & MAINT DELAYS: The "mishaps" issue raised earlier on this discussion board is a great example of the need for clear terminology to enable fair comparisons. I addressed the transcontinental flight maintenance delay issue earlier, but I should clarify my usage of 'mishap'. DoD defines mishap in classes: class A = aircraft destroyed, or loss of life/permanent disability, or >$1M of damage, and class B/C are defined by lower thresholds in the same areas. The "mishap free" term means, in generic terms, "no big crashes"--NOT that there were not instances of things not going as planned.

FLOGGING & BLOGGING: I was not aware of the "flogging" concept. It sounds feasible that it could occur, but think it is fair to ask for documentation of this sort of thing before believing that every pro-Opsrey writer is a front-man for industry bent on repressing the truth as put forth by a few brave souls exposing government deceit. My reading of various commentators on the Osprey tells me that there are a few folks who are so ferociously anti-Osprey that they filter out anything but negative information regarding the aircraft--just as there are writers whose clear motivation is to propagandize in favor of the aircraft. It is appropriate to be skeptical of writers whose stance is that an entire government program is a complete fraud if their writings contain a number of statements that simply aren't true. Some of these writers cite no sources (or cite other bloggers!) for key assertions, and it is relevant to consider their backgrounds and past actions when assessing their statements--just like it is appropriate to consider the motivation of a defense contractor's statements about his own product. The bias knife cuts both ways. I fear the day--coming soon--when we have no Washington Post or New York Times and the like, and all "news" will come from writers who have no fear of inaccurate reporting and no requirement for fact checking (in fact there was a column in the Sunday NYT about this very subject, noting that some Tech blogs knowingly post bad rumors just to increase "buzz").

Regarding my own bias, I've already explained my position and background. Though I have emphasized some of the Osprey's strengths, I know it is far from perfect: it is really expensive, perhaps not as reliable as it should be (at least right now), and there are a few scenarios where other aircraft would be preferred. It has some unique aerodynamic and flying qualities that must be respected, but I those are vastly outweighed by its capabilities in my opinion as a pilot. I recognize that some may dismiss everything I've written as a fabrication because they believe I am part of conspiracy to support an aircraft on which my life often depends. If so, I encourage the disclosure of verifiable facts to counter my statements, as they are based mostly on my personal experience. In the end, I hope the tone and content of this posting achieve the reasoned approach I sought.

I hope this has been informative. The Osprey is not going to bring about world peace or cure cancer, nor is it a perfect or cheap aircraft. But in the final analysis, it is certainly a tool worth having in our arsenal. Let future debates be based on facts.

Since Mr. Ricks has taken interest in this scandal, I will take time to refute the seemingly valid comments made by mb. I realize he hasn't the time to study the program or read all the info at G2mil, so he mostly throws out sales pitches he heard in briefings. I'm sure if he finds time to read and ponder the real info, he will change his mind. Of course he is not allowed to speak his mind, lest the Generals track him down and burn him at the stake. I'll break this into parts for ease of reading.

After all the sales talk of V-22s ability to "self-deploy" overseas, they do not. I wrote long ago that each V-22 would require a KC-130 escort to refuel it. It must carry three internal fuel tanks, so no troops. It must fly 8 hours at 18,000 feet where pilots must wear masks and don arctic clothing. If it loses an engine it may not make it. And contrary to claims, it has never demonstrated 2100nm flight with one refuel, it can't even take off at the max gross weight required for such an attempt. Then there is crew rest and aircraft wear and tear. This has been demonstrated as pilots hugged the North Atlantic coast to fly to England, where one broke down enroute, but it is not practical, which is why the 12 V-22s went to Iraq and came home as ship cargo. The CH-53E can do this too, but does not.

A common spin is that all new DoD equipment encounters problems, so just give the V-22 time. 26 years? Some ideas don't work out, read about "Tail sitter" aircraft, so they are canceled. The V-22 was canceled for this reason, but continues only because of corruption in DC, where Generals get kickbacks upon retirement and Congressmen spend most time soliciting bribes (called contributions)FYI, the F-14 had problems because it went from first flight to combat duty within 3 years.

Yes, the V-22 has many new electronic gadgets that are wonderful, but the same systems exist on modern helicopters. In fact, the V-22 is a decade behind in design technology compared to the latest helos.

As for autorotation, the Marine Corps made that a requirement, but was only dropped when the V-22 failed to demonstrate it. The FAA requires it for helos, which is why it refused to certify the V-22 for commerical development. This is why Boeing isn't trying to sell the V-22 to commerical carriers, it is unsafe.

Where are the foreign buyers for the great V-22? The Army and Coast Guard have studied and rejected it, as has the Navy, despite claims by the program office. The V-22 is such a flop that Boeing didn't even enter it in the recent USAF CSAR competition, which was won by the HH-47 since that is much safer, can carry twice as much, has three heavy machine guns, has far less downwash, and has MORE range. The Air Force spec ops people are stuck with an old order for 50 CV-22s, which may be useful in some missions where a small payload is moved long distances.

Why wasn't the V-22 considered for the new Presidential helo, the Marine pilots at HMX-1 said it was not safe, which led to the formation of VMX-22 so the tiltrotor people could confirm their own tests. There is more on this in a Marine Corps funded study posted at G2mil.

Also, the V-22 has the dangerous side-by-side rotor design, which can lead to VRS or rotor or gearbox damage which can flip over a V-22 in an instant. This has been avoided by keeping V-22s 250 feet apart and prohibiting combat maneuvering. They tried flying helo type combat maneuvers during testing. No. 10 almost broke apart and suffered so much damaged that it was retired.

More later

Hiding problems?

Yes, the Marine Corps has refused to provide key unclassified data to the GAO. As a result, it was called before a congressional committee, and it refused to provide it. The excuse is that DOD must approve any info Congress requests, which is simply not true.

There are Marine Generals at DoD who can help kill scandals. The committee planned to hold hearings again last Thursday, but that was scrubbed with no explanation. Marine Major Dent at HQMC told Colin Clark at DoD buzz that he would provide the info, but no go. The Corps can simply put the data on its website to silence the critics.

Last week, General Conway held a news conference to assure everyone that the V-22 did not have mission capable problems, but then he refused to say what rates have been reported. It seems that this scandal was about to break open, but the Bell-Boeing lobby crushed it.

It would be embarrassing to admit there are 27 broke down V-22s hidden at New River where they are officially in "preservation" status. Preserved for what? Too bad a film crew can't visit the hangar at New River behind ops where the C-12s are parked to report on the 27 scrapped V-22s hidden there, plus two dozen more hidden at Amarillo. A Marine may be kicked out for losing his rifle, but the Generals "lost" four dozen V-22s worth $4 billion and nothing happens.

Tiltrotor technology is not "new". It seems like a nifty idea and has been studied for decades with a dozen test aircraft. In the end, they are so heavy and complex the payload is near zero. The V-22 has only half the range and payload promised. When you see V-22 specs on websites, those are the old program goals. America's leading rotorcraft expert, Dr. J. Gordon Leishman, has denounced the V-22 as a horrible design, but the press didn't seem to notice. The DoD's top independent rotorcraft expert at IDA, Rex Rivilo, reported the V-22 is unsafe in 2003, but no one cared.

Mb's misleading comparison

The common V-22 tactic is to only compare it to "the aircraft it is replacing," the 40-year CH-46E, which is half its size, with one-sixth its engine power. Mb used a different spin in his comparison, comparing the V-22 with the H-60, which is one-third its size.

A March 2006 USAF report http://www.g2mil.com/scandal.htm
compared the V-22 to the Corps's 25-year old CH-53E, which is slightly smaller than the V-22. It concluded that old helo can move much more per day than a V-22 since it can carry twice as much. Perhaps Mb would like to do a lift comparison with the new CH-53K that will enter the fleet in 2015. That is the same size of the V-22 but can carry five times more! It is wider than the Echo so it can carry two Hummers, whilst the V-22 can't even carry one old WWII jeep.

Another myth is that Mb spun the V-22 can carry 24 combat equipped troops. If he is a V-22 pilot, he will admit that he never carried that many. Recall that 10 people can fit in phone booth too. The GAO concluded only 15-18 would fit. To pass opeval, they selected 24 small Marines and jammed them inside with no combat equipment (e.g. backpacks. Knees interlock so no one can move about. Nevertheless, the Corps is now "trying" to install a complex million dollar belly gun that will require the removal of four seats.

The V-22's cabin is 25% smaller than the CH-46E, but a friend of mine said that in all his years as a pilot the most they ever jammed in the back of a CH-46E is 18 combat troops. A few years ago, the CH-46E was safety restricted to half its original payload for age reasons, but also to make the V-22 look better.

I wrote about this in an article several years ago, noting the specs show the the V-22s cabin is four feet shorter, six inches narrower, and six inches lower than the CH-46E. They promptly changed the specs on all V-22 websites to match the CH-46E. A couple years ago, a new V-22 pilot Captain Sarno told me that was an absurd claim. I suggested that he measure the V-22 himself. He did, and apologized.

Finally, the V-22 demonstrated a cruise speed of only 220-240 knots during OPEVAL in 2005, but has gained a couple thousand pounds of empty weight, so 210 knots is a good estimate now, compared to the goal of 300 knots and the minimum KPP requirement of 275 knots that somehow disappeared. Still much better than a helo of around 150 knots. However, the most dangerous area is the LZ where 91% of helos in Vietnam were downed, and a V-22 cannot land faster than a helo vertically as it must land straight and slow to avoid flipping over.

All this and much more is at G2mil.com for those interested. The basic problem is that the Corps' political machine "committed" to the V-22 decades ago, and since they never fail, they will get the V-22 fully fielded, even if far superior alternatives are available. One thing that shocks civilians is that telling lies is not only tolerated among today's career military officers, it is expected. I don't mean to attack on demean mb as I realize he is just sharing what he has been told and that every pilot loves his own aircraft.

Here are the alternatives. http://www.g2mil.com/V-22retirement.htm

The V-22 first flew in 1989 and went into production in 1999. Over 140 have been built, 50 have been scrapped. They have a good idea of how it works, which is why they are hiding reports from Congress and the GAO.

You hit the nail on the head. Those involved in testing and evaluating DoD programs have their careers tied to them. If the V-22 is canceled, all V-22 pilots will be unfairly tarnished as losers.

...that's been interesting, civil and...nobody's yet been banned!

Amazing. Of all the gin joints in all the world, it could only happen at Ricks Place, I guess...

Speaking of alternatives, it occurs to me that rocket equipped C-130 they threw together in three weeks for the Iran Hostage rescue mission was a better idea than a tilt-rotor. Think about it; all those billions spent on that turkey...I mean, Osprey. There is not much that can go wrong with JATO bottles. A C-130 that can drop into a soccer stadium and blast off vertically would be a "good piece of kit" for the Marines. If you watch the video of the credible sport mishap you can see it managed to crash and not kill the crew, which brings to mind the old saying about any good landing. It would have worked and still would. Consider just for starters engine nacelles that tilt 90 degrees, computer assisted fly by wire, composites, titanium tubing, propellers that perform poorly as rotors and vice versa. Now consider solid fuel rockets with no moving parts, no vortex ring state or altitude problems, no FOD, and a plane that can fly at high altitude to distant lands and back- normal ops. Yes, a C-130 can land on an aircraft carrier but it really does not need to. Credible Sport would definiteley start brush fires but the one hundred fully equipped marines with fire extinguishers that run down the ramp in triple file might be able to deal with it. Credible sport cannot hover but it could dive into an LZ pulling G's and climb out like....a rocket. It might even make it with a couple engines shot out. Sound incredible? Rocket science is amazing stuff and has been around longer than tilt rotors. I submit 30 years and 30 billion dollars of development of credible sport would have given the Corps the sure ability to air assault with thousands of Marines from thousands of miles away instead of the criminally poor results we are discussing in this thread.

The C-130 landing TO trials shown here are not JATO.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfwJJD5jGXk

The narration track says that the sink rate (wing/gear stress) was about half the tolerance, but nowhere near naval aviation standards. The carrier stuff starts at 2:30

I do recall seeing a JATO Herc lifting off a football pitch, where it had landed.

Kids, don't try that at home.

In terms of V-22 alternatives, the C-27J transport and the current CH47 and CH53 models are what the Army is using to do the same jobs (bigger loads and Af-Pak altitudes), and integrating much of the avionics advancements too.

In defense of V-22 cost growth, the Comanche armed scout helo was up to $60M/ea when it was deemed obsolescent and cancelled pre-purchase.