The new issue of the Air Force's Strategic
Studies Quarterly contains an unfortunate article on
Iranian support for Iraqi Shiite militias. I turned to it eagerly, because this
is a subject that interests me, in part because I think the Iranian effort in
Iraq has been a model of a high-impact, low-profile training and advisory mission.
I've been kind of stewing about it ever since I was in a convoy near Najaf in
2004 that I now believe was tracked and attacked by Iranian special operators.
One soldier died and another was wounded.
But as I read, it pretty quickly
became apparent to me that the author had nothing to say. Even so, I slogged
on, and finally I got to this breathtaking conclusion:
There
are no easy choices, and the road ahead is perilous and uncertain. However, in
this high-stakes security environment, America cannot afford to get this wrong
and must pursue a thoughtful, purposeful policy guided by theory, history and
pragmatic common sense."
Stop the presses! I think that
paragraph-or rather, that car crash of clichés -- could apply to just about any
foreign policy question any nation at war ever has faced. I mean, when is the
road ahead ever safe and certain? And can you imagine calling for a
thoughtless strategy unguided by history? (I know, I know -- we already tried
that in Iraq in 2003.)
As a taxpayer, I'd like my money
back. And I sentence this writer to a remedial reading of George Orwell's great
essay on "Politics
and the English Language," which makes the point that slovenly language
leads to foolish thinking.
By the way, H. John Poole has written several books, like Tactics of the Crescent Moon and Militant Tricks that deal with, amongst other things, (possible) Iranian involvement in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan.
It's not his fault. All of us Tufts graduates end up with a very good grasp of generalities and a very bad grasp of specifics.
But what's so bad about it? It's a classic IR article and for the most part a fairly readable rewrite of Nasr (presumably one of his professors while he was at Fletcher), Byman, et al.
I presume Tom takes umbrage at IR theory focus, but that is to be expected from Strategic Studies Quarterly. So, rather than simply focus on the linguistic snafus, why don't we actually critique Forrest's argument? I'm sure it'll be far more useful for us and him.
Forrest's thesis -
"Increased levels of Iranian support are primarily caused by Iran’s perception of the balance of power in the region and the perceived threat to its own security."
- sounds like a decent violation of the need for non-triviality (aka "duh") that professors hammer into their students in Intro to IR classes. But the point of much of IR theory - especially realism [that's a stretch - ed.] - is to state lay out the seemingly obvious in order to establish an easily understood playing field. Tom Ricks probably isn't the target audience of this article.
That being said, there really is a lack of new data, e.g. on page 12 Forrest claims that "one can see that aggregate Iranian support levels are subject to degrees of variance" by looking at a little graph he drew - except that he just made that graph up and doesn't base it upon any quantitative modelling (or much qualitative evidence, come to think of it). I suppose that modelling is unnecessary since the chart simply says "back off and Iran will decrease its level of aggression". Which, surely, can't be stated often enough in conservative circles such as the military?
What did leave me scratching my head until towards the end was "what does all this have to do with the Air Force?" Ah, but then the moment of truth: backing off is all fair and good, but Forrest sneaks in coercive bargaining theory to justify bombing IRGC and Quds Force facilities in order to, apparently, de-escalate the situation. I think that's where the problem with the article lies. I don't care how he makes it sound on paper: air strikes in Iran will be far more escalatory than increasing diplomatic links with Iran will ever be de-escalatory. And that, to me, is also a "duh".
Anyone here got the time to write up a quick neo-liberal counterargument to Forrest? Maybe throw in some Institutionalism?
PS: The article also lacks parsimony: there's far too much detail that people in his profession should be clearly aware of by now, e.g. the difference between Sunni and Shi'a.
PPS: H. John Poole's books are based on conjecture, rather than hard evidence (there's also one on China being best buddies with AQ). Amusing and sometimes thought-provoking reads, but hardly accurate sources. He's much better on infantry tactics, although I wonder if this book was written specifically for him.
Some papers just have really bad parts. In this case it's the ending [and some bits at the beginning and in the middle - ed.]. The SSQ reviewers probably failed to give Forrest adequate feedback. Maybe he had to finish it before catching a plan to Kuwait, I don't know. But I'm sure that, as a Fletcherite, Major Forrest has the character to kick himself for that howler of a conclusion and laugh at the same time. Inshallah, he'll find this thread and post his own response.
But I think you can safely ignore the vapid paragraph and focus on what seems to me to be the real bummer - one that reinforces my own misgivings about the air force's priorities: Forrest seems to believe that air strikes against Iran are a viable option to defuse tensions. And not even because of Iran's nuclear weapons programme, but because of its meddling in Iraq. That, to me, is the real failure of the paper, although I'd love to be corrected if I either misinterpreted him or someone believes he's right.
@ Toby Bonthrone: I agree that Poole's forte is primarily infantry tactics. Nevertheless I find his chapters on "foreign policy-related matters" worthwhile, although a bit speculative. Dragon Days deals with the Sino-Islamic connection. Poole uses quotes from the Washington Times and the Christian Science Monitor to show that there's indeed a link between China and AQ (pp.125-126). Whether these sources are accurate or not, everybody should decide for themselves.
I haven’t read Porter’s book, but after browsing through the product description I sincerely doubt that it was written with H. John Poole in mind. Rather than condescendingly portraying him as an “Oriental warfare fetishist”, as you do by implication, I prefer calling him an advocate of common sense infantry tactics. And an expert on the subject. “Eastern warfare”, for the greater part, is based on common sense. Poole learned this the hard way in Vietnam.
Street smarts, instead of highbrow baloney.
I wouldn't get too excited about pointless USAF writings. Often guys do it because it's required for classes (e.g., PME, night school) or they're trying to impress their O-6s & above. I'm a retired USAF officer who works for DOD. I'm also a life member of USNI because I enjoy reading PROCEEDINGS. My very first USAF boss, a B-52 radar navigator, introduced it to me in the early 1980s. He said it was the best military periodical he'd read.
"When one watches some tired hack on the platform mechanically repeating the familiar phrases one often has a curious feeling that one is not watching a live human being but some kind of dummy." George Orwell
A speech from Mr. Cheney will now be forever placed in my mind equal to that of speak from Howdy Doodee, those who worked on Cheney's behalf to create and manage the gulags in his torturers' archipelago from Abu Ghraib to Gitmo and those who speak in terms like "enhanced interrogation techniques" when torture, rape and sodomy would be more appropriate.
My question then becomes if Cheney and his like is the dummy, where sits the Goebbels and the Buffalo Bob?
Tom, like the use of "vapid" also. Good antacid.
Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.
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