I watched (and you did also, Tom) as Rumsfeld and his direct assistants worked to find flag officers who were in synch with his efforts at transformation. This seemed a noble cause (all 3 major Services are pretty hidebound and - in 2001 - had an acquisition pipeline filled with Cold War iron) and did ID some pretty good guys (a unisex word).

But two things happened that turned the effort to mush. One was Iraq - it swamped everything and transformation became a thing of meetings, briefings, and buzzwords rather than sustained effort to truly transform. The other was a subtle shift in the desired characteristics of those moved forward, from seeking innovators to identifying sycophants. Thus Myers persisting. Thus Peter Pace. Etc.

One knew the game was over when Rumsfeld faced the POM choice between Cold-War continuance or a new direction. He picked both. Unsustainable. Vastly unsustainable under wartime spending. For all his bullying habits and bluster, he had tiny cahones.

The thing about Rumsfeld's micro-management was its promiscuous use during the early months of the Afghan war and with regard to Iraq during the 2002-04 period. Arguably in the first instance, and inarguably in the second, Rumsfeld used his position to substitute his judgement for that of service commanders in areas where the service commanders really knew what they were doing.

There is a difference between contradicting the uniformed services about what weapons systems we might need ten years from now and mucking up a combat deployment by forcing combatant commanders to justify the need for individual units. Gates has done the former kind of thing far more often than Rumsfeld did -- though Rumsfeld talked a great deal about transforming the military -- and in the event he happens to be wrong there are checks in the system able to keep an error in judgement from becoming an error in policy.

Rumsfeld's mistakes, by contrast, were not recoverable. We couldn't recover from not having enough troops in Iraq in the spring of 2003 by sending more six months or a year later. Nor, for that matter, could the postwar planning that Rumsfeld helped impede before the invasion get done adequately after civil authority in Iraq had collapsed. Rumsfeld, who had once thought about becoming a Presidential candidate and ended up having vast authority delegated to him by the weak President he served, was the last word in these areas and got the big decisions wrong.

Take a look at the career arcs of the two men. Rummy is a champion wrestler in college. It's a tough sport to be sure, but a solo effort, decided in a few grueling minutes. He then volunteers for Navy jets; dangerous, physical work in that era, but not a leadership billet.

Gates studies history and edits the college literary review, a team effort. He's noted as the undergraduate who "has made the greatest contribution to his fellow man." He excels in a stable academic path thru sino-soviet studies and graduate school at GWU. Recruited by CIA, he's conscripted into a service hitch as an ICBM intel/briefing officer. He then rises thru to the top at CIA in under 20 years, including two stints at NSC. It's a path of development and leadership, within a premier organization, during historic challenges and changes.

While young Gates is detached to Jerry Ford's NSC, Rummy and Cheney are pursuing a pinball path thru Nixon and Ford's unsettled executive branch. Self-selecting for advancement, they play the players and game the weaknesses of the system. It's hard to imagine anyone trusting an infighting Nixon confidante like Rummy with the CIA directorship. Gates' CIA career on the other hand was tarred by the Reagan-Bush WH excesses of secret/illegal Iran arms and Nicaragua wars.

In 2001, Rummy is pulled onto the inexperienced W's team, a coup for Cheney's takeover of the national security brief. Gates is pushed past Cheney by Baker and the wise men of the 2006 Iraq Study Group, to salvage the wars and prevent new ones after the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld team has screwed the pooch.

Gates was a player who studies, earns trust, learns the game in depth, starting and ending with public service choices. Rummy was a gamer that played. He learned the holds and takedowns, but never stayed long on one team or position. After years of 'heckuva job, Rummy' victories over the Pentagon press corp, the leaders of his own party were calling him the worst SecDef ever.

It's really quite a contrast.

Tom Ricks wrote in the Washington Post to abolish all Academies and War Colleges but still has not told which if any of the Academies or War Colleges he has actually visited so that readers and listeners would know if Ricks had any valid knowledge of what he is talking about. That is, Ricks popped-off with "Lets kill Annapolis et al" with no personal knowledge of the life, culture, ethos of each of the Academies.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/16/AR2009041603483.html

The article by Tom Ricks in this case is irresponsible and sloppy and Ricks owes cadets, midshipmen, families, NOK, grads, prospects and his readers an apology for his weak journalism. His topic, Accountability and Transparency, is excellent -- Grads more or as much as any others urge Accountability and Transparency of their Academies -- and War Colleges -- and I have written so; but his actual article is so failed as to warrant some decent apology especially for injury to those who cannot hit back: families and NOK and the dead and prospects for academies affected by the sloppy article.

By way of introduction, my West Point class is 1966. I chaired construction of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in DC and worked with vets for decades building the Korean War Veterans Memorial, the Women's statue at the Wall, the Women in Military Service Memorial in DC and Memorials in many states. Right now I work to help the project for the WW II Women Pilots (WASPs) be awarded a Congressional Gold Medal, as were the Tuskegee Airmen. That legislation has just passed the Senate. For President Reagan I planned and directed the Vietnam Veterans Leadership Program in 47 states. Some of the programs continue to this day, on their own funding. The VVLP mission is to link vets up with each other to find jobs and to break the false stereotype of vets as folks to feel sorry for, to pity, to treat as victims; instead to recognize vets as Strong Warfighters and Strong Citizens. Many VVLP guys and gals now work this mission for Iraq and Afghanistan vets.

Here is why Tom Ricks owes an apology. First, he seems not even to know that USCGA and USMMA exist. But his piece would abolish them. What an insult to USCGA and USMMA -- to say abolish them and not mention them. Second, Ricks does not say where on the web his cost data can be obtained and examined. Third, he in fact has not visited all the Academies and War Colleges he would shut, in a way to learn their ethos and culture and effectiveness of teaching, but by his tone of (false) knowledge, readers would think he has some close knowledge of the schools; West Point reports that Ricks has visited briefly, but not to learn anything at West Point of depth about the life and values of cadets and West Point and of West Point grads.

Fourth, Ricks omits mention that Washington and Jefferson long ago had sharp discussions about the need for West Point, and Washington strongly wanted the Academy. Jefferson opposed until right after he became President and saw the light, so to speak. He set up West Point (and so all Academies) (except USCGA) to draw youngsters from all walks of life -- the very poor especially -- proportionately from all over America through Congressional appointment. The Academies Reflect America thanks to Jefferson's Genius and Washington's Leadership.

Ricks seems not to know that the founders were clear on the need for a National Military Academy and he does not re-examine their arguments. USCGA brings in applicants by examination only, not by appointment from Congress proportionally nationwide. USCGA still succeeds in reflecting all of America and in fact has a slightly higher proportion of women admitted than the other four academies.

Fifth, Ricks does a thing that shows complete unfamiliarity with the heartbeat and life of the Academies: he tries to separate the Graduates from their Academies by saying the Grads are "crackerjack" but the schools are "community colleges" -- meant to mean, "second or third rate." So he insults Community Colleges too :) Most Academy grads strive to embody the values of their Academy in their lives. Ricks, unaware of this, shows a kind of insulting ignorance.

Sixth, Ricks in his article holds up ROTC as a paradigm without noting that no O-10 in active service has faced Peer War -- WW II kind of like war -- meaning that in 2009 the military does not know if ROTC programs steel grads adequately for Peer War. Meanwhile, Academies are proved in steeling grads for Peer War. He does not address the known un-evenness and disparities and inadequacies reported on many ROTC programs nationwide. He shows ignorance of his subject matter, in short. He goes on to say that Academy grads are too expensive therefore, but with no foundation of fact and analysis. Some or many or all ROTC programs may in fact be significantly underfunded.

Seventh, Ricks in his piece uses some alleged hearsay about some commanders who prefer non-West Pointers, he says. That is fine -- West Point is not perfect and not nearly perfect :) But anecdotal hearsay proves nothing. An editor of merit would have deleted, and pressed for real substantiation.

Eighth, Ricks omits to say that more than any other Americans, many Academy grads believe that their Academies have to earn their keep anew in each generation. I have written this myself. It is a reason that I participated in and supported the work of author Rick Atkinson in his writing the book, "The Long Gray Line" about West Point and the class of 1966. I told Rick, "We owe an accounting, to say to Americans, this is what you gave to us, and this is our Report." The book shows my own foibles, blunders and errors :) The point is, Accountabilty and Transparency :)

Ninth, Ricks omits mention of women and the gateway that the Academies provide to women for contributing to the defense and life of our Country. In 2005 the 10,000th woman graduated from the Five Federal Academies (I did the research); America is now on the way to 15,000 women grads of the Academies. This is a powerful and culturally and militarily important cohort. Ricks seems oblivious to this aspect, the aspect of bringing women so quickly and fully into mainstream Military and (as vets) Community Leadership. This exhibits again the genius of Washington and Jefferson. They made this possible.

Tenth, the piece Ricks wrote is so journalistically irresponsible that it unforgivably wounded folks who Can't Fight Back. That is, he rattled the morale and feelings of parents of prospective cadets and midshipmen and the prospects themselves, and many cadets and midshipmen, and widows and NOK of Academy grads killed in battle, and he insulted the brave dead from Academies. Hal Moore USMA 1945 of "We Were Soldiers" is an overpriced product of a third-rate college? Some would disagree. His steel in saving his battalion is seen by many as Proof of West Point's Value as Founded by Presidents Washington and Jefferson. Paul W. "Buddy" Bucha USMA 1965 is an overpriced grad of a third rate school? Congress and the President probably thought otherwise in citing Buddy for the Medal of Honor for saving the 89 men in his surrounded and cut-off Company in the 101st Abn. My dad John Wheeler USMA Jan 1943 at Normandy and the Ardennes and the Bridge at Remagen and the Liberation of the Nordhausen Death Camps was the overpriced grad of a third rate school? Ricks can go to Arlington and speak that at my Dad's grave :)

Eleventh, Ricks rabbit-punches Dave Petraeus USMA 1974. He insults him. He calls Dave's school third rate but says Dave somehow got into Princeton for graduate school. Dave had been kind and gracious to Ricks. Ricks is rather insulting to the Commanding General who trusts him. He does owe an apology for that. Ricks ignores that Dave himself by his life and work strives to embody West Point.

Twelfth, Ricks clings to an unmanly quality of Never Own up to an Error. There are better men and women at the Washington Post than that. Dave Broder, for example. Ann Scott Tyson, for example. Henry Allen, for example. Don Graham, for example. Ricks instead has done the unmanly thing of hiding behind a few editors at the Post who hew to the "Never Apologize, Never Explain" doctrine that infects some Journalists. The ombudsman of the Post says he only does news, not opinion pieces. Ricks' editor at the Outlook Section has never explained why he let the journalistically weak piece get published in a Fine Newspaper. The Editorial Page editor still does not "get" the flaws of the Ricks writing. The topic -- Accountability for the Academies -- is superb and timely. The actual article is journalistically unprofessional and failed.

Ricks instead drifts along at stall-speed, so to speak, in denial -- unattractive in anyone but especially a journalist and author. Instead Ricks this week points out that the West Point class of 1976 with Raymond Odierno, Dave Rodriguez, and Stanley McChrystal had the travail of an Honor scandal -- a periodic event at USMA; but without mention that at West Point Honor is Real and the human condition means that humans fall short. The point is, West Point stands for and hews faithfully to Honor. And to Accountabilty and Transparency.

The Washington Post and Tom Ricks want the Military and the Academies to be Transparent and Accountable. But in this egregious case of awful journalism the Washington Post and Tom Ricks do not hold themselves to anything close to that Noble Standard.

The Editorial Page Editor and Outlook Editor of the Post and Ricks can Man-Up and apologize, at least to the young and innocent and good folks they wounded.

John Wheeler
USMA 66
wheelerusa@usa.net