Time to amend FM 3-24?

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Wednesday, May 6, 2009 - 3:44 PM Share

The counterinsurgency manual issued in December 2006 was good as far as it went, but with the passage of more than two years we are seeing reports from the field that amount to calls for deviations from it. I noticed a couple in an article by Maj. Thomas Sills in the new issue of the Army's Military Review, which isn't as good as it was a couple of years ago, when it was essential, but still manages to bring it occasionally.

Sills notes that the manual advocates issuing identification cards. But the unit he was in didn't do this, for common-sensical reasons having to do with the overall priority of protecting the population. He notes that, "the local population residents needed false ID cards without Sunni-sounding names to avoid being harmed at National Police checkpoints or being targeted for kidnapping by Shi'a extremists."

Also, he found a problem with FM 3-24's recommendation to place local police in the lead, because of deep and warranted local distrust of those police.

Both points made me think the manual probably needs a section on the sensitive issue of how to protect the people from your local allies. From what I have heard, this is also part of the problem in Afghanistan, where police corruption is so extreme as to be punitive. Do you read me, Centcom?

EXPLORE:INTELLIGENCE, IRAQ, MILITARY

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TYRTAIOS

7:00 PM ET

May 6, 2009

All field manuals need to be

All field manuals need to be updated, rewritten, or thrown-out periodically. However, is it really necessary, everytime a command experiences something unique in their area of operation where deviation from the norm or common sense dictates an alternate course of action should be followed, require that "the manual" needs revision?

Why not publish bulletins in CD format on lessons learned that dissiminates knowledge that's been gained through a particular unique operational experience?

I don't see anything unusual on the example given, unless FM 3-24 has a disclaimer that says everything contained is locked in stone, and commanders are prevented from showing common sense in special circumstances, unless of course it's a shared common trend?

NIEL SMITH

10:31 PM ET

May 6, 2009

RTFM!

Have John Nagl reach out of his palatial office and whack you over the head. :)

From the good book, page 1-28

If a Tactic Works this Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works in this Province, It Might Not Work in the Next

1-155. Competent insurgents are adaptive. They are often part of a widespread network that communicates constantly and instantly. Insurgents quickly adjust to successful COIN practices and rapidly disseminate information throughout the insurgency. Indeed, the more effective a COIN tactic is, the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it. Effective leaders at all levels avoid complacency and are at least as adaptive as their enemies. There is no “silver bullet” set of COIN procedures. Constantly developing new practices is essential.

Doctrine is a guide, not a suicide pact.

TYRTAIOS

11:33 PM ET

May 6, 2009

Imagine that! Who'd of thunk

Imagine that! Who'd of thunk it - doctrine only a guide?

Considering how long it took everyone to get around to "reinventing" the wheel on counter-insurgency like it was something new, though possibly mysterious to that five sided building in Arlington. : - }

TOM RICKS

1:44 PM ET

May 7, 2009

update

I hear from COIN Central at Leavenworth that they do indeed plan to update the COIN manual over the next coupla years.

ACCIDENTALBLOGGER

3:10 PM ET

May 9, 2009

What was added when they

What was added when they rolled out 3-24-2, just the stability ops piece?