Wednesday, May 6, 2009 - 3:53 PM

The academy didn't teach me squat about contemporary warfare, this pilot complains in his blog:
At no point in my career so far has the Air Force prepared me to fight and win the nation's wars at the operational or strategic levels; instead, it has trained me over and over to fight Desert Storm. The numerous PME courses I've taken are all built on the same canon: a cursory introduction to Jomini and Clausewitz, overviews of historical airpower theories, then discussions of how airpower was used and misused in World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. The saga culminates with John Warden and his strategic airpower theory which was successfully employed in Desert Storm. This is the holy grail of airpower. Airpower post-Desert Storm is treated only briefly."
I actually know this pilot, and he is a smart guy. My thought: the Air Force Academy has the rep of being a faith-based institution, so perhaps this isn't surprising.
Interestingly, this pilot goes on to credit his wife and the Small Wars Journal and like outlets for providing him the education in warfare that he needed:
It's embarrassing that a captain in the United States Air Force has to turn to the Army for an education about war, but that is exactly the situation I've found myself in. While the Air Force was sitting out the FM 3-24 development process, I was on Small Wars Journal every morning and working through reading lists by top Army thinkers."
He thinks that the Air Force Academy probably should remain open, but certainly not because it passes on the Air Force culture, which he condemns:
. . . I believe the service culture -- both within USAFA and the Air Force at large -- is a liability, not an asset. USAFA and the Air Force PME schools may not need to be closed, but they need to be reformed."
Responsible opposing viewpoints? Also, is the F-16 really an impressive platform anymore?
I learned very little about fighting wars during my time as a cadet at the AFA (1998-2002). We had one, maybe two classes on Air Power doctrine, and like the Captain said, they focused exclusively on Warden, Douhet, Mitchell and a few others.
Possibly the most brilliant strategist the Air Force has ever produced, John Boyd, was never mentioned, even though he wrote critical air doctrine (Energy-Manueverability) and land doctrine (OODA loop).
I did a quick check and none of the mission statements at the Service Academies mention winning the nation's wars. Maybe this is an old fashioned thought, but isn't that the idea behind the military and their academies?
Keith Boyea, USAFA 2002
I wonder troll18: you don't suppose having never discovered a mission statement on winning the Nation's wars was because it's not a question of winning but of managing our wars, rather than there being an unavoidable obligation or requirement for winning?
What is our definition of war anyway? We've war on crime, drugs, world wide terrorism, poverty, etc?
Tyrtaois,
Great questions--I sort of fall into the category of: we shouldn't go to war unless we give soilders the resources necessary to win, and winning requires a definite, achievable end point. If some part of that is missing, then we shouldn't go to war.
A lot of the answers to your questions are left up to the politicians, not the military and certainly not the military academies.
For those that haven't had the pleasure of visiting the Air Academy at Colorado Springs, that's the cathedral that they call a chapel, pictured above. It's visible from I-25, and it always reminded me of a missile battery, symbolic of the strategic center of the service.
When you consider the nature of offensive air war, a Warrior/Battlemind focus on kinetic victory might trend towards Dr. Strangelove, the Sum of All Fears, or Wild Fire.
In 'The Fog of War' documentary, MacNamarra quotes his boss Gen. Lemay as telling him, 'if we lose, we'll be tried as war criminals' for unrestricted air war on Japanese cities.
Thank god WW3 was mostly a patient, cold war, that young Elvis and Colin Powell didn't have to fight Soviet tanks at the Fulda Gap until the tac nukes came in 'danger close'.
Re F16; the lumpy strike-bomber that the Israeli's keep feeding steroids to is not the sleek Falcon that the Thunderbirds show off.
troll18--perhaps the idea behind not including winning the nation's wars in the various mission statements is the fact that it comes inherent with the oath to "support and defend the Constitution". One would hope that winning wars would work in congruence with this oath, otherwise there might be far more important reforms needed at much higher levels than just the Academies.
There is now a lot more talk about winning wars at the Air Force Academy. In twenty days I will graduate with a degree in Military Strategic Studies. I have read Nagl. I have read Corum and Johnson's Airpower in Small Wars. I have read Barnett, Gray, and Rosen. Some of us are getting an education in contemporary theory. The Department of Military Strategic Studies now has two courses in the core curriculum, with talk of expanding that. Gone are the days of the MAS degree (Military Arts and Science, or "Movies And Stories"). John Boyd was considered as an option for the class of 2012's exemplar, a deceased officer to serve as a role model for the class as it proceeds.
But I must admit that Captain Reach's assessment of the Air Force culture and the disappointment at having to go to the other services for innovative thought still echoes my own experience. Boyd was discouraged as an exemplar by the permanent party, perhaps because of his maverick persona.
And to Mr. (Captain?) Boyea: the mission of the Air Force as a whole is to "fly, fight and win...". Perhaps USAFA's mission could use an update, but educating, training, and inspiring seems more in line with its actual goals than winning wars directly.
Again, as with my previous comments, this is only meant to add another perspective. My friends and fellow MSS majors have filled four walls of whiteboard with our ideas on how the Academy could be more effective. I cannot agree more with Captain Reach on the point that reform of some sort is needed. I hope to come back as an instructor as soon as I can get a postgrad and help continue the process.
C1C Hicks
P.S.> F-16 unimpressive? Maybe. And for some reason I find the F-4 that sits opposite the 16 much more attractive. But I believe the point of the Terazzo static displays aren't to showcase our aerial might (we've got a Thud on a third corner). They're more for the heritage.
I will not question Capt Boyea’s perceptions, but I will question his facts. If he was at USAFA from 1998 – 2002, then he certainly had more than “…one, maybe two classes on Air Power doctrine.” As a sophomore, Cadet Boyea would have had an entire semester (42 lessons) on the Foundations of a military professional. This was a broad course that discussed the uniqueness of the military profession/officer, an introduction to the major military theorists, and finally an introduction to the application of airpower on the modern battlefield. As a junior, Cadet Boyea would have taken a 4.5 semester hours course (that’s 63 lessons) on the Foundations of Military and Aerospace Power. This course encompassed early military and aerospace power theory and doctrine and moved on to modern aspects of aerospace power to include operations in the air, information (what we now call cyberspace), and space operating domains. Here he certainly would have received more than 2 lessons on air power doctrine. Finally, as a senior, he would have taken another full semester course on Joint and Multinational Operations which examined U.S. military doctrine and employment concepts as mandated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction for all pre-commissioning sources. C1C Hicks aptly describes the current focus of the Military Strategic Studies at USAFA, I just wanted to provide an historical clarification of Capt Boyea’s comment.
I should have said courses instead of classes, as that's what I mean. I guess the answer is around 3 courses, or 10.5 hours on military strategy out of approximately 150 semester hours of coursework.
And I'm not a captain anymore--the Air Force's brilliant strategy of trading people for F-22s forced (allowed?) me to exit the military earlier than I had planned.
What frippery! 'Fighting wars' (shorthand for 'conduct prompt and sustained combat operations...' of Service mission statements) is what the military does. 'Winning wars' is the desired outcome. The essential nature of football is blocking and tackling, not cheering after victory. This seems so basic that one wonders that adults would discuss it.
What should be discussed is the very existence of the Air Force. It's a Service based on the truth of Giulio Douhet's thesis, so far never proven, never demonstrated. Now even more cluttered with space and cyberspace, the Air Force has become this diffuse collection of non-unique capabilities sustaining a questionable culture made more so by its well-publicized infiltration by Christian Crazies. If the Air Force did not exist, we would not invent it. Maybe time now to un-invent it.
I've heard that football is scored by touchdowns and goal-kicks, not blocks and tackles. The AA Falcons are known for strategic (ie tricky) use of the southern sun in their thin-air home-field offense and defense. Victory for the home team is sweet, but I suggest career officers should study the experience of King Pyrrhus, a winning general of late Greek period, who met congratulations with "One more such victory and I shall be undone." And he was.
Douhet air power theories, while ahead of the weapons of his time, were vindicated by the Pacific war, where fleets were sunk and the home islands defeated by air delivered weapons. Even without an A-bomb, fuel-air and thermobaric overpressure weapons, within reach of 1939 chemists and 1945 aircraft, are now capable of destroying any city and disorganizing the survivors beyond any ability to sustain conventional national warfare. Ballistic missiles go far beyond Douhet's thesis that the defense will be ineffective, with an offense able to penetrate to any distance, destroying a surface target of any size within minutes of launch. No further proof needed, thank you.
The technology, systems, theory, practice, philosophy and morality of 3D/deep-orbital cloud penetrating hyperspeed thermonuclear war is so different from surface or maritime experience or scale. I can't imagine not having a dedicated national institution for aerospace officer development, whatever demons may need to be excorcised at the air academy, or in weapons procurement cults.
All that said, an artificial service-turf rule denying fixed-wing close air support (A10) to Army aviation is criminally stupid, and should be fixed post-haste.
good word
Also, I am told that it is an F-15 in that photo, not an F16.
Best,
Tom
Mr Ricks is damaging his credibility
The article is clearly about the Academy, however the Academy is only referenced in the last quote of this article. The pilot in question laments "PME", which is an acronym referencing "Professional Military Education", which happens on numerous occasions once one is an officer (ASBC, SOS, etc).
Reform is almost always necessary in some form or another and I agree with that point. But Mr Ricks tends to knock the Academy at every opportunity, even when the Academy isn't relevant. This severely damages his credibility.
My father attended the USAFA from 1982 to 1986. He says it was the best thing he has ever done in his life. As far as cadets being taught about Warfare itself, well he said about one third of his accedemics were dedicated to this. Mostly how the past (Strategies, History, Tactics, etc.) has shaped warfare. But he also said they can teach you about the past, but only a small portion of this training can really be adapted to what happens in the future, as the world of warfare is always changing, he says in the military the best way to "really" learn how to fight is on the job! That said any military academy has certain drawbacks in its education. Why is the USAFA always complained about, I guess its just because the guys in New York and Maryland are just more faithful to themselves, and their school. (Also yeah those two institutions have been around MUCH LONGER).
F-16 is still a very good weapon. Its 30 years old yes, but upgrades have made it a new aircraft. Also most of our enemies (and allies as well) have nothing even close to comparable to the Falcon. And that's the biggest most important thing.
But yes the aircraft in the picture is an F-15!
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