Maliki will never control everything because the govermment is divided and dysfunctional. As the official points out, what he has been able to do is create grass root support through the Tribal Support Councils, something his Dawa party never had. Not mentioned is the fact that he has also effectively portrayed himself as an Arab nationalist. The desire for a strong central government is popular because Iraqis have gone through so much chaos. He is also pushing the Kurds, which is popular amongst Arabs for a whole bunch of reasons. His military operations, although mixed overall, success against the Sadrists, not so much against insurgents, gained popular support as well because it was the first time the government took strong action.

The problems, he only won majorities in two provinces and will not be able to put together a new ruling coalition after the parliamentary elections to solidify power. Maliki's State of Law list only won majorities in Baghdad and Basra. In Basra he still hasn't been able to put together a coalition to rule, and his efforts in the rest of the south have not always been to his favor. He's been trying to put together a new coalition to run in the parliamentary elections, but it hasn't worked out in the provinces, so it's unlikely to work come the next vote. Even if he was able to put together the Sadrists, ex-PM Jaafari's Reform party, ex-PM Allawi's Iraqi National List, plus the Sunni Iraqi National Dialogue Front, plus his STate of Law/Dawa he STILL wouldn't have a majority in parliament.

He can still throw his weight around. He can still use the power of the purse. He can still use the security forces. That's probaby enough for Iraq right now. He still won't be able to push through important legislation like an oil law or anything like that so politically it'll be continued deadlock.
musingsoniraq.blogspot.com

1. I know this post is about inter Shia rivalries, but what has happened to Saddam's officers? I've read that the Sunni have definitely lost the civil war, but what's a former Republican Guard officer with a loathing for Maliki up to these days?

2. Which is a better fighting force? A Maliki special operations force or a unit comprised of Sunni ex republican guards or Kurdish Pesh Merga? Anyone know?

A lot of former Saddam era officers and NCOs have been brought back into the new Iraqi army. They are severely lacking in leadership so they've brought in thousands. The last count I saw from Jan. 09 said that 96,961 NCOs and officers had been re-integrated. That included 1,321 generals.

There are also several thousand ex-officers who are in exile as well. Maliki was trying to have some reconciliation with them at the beginning of the year as an attempt to forge an alliance with the Iraqi Dialogue Front, but the other Shiite parties made him back off.

musingsoniraq.blogspot.com

Does anyone have any more details to flesh in the characterization of the Interior Minister as an emerging political rival? What power does the Interior Minister wield and how are his forces meshing with Maliki's at this point?

Here's the source on the number of former NCOs and officers brought back into the army

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jan09/Default.aspx

Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani formed Iraqi Constitutional Party in June 2005. When he took his current post he said he resigned as party leader. Of the 14 provinces that held provincial elections in Jan. 09 the Constitution party only won 3 seats in Wasit tying it for last. I don't think he's much of a rival. Maliki has got bigger fish to fry with the Supreme Council and the Kurds. Plus the Interior Ministry actually doesn't have that much control over individual units. Most of the neighborhood police are locally recruited, there are thousands that have not been trained, and they are much more responsive to the local leaders rather than Baghdad.

As for the original post that said Maliki doesn't have much control over the security forces, I would beg to differ. Army units cannot move without his orders. He has to okay the promotion or appointment of all top officers, etc. That doesn't mean that they would all rally around him, but he has inserted himself into the Defense Ministry and each unit.

musingsoniraq.blogspot.com

Same roads, same outcomes.
Look folks, it's time for a paradigm shift. All these are tunnel looking action plans. Need to look at the big picture. There is no "ism" that will rise above. The only answer is no answer. This must play out. We may not like what we will see in the next operation period, but we must let it fall........

It's a dying patient on life support. As we keep the therapies going, other patients are dying in the region. Our doctors (commanders) can only do so much.

Following Iraqi history, it is always important to watch three things:

1. The Kurds. History suggests to expect them to join the more troublesome side of a quarrel at just the wrong time. They are not afraid to fight or die, sometimes in service of an effort with very slim odds of success. Still, for Iraq,they are like the moon circling the Earth, and create the tides...

2. The Leaders in Exile. Challengers to Iraq's existing government historically work from outside---shias from Iran, and sunnis from the western side. Who is where, and what are they doing now (including what reach they have inside, and to influential outside parties)? Sounds like reconciliation is not going anywhere in a hurry, nor broad based coalition building, so what recourse will the exiles take?

3. Service Delivery. Among all the talk of high end foreign policy, dictators stayed in power and good graces largely because of the ability to deliver increased benefits and services to people...a major underlying factor in the provincial elections. Today's Iraq is increasingly urbanized in large, complex cities. Government and political party progress in economic and service delivery, amidst an on-going drought and declining economy/budget, must be strong enough to offset public concern for progress or the ball is in play, and the above two factors become significant variables.