Thursday, April 23, 2009 - 1:11 PM

Jesse Sloman, a smart young Tufts student who wants to be a Marine officer was inspired by this blog to do some research. He found this paper, and wrote this summary:
After some research, I was able to find a Naval Postgraduate School master's thesis entitled: "AN ANALYSIS OF OFFICER ACCESSION PROGRAMS AND THE CAREER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. MARINE CORPS OFFICERS."
The study (attached at the bottom of this email) was published by a Turkish Army officer named Levent Ergun in 2003. It would seem to largely vindicate your arguments (I realize that the USMC has a unique officer training model which is more conducive to minimizing an Academy advantage than the other services).
Maj. Ergun used data from "more than 28,000 Marines who entered between FY 1980 and 1999" to analyze performance at TBS, fitness reports up to the O-4, and promotion rates. Although the study is too complex to summarize here, a number of the findings directly relate to your argument:
1) Comparing TBS class standing percentiles by commissioning source reveals that NROTC graduates have a higher mean than USNA graduates (54.8% vs. 53.5%). OCC and PLC accessions fare the worst, while former enlisted have the highest means. (see Table 4.12 on pg. 65)
2) 10 year retention rates marginally favor USNA graduates (56.2% vs. 55.3%) but the difference is very small. Prior enlisted have significantly higher retention rates, while PLC/OCC have the lowest retention rates. (see Table 4.13 on pg. 66)
3) Looking at Performance Index (PI) and promotion rates muddies the water somewhat, but it does show that there is little difference between USNA and NROTC graduates, certainly not enough difference to support a purely cost-based argument that USNA graduates are "worth" their cost relative to NROTC graduates.
For myself, as a participant in the PLC program, the most interesting finding -- and one that is somewhat worrying -- is that PLC/OCC grads. have statistically worse performance at TBS and in subsequent evaluations in the fleet. Perhaps the Marine Corps would be best served moving from its OCS-heavy model of officer accessions to one more in line with the other services; one that relies mostly on ROTC and Academy graduates (or purely on ROTC graduates). However, the uniqueness PLC/OCC model -- particularly the freedom it allows candidates during their undergraduate years--is a serious incentive for individuals like myself who did not find ROTC's regimentation appealing. I don't think it is a coincidence that many of the "elites" commenting on your blog are joining the Marine Corps via PLC. Andrew Exum has also revealed on Abu Muqawama that he generally advises undergraduates to go the PLC route.
Of course statistics aren't everything. Considering that Ergun's study ends in 1999, one wonders if the relative increase in "elite" candidates through PLC/OCC in the post-9/11 years has altered the conclusions that held true during the 80s and 90s. Either way, I though you would find the study helpful as this discussion of the value of the Academies continue."
It's not about the Army, but it's a start. Anyone got more data?
John Moore/Getty Images
For Rent/Sale...Old Army Major...Used to tough conditions and decisions...Used to leading large groups of men that are indigenious and do not speak english as a primary language.....Doesn't like to work in an office...Prefers outdoors....Will work for food. Will travel...
As my mortar platoon sergeant replied....
"I dont know about renting but I will follow. Ive heard of that man. teaching many things but learning the whole time he spoke. Once I visited this man and we traveled to the places that normal men fear. It was there that we all became what we did not know and at the end will be who we are. If you see this man tell him I miss him and I love him and THANKS........BLK7 out"
As my Vietnam buddy replied...
"You should consider trying out as an old hippie, not the new kind mind ya. No sir, rather the old variety where there may well be a man of substance behind the hair.
You my friend would look bitchin' with some dreads.
A little patchoulli and your off to see the Dead, with me and the kids..."
I think Dr. Seuss wrote a book about it entitled "Oh, the places you'll go."
v/r
Major Michael Few
I've been following the Academy discussion and keep coming back to two questions:
1.) Should Academy grads be different than those commissioned by other sources?
2.) What should we expect out of Academy grads?
I think the answer to #1 is yes. My anecdotal experience is that they are different--they are worse. I don't think that's the kind of difference we should be expecting.
As far as number 2, it is probably hard to agree on anything, but if we expect the same thing out of them as we do ROTC grads, then why have the Academies at all? Shouldn't we expect more because we pay more for them?
Keith, USAFA 2002
To draw a conclusion from TBS graduation rank is manipulating the data to suit the claims of the report's writer, because the company that most USNA grads go to consists of 2/3-3/4 Naval Academy graduates so the pool they compete in for rank is filled mainly with their classmates from Navy. Some USNA grads will either go early or late to TBS because they feel it is easier to get a coveted MOS (military occupational specialties) like infantry in a different company, where they are not competing with their former peers from the Academy. Oliver North stated that he did this in the book, The Nightingale's Song. But as a Marine from USNA I am little bit biased in this whole argument.
I think the Academies are a useful tool for developing leaders to fight our country's wars. They develop a cadre of offiers that have been prepared specifically to be leaders and to fight for four years, a time that allows them grow into their future roles and responsibilities. If I had more time I would write a more passionate defense of why the schools are valuable and necessary, but I am in Iraq and have more important things to do.
",,,,capable...but much more...John Paul Jones..
Dear Nik:
To "I think the Academies are a useful tool for developing leaders to fight our country's wars."Add...."while in the crush of such wars are able to maintain the integrity of their oaths, the veracity of their speech and loyalty to the principles of the Nation incorporated in upholding our laws and treaties." Now you have both necessity and value.
Our shipmates have been broadly quiet and may be pliable while the heritage of James Stockdale has been disgraced.
May you remain well in that crucible "east of Eden" and Godspeed. Thank you for your contribution to our national security.
Mustang officers were the strongest, best retained officers, within the limits of the study as described.
So instead of all that bizarre hazing of plebes and doolies, have the academy applicants put in 2 years (the old draft hitch) in the ranks. Then power thru the freshmen-sophmore academics (sharing academy space with standout enlisted applicants) before serving as a junior officer. Having survived 4 years of active service, ensigns and LT's can rejoin the cadet corp (with another class augmentation of non-coms having AA degree minimum), for a career track academy degree. Some officer-students could opt for a university BA in lieu of the Academy degree, and those officers opting out at the end of their hitch wouldn't be taking up space in upper-division classes.
Basically that's the JC-university model that has proved relatively effective in reducing undergrad drop-out costs at the state U's. Military discipline and weapons training would be delivered in the traditional boot-basic manner. Why train someone as an officer, if a seargent wouldn't trust him with live ammo on a target range?
Re the service command colleges, I suggest that whatever gnostic secrets the command colleges confer on how this country's governance really works, that should be core curriculum for all citizens.
As I began PoliSci PhD studies (a few years ago) at a Big 10 school, I met an Army major pursuing an MA to advance his career. Originally, he enlisted and later attended OCS and had seen action in both of America's Iraq wars.
I learned two things from this man relevant to the current discussion: 1) he said he'd never admit it to them, but he envied Westpoint grads for being sharp, experiencing a unique education, and generally "knowing their stuff" and 2) the utility of most civilian advanced degrees to those filling or leading boots on the ground: none. Most grad programs and their faculties disdain policy relevance. Perhaps the military academies and their war college cousins are hidebound and less effective than they should be, but I am skeptical their jobs can or should be outsourced to major universities with opaque research agendas.
Axe the gentlemen officer program!
Similar to what Walking Wounded suggested, everybody begins with at least 2 years active enlisted service. They then follow either a commissioned, warrant, or non-commissioned career path in accordance with their own professional goals and talents.
The idea I floated was addressed towards getting better officers out of the academies, improving retention of those who do come thru those military seminaries.
As to the overarching question of getting more better officers, the country and the services should willing to take the young folks as they come, and that means a variety of educational paths prior to OCS. It's not clear to me that a person who already has a BA, MA or PhD should be humping an 80 lb pack for two years, unless his ambition is to lead infantry, a la Petraeus or Chesty Puller.
Some folks are capable of HS graduation at 15, getting thru MIT or Berkely at 20. Now maybe it's a waste for them to be wearing the uniform, but I'm not sure the USAF is wise to decline any service offered, based on a one-size-fits-all program. Nice to have a few rocket scientists in the strategic forces; ditto for infowar, psyops, intel, signals/comm, etc.
There were too many officers (and civilians) willing to butt heads, lose hmv's and tough it out in 2004, instead of figuring out (and informing congress) that we weren't really killing the same 5000 dead-enders over and over. Just because the SecDef says it, that doesn't transform misinfo into doctrine.
The problem hasn't been lack of willing hooah from the new academy graduates. The failure's been in lack of Aha! and willingness to speak up and/or listen at the top.
... a USMC academy
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