Iraq: the unraveling? (II)

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Tuesday, March 31, 2009 - 4:10 PM Share

I checked in yesterday when retired Col. Pete Mansoor, who was Gen. Petraeus's executive officer in Iraq during most of the surge. I had been told that Mansoor had warned in Baghdad that signing the Status of Forces Agreement could lead the United States into fighting the Sunni "Awakening" units also known as the "Sons of Iraq," or SOI.

Mansoor, who is now retired and a professor of history at Ohio State, confirmed in a note that he did indeed express such a concern. Here is his note, which I am quoting with his permission:

As I recall what I said was that the status of forces agreement would put U.S. forces into a position where they could not intervene to stop the government of Iraq from attacking the SOI. If the Iraqi Security Forces needed help once engaged against the SOI, U.S. forces could be drawn into the fight against the very people who helped us turn the war around.
I certainly hope this doesn't come to pass, but given what we've just seen happen in Baghdad, the possibility is disturbing.

I think it is significant that one of the people closest to Petraeus in Iraq during the surge foresaw the kind of fighting we have saw in the streets of Baghdad over the weekend. (Private note to "PW in DC": I also think former regime elements who have been dumping on Joe Klein might want to start composing notes of apology.)

Along the same lines, Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group, who knows Iraq, warns how things could fall apart if U.S. troops are withdrawn without more sustainable political deals:

Absent the glue that US troops have provided, Iraq's political actors are likely to fight, emboldened by a sense they can prevail, if necessary with outside help. Obama should make sure that the peace he leaves behind is sustainable, lest Bush's war of choice turn into his war of necessity.

Meanwhile, Ali Wyne of the Carnegie Endowment sends this insightful analysis weighing the success or failure of the surge. I quote it with his permission:

Conventional wisdom holds that the United States is shifting its focus back to Afghanistan now that the war in Iraq has been won. The suggestion -- which has, by now, been internalized in mainstream discourse -- that the surge of American troops into Baghdad has been a success is dubious on two grounds.
First, there are factual difficulties. A September 2008 report by researchers at UCLA found that "violence has declined in Baghdad because of intercommunal violence that reached a climax as the surge was beginning." They concluded, therefore, that "the surge has had no observable effect, except insofar as it has helped to provide a seal of approval for a process of ethno-sectarian neighborhood homogenization that is now largely achieved." That is, the surge occurred after the tinderbox that it was intended to eliminate had mostly been defused. Furthermore, according to a recent wire story, the apparent stability in Baghdad results from "fear," which "keeps the peace."
Second, there are moral considerations. Approximately five million Iraqis, or 20% of the Iraqi population, have been displaced from their homes; Human Rights Watch reports that "no structure exists to meet [their] humanitarian needs." According to recent statistics, 88% of Iraqis do not have access to electricity; 70% do not have access to clean water (a new report found that 36% of Baghdad's drinking water is unsafe); and 43% live on less than a dollar a day. One in five Iraqi women suffers physical violence, and one in three Iraqi children is hungry. It strains credulity to suggest that victory has been achieved in Iraq even though the country's social services apparatus is dysfunctional, most Iraqis cannot access basic provisions, and the rule of fear substitutes for the rule of law. Because the surge "is not linked to any sustainable plan for building a viable Iraqi state," concluded a respected analyst, "the recent short-term gains [in stability] have come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq."
The dichotomous debate over Iraq -- one side supports (even if tacitly) indefinite occupation on the grounds that a full-scale civil war will erupt if the United States withdraws prematurely; the other supports a phased withdrawal of American troops from Iraq on the grounds that the occupation is increasingly a strategic liability - excludes moral considerations. Members of the former camp should ask themselves: is it right for the United States to stay in Iraq if it does not accord at least as much priority to the welfare of Iraqis as it does to its own strategic interests? Members of the latter camp should ask themselves: given how greatly Iraqis have suffered as a result of the war, is it principled for the United States to abdicate its humanitarian obligations to them under the banner of "ending the occupation?" Although each camp claims the moral high ground, the reality is that they both avoid the considerations that must underlie any moral posture.

Read Iraq: the unravling? (Part I)

ALI YUSSEF/AFP/Getty Images

EXPLORE:IRAQ THE UNRAVELING, BUSH ADMINISTRATION, IRAQ, MILITARY, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

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GREGSANDERS

4:45 PM ET

March 31, 2009

We should treat the Iraqis as if they have moral agency

Members of the latter camp should ask themselves: given how greatly Iraqis have suffered as a result of the war, is it principled for the United States to abdicate its humanitarian obligations to them under the banner of "ending the occupation?" Although each camp claims the moral high ground, the reality is that they both avoid the considerations that must underlie any moral posture.

The idea that we need to stay in Iraq out of our humanitarian obligation to them treats the Iraqi people as if they were wards of America incapable of making their own decisions. The Status of Forces debate and the hard withdrawal deadline it set shows that they think we should best fulfill our moral obligation by other means.

This is not to say that there are not individual Iraqis who helped the coalition that we have a special obligation to. In those cases however, immigration and not occupation is the proportional remedy.

DON BACON

5:44 PM ET

March 31, 2009

SOFA

If Iraq bites Obama because of a lack of political reconciliation it is partly because of his own past actions when Obama/Biden last fall kept the Senate from debating the Strategic Framework Agreement part of the SOFA, the political part. A House committee considered it, but the Senate did not, which was a violation of the US Constitution regarding treaties. If it had been considered and debated by the Senate then we would have ended up with a better agreement (or no agreement) and political matters would have been (or should have been) considered. As it was, it was strictly a Pentagon affair so we are left with a military mess.

The fact that the SOFA is not a treaty and is merely an executive agreement suited both Bush and also Obama, who is now not restrained by a treaty (law). Gates has been talking about how the US and Iraq might change the terms, and of course we should expect an unending US military presence in Iraq.

In general, allowing the Pentagon to conduct foreign affairs is a recipe for continuing regional instability, which of course suits the Pentagon just fine.

MOTOWN67

7:23 PM ET

March 31, 2009

The U.S, Baghdad and SOI

Before the SOFA was signed Maliki went after some of the SOI and the U.S. did little. Beginning in May 2008 the government arrested several SOI leaders in Baghdad claiming they were connected to terrorism and the insurgents. Then in July when Maliki launched an offensive in Diyala he tried to break up or co-opt all the SOI there. In Diyala the Islamic Party had used their positions in the provincial council to co-op the SOI first to give them a larger base that would serve them in the provincial elections. During the government offensive, Maliki shut down all of the SOI offices in Baquba, arrested and ran off almost all of their leaders, and then set up Tribal Support Councils there that offered them direct access to jobs with the security forces. Later when control of the SOI were transferred to Iraqi control the government offered them a larger percentage of jobs in the security forces than the 20% Maliki offered to them across the country. In both Baghdad and Diyala the U.S. tried to mediate, but did not stop the government's actions. Maliki has been very effective at this carrot and stick policy with the SOI and other groups in the country. musingsoniraq.blogspot.com

WALKING WOUNDED

8:18 PM ET

April 1, 2009

the moral high ground...

in our war of choice is a bit of an oxymoron, a mixing of military and ethical parlance. Is morality a tactical advantage, like works on the military crest? Or is humility the missing first step on that thorny road to redemption? Aquinas was reacting to wars between 'christian' princes and barons. Napolean thought that God favored the stronger regiments, enhanced by the emporer's standardized cannon parts and rounds.

I noted in the Wehner-Klein kerfuffle that Killcullen (and others in mid-07) were still putting quotes around 'what I would call the "surge"...'.

Whatever the Petraeus/Odierno counteroffensive was called, by who and when, and however it 'worked', the Maliki gov't was not in favor of measures that halted their push West of the Green Zone. A view that it was a 'surge' to stop Shiite preeminence is supported by the terms Team Maliki wrung from Bush in the Withdrawal/SOFA. Winding US brigades back from the capitol and thereby jeopardizing a successful population security mission is the Shiite price for legal cover and 'a decent interval'.

US priorities of 2008 provincial elections were delayed until we signed off on Withdrawal. Maliki's promise to ease Petraeus' Awakening nightmare by integrating more Sunni into the ISF was likewise delayed, and seems on the verge of breach. Frack morality, this is politics by other means.

As Bush was warned, Petraeus is operating without a reserve, and now publicly committed to deploying his Iraq rotation forces to the Pashtun Kush. Time is on the side of a renewed push for Shiite victory.

NAGEE76

3:32 AM ET

April 2, 2009

If only Iraqis could read this ...

I wish that average Iraqis could read this blog and observe for themselves that they are seen as nothing more than an inconvenience that needs to be dealt with..

Bush was warned, Petraeus was warned.. blah blah and more blah. Where were you geniuses when 60% of the people in this country were "supporting" the war in 2003? let me guess.. you were either scared or mislead like innocent lambs or were just plain afraid to voice your opinions.

After the enormous mistakes made, the surge was the only right thing that Bush did. Commentators here have an abject myopia of the Sunni Shia relationship in Iraq. They are more than the "Sons of Iraq". They have undergone some of the worst violence/bloodbaths without breaking up into different states - heck, they had a pretty darned good election a mere 2 months back where Sunnis came out and participated in HUGE numbers.

And all that you can find here is bitching and moaning about how the surge really meant nothing and was useless. There is no mistaking that Iraq has a real hard road ahead but quit your crocodile tears for their humanitarian crisis.

You were the same people who wanted to wash your hands off the Iraqi blood and surrender the country to Iran and Syria back in 2006 without caring a whit for the consequences. And now we are supposed to listen to your dire warnings of "unraveling".

There are risks associated with every thing - surge opponents called for surrendering the Iraqi nation state to the Iranian Govt (that has worked exceeeeeedingly well for the Lebanese, hasnt it) and leave the country within a year. They are all worried about Iraq unraveling.

QUIT the charade already.

J THOMAS

6:03 AM ET

April 3, 2009

Where were you geniuses when

Where were you geniuses when 60% of the people in this country were "supporting" the war in 2003? let me guess.. you were either scared or mislead like innocent lambs or were just plain afraid to voice your opinions.

I was speaking out the best I could. Various people said I was just a naysayer, that it would be an easy victory. We'd be down to 50,000 troops in 6 months.

Where were you then? Were you one of those guys saying it would be an easy victory and we'd have peaceful bases in 6 months?

You were the same people who wanted to wash your hands off the Iraqi blood and surrender the country to Iran and Syria back in 2006 without caring a whit for the consequences.

Do you suppose that iran or syria *want* iraq? You think they want to take our place as occupiers? Dream on, bub.

So anyway, our military has been warning us for a couple of years that we have to have a big drawdown in iraq so our soldiers can get sufficient training and rest. This hasn't been any sort of secret. If iraq needs us to keep high levels of troops there, well we can't. We can keep low levels of troops there supposing they can defend themselves at those levels.

Whatever you think we ought to do, whatever resolve you think we ought to demonstrate, this is what we can do.

So think it out. We have to pull out a lot of troops. If things improve enough that the remaining troops can handle the problems, then great. If things improve enough that the remaining troops can defend themselves without their buddies, then they can stay in the frying pan. If things heat up again after we pull out most of the troops, then the remaining troops have to jump out of the frying pan.

Those are our choices. Oh, there's the other choice, to pull out the last troops before it gets that bad.

But hanging in there isn't one of our choices. We either leave limited troops in iraq, probably hostage to the shia army, or we pull everybody out.